ChanRobles Virtual law Library

chanrobles.com - PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTIONS - ON-LINE

cralaw_scresolutions_separator.NHAD

GR No. 159139. August 22, 2006]

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OF THE PHILIPPINES et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al.

En Banc

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG. 22, 2006

GR No. 159139 (Information Technology of the Philippines et al. v. Commission on Elections et al.)

Before the Court is an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court (1) to Reopen the Case; and (2) to Intervene and Admit the Attached Petition in Intervention," filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal. In brief, Atty. Macalintal seeks the Reopening of this case in order that he may be allowed to intervene as a taxpayer and citizen, for the purpose of justifying another testing of the automated counting machines with the ultimate objective of allowing the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to use them in the 2007 national elections.

Decision Final and Immutable

Let it be stressed: our Decision in this case, which movant seeks to reopen, has become final and executory for well over two years. It was promulgated way back on January 13, 2004. The parties' Motions for Reconsideration were denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 17, 2004. Consequently, the Decision was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on March 30, 2004, and thus rendered final and executory. In other words, the Decision has become immutable and unalterable; hence, it may no longer undergo any modification. [1] cralaw

The basic doctrinal rule is that final judgments may no longer be modified, except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes, [2] cralaw or when the judgment is void, [3] cralaw or if supervening events or circumstances that transpire after the finality of the decision render its execution unjust and inequitable. [4] cralaw

Object of Omnibus Motion Already Resolved

The ultimate objective of the present Omnibus Motion is, however, no different from that of the poll body's earlier Motion filed in December 2004, which had sought leave from the Court to use the said automated counting machines (ACMs) during the August 8, 2005 elections in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). That Motion was UNANIMOUSLY DENIED by this Court in its Resolution of June 15, 2005.

The only material difference between the! two Motions is that Comelec in its Motion alleged the confirmation by "information technology experts" that the ACMs had been made in accordance with "internationally accepted standards (ISO/IEC 12207) for software life cycle processes"; while the present Motion seeks permission for the "retesting" of the machines to confirm alleged "persistent claims and assurances made by the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) that the x x x ACMs [were] 100% accurate and reliable."

Like the earlier Comelec Motion, however, the present one of Atty. Macalintal utterly fails to demonstrate - nay, even slightly indicate -- what "certain supervening and legal circumstances [have] transpired" to justify the reliefs it seeks. In fact, after the Court had ruled, among others, that the ACMs had failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements, they have admittedly been simply stored.

In other words, they have merely remained idle and unused since their last evaluation in which they failed to hurdle the crucial tests. Thus, again we say, the ACMs were not good enough for either the 2004 national elections or for the 2005 ARMM polls; why should they be good enough for the 2007 elections, considering that nothing has been done to correct the legal, jurisprudential and technical flaws underscored in our final and executory Decision? [5] cralaw Likewise, we repeat that no matter how many times the machines were retested, if nothing was done about the programming defects and deficiencies, the same danger of massive electoral fraud remains. [6] cralaw

As we said in our June 15, 2005 Resolution, "the inexorable result of granting the present Motion [to use the ACMs in the ARMM elections] will precisely subvert the Decision, rendering it totally ineffective and nugatory." There being no new arguments or real supervening event that would legally justify a reopening of the case, our disposition must remain the same. Clearly, the present Motion does not present any justifiable ground to reopen our Decision that has long been final.

Well-entrenched is the rule that issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations. [7] cralaw That litigations must terminate sometime and somewhere is essential to an effective administration of justice. The doctrine of finality of judgment rests on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. [8] cralaw

Intervention Now Procedurally Improper

Moreover, intervention may, as a general rule, be allowed only "before rendition of judgment by the trial court." [9] cralaw In the interest of substantial justice, this Court has allowed exceptions to this rule. [10] cralaw Looyuko v. Court of Appeals [11] cralaw further clarified that the amended Rules of Court permitted the filing of a motion to intervene at any time before the rendition of the final judgment on the case, provided the motion was for a good cause shown.

In that case, the Motions for intervention were filed after judgment had already become final and executory. We held then that in a case already terminated by final judgment, intervention could no longer be allowed. The Court rationalized thus: [12] cralaw

"Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based."

In the present case, the main Decision has been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments more than two years ago since March 30, 2004. Clearly, in accordance with the Rules of Court as interpreted in Looyuko, intervention can no longer be allowed at this time.

The Court is not unmindful of Mago v. Court of Appeals, [13] cralaw in which intervention was granted even if the case had become final and executory. In Mago , however, the petitioner-intervenors were unaware of the original proceedings; the private respondent, on the other hand, was in bad faith. He accepted the land award erroneously made to him by the National Housing Authority, despite having known fully well that a perfected agreement had been forged earlier between him and petitioners for the division of the land between them. A strict application of technical rules would have caused a rank injustice and direct injury to the petitioners who were indispensable parties, because they had an undisputed substantial interest in the subject property.

Mago merely upheld the basic principle allowing intervention. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the rule on who can intervene: "A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof, may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action."

Accordingly, in Poe v. Arroyo, [14] cralaw the Court said that "the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment." [15] cralaw In that case, the protestant's spouse, Susan Roces, sought to intervene in the case by substituting for the protestant (Fernando Poe Jr.) after his death. She invoked "paramount public interest" in "pursuing the process to determine who truly won the election, as a service to the Filipino people."

While lauding her noble intention and interest to find out the true will of the electorate, the Court nevertheless said that, if it allowed persons who were not the real parties in the action to intervene, then proceedings would unnecessarily become complicated, expensive and interminable. It stressed that such proceedings would not be in accord with the policy of the law. "It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules," the Tribunal ultimately said.

Applying the above rules and principles, it is simply too late in the day for Atty. Macalintal to come before the Court, invoking his right as a citizen and taxpayer and the public-interest principle. This case was originally brought before this Court about three years ago; if movant sincerely believed that his rights and interests were needful of protection, he should have come then. Obviously, under the circumstances, his filing of a Motion for Leave to Intervene - well over two years after the finality of the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration - cannot be what he refers to as a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy as provided for in the ordinary course of law."

Neither does his invocation of public interest justify his intervention at this time. The principle is unavailing, as he does not have a direct and immediate substantial interest in the subject matter of the controversy. In any event, the Court believes that his or, for that matter, any Filipino's interest as citizen and taxpayer has been taken into consideration in the Decision as well as the subsequent Resolutions in this case. Precisely, petitioners in this case came before the Court - and their legal standing was recognized - in their capacities as "taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens."

Void Comelec Acts

We stress once again that the Contract entered into by the Comelec for the supply of the ACMs was declared VOID by the Court in its Decision, because of clear violations of law and jurisprudence, as well as the reckless disregard by the Commission of its own bidding rules and procedure. In addition, the poll body entered into the Contract with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. As explained in our Decision, Comelec's gravely abusive acts consisted of the following:

1.� By a formal Resolution, it awarded the project to "Mega Pacific Consortium," an entity that had not participated in the bidding. Despite this grant, Comelec entered into the actual Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc." (MPEI), a company that joined the bidding process but did not meet the eligibility requirements.

2.� Comelec accepted and irregularly paid for MPEI's ACMs that had failed the accuracy requirement of 99.9995 percent set up by the Comelec bidding rules. Acknowledging that this rating could have been too steep, the Court nonetheless noted that "the essence of public bidding is violated by the practice of requiring very high standards or unrealistic specifications that cannot be met, x x x only to water them down after the award is made. Such scheme, which discourages the entry of bona fide bidders, is in fact a sure indication of fraud in the bidding, designed to eliminate fair competition."

3.� The software program of the counting machines likewise failed to detect previously downloaded precinct results and to prevent them from being reentered. This failure, which has not been corrected (not even mentioned in the Omnibus Motion), would have allowed unscrupulous persons to repeatedly feed into the computers the results favorable to a particular candidate, an act that would have translated into massive election fraud by just a few key strokes.

4.� Neither were the ACMs able to print audit trails without loss of data - a mandatory requirement under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436. Audit trails would enable the Comelec to document the identities of the ACM operators responsible for data entry and downloading, as well as the times when the various data were processed, in order to forestall fraud and to identify the perpetrators. The absence of audit trails would have posed a serious threat to free and credible elections.

5.� Comelec failed to explain satisfactorily why it had ignored its own bidding rules and requirements. It admitted that the software program used to test the ACMs was merely a "demo" version, and that the final one to be actually used in the elections was still being developed. By awarding the Contract and irregularly paying for the supply of the ACMs without having seen -- much less, evaluated -- the final product being purchased, Comelec desecrated the law on public bidding. It would have allowed the winner to alter its bid substantially, without any public bidding.

All in all, Comelec subverted the essence of public bidding: to give the public an opportunity for fair competition and a clear basis for a precise comparison of bids.

To muddle the issue, Comelec keeps on saying that the "winning" bidder presented a lower price than the only other bidder. It ignored the fact that the whole bidding process was VOID and FRAUDULENT. How then could there have been a "winning" bid?

In conclusion, the Decision said that the case involved not merely the invalidation of a business contract, but the "ability and capacity of the Commission on Elections to perform properly, legally and prudently its legal mandate to implement the transition from manual to automated elections"; and to fulfill its constitutional mandate to ensure honest, orderly and credible elections. Thus, the Court found it completely unacceptable to place its imprimatur on the void and illegal transaction that would seriously endanger our electoral system. Movant's simplistic proposal to use the illegally procured, demonstrably defective and fraud-prone ACMs is simply nonsensical.

Continued Use of Public Funds

As to the allegation that the nonuse of the ACMs would be a waste of public funds, the Court has also ALREADY RULED that "[a]s a necessary consequence of [the] nullity and illegality [of the Comelec Contract and Resolution], the purchase of the machines and all appurtenances thereto including the still-to-be produced (or in Comelec's words, to be 'reprogrammed') software, as well as all the payments made therefor, have no basis whatsoever in law. The public funds expended pursuant to the void Resolution and Contract must therefore be recovered from the payees and/or from the persons who made possible the illegal disbursements, without prejudice to possible criminal prosecutions against them." [16] cralaw

We also held in that Decision that "Comelec and its concerned officials must bear full responsibility for the failed bidding and award, and held accountable for the electoral mess wrought by their grave abuse of discretion in the performance of their functions. The State, of course, is not bound by the mistakes and illegalities of its agents and servants." [17] cralaw

Further, in our June 15, 2005 Resolution denying Comelec's Motion to use the machines during the ARMM elections, we again reminded the poll body to "return the ACMs to MPC-MPEI and recover the improvidently disbursed funds." That the Comelec officials have chosen to this day to keep the ACMs - in direct contravention of our directive - and, worse, to incur imprudently and pay illegally for costs for their storage at the expense of public funds will simply add to their liability in the end.

In sum, to grant the present Motion and Petition and allow the use of the ACMs, after they were found to have failed mandatory legal requirements (not just the DOST testing, upon which the present Motion places so much reliance), would effectively overturn the Court's findings and conclusions in its final and executory Decision. In that event, it would in effect be recognizing that the machines and the software program were viable after all, despite unchanged circumstances.

It would be an admission that the Court made a horrible mistake, and that Comelec's impugned acts were above board, reasonable and valid. To grant the present Motion and Petition would be to validate the Contract with MPEI and thus remove all grounds for any action to recover the public funds expended for the flawed ACMs. It would render nugatory the investigations now being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) and, worse, abrogate the OMB's June 28, 2006 Resolution in Kilosbayan v. Abalos . In that case, the OMB ordered the filing of criminal informations against certain Comelec officials and their dismissal from the service for violation of the Anti-Graft Law, in connection with the bidding for the ACMs.

Contrary to the avowed assurances of movant-intervenor, his Omnibus Motion and Petition would directly undermine the "(a) ongoing investigation [being] conducted by the Ombudsman against some COMELEC officials and private individuals implicated in the alleged irregularities committed in the connection with the aforesaid voided contract between the COMELEC and the MPC/MPEI; and (b) the recovery of the P1.2B from the MPC/MPEI in Civil Case No. 04-346 now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59 x x x."

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DENY the Omnibus Motion for its patent lack of merit. All die parties are DIRECTED to abide by and strictly follow the previous Decision, Resolutions and Orders of this Court. (Corona, J., On leave)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court


Endnotes:

[1] cralaw Honoridez v. Mahinay, 466 SCRA 646, August 12, 2005; Hufana v. Genato, 365 SCRA 384, September 17, 2001; Lapulapu Development and Housing Corporation v. Group Management Corporation, 388 SCRA 493, September 9, 2002; Nacuray v. NLRC, 270 SCRA 9, March 18, 1997; SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, 339 SCRA 275, August 30, 2000.

[2] cralaw Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. CA, 317 Phil. 700, August 23, 1995; Salva v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 632, March 11, 1999.

[3] cralaw Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, 440 SCRA 377, October 18, 2004.

[4] cralaw Cabrias v. Hon. Midpantao, 220 Phil. 41, March 18, 1985.

[5] cralaw Resolution, 460 SCRA 291, 294, June 15, 2005.

[6] cralaw Decision, 419 SCRA 141, 193, January 13, 2004; Resolution, id. at 307-308.

[7] cralaw Kabankalan Catholic College v. Kabankalan Catholic College Union-PAClWU-TUCP, 461 SCRA 481, June 28, 2005; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 40, November 4, 1996.

[8] cralaw Honoridez v. Mahinay, supra.

[9] cralaw Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.

[10] cralaw Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 238, September 25, 1979; La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 498, September 5, 1997; Collado v. Court of Appeals, 390 SCRA 343, October 4, 2002; Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, 411 SCRA 419, September 10, 2003.

[11] cralaw 361 SCRA 151, July 12, 2001.

[12] cralaw Id. at 165-66, per Kapunan, J.

[13] cralaw 303 SCRA 600, February 25, 1999.

[14] cralaw 454 SCRA 142, March 29, 2005.

[15] cralaw Emphasis supplied.

[16] cralaw Decision, supra at 203.

[17] cralaw Id.


Back to Home | Back to Main

 

CLICK HERE FOR THE LATEST SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

QUICK SEARCH

cralaw

 







chanrobles.com

ChanRobles Legal Resources:

ChanRobles On-Line Bar Review

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : www.chanroblesbar.com

ChanRobles MCLE On-line

ChanRobles Lawnet Inc. - ChanRobles MCLE On-line : www.chanroblesmcleonline.com