ChanRobles Virtual law Library

[G.R. No. 141537. April 19, 2006]

LAKAS TULUNGAN MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. v. WILFREDO M. PASCUA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR. 19, 2006

G.R. No. 141537 (Lakas Tulungan Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Wilfredo M. Pascua and the Court of Appeals)

Before us is a case that calls for the application of Article 223 of the Labor Code. Atypically, the employee to be reinstated pending appeal is, in the phrase of petitioner, "an affluent man" ^[1] cralaw and not an ordinary laborer in dire need of money. Petitioner therefore prays that the rule on immediate reinstatement pending appeal be relaxed in this case. We disagree.

The facts are as follows.

Respondent Wilfredo M. Pascua (Pascua) was the general manager of petitioner Lakas Tulungan Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Lakas). On 19 June 1996 Pascua was dismissed from service after Lakas discovered some alleged irregular acts on the part of former. Pascua then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Lakas before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). After hearing, Labor Arbiter Francisco A. Robles (Labor Arbiter Robles) rendered a Decision on 23 May 1998 in favor of Pascua. ^[2] cralaw Lakas elevated the case to the NLRC on appeal.

In the meantime, a Writ of Execution ^[3] cralaw was issued by Labor Arbiter Robles to execute partially the 23 May 1998 Decision. However, as reflected in the Sheriff's Return ^[4] cralaw dated 25 May 1998, Lakas refused to reinstate Pascua to his former or equivalent position. Otherwise, the monetary award in favor of Pascua was partially satisfied on 16 July 1999 when the Philippine Veteran's Bank released the amount of One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00) from the account maintained by Lakas in compliance with the Notice of Garnishment served by the NLRC Sheriff. ^[5] cralaw The stated amount was turned over to the NLRC cashier to be released only upon the order of Labor Arbiter Robles.

Lakas moved to set aside and quash the writ of execution and/or garnishment but the same was denied in an Order ^[6] cralaw dated 25 May 1999 by Labor Arbiter Robles. Hence, Lakas filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari reiterating the same grounds argued in its motion, to wit:

1. The underlying philosophy of Article 223 of the Labor Code allowing execution pending appeal of a Labor Arbiter's decision reinstating a dismissed employee is the general conception that the latter is poor, marginalized and is deprived of his livelihood by reason of his dismissal, hence, the State by its Police Power must come to his aid, is merely directory and not mandatory;

2. Article 223 of the Labor Code allows an exception and the Labor Arbiter is given a latitude of discretion in applying the rule;

3. Private Respondent is a wealthy man, an able Business Executive currently employed in a high earning position, hence, his livelihood and that of his family are not dependent upon his employment with Petitioner, thus the inapplicability of the aforesaid Article 223 in his case. ^[7] cralaw

On 16 July 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order preventing the Labor Arbiter from carrying out the reinstatement aspect of the case. Nonetheless, on 13 October 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision ^[8] cralaw dismissing the petition and recalling the temporary restraining order it earlier issued in favor of herein petitioner. ^[9] cralaw

Subsequently, on 18 July 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued another order ^[10] cralaw holding in abeyance the execution of the reinstatement of Pascua as the present case is pending before this Court.

Ultimately, the main issue for resolution, as cast by petitioner, is whether Article 223 of the Labor Code allows as an exception when the employee sought to be reinstated happens to be of means.

It should be noted that while the case involves the application of Article 223 of the Labor Code, a provision concerning reinstatement pending appeal, the Labor Arbiter's ruling that Pascua had been illegally dismissed has since become final and executory. The NLRC through Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay issued a Resolution dated 30 April 1999 dismissing the appeal for non-posting of the requisite appeal bond. ^[11] cralaw The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and subsequently by this Court in a Resolution dated 13 November 2000. ^[12] cralaw Clearly then, Pascua at this point is entitled not only to an interim reinstatement pending appeal, but unqualified reinstatement owing to a final and executory decision nullifying his earlier dismissal. However, a resolution of this petition on the merits is still warranted, as the Labor Arbiter has opted to defer implementation of the release of Pascua's salary from June 1999 until January 2000, pending adjudication of this case. ^[13] cralaw

We find the petition without merit.

A reproduction of Article 223 of the Labor Code is warranted.

ART. 223. Appeal.-Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x x

In any event the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

x x x x

Of course, the mere allegation of Lakas that Pascua is rich can barely be sustained in the absence of factual evidence to that effect, and even if such evidence were presented before us, the Court is not a trier of fact. But assuming such premise could be entertained, there is nothing in the afore-quoted law which even remotely suggests that it is only applicable to poor or marginalized employees. On the contrary, the law is so clear that it leaves no room for any construction. It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation-there is only room for application. ^[14] cralaw

Lakas's contention that Pascua is well-to-do does not make any difference insofar as Article 223 is concerned. If the Court withholds the monetary award from Pascua just because of his apparent wealth, a prejudicial situation would be created where a party is to be discriminated just because he is rich. This is a circumstance which the Court vows to prevent. The law should be upheld regardless of any external predicaments of the parties.

The animating force behind our labor laws, as enshrined in the Constitution, is due solicitude to the rights and concerns of labor to the extent of tilting the scales in favor of the laborers in case of doubtful questions. Notably though, the purposeful distinction recognized by law and jurisprudence has been between labor and capital, and not rich and poor. Equating labor-capital with rich-poor creates a vacuous syllogism. The perceived inequity which predicates the "pro-labor" thrust of our laws does not necessarily arise from the simplistic belief that all laborers are poor, but instead from a recognition that capital is advantaged vis-a-vis labor in the game of power relations and the readily available resources at its hand. The fact that the employee concerned happens to be wealthy does not detract from these innate advantages enjoyed by the employer.

It should be noted that the present case has been dragging on for nearly eight (8) years now. The Resolution of the NLRC upholding the labor arbiter's decision has long become final and executory. The Court does not see any cogent reason why Lakas has been repulsing the order of reinstatement when the proper administrative bodies, both the labor arbiter and the NLRC, have concurred that reinstatement is proper under the situation. The higher economic status of a party does not call for the slackening of the mandatory rule in labor cases to immediately reinstate an employee even pending appeal.

But more importantly, the Court is guided by the legal principle ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus (when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANO
Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

^[1] cralaw Rollo , p. 3.

^[2] cralaw The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgement is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of the complainant's dismissal and ordering the respondent Lakas Tulungan Multi-Purpose Cooperative to reinstate the complainant to his former position or equivalent position without loss of seniority and other rights and benefits and to pay the complainant the amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P216,200.00) representing his backwages for twenty (20) months, from June 19, 1996 up to February 28, 1998, provided, however, that the aforestated amount of backwages shall be subject to further computation until actual reinstatement.

The respondent is likewise ordered to pay the complainant the amount of TEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P10,800.00) representing his 13^th month pay for 1996 and the complainant's claim for attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total awards granted to him under this Decision.

All other claims between the complainant and the respondent are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

See Resolution penned by Commissioner Victoriano A. Calaycay, National Labor Relations Commission. Id. at 97-99.

^[3] cralaw Rollo , pp. 78-80.

^[4] cralaw Id. at 81. The salient part of the Sheriff's Return reads:

The Manager, in the person of Col. Eufroci�a Alfonso, after consulting their legal counsel, categorically state[s] that she refuse[s] to reinstate the complainant on the ground that his former position was already filled up. It was done in the presence of herein complainant.

^[5] cralaw See Sheriff's Return dated 16 July 1999. Id. at 88.

^[6] cralaw The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations, the aforesaid motion dated April 21, 1999 filed by complainant should be, as it is hereby GRANTED and the following Orders are hereby issued:

1. The Board of Directors of the respondent Lakas Tulungan Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc. is hereby directed to pay and release the salaries of the complainant, Wilfredo M. Pascua from May 6, 1998 up to the present in accordance with the Writ of Execution dated May 20, 1998, issued by this Office, and to issue to the Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission, National Capital Region or its duly authorized representative, a certification regarding the payment and release of the aforesaid salaries of the complainant; and

2. In any case, of failure or refusal on the part of the Board of Directors of the respondent Lakas Tulungan Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. to pay and release such salaries of the complainant, the Sheriff of the NLRC, NCR shall make a computation of such salaries of the complainant, from May 6, 1998 up to the present, based on the last salary received by the complainant from the respondent cooperative wherever such funds may be found for the purpose of effecting such payment, in full of the aforesaid salaries of the herein complainant, provided, however, that the funds of the respondent which may be garnished by the Sheriff shall only be released to the Cashier, NLRC, NCR.

SO ORDERED.

See Decision of the Court of Appeals, rollo , pp. 19-20.

^[7] cralaw Rollo , p. 142.

^[8] cralaw ld. at 19-26.

^[9] cralaw The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court is hereby RECALLED.

SO ORDERED.

^[10] cralaw Rollo , pp. 128-133.

^[11] cralaw Id. at 97-99.

^[12] cralaw Id. at 135.

^[13] cralaw Id. at 128-133.

^[14] cralaw CDA v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, 432 Phil. 290, 310-311 (2002), citing Director of Lands v. CA, 276 SCRA276, 287 (1997) citing Cebu Portland Cement Company v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu , 24 SCRA 708, 712 (1968).

Back to Home | Back to Main

 

CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916
1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924
1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932
1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
2013

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

QUICK SEARCH

1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916
1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924
1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932
1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011