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Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-1691-MTJ. April 5, 2006]
RE: LUCRESIA LAGATUZ, et al. v. JUDGE THELMA N. DELOS SANTOS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 48, PASAY CITY
First Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this Court dated APR. 5, 2006
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-1691-MTJ (Re: Lucresia Lagatuz, et al. v. Judge Thelma N. Delos em>Santos , Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 48, Pasay City)
Before the Court is the complaint filed by Lucresia Lagatuz, Juanito, Ernesto and Panfilo, all surnamed San Luis, charging respondent Judge Thelma N. Delos Santos with Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment.
Complainants allege that they were the defendants in an ejectment case entitled "Eulalio Esteban, et al. vs. Lucresia Lagatuz, et al." and docketed as Civil Case No. 230-04 CFM of Branch 48, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City. The case was heard summarily by Pairing Judge Estrelita Paas of Branch 44, Pasay City. On September 15, 2005, respondent Judge Delos Santos in her capacity as acting Presiding Judge of Branch 48, MeTC, Pasay City rendered a decision in the case ruling in favor of the plaintiffs.
In the present complaint, complainants assail the portion of respondent's decision which orders them to pay the plaintiffs the sum of Three Hundred Nineteen Thousand Pesos [P319,000.00] representing the unpaid rents covering the period from January 1985 to December 2003 which amount is exactly the same as that prayed for by the plaintiffs. Complainants allege that in ordering so, respondent completely ignored and willfully disregarded the principles of prescription they repeatedly raised before the trial judge but respondent capriciously disregarded. They cite and discuss Articles 1139, 1145 (1) and the last paragraph of Article 1231 as their legal bases to support their contention that prescription applies in their case. They aver that there is no existing contract of lease between them and the plaintiffs and hence they are bound only under an oral contract of lease which prescribes after six (6) years.
Further, complainants contend that since the ejectment complaint was filed only on March 2004 they are obliged to pay only the rentals from January 1999 to March 2004 as the period to claim the monthly rentals for fourteen (14) years from January 1985 to January 1998 amounting to Two Hundred Twenty Three Thousand Four Hundred Forty (P223,440.00) Pesos has already prescribed. Consequently, the amount justly due as arrears of rent is Ninety Five Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty [P95,760.00] Pesos only. Complainants claim that since the decision ordered the payment of back rentals including those covered from January 1985 to January 1998, the award was unjust making respondent liable for violation of Section 6, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that the back rentals to be awarded should be for "the sum justly due as arrears of rent."
On
Respondent also denied complainants' "Motion to Reduce The Supersedeas Bond by Deducting the Total Amount of the Prescribed Monthly Rentals for the Purpose of Posting the Bond required to Perfect the Appeal" and the "Motion To Recall Order dated December 8, 2004." Respondent ruled that the Motion to Reduce Supersedeas Bond partakes of the nature of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment which is not allowed under Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Complainants stress that in filing the aforesaid motions, it was not their intention to seek for a new trial or reconsideration of the decision but only to ask that the dispositive portion of the decision be corrected by removing the evidently prescribed back rentals from 1985 to 1998, and that the reduced amount be made the basis in fixing the supersedeas bond that they have to post to perfect their appeal. The amendment or correction of the dispositive portion merely involves the application of the pertinent law on prescription and extinguishment of obligation particularly Articles 1139, 1145 and 1231 of the Civil Code, hence new trial is not needed to correct an injustice.
Complainants likewise allege that had respondent granted their motion to correct or amend the award of back rentals, the underlying objective of the Rule on Summary Procedure which is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the case without much regard to strict technical rule of procedure applicable in ordinary cases could have been served. They have become victims of the respondent's unjust decision for they were not able to raise the amount of the supersedeas bond to perfect their appeal, thereby giving undue advantage to the plaintiffs in the ejectment case. They maintain that respondent is aware of the unjustness of her judgment and in refusing to amend or correct the same, she has incurred criminal liability under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code for Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment.
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT dated March 29, 2005 of complainants.
Complainants allege that on March 29, 2004, they received a Notice to Vacate and to Pay Judgment Debt to Enforce the Writ of Execution dated March 3, 2005 giving them five [5] days from March 28, 2005 to vacate the premises and to pay the judgment debt. They assert that the enforcement of the unjust judgment will cause irreparable injury to them considering that their present administrative complaint is still pending before this Office. They were deprived of their right to appeal respondent's decision because of the inclusion in the judgment of the back rentals, thus preventing them from perfecting their appeal. They express apprehension that the final execution of the unjust judgment may negate their present complaint against respondent.
COMMENT dated May 10, 2005 of respondent Judge Thelma Delos Santos.
Respondent submits that the present administrative complaint is not the proper recourse to question the propriety of the decision she rendered in the ejectment case with respect to the back rentals awarded therein. She did not willfully ignore and capriciously disregard the principle of prescription and its effect when she awarded as back rentals the amount of P319,000.00. Article 1145 of the Civil Code does not apply to damages recoverable in ejectment cases but to extinguishment of obligations based on an oral contract or quasi-contract if such contract for its enforcement is not brought within six (6) years. Hence the payment of back rentals in the amount of P319,000.00 by the complainants to the plaintiffs is not an obligation that arose from the oral contract of lease entered into by them but as compensation for damages caused by their use and occupancy of the property of the plaintiff since 1989 which justifies the amount awarded as back rentals, consistent with the maxim that no one shall enrich himself at the expense of others.
Respondent claims that even assuming Article 1145 is applicable in the subject ejectment case, still it cannot be considered as a defense since complainants did not plead the same in their answer and is deemed waived by them. Prescription is not a substantial right of the complainants but a defense which they should have expressly pleaded, proved or established in the ejectment case.
She explains that she consistently denied complainants' Motions to Amend the Dispositive Portion of the Decision and To Reduce the Supersedeas Bond because they partake of the nature of a Motion for Reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. None of the defendants' allegations in their-motions persuaded her to allow relaxation of the mandatory rules on Summary Procedure as their main basis was prescription only. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be applied at will and at random. It is only for the most persuasive of reasons that the court should allow a relaxation of procedural rules.
As to complainants' alleged failure to perfect their appeal because of respondent's alleged refusal to reduce the supersedeas bond, respondent should not be blamed for it. The purpose of the supersedeas bond provided in Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not for perfecting an appeal but to stay immediate execution of judgments.
REJOINDER dated May 24, 2005 of complainants.
Complainants narrate in detail the events and circumstances that transpired prior to the filing of the subject ejectment suit and assert that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against them as their cause of action was properly one for accion publiciana and not for ejectment. They explain that they did not raise in their answer the defense of prescription of portion of the back rentals because it would be inconsistent with their denial of the plaintiffs' alleged cause of action against them.
Complainants also question the veracity of the amount of P319,000.00 determined by the respondent as unpaid rentals. Since the ejectment case was prosecuted under the Rules on Summary Procedure, they had no opportunity to oppose it. Respondent should have observed Section 17, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court and Article 19 of the Civil Code in her computation of the back rentals. The plaintiffs in their complaint did not ask for payment of damages but of rentals so the maxim cited by respondent that "no one shall be enriched at the expense of others" does not apply in the case.
EVALUATION : The present administrative complaint against respondent judge for knowingly rendering unjust judgment is premised on her alleged erroneous and unjust award of back rentals in the ejectment case where the complainants are the losing party, and her alleged capricious refusal to amend the same. However, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that the issues presented in this complaint are judicial in nature and arose from the respondent's exercise of her judicial functions.
As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertains to his judicial
functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with
fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable for no one tried to call upon the facts or interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. (Spouses
Florencio and Esther Causin
vs. Judge Leonardo Demecillo, etc., A.M. No.
RTJ-04-1860,
As to the specific charge of Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment, it is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust and (d) he knew that the said judgment is unjust. This court has ruled that in order to hold a judge liable for this offense, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. [Eduardo P. Diego vs. Judge Silverio Q. Castillo, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673, August 11, 2004.]
In the instant case, other than the bare and self-serving assertion that the judgment rendered by respondent was unjust and that she knew it to be unjust, complainants have not offered any proof or evidence to substantiate the same such as a finding by an appellate court that the judgment was indeed erroneous and unjust. And even assuming that respondent erred in the dispositions in her judgment in the ejectment case, still she cannot be held administratively liable because the elements of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose are lacking as complainants neither alleged them in their complaint nor cited any specific acts of those elements.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Court Administrator.
The established rule in administrative proceedings is that the burden of proof that respondent judge committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. Administrative charges against members of the judiciary must be supported at least by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. [1] cralaw
When an administrative charge against a judge or any personnel of the court has no basis whatsoever, this Court will not hesitate to protect him against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes. We will not shirk from our responsibility of imposing discipline upon employees and officials of the Judiciary, but neither shall we hesitate to shield the same officials or employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. [2] cralaw
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
First Division
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Alcaraz v. Lindo , A.M. No. MTJ-04-1539, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 393, 397.
[2] cralaw Tan v. Adre , A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 145, 154.
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