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[G.R. No. 167621.� June 6, 2005]
VICTORIA EXPORTS & IMPORTS vs. PHILEXCEL
THIRD DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 6 2005.
G.R. No. 167621 (VICTORIA EXPORTS & IMPORTS, INC., represented by its President, MANUEL R. STA. CRUZ vs. PHILEXCEL INDUSTRIAL PARK, INC., represented by its General Manager, IAN PACKHAM.)
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals' resolutions [1] cralaw dated 03 February 2005 and 30 March 2005, which respectively dismissed petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 81370 for failure to file its appellant's brief within the extended period granted it for the purpose, and denied its motion for reconsideration.
On 05 February 1999, petitioner Victoria Exports & Imports, Inc. and respondent PhilExcel Industrial Park, Inc. a corporation engage in the business of sub-leasing its property within the Clark Special Economic Zone at Pampanga, entered into a sub-lease agreement covering respondent's Building 04 (3) at the Mitchell Highway 1961st Area, Clark Special Economic Zone, to be used by the petitioner as its warehouse.
As agreed, the lease shall be for a term of two (2) years commencing on 01 February 1999 at a monthly rental of US$900.00. Under the agreement, petitioner was to pay a non-interest bearing security deposit of US$2,700.00, and a rental deposit of US$2,700.00, both to be immediately due upon the signing of the sub-lease contract. Forthwith, petitioner was given possession and control of the building.
Petitioner, however, failed to pay the stipulated security and rental deposits from the time it took possession of the building.� Worse, it even failed to pay despite demand, the agreed rental for the following month of March, 1999, prompting respondent to terminate the sub-lease agreement.
Upon receipt of the notice of termination, petitioner settled its unpaid rentals, with a promise to give the stipulated security and rental deposits.� Respondent then allowed petitioner to continue occupying the leased premises.
Thereafter, petitioner made a partial payment of the security deposit in the amount of US$ 1,945.00, leaving a balance of US$755.00.
Later, however, petitioner again defaulted in the payment of its rentals for the months of May to July, 1999, and likewise failed to give the promised rental deposit of US$ 2,700.00 as well as the balance of the security deposit of US$755.00, compelling respondent to address a demand letter to petitioner requiring it to pay until 30 June 1999.� Despite said demand, however, there was no compliance by the petitioner.� Hence, respondent terminated anew the sub-lease agreement and declared forfeited any of petitioner's advance rentals and security deposit, following which respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court at Angeles City a complaint for a sum of money with damages against petitioner.
In its answer, petitioner explained that it encountered cash flow problems due to its inability to collect its receivables.� It added that it never intended to disregard respondent's demand but is only requesting for a correct statement of account of its rental obligation, excluding therefrom the security and rental deposits which were allegedly waived by respondent.
In a decision dated 6 August 2003, [2] cralaw the trial court rendered judgment for respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent] PhilExcel Industrial Park, Inc. and against the [petitioner] Victoria Exports and Imports, Inc., ordering the latter to pay:
1.� The amount of US$2,475.00 which is equivalent to P99,000.00
(US$2,475.00 x P40.00/US$1.00) representing the unpaid rentals as actual
damages;
2.� The amount equivalent to 10% of the total amount due as and by way of attorney's fees; and
3.� The costs of suit.
The amount of P75,834.00 representing partial payment of
deposit is forfeited in favor of the [respondent] as liquidated damages.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81370.
In the herein assailed resolution dated 03 February 2005, the appellate court dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to file its appellant's brief despite the extended period previously granted to it, thus:
Considering that per report of the Judicial Records Division, no appellant's brief has been filed despite the extended period granted to appellant in the Court's Resolution dated September 30, 2004, the present appeal is dismissed (Section 1[e], Rule 50, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
SO ORDERED.
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its subsequent resolution of 30 March 2005, petitioner is now with this Court via the present recourse, principally faulting the appellate court for dismissing its appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 81370.
We DENY.
It is not disputed that petitioner was given by the appellate court an extension of thirty (30) days, or until 09 October 2004, within which to file its appellant's brief. Sadly, however, it was only on 09 February 2005, or four (4) months after the expiration of the extended period when petitioner filed its appellant's brief, giving the shallow excuse that it "was an honest mistake because (its counsel) had overlooked the said period due to his numerous court appearances and other professional commitments not to mention the preparation of equally important pleadings".
By no stretch of imagination could the alleged "numerous court appearances and other professional commitments" of its counsel ever justify petitioner's delay of four (4) months in filing its appellate's brief. It bears stressing that petitioner is no less the appellant, and that it was only at the generosity of the Court of Appeals that it was given an extension of time to file its appellant's brief. The very circumstance alone that petitioner is laboring under an extended period, would have been enough for it give serious thoughts to its duty as appellant.� The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no error in dismissing petitioner's appeal, said court having acted conformably with Section 1 [e], Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. [3] cralaw
It is of no moment that on 09 February 2005, or one (1) day before it received a copy of the appellate court's dismissal resolution of 03 February 2005, petitioner filed an omnibus motion to admit its belatedly filed brief.� It bears stressing that the extended period ended on 09 October 2004, not on 10 February 2005 when petitioner received a copy of the appellate court's resolution of 03 February 2005.� At the very least, petitioner should have verified from the Court of Appeals the status of its appeal soon after it received the notice of extension for the filing of its appellant's brief. This, petitioner never did.
As we said in numerous cases, [4] cralaw the appellant's failure to file its brief within the time given therefor results to the loss of its statutory right to appeal. So it is that in Ozaeta vs. Court of Appeals, [5] cralaw we said:
The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. More so in this case where petitioner not only neglected to file appellant's brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time for a cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.� (Emphasis supplied)
Again, in Casim vs. Flordeliza, [6] cralaw we said:
Petitioner does not deny his procedural infractions for his appeal to be considered by the Court of Appeals but seeks an indulgence from this Court for the relaxation of the rules.� Quite unfortunately, this plea is not all up to this Court for to conclude otherwise would be to fault the appellate court for duly acting in faithful compliance with the rules of procedure it has been mandated to observe. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rules 44, 46 and 50 which are designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases before the appellate court, truly cannot be ignored. The rules provide for a system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner at the prescribed time in an orderly confrontation before a judge whose authority is acknowledged. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye on and tolerate the transgressions of these rules.
A notice to file the appeal brief was received by petitioner on 22 September 1998, and he, originally, had until 06 November 1998 within which to file the appeal brief. He requested for an extension of 45 days stating in his motion of 05 November that, while his brief had been drafted, he, however, needed additional time to finalize it. The Court of Appeals granted the request and gave petitioner until 04 February 1999 to file his brief with a warning that no further extension would be given. It was several days after, or on 24 February 1999, when the brief was finally submitted on the excuse that the delay in the service and filing of appellant's brief was due to his counsel's 'oversight and belief in good faith that the motion for consolidation would be granted' by the Court of Appeals and 'that there (might) be no need to file a brief for petitioner as the proceedings in CA-G.R. CV No. 54204 could just be adopted.' It was completely wrong for petitioner to anticipate a favorable ruling on his motion. Parenthetically, the motion for consolidation itself was filed only on 03 February 1999, just a day before the last day of the extended period for filing the appellant's brief.
The appellant's brief itself could be faulted for being in contravention with Section 7 and Section 13, Rule 44, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that could justify the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1 (e), of the Rules.
It would be incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal as being merely 'harmless and trivial technicalities' that can just be discarded. As this Court so explained in Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals -
'Petitioners' plea for liberality in applying these rules in preparing Appellants' Brief does not deserve any sympathy. Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules. In People vs. Marong, we held that deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate. These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants.' (Emphasis supplied)
We now take this occasion to remind petitioner's counsel on the significance of his role as an officer of the court and as a vital instrument in the dispensation of justice.� As such, he should not neglect any legal matter entrusted to him because -
xxx. it is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client.� This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring; Rollo, p. 46, 48-49.
[2] cralaw Rollo, pp. 77-81.
[3] cralaw Rule 50, Section 1.� Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx�� xxx�� xxx
����������� (e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.
[4] cralaw E.g., Bergonia vs. Merrera, 446 Phil. 1 [2003]; Toledo, et al. vs. IAC,152 SCRA 579 [1987]; and Ragasajo vs. IAC, 153 SCRA 462 [1987].
[5] cralaw 179 SCRA 800, 803 [1989].
[6] cralaw 425 Phil. 210, 219-221 [2002].
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