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A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2399-RTJ.
ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR. v. JUDGE AMELIA COTANGCO-MANALASTAS, RTC, BRANCH 268, PASIG CITY
First Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2399-RTJ (Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. v. Judge Amelia Cotangco-Manalastas, RTC, Branch 268, Pasig City.)
Considering the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator, to wit:
1. A VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated
Complainant challenged respondent Judge's Omnibus Order dated
Complainant questioned said Omnibus Order and argued that the case should have been dismissed because the correct docket fees were not paid, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction. He averred that respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the law or procedure when she denied said motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. He insisted that the case was for sum a [sic] of money represented by the checks that plaintiff was claiming. Said checks amounted to Fifty Eight Million Five Hundred Thousand (P58,500,000.00) hence, the payment of Five Thousand One Hundred Thirty Five (P5,135.00) docket fees was not proper. Complainant attached the Certification issued by the clerk of court certifying that plaintiff paid the amount of P5,135.00 only and that "the computation of the aforesaid docket fee was resorted to on the basis of what the plaintiff prayed for in his complaint because the same failed to denote properly the nature of the case, which we deemed to be an Action for Specific Performance and/or Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. He alleged that by complainant's failure to specify his total claim in his complaint, he succeeded in evading payment of the correct docket fees.
Complainant also maintained that respondent Judge should have inhibited herself from hearing the case. He claimed that he had information that respondent Judge, together with the plaintiff in the civil case, stood as godparents to a child of a common friend. Further, complainant alleged that he received a couple of letters from the law firm of Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manalastas for and in behalf of their client, Mr. Hernando Balmores. The subject of said letters was the very transaction which was the subject matter of the civil case. The claim was identical to the claim asserted by plaintiff. One of the partners of the said law firm is respondent's husband, Atty. Jesus M. Manalastas, who was one of the signatories to the said letters.
As regards the charge of bias and partiality, complainant asserted
that after respondent Judge issued her Omnibus Order, she continued to hear the
case. She conducted summary hearing on
plaintiff's application for a writ of attachment on
2. COMMENT dated
Respondent Judge explained that the complainant's Motion to Dismiss was denied because the same was filed out of time. She averred that the Rules of Court prescribe the procedure to be followed in the cases pending before her and she was not at liberty to disregard the Rules.
Regarding the charge that the docket fees paid was not proper, respondent Judge asserted that she is not unaware of the Manchester and Sun Insurance cases. She argued that assuming that the said fees were not correct, the court may allow payment of docket fees within a reasonable period as held in the Sun Insurance case and as allowed in Section 2 Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court.
As regards the denial of the Motion for Inhibition, respondent alleged the fact that in connection with the questioned Omnibus Order, complainant filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, wherein the issues raised were related and interlocking with the instant administrative case. She then prayed for the dismissal of the latter for being premature.
3. REPLY dated
Complainant alleged that nothing in respondent's Comment directly impugned the charges against her. He reiterated his claims in his complaint.
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION: Respondent has been ADMONISHED in A.M. No. 03-1757-RTJ entitled "Aida Schlobohm vs. Judge Amelia Cotangco-Manalastas" for failure to decide a case within the reglementary period.
EVALUATION: The complaint is devoid of merit.
Anent the charge of Gross Ignorance of the Law and/or Procedure,
there is no evidence beyond the bare allegations of complainant to prove that
respondent issued the assailed omnibus order because of any corrupt motives. To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious
accusation, and a person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must
be sure of the grounds for the accusation. (Evelyn Suarez-de Leon
v. Judge Santiago R. Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1935;
On the matter of respondent's denial of the motion for inhibition, the rule on disqualification of judges is laid down in Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Disqualification of Judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according [to] the rules of [the] civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
As can be gleaned from the records, complainant's basis for inhibition was the information that respondent and plaintiff were godparents of a child of a common friend. In addition, complainant alleged that he received two letters from the law office of respondent's husband, handling a case for a client who had similar claims as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 70251, which letter were signed by respondent Judge's husband.
As regards the charge of bias and partiality, it should be emphasized, however, that as a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous. He cannot be subjected to
liability-civil, criminal or administrative- for any of his official acts, no
matter how erroneous as long as he acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is not to file an administrative complaint against the judge but to
elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of
the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter
can be branded the stigma of being bias and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge
commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown
to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. (Ester B. Cepeda vs. Judge Loreto Purugganan,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1866, July 30, 2004; citing Edgardo D. Balsamo
vs. Judge Pedro L. Suan, RTC, Branch 15, Ozamis City
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1656,
In fine, the alleged errors committed by respondent pertained [to]
the performance of her adjudicative functions. In Maquiran vs. Grageda (A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888,
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may [be] deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia , the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal in nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Law and logic decree that "administrative" or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for [f]acts they may do and dispositions, th[ey] may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of this Honorable Court is our recommendation that the instant case be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
and finding the evaluation and recommendation therein to be in accord with law and the facts of the case, the Court approves and adopts the same.
Indeed, alleged errors committed by respondent judge pertain to
the exercise of her adjudicative functions. Such cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies. (em>Bello
III v. Dias, AM-MTJ-00-1311,
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against Judge Amelia Cotangco-Manalastas is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
First Division
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