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[G.R. No. 148630. September 4, 2006]

ANGELO DWIGHT PENSON vs. SPOUSES MELCHOR AND VIRGINIA MARANAN

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT. 4, 2006

G.R. No. 148630 (Angelo Dwight Penson vs. Spouses Melchor and Virginia Maranan )

For resolution are the following incidents:

(a)����������� First and Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment on the Attorney's Lien;

(b)����������� Entry of Appearance for petitioner by Atty. Pericles C. Consunji of the Aranas Consunji Barleta & Co.;

(c)����������� A Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated June 20, 2006, denying the petition and affirming the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 14, 2000, which annulled the RTC Order dated August 17, 1999 enjoining respondents and all persons acting for and in their behalf to cease and desist from implementing the writ of possession, subject to petitioner's filing of a bond in the amount of P3,000,000.00.;

(d)����������� Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition (Re: PECABAR's Notice of Attorney's Lien); and

(e)����������� Petitioner's Comment/Opposition (Re: PECABAR's Notice of Attorney's Lien).

In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner argues that the Court erred in ruling that he is not a true third party with respect to the mortgage and the writ of possession, and that injunction is the proper and only remedy given the inconveniences that petitioner will suffer vis- �-vis respondents. Petitioner also alleges "equity" as a basis for the Court's reconsideration of the assailed Decision.

The Court, however, has already resolved all these arguments in the assailed Decision. Petitioner's invocation of equity cannot stand since there is a clear provision of law/rule applicable in this case, ^[1] cralaw i.e. the issuance of a writ of possession concomitant to an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding is a ministerial duty of the court, and it issues as a matter of course even without the filing and approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in the name of the purchaser, and that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with issuance or enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to issue such writ.

Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration should be DENIED.

Anent Petitioner's Comment/Opposition (Re: PECABAR's Notice of Attorney's Lien), the same opposes the Notice of Attorney's Lien filed by the law firm of Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manalastas on November 23, 2005. The Notice of Attorney's Lien seeks the notation of a lien over any judgment to be rendered in this case to be made in favor of the law firm for the unpaid attorney's fees in the amount of P467,161.00.

As correctly pointed out in the Comment/Opposition, what PECABAR actually seeks in this case is a charging lien, as provided in Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time w hen he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

In Rilloraza v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., ^[2] cralaw the Court ruled that:

A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client. From the facts of the case it would seem that petitioner had no hand in the settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a favorable judgment for ETPI. (Emphasis supplied)

It presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client and grants the attorney "the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements." ^[3] cralaw

The present case involves the validity of the issuance of the writ of possession by the RTC of Para�aque City, Branch 260 in the case filed by petitioner docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0272 for Annulment of Title with Damages and Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. The Court's Decision does not provide for any money judgment or monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. Such being the case, the Notice of Attorney's Lien does not have any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property. ^[4] cralaw

If the firm has any recourse, it is to file the notice with the court of origin (RTC of Para�aque City, Branch 260) since the case filed by petitioner below includes damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:

(a) GRANT the First and Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment on the Attorney's Lien;

(b) NOTE the Entry of Appearance for petitioner by Atty. Pericles C. Consunji of the Aranas Consunji Barleta & Co.;

(c) DENY WITH FINALITY the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated June 20, 2006;

(d) GRANT the Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition (Re: PECABAR's Notice of Attorney's Lien);

(e) NOTE petitioner's Comment/Opposition (Re: PECABAR's Notice of Attorney's Lien); and

(f) DENY PECABAR's Notice of Attorney's Lien.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court

First Division

Endnotes:

^[1] cralaw Valdevieso v. Damalerio, G.R. No. 133303, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 664, 672.

^[2] cralaw 369 Phil. 1, 12 (1999).

^[3] cralaw Ampil v. Agrava, 145 Phil. 297, 305 (1970).

^[4] cralaw Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 86100-03, January 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 367, 373.

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