US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
BLITZ V. UNITED STATES, 153 U. S. 308 (1894)
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Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308 (1894)
Blitz v. United States
No. 1102
Argued April 13, 1894
Decided April 30, 1894
153 U.S. 308
Syllabus
B. having been indicted under Rev.Stat. § 5511 for voting more than once at the same election for a Representative in Congress, a special deputy of the marshal swore at the trial that he saw B. vote twice at the poll. On cross-examination, he was asked why be did not arrest B. when he saw that he had thus voted. The question, being objected to, was excluded. Held that it was irrelevant and was properly excluded.
The refusal by a federal court to grant a new trial cannot be reviewed on a writ of error.
An indictment under Rev.Stat. § 5511 for knowingly personating and voting under the name of another at an election at which a Representative in Congress and also state officers were to be elected, is fatally defective if it fails to clearly charge that the accused so voted for a Representative in Congress.
A count in an indictment under that section which charges that the defendant did then and there unlawfully, knowingly, and feloniously vote at said election for a candidate for the same office for Representative in the Congress of the United States more than once describes the offense with sufficient certainty, and the election at which it took place sufficiently by such reference to the date of it named in a previous count in the indictment. chanrobles.com-red
The indictment in this case contained three counts, specifying three separate offenses against Rev.Stat. § 5511. The defendant was convicted of all. A motion in arrest of judgment under the second count being entertained, he was sentenced under the first conviction to imprisonment for a term commencing on a day named, and under the third conviction to a further term commencing on the expiration of the first term. This Court, holding the first count in the indictment to he fatally defective, and sustaining the arrest of judgment under the second count, directs that the term of imprisonment under the third count shall be held to commence on the day named for the commencement of the first term.
The case is stated in the opinion.
