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[G.R. No. 139930. April 17, 2006]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., et al.
Second Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR. 17, 2006
G.R. No. 139930 (Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al.)
For consideration of the Court are the following:
(a) The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines, of the Resolution dated October 3, 2005 which granted the motion of the counsel for the deceased respondent, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, for the dismissal of the case against her; and
(b) The Motion for the Leave to Admit the Opposition to the OSG's motion and the Opposition thereto filed by the counsel for the heirs of respondent Lobregat.
In a resolution dated
During the pendency of this case, respondent Maria Clara Lobregat died on January 2, 2004 due to multi-organ failure. On May 14, 2004, respondent's counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the death of respondent Lobregat extinguishes both her criminal as well as civil liability based solely on the act complained of.
The OSG opposed the motion on the ground that respondent's death does not extinguish her civil liability because the same is not solely based on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto . The OSG, citing People v. Bayotas [1] cralaw maintains that while respondent's death extinguishes her criminal liability, the same cannot be made to apply with regard to her civil liability. The OSG avers that "as a director of UCPB and the UNICOM, respondent had duties and liabilities under the law and in accordance with her employment contract." It cites that under Sections 31 and 33 of the Corporation Code, any director who willfully and knowingly votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
The heirs of the respondent counter that the ruling in People v. Bayotas does not apply because in the said case, the accused was convicted and died during the pendency of the appeal. On the contrary, in the present case, respondent was a mere respondent in a complaint which the Office of the Ombudsman had dismissed. They explained that even assuming that the Bayotas ruling applies, the death of the respondent extinguished her civil liability, if any, since the same could only be based on delict.
In a similar case. Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, [2] cralaw the Court, applying Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, dismissed the charges against the deceased petitioner. Benedicto, which were then pending before the trial court, as death extinguished any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him. In a recently decided case, Republic v. Desierto, [3] cralaw where herein deceased respondent was also a respondent, the Court, in a Resolution dated August 16, 2004, ordered the dismissal of charges against herein respondent, then pending before the Office of the Ombudsman, stating that any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might arise from said case is declared extinguished by reason of her death.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion of the counsel for the deceased respondent, Ma[ria]J Clara [L]. Lobregat, praying for the dismissal of the case against her is GRANTED. Any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might arise from said case is declared extinguished by reason of her death.
SO ORDERED.
In seeking reconsideration, petitioner maintains that while respondent Lobregat's death extinguished her criminal as well as civil liability predicated solely on the delict, her civil liability arising from other sources of obligation, i.e., based on law and contract, subsists independently of that predicated on the delict. Petitioner argues that it is under this category of civil liability that it seeks to prosecute respondent Lobregat, not on her civil liability ex delicto . Invoking Sections 31 and 33 of the Corporation Code, petitioner reiterates that respondent Lobregat, in her capacity as a member of the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM), had willfully and knowingly voted for and assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporations which constituted the bases for her civil liability ''as a corporate officer who had duties under the law and in accordance with her employment contract" with the companies. Petitioner maintains that the Bayotas case, which states that in instances where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure (re: action which may or may not be brought against the executor or administrator), should not be applied in the present case. Stated otherwise, petitioner suggests that respondent Lobregat's civil liability arising from law and contract be litigated in the present case on the grounds that: First. It is consistent with fair play - because of petitioner's theory of conspiracy which attended the commission of respondents' acts that gave unwarranted benefits to themselves, constitutive of acts violative of the Anti-Graft Law and therefore, the dismissal of the case against respondent Lobregat would cause inequity to her co-respondents. Second. It would avoid multiplicity of suits - because the civil liability of all respondents would be determined concomitantly with their criminal liability. Petitioner, citing Villegas v. Court of Appeals, [4] cralaw prays that the heirs of respondent Lobregat be substituted in the case to answer for whatever civil liability based on law and contract eventually might be adjudged against her.
In their Opposition, the heirs of respondent Lobregat countered that the OSG's motion for reconsideration is basically a rehash of its comment (to respondent counsel's motion to dismiss the case against respondent in view of her death); that the death of respondent Lobregat also extinguished her civil liability because the same could only be predicated on the delict alone; that the ruling in Bayotas , where therein accused died after his conviction, does not apply because deceased respondent Lobregat was a mere respondent in a criminal complaint for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019 which the Office of the Ombudsman had long dismissed; and even assuming that the Bayotas case is applicable, the rule regarding separate civil actions enforced against the executor/administrator or the estate of herein petitioner and that pertaining to civil case impliedly instituted with the criminal case where the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, should be followed. Petitioner cannot take exception by saying that there is no need for a separate civil action for the purpose of seeking the civil liability.
The motion for reconsideration lacks merit.
Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that one of the grounds for the total extinguishment of criminal, as well as civil liability, if any, is the death of a party to the case. In the present case, the death of respondent Lobregat, which occurred during the pendency of the case and before final judgment is rendered, extinguishes whatever criminal liability she might be held responsible for as the same is purely personal to her. Consequently, the civil liability arising from whatever criminal liability may be adjudged against her is perforce extinguished.
It is an erroneous supposition for petitioner to insist that respondent Lobregat, through her heirs, can be made civilly liable for obligations arising from law and contract by virtue of respondent Lobregat's being one of the Directors of UCPB and UNICOM, which is to be considered an employment contract (between these companies and respondent Lobregat). It bears stressing that respondent Lobregat, together with the other respondents, was charged with the violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 in the Office of the Ombudsman in her capacity as a member of the Board of Directors of the UCPB and UNICOM allegedly because these transactions allowed the other respondents unwarranted benefits and were grossly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) recommending the dismissal of the complaint against all herein respondents, including Lobregat, on the grounds of prescription and insufficiency of evidence. From the said dismissal, petitioner appealed to this Court via petition for certiorari.
The issue in the present case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman erred in approving the recommendation of the OSP for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of Section 3 of R.A No. 3019 against herein respondents, including Lobregat. Thus, the nature of the action involves a determination of whether the contracts or transactions entered into by respondents were grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether they caused undue injury to the government, and whether respondents had obtained personal gain in these transactions. Necessarily, the foregoing matters are criminal in nature. Being a criminal complaint against the respondents, the death of respondent Lobregat results in the dismissal of the present case against her and the concomitant civil liability arising therefrom. It is absurd to dissociate the criminal aspect of the case from that of respondent Lobregat's alleged liability as a member of the board of the two aforementioned companies precisely because she was being sued in such capacity.
Moreover, the rulings in Bayotas and Villegas do not apply. In Bayotas , it was clarified that:
3. Where the civil liability survives, . an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of the obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, [5] cralaw that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
The procedure provided by the law is clear. It cannot be construed otherwise. In the same breath, the Villegas case is not applicable because the Court ruled that therein private offended party can still file an appropriate civil action for damages against the executor or administrator of the estate, or the heirs of the deceased. Therefore, as applied to the present case, petitioner would be required to file another civil suit which is contrary to what it prays for.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:
(a) GRANT the Motion for Leave to Admit the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Solicitor General and NOTE the Opposition thereto both filed by the counsel for the heirs of the deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat; and
(b) DENY with FINALITY for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines, of the Resolution dated October 3, 2005 which granted the motion of the counsel for the deceased respondent Maria Clara L. Lobregat for the dismissal of the case against her.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239.
[2] cralaw G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001, 364 SCRA 334.
[3] cralaw G.R. No. 131966, September 23, 2002, 389 SCRA 452.
[4] cralaw G.R. No. 82562, April 11, 1997, 271 SCRA 148.
[5] cralaw Article 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
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