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[A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 05-84-CA-J.  June 28, 2005]

BUHAYO vs. PINE

EN BANC

Sirs and Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 28 2005.

A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 05-84-CA-J (Dominador T. Buhayo, Jr. vs. Justice Danilo B. Pine.)

For consideration is the administrative complaint dated 23 November 2004, filed by Dominador T. Buhayo charging Justice Danilo B. Pine of the Court of Appeals with Gross Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to CA-G.R. SP No. 75754 entitled, "Dominador T. Buhayo v. National Labor Relation Commission, et al."

Complainant Dominador T. Buhayo, a civil engineer, had worked for Petrola International (Petrola) in Saudi Arabia for almost five (5) years, when he was terminated from work and involuntarily repatriated to the Philippines, days before his work contract was to expire.

Thereafter, complainant filed a complaint against Petrola and its placement agency, Cardinal Industries, Inc. (Cardinal), for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, service award and bonus, plus damages before the Philippine Overseas and Placement Agency (POEA). Ormont Management, Manpower and Trading Corporation (Ormont) was later on impleaded as Cardinal's successor-in-interest and exclusive agent of Petrola in the Philippines.

Petrola and Ormont were adjudged jointly and severally liable to pay the complainant the amount of $400 equivalent to the unexpired portion of his contract or its peso equivalent at the time of its payment. The complaint against Cardinal was dismissed.

Not satisfied with the decision of the POEA, complainant interposed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which dismissed the same on the ground that the POEA decision had already become final and executory. Complainant's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

On 17 November 1999, complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. For failure of therein respondents to file a comment, complainant filed on 7 January 2003 an urgent motion for early resolution of the case. Consequently, the appellate court declared the case submitted for decision on 26 February 2003. After three (3) more motions for early resolution of the petition, the Court of Appeals, on 30 September 2004, rendered its decision affirming the dismissal of the appeal by the NLRC. On 18 October 2004, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision.

Complainant asserts that despite several motions for early resolution, it took more than twelve (12) months for the respondent to arrive at a decision which is beyond the reglementary period provided by the Constitution. He further assails the Court of Appeals' failure to address the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it refused to grant the complainant overtime pay and damages. This effectively renders the petition useless and complainant's arguments therein of no account. Complainant likewise faults the Court of Appeals for retroactively applying the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 in the resolution of the petition. He claims that the incidents involved in the complaint occurred sometime in 1989, while the law became effective only in 1995. Thus, complainant ascribes gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law to herein respondent.

In his Comment dated 20 January 2005, ^[1] cralaw respondent claims that complainant cannot rightly accuse him of delay when complainant himself is guilty thereof. He points out that from the time the NLRC rendered the assailed decision, it took complainant thirteen (13) years to file a petition before the Court of Appeals. At first, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for, among other reasons, failure to show that it was timely filed; however, for one reason or another, it was reinstated on reconsideration. Respondent admits that the resolution of the case went beyond the 12-month period mandated by the Constitution. He claims, however, that despite his extraordinary efforts, the physical impossibility of clearing his docket from all cases submitted for decision prevents him from strictly complying with the Constitution. Respondent explains:

When undersigned was appointed on April 18, 2002, he had an initial caseload of 112 cases. Out of this initial caseload, as well as the other cases which were subsequently raffled to him, there were cases which were prioritized, particularly the civil cases which had counted years before they were resolved. Most of these cases were inherited from justices who have retired, and in fact were the subject of the "Zero Backlog Project" of the Court, which categorized cases submitted for decision as of 1997 and earlier as priority cases. Records will show that respondent successfully disposed of the "Zero Backlog" cases assigned to him, and then proceeded to dispose of other equally important cases which were earlier submitted for decision.

Furthermore, aside from his initial caseload, new cases were raffled and assigned to respondent and all other Justices on a daily basis. In these new cases, particularly the special cases, respondent has to issue resolutions to resolve incidents, as well as to require the parties to submit certain pleadings as may be required by the Rules of Procedure. Respondent cannot just concentrate on deciding cases, as there are urgent matters which must be resolved. It is of common knowledge that majority of the petitions for review and certiorari filed with this Court have pro forma prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction. While these prayers for the issuance of a TRO are sometimes just that, pro forma, there are meritorious cases where the respondent issued the TRO's prayed for. Respondent had to read each petition carefully in order to determine which cases are meritorious. In some cases where a TRO was issued, respondent had to schedule hearings in order to determine the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Aside from these hearings, there are also those scheduled by the other members of his division which respondent must attend.

On top of all these, respondent, as a member of a division, has to read at least twenty-four (24) more decisions penned by two (2) other Justices of said division, in order to determine whether or not he will concur to or dissent from said decisions. In like manner, he has to read and concur to or dissent from numerous resolutions penned by the other two (2) members of his division. Respondent, as records of the Court may show, also had been assigned a number of times as an Acting Member of other divisions where the regular member was on leave. In addition to reading at least twenty-four (24) decisions and numerous resolutions in his regular division, respondent had to read at least another twenty-four (24) more and numerous resolutions in the special division as acting member thereof.

In trying to accomplish all the foregoing, respondent is assigned with three court attorneys and one executive assistant. Consistent with their job description, they are assigned to review cases submitted for decision and to make recommendations thereon, as well to review newly-raffled cases, particularly those with prayers for the issuance of a TRO. While their work facilitates those of a Justice of this Court, respondent still must review each and every case to determine for himself whether or not the recommendation of a member of his staff is in accord with the Rules and the law, because at the end of the day, it will be respondent's signature which must appear after the dispositive portion of the decision or resolution.

Respondent further asseverates that at the time the case was declared submitted for decision on 06 February 2003, he still had 252 cases to resolve and that evidently, complainant's case was the 253^rd in the priority list. In as much as these cases are equally important, respondent argues that complainant cannot demand special treatment. It is for this reason that in the Resolution dated 06 February 2003, respondent noted complainant's motions for early resolution "subject to the priority of cases accorded to cases earlier submitted for resolution."

Anent complainant's claim that the Court of Appeals should have relied on its own findings and should not have relied on the findings of the NLRC, respondent, citing pertinent jurisprudence, states that as the findings of the POEA Administrator were duly affirmed by the NLRC, and the same were duly supported by substantial evidence, thus, there is no basis for reversing the findings of the POEA Administrator and the NLRC.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint, the reasons for which we find befitting to be quoted:

We are not unmindful of the congested nature of the court's docket. Thus, when the act complained of transpired, the lapses may well be considered unintentional and usual in the ordinary course of the heavy volume of the official business. According to the respondent, at the time the case was declared submitted for decision, he still had 252 cases to resolve. For this reason, when the complainant's motions for early resolution were noted, it was emphatically stated that the same is subject to the priority of cases earlier submitted for resolution. This serves as a sufficient notice to the complainant that there was numerous pending cases which respondent has to dispose of. Without tolerating respondent's conduct, we are inclined to absolve respondent from the charge of delay in the disposition of cases.

Anent the charge that respondent erred in gross ignorance of the law when he adopted the findings of facts made by the NLRC which ruled that complainant failed to establish the factual basis for overtime pay and when he retroactively applied the Migrant Worker's Act, it must be stressed that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subject to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. ^[2] cralaw

The case of De Guzman v. Pamintuan, ^[3] cralaw is worth mentioning, for in this case the Court has enunciated that an administrative action is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari.

Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complimentary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is tainted with bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.

Finding the recommendation to be in accord with the law and the facts of the case on record, the same is APPROVED. The administrative complaint against Justice Danilo B. Pine of the Court of Appeals is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Acting Clerk of Court

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