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A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-2476-RTJ.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. JUDGE MARY ANN E. CORPUS-MA�ALAC, RTC, BRANCH 28, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA
First Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-2476-RTJ (Antonio B. Baltazar v. Judge Mary Ann E. Corpus-Ma�alac, RTC, Branch 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna)
Acting on the Report
[1]
cralaw
of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated
REASON FOR AGENDA: In a 1st indorsement dated
The resolution refers to the complaint filed by Antonio B. Baltazar
against Hon. Mary Ann E. Corpuz-Ma�alac, former Resident Ombudsman, Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila,
for grave misconduct and dishonesty. The
respondent is presently [the] presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, having been appointed to the service on
Complainant Baltazar alleges that respondent Ma�alac,
aside from collecting Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA), was
also using government vehicle in open defiance to the memorandum dated
He further avers that in respondent's letter dated
In the aforesaid resolution, the Office of the Internal Affairs Board, Ombudsman, recommended that an administrative investigation be conducted and respondent Ma�alac be required to file her counter-affidavit.
In our 1st indorsement dated
In compliance with the directive, respondent judge submitted her
comment on
She notes that the acts imputed against her pertain to her stint as DPWH Resident Ombudsman and not as a judge. She contends that the administrative authority therefore should nor be with the Office of the Ombudsman, whose internal memorandum was allegedly violated. She argues that the resolution of whether she committed an infraction of the Ombudsman directive is determinable by the Ombudsman herself since a finding of administrative infraction will involve an interpretation of the memorandum issued by her office.
Respondent Judge Ma�alac alleges that complainant wanted to create the impression that she was issued a vehicle aside from receiving transportation allowance in violation of accounting rules in relation to R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). She denies that her host agency issued to her a vehicle as claimed by the complainant. The vehicle being referred to was simply detailed and made available for the use of the Office of the Resident Ombudsman-DPWH pursuant to the OMB-DPWH MOA (Annex "A" of Compliance of respondent). The vehicle was issued to and received by the DPWH employee detailed to the said office as shown by the memorandum of receipt (Annex "D" of Compliance of respondent). Respondent contends that she is therefore not in a position to return the vehicle since it was not issued to her.
She claims that the vehicle was not used for her personal benefit. No less than the documents/trip tickets attached to Mr. Baltazar's complaint show that the same was used for official business. It was used particularly in transporting confidential documents and reports from the ORO-DPWH to the Office of the Ombudsman and back, as well as in transporting the respondent herself to various lecture fora she was officially mandated to undertake.
She further claims that in the meeting of the Resident Ombudsmen
held on
Respondent emphasizes that the use of the subject vehicle for official business was never concealed from the knowledge of her immediate supervisor, the Director of the Bureau of Resident Ombudsmen.
Respondent submits that dishonesty and misconduct could not
therefore be imputed to her. Her use of
the vehicle was in good faith, above board and properly documented. Her honest intention could be gleaned from her
letter to the DPWH Secretary dated
Finally, respondent notes that the Offices of Resident Ombudsmen in various host agencies were assigned only one organic staff from the Ombudsman which is grossly disproportionate to the demanded work output. In the case of DPWH-ORO, the staff assigned was even a young female who was then pregnant. By analogy, respondent equates herself to a soldier sent to the battlefield risking her life with very scant weapon and ammunition. With these constraints, the respondent, who is a female and was then in her mid-thirties, tried her best to deliver the demanded work output and even undertook the responsibility of personally transmitting confidential reports from DPWH (Manila) to the Office of the Ombudsman (Quezon City). Borrowing a DPWH vehicle for official purpose was in her honest opinion, without any intent to defy their office memorandum.
EVALUATION: The instant administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by Antonio B. Baltazar against Hon. Mary Ann E. Corpuz-Ma�alac, former Resident Ombudsman and now presiding judge of RTC, Branch 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The complaint was referred to this Office in view of the exclusive disciplining authority of the Supreme Court over incumbent judges, although this pertains to acts allegedly committed prior to respondent judge's appointment to the judiciary.
In the resolution dated
This Office takes note of the subsequent resolution issued by the
same Office of the Ombudsman on
The resolution further states that "xxx, the respondent's act of using the government vehicle issued to her office does not, by itself, constitute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence as would constitute a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. To render otherwise, would make for an overreaching if not strained application of the said legal provision. Indeed, the relevant improvement in policy and practice relative to the use of organic vehicles does not suddenly make criminal an act that appears to contravene such declared policy. At most, any such violation may only be considered administrative in nature probably for insubordination and/or violation of reasonable office rules and regulations." Thus, the complaint was dismissed for lack of probable cause.
It is evident from the aforesaid resolution that there was no criminal liability on the part of respondent Judge Ma�alac for using the vehicle provided for her office by the DPWH. There is therefore no necessity for this Office to discuss further the allegations of complainant Baltazar. If at all, as stated in the resolution, respondent may only be held liable for "insubordination and/or violation of reasonable office rules and regulations." If the Office of the Ombudsman declined from taking any action on the aforesaid insubordination and/or violation, with more reason that xxx this Office [should] decline from taking action. After all, it was allegedly the office rules and regulations of the Office of the Ombudsman and not that of the Supreme Court that was allegedly violated.
RECOMMENDATION: IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the instant administrative complaint filed by Mr. Antonio B. Baltazar against Judge Mary Ann E. Corpuz-Ma�alac, RTC, Branch 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna be DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
Considering the peculiar circumstances in this case, the Court agrees that Judge Corpuz-Ma�alac cannot be held administratively liable for acts done prior to her appointment in the Judiciary. The proper agency to act on the matter, the Office of Internal Affairs Board of the Ombudsman, already dismissed the charges [2] cralaw against her for lack of probable cause for violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the instant administrative complaint against Judge Mary Ann E. Corpuz-Ma�alac for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
First Division
Endnotes:
[1] cralaw Rollo , pp. 100-103.
[2] cralaw Id. at 66-70.
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