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[G.R. No. 124242.
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. CA
SECOND DIVISION
Sirs and Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
G.R. No. 124242 (San Lorenzo Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, Pablo S. Babasanta, Sps. Miguel Lu and Pacita Zavalla Lu.)
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration [1] cralaw of the Decision [2] cralaw of this Court promulgated on 21 January 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31 of San Pedro, Laguna is REINSTATED. No costs. [3] cralaw
The Motion for Reconsideration dwells on both the procedural and substantive aspects of the case.
Respondent Pablo S. Babasanta (hereinafter, Babasanta) recalls that the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by San Lorenzo Development Corporation (hereinafter, SLDC) had been previously denied in a Resolution [4] cralaw issued by the Second Division of the Court for non-compliance with a procedural requirement consisting of SLDC's failure to submit a duplicate original or certified copy of the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated 11 March 1996 denying its motion for reconsideration.
The records show that SLDC filed two motions, [5] cralaw one after the other, for the reconsideration of the Resolution dated 17 June 1996, pleading honest mistake. Both motions were denied. [6] cralaw
Undaunted, SLDC filed on 16 December 1996 a Motion for Leave to File Third Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Argument [7] cralaw (Third Motion). As if to crown its efforts, the Third Division of the Court this time granted the petitioner's Third Motion, in its Resolution [8] cralaw dated 25 August 1997, ratiocinating as follows:
The case at bar having been referred back to this Division by the Court En Banc which, by Resolution dated August 5 1997 declined to take cognizance thereof, petitioner's third motion for reconsideration was deliberated on once again. Divergent views were reiterated during the discussions-views embodying weighty considerations respecting different aspects of the case which, in the first place, caused the abortive referral thereof to the Court En Banc.
Among the views expressed was that the Division seems to have dealt with undue severity with a party's honest and harmless error, which simply consists of the inadvertent attachment to its petition for review of a certified copy of a resolution of the Court of Appeals other than the one it explicitly referred to in the body of its petition (i.e., that denying reconsideration of the decision subject of the appeal); that the mistake was an unintended one, for the petition for review categorically stated, in paragraph 3, page 6 thereof, that a certified copy of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated March 11, 1996 - denying its motion for the reconsideration of the Decision - as being appended thereto, but as it turned out, what was not a copy of the Resolution of March 11, 1996 explicitly adverted to, but a copy of another, irrelevant one; that such an unintentional mistake - which petitioner quickly sought to correct upon its discovery - should not warrant summary dismissal of the petition for review on certiorari, specially considering that the subject matter involved is of not inconsiderable value and the issues, of no little importance; that moreover, the error was a harmless one the recitals of a resolution denying reconsideration of a judgment of the Court of Appeals not being ordinarily material to a determination of the merits of an appeal therefrom.
With full realization that while it is desirable that there be consistency in ruling and due deference be accorded to routinary procedures and processes, the overriding concern of the Court should be that its judgments and orders be correct and just in the mind of the majority if not of all its Members, the Court Resolved, with two Members dissenting, that without touching on the merits of the case, the motion for reconsideration be GRANTED, the petition for review on certiorari REINSTATED, and respondents REQUIRED to comment thereon (not to file a motion to dismiss) within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution.
Babasanta filed a Motion for Reconsideration [9] cralaw to the above-quoted Resolution which the Court denied in another Resolution dated 14 October 1998 which reads as follows:
The Court deliberated on respondent Babasanta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 25, 1997 with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance the filing of the Required Comment on the Petition. The arguments therein set forth were all duly considered and weighed prior to the promulgation of the Resolution of-August 25, 1997. The petitioner's omission to attach to its petition for review on certiorari a certified copy or duplicate original of the resolution of the Court of Appeals, of which the motion for reconsideration particularly makes capital, was found, after careful study and assessment in light of the attendant circumstance, to constitute a mere "honest and harmless" one, not warranting the peremptory dismissal of the petition and the preclusion of a review of what appear to be meritorious questions involved in the case at bar. Paramount considerations of justice and equity fully justify the exercise by this Court of extraordinary power to suspend the effectivity of relevant procedural rules or to except a case from their operation.
IN VIEW THEREOF, the Court Resolved to Deny the "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 25, 1997 with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance the filing of the Required Comment on the Petition," and to REITERATE the directive in said Resolution of August 25, 1997 for respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED. [10] cralaw
After the lapse of seven (7) years since the issuance of the Resolution dated 14 October 1998, in the instant Motion for Reconsideration, Babasanta repeats his assertions that SLDC's Petition for Review on Certiorari [11] cralaw (Petition) is fraught with procedural deficiencies and entreats the Court to reconsider its Decision. He argues that the denial of SLDC's first motion for reconsideration had long become final and executory. Moreover, under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and in the case of Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, [12] cralaw second or third motions for reconsiderations are considered prohibited pleadings by the Court. And in the ordinary course of business, they are merely noted without further action. [13] cralaw Babasanta further points out the necessary votes of three members of the division was not obtained in the issuance of the Resolution dated 25 August 1997.
We are not persuaded.
It must be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Its strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever higher interest of justice so required. [14] cralaw
The prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration is justified by public policy which demands that at risk of occasional errors, judgments of court must become final at some definite date fixed by law. Procedural laws are technicalities which are adopted not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of law and justice. The rules of procedure are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. [15] cralaw
As the Court held in Mauna v. Civil Service Commission, [16] cralaw "it is within the power of Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties." [17] cralaw
The relaxation of procedural rules or saving a particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires it, should no longer be subject to cavil. [18] cralaw
Further, quoting the pertinent phrase in our Resolution dated 25 August 1997, "the Court Resolved, with two Members dissenting, that without touching on the merits of the case, the motion for reconsideration be GRANTED, the petition for review on certiorari REINSTATED," it is clear that the required number of votes was reached for its issuance.
On the substantive aspect, Babasanta
insists that contrary to the Court's findings in its Decision, the
transaction between him and the respondents Miguel Lu and Pacita
Zavalla (hereinafter, the Spouses Lu) was a contract of sale, not a contract to
sell, as evidenced by the receipt dated 20 August 1986 proving the partial
payment of the purchase price of the subject properties.
[19]
cralaw Babasanta likewise contends that the check in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 200,000.00) issued by SLDC at the instance
of the Spouses Lu and its delivery to Babasanta, but
which was refused by him, is of prime significance as it proves SLDC's recognition of Babasanta's
prior right to the subject properties. SLDC's denial
therefore of prior knowledge of the first sale to Babasanta
is untenable.
[20]
cralaw
Moreover, Babasanta asserts that a consignation or tender of payment in favor of the Spouses Lu was not necessary as he had previously tendered payment of the balance but which did not materialize due to the latter's refusal to execute a Deed of Sale in his favor. [21] cralaw Babasanta also contends that the fact that the agreement for the purchase of the subject properties was not embodied in a public instrument did not diminish its validity. [22] cralaw
Further, Babasanta puts forward that the registration of the sale in SLDC's name was made after the annotation of lis pendens in his favor. This shows that SLDC was a second buyer and negates its claim of good faith. [23] cralaw Being the first buyer and SLDC having knowledge of such prior sale, SLDC's claim of actual possession will not defeat Babasanta's superior right over the subject properties. [24] cralaw
Babasanta's contentions are without merit and his Motion for Reconsideration must be denied.
In essence, Babasanta's Motion for Reconsideration concerns issues which have been passed upon by the Court. He raises no new substantial arguments to warrant the reversal of the Court's Decision.
The Court correctly held that the transaction between Babasanta and Spouses Lu was a contract to sell and not a
contract of sale. In the Decision the Court observed that the receipt
purportedly evidencing the contrary, merely stated that Pacita
Lu accepted the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6 hectares of farm lot situated
in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
[25]
cralaw
In addition, the parties' subsequent acts support the Court's conclusion. For
one, in Babasanta's letter dated 22 May 1989 he
recognized, by repeatedly requesting the execution of the final deed of sale,
that ownership of the property would not be transferred to him until he shall
have effected full payment of its purchase price-indeed, a distinguishing
feature of a contact to sell.
[26]
cralaw
The full payment of the purchase price of the property being a positive suspensive condition in a contract to sell, the non-transfer therefore of the property to Babasanta was largely due to his fault as he failed to make the proper tender of payment and consignation of the price in court as required by law. Restating our ruling in the Decision, Babasanta's mere sending of a letter conveying his intention to pay without the accompanying payment is not a valid tender of payment. [27] cralaw The Court's disquisition on the matter in People's Industrial and Commercial Corp. v Court of Appeals, [28] cralaw citing our ruling in Adelfa Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [29] cralaw finds relevance in this regard:
The mere sending of a letter by the vendee expressing the intention to pay, without the accompanying payment, is not considered a valid tender of payment. Besides, a mere tender of payment is not sufficient to compel private respondents to deliver the property and execute the deed of absolute sale. It is consignation which is essential in order to extinguish petitioner's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price . . . . A contract to sell, as in the case before us, involves the performance of an obligation, not merely the exercise of a privilege or a right. Consequently, performance or payment may be effected not by tender of payment alone but by both tender and consignation. [30] cralaw
Babasanta calls the attention of the Court to another matter, vigorously contending that the embodiment of his transaction with the Spouses Lu was not essential to its validity. The Court feels that Babasanta may have misunderstood the part of our Decision dealing on its issue. We said therein that "the agreement between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu, though valid, was not embodied in a public instrument," [31] cralaw The execution of a public instrument evidencing the sale was only material to effect the constructive delivery of the property. As no such public document was executed nor possession of the property enjoyed by Babasanta at any time after the perfection of the sale, it follows there was no delivery, actual or constructive, to him which is essential to the transfer of ownership. Thus, even on the assumption that the contract between the parties was a sale, ownership could not have passed to Babasanta in the absence of delivery. [32] cralaw
Anent Babasanta's contention that the registration of the sale in SLDC's favor after the annotation of lis pendens evidences the latter's bad faith and affects its claim on the property, we reiterate our finding that SLDC qualifies as buyer in good faith as there was no evidence extant in the records that it had knowledge of the prior transaction to Babasanta. From the time of the execution of the deed up to the moment to transfer and delivery of possession of the land to SLDC, it had acted in good faith and the subsequent annotation of lis pendens has no effect at all on the consummated sale between SLDC and the Spouses Lu. [33] cralaw
We likewise find that the issuance of a check in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 200,000.00) payable to Babasanta,
at the instance of Pacita Lu, has no effect on the
position of SLDC as it took place after the Spouses Lu had already executed the
deed of sale in SLDC's favor.
[34]
cralaw
Even assuming that SLDC's registration of said sale had been tainted by the prior notice of the lis pendens and that this case was one of the double sale, Babasanta's claim would not prevail over that of SLDC's. If registration was done in bad faith, it is as if there was no registration at all and the buyer was first in possession of the property in good faith should be preferred. [35] cralaw "Since SLDC acquired possession of the property in good faith in contrast to Babasanta, who neither registered nor possessed the property at any time, SLDC's right is definitely superior to that of Babasanta's." [36] cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
Very truly yours.
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Dated 10 February 2005; Rollo, pp. 548-633 with annexes.
[2] cralaw Id. at 521-547.
[3] cralaw Id. at 546.
[4] cralaw Id. at 93; Dated 17 June 1996.
[5] cralaw Id. at 95-98.
[6] cralaw Id. at 122-125. In a Resolution dated 29 July 1996, the case was re-raffled between the First and Third Division; Rollo, pp. 121, 128-131; Dated 26 September 1996. See also Rollo, pp. 132-144, 163.
[7] cralaw Id. at 166-170.
[8] cralaw Id. at 232-233.
[9] cralaw Id. at 234-254.
[10] cralaw Id at 259-260.
[11] cralaw Id. at 3-92 with annexes.
[12] cralaw 254 SCRA 234 (1996).
[13] cralaw Rollo, pp. 552-553.
[14] cralaw Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76378-81, 24 September 1990, 190 SCRA 31, 39.
[15] cralaw Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 163, 173 (1997).
[16] cralaw G.R. No. 97794, 13 May 1994, 232 SCRA 388.
[17] cralaw Ibid citing Riconada Telephone Company, Inc. v. Buenviaje, 184 SCRA 701; Seri�a v Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 421; Leyte v. Cusi, 151 SCRA 496.
[18] cralaw Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 163, 174 (1997).
[19] cralaw Rollo, pp. 555-560.
[20] cralaw Id. at 560-565.
[21] cralaw Id. at 565-566
[22] cralaw Id. at 566-570.
[23] cralaw Id. at 570-572.
[24] cralaw Id. at 577-578.
[25] cralaw Decision, pp. 13-14; Id. at 533-534.
[26] cralaw Ibid.
[27] cralaw Id. at 15, 535.
[28] cralaw 346 Phil. 189 (1997).
[29] cralaw 310 Phil. 623, 649-650 (1995).
[30] cralaw 346 Phil. 189, 209 (1997).
[31] cralaw Decision, p. 18; Rollo, p. 538.
[32] cralaw Ibid.
[33] cralaw Id. at 21; id. at 541.
[34] cralaw Id. at 23; id. at 544.
[35] cralaw Id. at 24; id. at 544 citing Abarquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95843,2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 415.
[36] cralaw Id. at 545.
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