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[A.C. No. 1526. January 17, 2006]

LUCIANO S. HERNANDEZ, JR., COMPLAINANT, vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO, RESPONDENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court dated JAN. 17, 2006

A.C. No. 1526 (Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr., complainant, vs. Atty. Jose C. Go, respondent.)

In our Decision promulgated on January 31, 2005, we imposed upon Atty. Jose C. Go, respondent, the supreme penalty of disbarment for gross misconduct and ordered that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In our Resolution of March 29, 2005, we denied the same for lack of merit.

Before us now are: (1) complainant's motion for partial reconsideration dated April 29, 2005, praying that respondent be ordered to return to him all the properties he (respondent) fraudulently transferred to his name; and (2) respondent's second motion for reconsideration.

In his opposition to complainant's motion, respondent maintains that ordering respondent to return the properties, now registered in his name, to complainant will disturb the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 23, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27310 which had long acquired finality. In this case, the Appellate Court ruled that the transfer of complainant's lots to respondent is supported by valuable consideration, except for Lot No. 848-A-1. Moreover, respondent submits that complainant is now estopped from claiming ownership of Lots Nos. 849-P, 849-Q, 2118, 1141-A and 1141-B because on September 12, 1994, the parties entered into a "Compromise Agreement" wherein they stipulated that respondent would retain ownership of the said lots.

A careful reading of complainant's motion for partial reconsideration shows that it is a thinly-veiled attempt to re-open CA-G.R. CV No. 27310. Complainant admits that "a review of the findings of fact and law of the CA decision is still in order and may be done by the Honorable Supreme Court in consideration of the fact that disbarment cases are not bound by strict rules of procedure."

It bears reiterating that we sustained the finding of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that complainant's lots were transferred to respondent without any valuable consideration, except Lot 849-D. This finding is obviously in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals.

Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the fact that right or wrong, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27310 is already final and executory. Not even this Court may now disturb the same without running afoul of the doctrine of stability of final judgments. More so, where such disturbance is sought to be accomplished through a mere motion in a disbarment proceeding.

Moreover, complainant should not lose sight of the true nature of a disbarment case. Disbarment is the act of this Court in withdrawing from an attorney the right to practice law, with the name of the lawyer being stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. ^[1] cralaw A disbarment suit is sui generis . It is a special proceeding peculiar to itself disciplinary in nature, and of summary character resulting from the inherent power of the courts over their officers. ^[2] cralaw It is not a criminal proceeding, as it is not intended for punishment. ^[3] cralaw It is not in any sense a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant, for it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private grievances. ^[4] cralaw Thus, complainant cannot utilize this disbarment suit as a vehicle for reconveyance of his properties transferred to respondent.

WHEREFORE, we DENY complainant's motion for partial reconsideration. Respondent's second motion for reconsideration is likewise DENIED, being a prohibited pleading.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

^[1] cralaw PINEDA, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1995 ed.) 276-77.

^[2] cralaw In re Prisock, 244 Miss. 427, 143 So. 2d. 434, 436.

^[3] cralaw In re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 589 (1904); In re Wenceslao Laureta , 12 March 1987, 148 SCRA 382, 422.

^[4] cralaw De Vera v. Pineda, G.R. No. 96333, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 434, 443, citing Tajan v. Hon. Vicente Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. 28899, 30 May 1974, 57 SCRA 154.

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