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[G.R. No. 167641.� May 10, 2005]
SAN PABLO vs. MARINA
EN BANC
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAY 10 2005 .
G.R. No. 167641 (Eugenia T. San Pablo vs. Maritime Industry Authority, and Its Officers, Hon. Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Hon. Gloria V. Banas, and Ho. Lamberto V. Pia.)
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction challenges the constitutionality of both RA 9295, entitled An Act Promoting The Development of Philippine Domestic Shipping, Shipbuilding, And Ship Repair and Ship Breaking, Ordaining Reforms In Government Policies Towards Shipping in the Philippines, and for Other Purposes [1] cralaw and the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued by the respondent Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
Petitioner Eugenia T. San Pablo is a grantee of a franchise to operate shipping services covering the routes via Matnog, Sorsogon-Alen, Northern Samar and Tabaco, Albay and vice-versa. As such, she operates three vessels, "MV Northern Samar", "MV Princess Bicolandia" and "MV Princess of Mayon".
From the turn of the century until 1936, public utility regulation was mostly confined to land transportation services. Then Commonwealth Act No. 146, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, was approved creating the Public Service Commission (PSC), which was vested with jurisdiction over numerous public utility services. When Martial Law was declared on September 21, 1972, the first decree issued by then President Marcos was PD No. 1 which, in one brief sentence, declared the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) "as part of the law of the land". The IRP abolished the PSC and created three Specialized Regulatory Boards, one of which was the Board of Transportation (BOT). The BOT exercised franchising and regulatory powers over land, water and air transportation public utilities. In time, respondent MARINA was created through Executive Orders No. 474, 1011, 125 and 125-A to undertake the special function of franchising and regulation over water transport services.
MARINA had since performed franchising and regulatory functions over water transport public utilities.
On May 3, 2004, President Arroyo signed into law RA 9295 aimed at promoting the development of the domestic shipping industry.
On November 30, 2004, MARINA promulgated the challenged IRR for RA 9295. And by the first quarter of 2005, MARINA commenced with the enforcement of RA 9295 and its IRR.
Pursuant to RA 9295, Marina directed the deregulation of rates for passenger and cargo vessels. [2] cralaw It also changed the venue and rules in the acceptance and processing of shipping applications, and delegated the authority to issue certificates of public convenience (CPC) to Maritime Regional Offices. [3] cralaw It also issued Application Forms and Notices to existing liner and tramp operators, directing them to file appropriate applications for new and extensions of CPCs within six months from the effectivity of the challenged IRR. [4] cralaw
Evidently apprehensive that by the end of the transition period on June 11, 2005, as fixed in the IRR, MARINA will commence with the cancellation of all shipping CPCs on ground that the laws from which they were issued have already been repealed and/or superseded by RA 9295, [5] cralaw petitioner came to this Court via the instant petition.
According to petitioner, RA 9295 allegedly contained unconstitutional provisions such as the delegation of fixing of shipping passenger and cargo rates to shipping operators themselves and authorizing foreigners to operate domestic shipping service as well as ship repair service in the country. Petitioner additionally contends that RA 9295 also violated the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act should be expressed in its title. With respect to the IRR, petitioner claims that MARINA crossed the constitutional boundaries when it required shipping operators to secure a much higher insurance coverage for passengers and cargoes compared to land and air transport operators; disregarded the citizenship and due process requisites in the franchising process, particularly the right to notice and hearing and to oppose on the part affected operators; and ordered the cancellation of shipping franchises/CPCs by June 11, 2005 without valid reason and without notice and hearing.
Petitioner insists that the instant case involves issues of transcendental or paramount importance that no less than this Court must declare the unconstitutionality of RA 9295 and its IRR.
Petitioner must be reminded of the unbending rule in constitutional law that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following conditions are first satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case. [6] cralaw
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. Here, it cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving petitioner, on the one hand, and all or any of the respondents, on the other hand, with respect to rights or obligations under RA 9295. As yet, petitioner's existing franchise remains operative and there is no indication that her application for new CPCs will, in fact, be denied. Thus, at this point in time, even if petitioner has established her locus standi to question the validity of RA 9295 and its IRR, there is as yet no actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination.
Moreover, this case should not have been directly brought before this Court. Petitioner justifies the direct filing with this Court of present action on the ground that constitutional questions must be raised at the earliest time. That is true, but it does not mean that the questions should be presented to this Court first hand.
In Tanho vs. Socrates, [7] cralaw this Court has had an occasion to declare that while it has concurrent jurisdiction with regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals in the matter of issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give a party an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
Verily, this concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as giving the party seeking any of the writs an absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court before which the application therefor will be directed. There is, after all, a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for issuance of extraordinary writs should be filed with the regional trial courts, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special, important and compelling reasons therefor, clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. [8] cralaw
It is, thus, high time that this Court reaffirm that policy and enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what is perceived to be a growing tendency on part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs and sometimes even their appeals from the second level courts passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land.
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which often are to be remanded or referred to lower courts, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, and which are better equipped to resolve the issues. This Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired or the reliefs sought cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. [9] cralaw Here, we perceive no sense of urgency. As it is, petitioner is merely apprehensive that she will sustain injury as a result of the implementation of the challenged law and its implementing rules and regulations. To stress, petitioner's existing franchise is very much operative without any concrete indication whatsoever that an application for a renewal thereof will be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Puno, J., on sick leave.
Panganiban and Gutierrez, JJ., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Also known as the Domestic Shipping Development Act of 2004.
[2] cralaw Sec. 8. Deregulation of the Domestic Shipping Industry.-in order to encourage investments in the domestic fishing industry by existing domestic ship operators and attract new investment from new operators and investors, domestic ship operators are hereby authorized to establish their own domestic shipping rates: Provided, That effective competition is fostered and public interest is served.
The MARINA shall monitor all shipping operations and exercise regulatory intervention where it is established, after due process that public interest need to be protected and safeguarded.
[3] cralaw Sec. 10. Jurisdiction, Powers and Duties of the MARINA.-the MARINA shall have the power and authority to:
(1) xxx
(2) Issue certificates of public convenience, or any extensions or amendments thereto, authorizing the operation of all kinds, classes and types of vessels in domestic shipping: Provided, no such certificate shall be valid for a period of more than twenty-five (25) years;
(3) xxx
���� xxx
���� xxx
(17) Issue such rules and regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this Act: Provided, That such rules and regulations cannot change or in anyway amend or be contrary to the intent and purposes of this Act.
[4] cralaw RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REPUBLIC ACT 9295-RULE XVIII Section 1. Period of transition-Within six (6) months upon the effectivity of this IRR, existing liner and tramp operators shall be required to file appropriate application for issuance of CPC under this Act and this IRR.
[5] cralaw Per letter of Marina Administrator Vicente T. Suazo Jr., Rollo, pp. 138 to 140.
[6] cralaw Board of Optometry vs. Hon Angel B. Colet, et al., 260 SCRA 88 [1996].
[7] cralaw 278 SCRA 155, [1997].
[8] cralaw People vs. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415 [1989] cited in Manila vs. Gloria, 235 SCRA 130 [1994].
[9] cralaw Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 [1993].
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