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A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2352-RTJ.
PORFIRIO B. TOCONG, JR. v. JUDGE MA. TERESA CRUZ-SAN GABRIEL, RTC, BRANCH 80, MORONG, RIZAL, JUDGE AMORFINA CERRADO-CEZAR, MCTC, TERESA, RIZAL AND SHERIFF FLORENCIO SJ. ALCANTARA, RTC, MORONG, RIZAL
First Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated
A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2352-RTJ (Porfirio B. Tocong, Jr. v. Judge Ma. Teresa Cruz-San Gabriel, RTC, Branch 80, Morong, Rizal, Judge Amorfina Cerrado-Cezar, MCTC, Teresa, Rizal and Sheriff Florencio SJ. Alcantara, RTC, Morong, Rizal)
Considering the Report of the Office of the Court Administrator, to wit;
A) Verified COMPLAINT of Porfirio B. Tocong, Jr. against Judge Maria Teresa Cruz-San Gabriel, Judge Amorfina Cerrado-Cezar and Sheriff Florencio SJ. Alcantara, for Grave Abuse of Discretion and Authority.
Complainant avers that, on March 7, 2000, a complaint for Unlawful Detainer was filed in the MCTC of Teresa-Baras, Rizal docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 904-T. Former Presiding Judge Pabel D. Sulit ruled in favor of the defendants, but on appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1254-M, former Presiding Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, RTC, Branch 80, Morong Rizal, reversed the decision of the inferior court and found in favor of the plaintiffs.
On
After hearing on
Respondent Sheriff Alcantara implemented
respondent Judge Cezar's Order of
Complainant charges that: (a) respondent Judge San Gabriel violated Canon 3, Rule 3.12 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics on Disqualification when she did not disqualify herself from handling SCA 04-051-M as she knew relevant facts of the case because of a previous case (Civil Case No. 00-1254-M) and that she even adopted from the previous case some of her findings in the Decision she rendered in SCA 04-051-M; (b) respondent Judge Cezar issued an Order on June 1, 2005 that is unjust, partial, null and void order because it gave more credence to fictitious and spurious documents and on the word of a person, who was not even summoned to testify, rather than on its finding in Order dated August 1, 2004 that he was the owner of the property; and (c) respondent Sheriff Alcantara demolished their family dwelling at the time of their bereavement.
B) COMMENT of respondent Judge San Gabriel disputing the allegations against her. She avers that if complainant had reasonable ground to question her qualification to hear and decide SCA No. 04-051-M, he failed to file the appropriate motion/manifestation to this effect and he even he [sic] took part in the proceedings therein. Complainant and his counsel did not even file a motion for reconsideration and the decision became final and executory.
Respondent Judge San Gabriel submits that there is no reasonable ground under Canon 3, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to disqualify her from handling SCA No. 04-051-M just because Civil Case No. 00-1254-M was decided earlier by RTC, Branch 80, and (sic) Morong Rizal through its former presiding judge. She categorically denies being partial to the petitioners in the case as she does not know them and there is nothing on record, including in the instant Complaint, which would indicate that she acted with grave abuse of discretion/authority. The Decision in SCA No. 04-051-M was arrived at after a painstaking review of the facts and the laws involved, and if complainant felt aggrieved or believed that she failed to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented therein, he should have filed an appeal in the appropriate court and not the present administrative complaint.
C) COMMENT of respondent Judge Cezar denying the allegations against her. She contends that although complainant was not included in the original detainer case, he is categorized as an agent of a defendant fraudulently occupying the disputed property and who is bound by the judgment. She contends that if complainant wanted to test his possessory rights in the concept of an owner as against the rights of the registered and titled owners of the property, he should have filed an action before the proper court. With the finality of the Decision in the ejectment case, the execution in favor of the plaintiff has become a matter of right and its implementation was mandatory. (Oblea, et al. vs. CA, G.R. 117389, May 11, 1995) Citing Gomez vs. Belen (292 SCRA 151) and Fule vs. CA (286 SCRA 358), respondent Judge Cezar argues that "administrative proceedings against judges are not acceptable substitutes for judicial remedies prescribed by law to correct supposed errors of the latter acting within the scope of their jurisdiction and functions and that the acts of a judge pertaining to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith."
D) COMMENT of respondent Sheriff Alcantara rejecting the allegations against him. He avers that the present complaint contains allegations similar to the complaint docketed as OCA IPI No. 04-1950 [-P] and he adopts his comment to said complaint as part of his comment to the present matter. The only additional imputation to the present complaint is the allegation that complainant and his family were grieving at the loss of a mother at the time of the implementation of the writ of demolition.
Respondent Sheriff Alcantara maintains that his acts were based on lawful Orders of the court, for which he cannot be held accountable. He contends that complainant raised the argument of a grieving family only to invite pity. He (respondent) learned about the request for postponement on the very day of the demolition and the wake was not in the property where the demolition would take place.
E) REPLY of complainant to respondents' Comments. Complainant merely rehashed his allegations in his original pleading.
OTHER RELEVANT
INFORMATION: OCA IPI No.
04-1950-P was dismissed for lack of merit by the Honorable Court in Resolution
dated
EVALUATION: The Complaint should be dismissed against all respondents. The arguments and reasons submitted by the respondents are well-founded and correct. Complainant's accusations obviously refer to judicial matters. His contentions are similar to his arguments submitted before the trial courts, which the respondent's [sic] have already passed upon and ruled, and which may only [be] reviewed judicially by an appellate court.
The assailed order of respondent Judge Cezar merely implemented the Decision of respondent Judge San Gabriel. While it is noted that her Order might appear unusual because she stated therein her own findings and conclusions, it is found to be neither irregular nor unjust and corrupt. The ultimate goal of the assailed order was nothing more than the implementation of the Decision of a higher court, which is as mandated by the rules. The Order of respondent Judge Cezar may be a complete turnaround from her previous Order, but such is explained by the fact [that] she was reversed by a higher court and it was her sworn duty as presiding judge of an inferior court to abide by the higher decree.
Sheriff Alcantara merely acted in
obedience to a lawful order of the court. His function is ministerial. As the Honorable Court held in the case of Celestino
A. Garcera II vs.
Othello A. Parrone, Sheriff III, Branch III,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Naga City (A.M. No. P-05-2030 [formerly
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1902-P],
A sheriff's duty to execute a valid writ is purely ministerial, not discretionary in connection with which this Court differentiates a ministerial act from a discretionary act in this wise:
The duty of the sheriff to execute a valid writ is ministerial and not discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. A discretionary act, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he may decide the question either way and still be right.
The duty of a sheriff to execute a writ being ministerial, he has no discretion to delay the execution thereof. Absent any instructions by a court to the contrary, he is mandated to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness with the strict implementation of the writ. [16] If for any reason he cannot implement the writ in part or in full, his duty is outlined in the above-quoted provision of Section 14 of Rule 39.
The duty of a sheriff to execute a writ being ministerial, he has no discretion to delay the execution thereof. Absent any instructions by a court to the contrary, he is mandated to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness with the strict implementation of the writ.
All told, if complainant felt aggrieved, he should have appealed the questioned order and decision to a higher court. Respondents merely acted within their authority and in lawful performance of their duties and functions. Indeed, complainant failed to adduce evidence of malice and ill-motive in their actuations.
As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action. He
cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative, for any
of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good
faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment. More importantly, the
filing of an administrative complaint against a judge is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse is still available. In the absence of fraud, malice or dishonesty
in rendering the assailed decision or order, the remedy of the aggrieved party
is to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and
correction. As such, an administrative
complaint against a judge cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial
remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by his erroneous order or judgment. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary
or extraordinary. An inquiry into a
judge's civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may be made only after
the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with finality. (Perfecto K. Estrada, Jr., A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1617 [Formerly A.M. No. 02-1342-MTJ] [sic] vs. Judge James
Stewart, Ramon E. Himalaloan, Municipal Trial Court,
Loon,
Bohol
,
In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of
establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint. Notatu
dignum
is the presumption of regularity in the
performance of a judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue
interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred
allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any
person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich. (Rovinna
De Jesus Elefant vs. Judge Socorro B. Inting, et al. [A.M. No.
RTJ-05-I938,
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court with the recommendation that the instant complaint be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
and finding the evaluation and recommendation therein to be in accord with law and the facts of the case, the Court approves and adopts the same.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against Judge Ma. Teresa Cruz-San Gabriel, Judge Amorfina Cerrado-Cezar and Sheriff Florencio SJ. Alcantara is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
First Division
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