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[G.R. No. 166497.� March 28, 2005]
SANTIAGO vs. FRANCISCO
THIRD DIVISION
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 28 2005.
G.R. No. 166497 (Heirs of Pedro Santiago, namely: Menor Santiago, Trinidad Santiago and Ernesto Santiago vs. G.B. Francisco, Inc.)
Before us is this petition for review on certiorari of the August 5, 2004 decision [1] cralaw of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74896 upholding an earlier order of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, Branch 85, which dismissed, on ground of laches, petitioners' complaint for Quieting of Title, Annulment of Titles, Recovery of Possession and Damages, thereat filed by them against, among others, the herein respondent G.B. Francisco, Inc.
Involved in the suit is a parcel of land identified as Lot 85 of the Tala Estate located at Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City. Lot No. 85 which has an aggregate area of 31,127 square meters is presently subdivided into six (6) lots, namely:� Lot No. 85-A-1-B, Lot No. 85-A-C, Lot No. 85-A-D, all registered in the name of respondent G.B. Francisco, Inc. under TCT No. 105108, 1051109, 105160, respectively; Lot 85-A-1-A, registered in the names of Remedios Manzano, Dionicia de Guzman and Julia de Guzman; and�� Lots 85-A-2 and Lot 85-B, respectively covered by TCTs No. N-136898 and N-136897, both in the name of Sinco Community Corporation.
On August 31, 2001, in the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, petitioners filed against all the above-registered owners a complaint [2] cralaw for Quieting of Title, Annulment of Titles, Recovery of Possession and Damages. In their complaint, docketed in the same court at Civil Case No. Q-01 -44997 which was raffled to Branch 85 thereof, petitioners alleged that they own the entire Lot No. 85 as heirs of Pedro Santiago who was issued TCT No. 10240 therefor as early as 1947; and that anomalies attended the issuance of the defendants' titles because TCT No. 10240 remained uncancelled in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Santiago.
Of the several defendants impleaded in the complaint, only defendant, now respondent G.B. Francisco, Inc. was served with summons.
On January 7, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, [3] cralaw thereunder praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the same does not state a cause of action and the filing thereof was already barred by prescription and/or laches.
In its Order of April 29, 2002, the trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss and accordingly dismissed [4] cralaw petitioners' complaint, holding that more than fifty-five (55) years had lapsed before they filed their action "which has already prescribed":
Anent the second issue, the Court however holds that the action has prescribed. In Vda. De Cabrera vs. CA 267 SCRA 339, the Supreme Court held that "an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed of the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff of the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property; since if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to property does not prescribe." (see also Jessie Pesuena vs. Heirs of Pedro Unating, 313 SCRA 384, August 31, 1999)
It appearing that TCT No. 10240 (Annex 'A' of the complaint) in the name of Pedro Santiago has been registered on October 22, 1947 or more than fifty-five years have lapsed until the filing of the present action and considering further that plaintiffs are not in actual possession of the property because the same have been occupied by defendants herein, the period to bring the instant action has already prescribed.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74896, petitioners argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint on ground of prescription on a mere motion to dismiss and without conducting a full-blown hearing; and when the same court ruled on a factual issue by assuming that respondent G.B. Francisco, Inc. is in actual possession of the subject property.
In a decision dated August 5, 2004, [5] cralaw the Court of Appeals upheld the appealed Order of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44997 dated 29 April 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, petitioners' present recourse seeking a reversal of the appellate court's aforementioned decision and ultimately the reinstatement of their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-01 -44997.
Petitioners maintain that since they hold a subsisting Torrens title over the disputed properties, they have a cause of action against respondent to recover its possession, adding that despite the lapse of time, their cause of action has not prescribed, consistent with the doctrine that "[A]ction to recover possession of registered land does not prescribe." [6] cralaw
In a nutshell, petitioners insist that the trial court should not have dismissed Civil Case No.Q-01-44997 without first conducting a full blown trial.
The argument is specious.
In National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals [7] this Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. made the following pronouncements regarding this matter. There, we clarified that prescription can be used in a motion to dismiss if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the action had indeed prescribed:
As to the defenses of laches and prescription, they are evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both [p]arties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. Under the rule the deferment of the resolution of the said issues was, thus, in order. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. In the instant case, the issue of prescription and laches cannot be resolved on the basis solely of the complaint, xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
Here, therefore, there is only a need to examine the complaint to determine if prescription is patent on its face. The trial court found, as later affirmed by the appellate court, that in their complaint, petitioners stated that as early as 1947, a title was issued in the name of their predecessor-in-interest; that as early as 1941 TCT No. 2250 and TCT No. 2249 were issued to respondent's predecessor-in-interest. Going by the very allegations of the complaint, it is thus beyond question that a considerable number of years had elapsed before petitioners tried to enforce whatever right they may have over the subject property.
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. [8] cralaw As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. [9] cralaw
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. [10] cralaw
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale", or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. [11] cralaw In other words, public policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit. [12] cralaw
Here, portions of Lot No. 85 had already been sold to third persons, among whom is herein respondent. This Court on a number of occasions declined to intervene where there had already been changes in the relative position of the parties. The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce a right remains, but the changes of condition which may have arisen, as here, during the period in which there has been a neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties has to change, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect, lest it does injustice or destroys or seriously impairs the intervening rights of third persons.
Lastly, petitioners fault the trial court in applying the case of Vda. De Cabrera v. Court of Appeals [13] because there is no evidence that respondent is in possession of the disputed property. However, and as correctly noted by the two courts below, petitioners never asserted in their complaint to be in possession of the subject property. In fact, they admit that the defendants were in possession thereof precisely because their complaint includes recovery of possession.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Ze�arosa concurring.
[2] cralaw Rollo, pp. 46-59.
[3] cralaw Rollo, pp. 86-93.
[4] cralaw Rollo, pp. 107-109.
[5] cralaw Rollo, pp. 37-43.
[6] cralaw Rollo, p. 23
[7] cralaw 318 SCRA 255 [1999].
[8] cralaw Arradaza vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 12, 20 [1989]; Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 150 SCRA 353 [1987].
[9] cralaw Ibid.
[10] cralaw Tijam vs. Sibonghahoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968], quoted in Bergado vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 500, 503 [1989].
[11] cralaw Arradaza, supra, see note 4.
[12] cralaw Chung Ka Bio vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 163 SCRA 534, 541 [1988].
[13] cralaw 267 SCRA 339 [1997].
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