DANKE-WALKER MILLING CO. V. BONDURANT, 257 U. S. 282 (1921)Subscribe to Cases that cite 257 U. S. 282
U.S. Supreme Court
Danke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921)
Danke-Walker Milling Company v. Bondurant
Argued March 18, 1921
Restored to docket for reargument June 6, 1921
Reargued October 10, 1921
Decided December 12, 1921
257 U.S. 282
1. A decision of a state court applying and enforcing a state statute of general scope against a particular transaction as to which there was not merely a claim of a right or immunity under the Constitution, but a distinct and timely insistence that, if so applied to it, the statute was unconstitutional and void, necessarily affirms the validity of the statute when so applied, and the judgment based thereon is therefore reviewable by writ of error under § 237 Jud.Code, as amended by the Act of September 6, 1916. P. 257 U. S. 288.
2. That the statute in such case is not claimed to be invalid in toto and for every purpose is immaterial, since a statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another, and a litigant, moreover, can be heard to question a statute's validity only when and insofar as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. P. 257 U. S. 289.
3. The right to review the validity of a state statute under Jud.Code § 237 is independent of the grounds or reasons on which the state court upholds the validity of the statute. P. 257 U. S. 289.
4. Where the state court denied enforceability to a contract made by a foreign corporation upon the grounds that the contract was local in character, and that the corporation had not complied with a statute conditioning the right of foreign corporations to do local business, although the corporation insisted that the contract was made in interstate commerce and that the statute, so applied, was therefore unconstitutional, held that the judgment was reviewable here by writ of error. P. 257 U. S. 290.
5. Interstate commerce is not confined to transportation from one state to another, but comprehends all commercial intercourse between different states and all the component parts of that intercourse. P. 257 U. S. 290.
6. Just as, where goods in one state are transported into another for purposes of sale, the interstate commerce embraces their sale after they reach their destination and while they are in the original packages, on the same principle, where goods are purchased chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
in one state for transportation to another, the commerce includes the purchase quite as much as it does the transportation. P. 257 U. S. 290.
7. A corporation of one state may go into another, without obtaining the leave or license of the latter, for all the legitimate purposes of such commerce, and any statute of the latter state which obstructs or lays a burden on the exercise of this privilege is pro tanto void under the commerce clause. P. 257 U. S. 291.
8. A Tennessee corporation, in pursuance of its practice of purchasing grain in Kentucky to be transported to and used in its Tennessee mill, made a contract for the purchase of wheat, to be delivered in Kentucky on the cars of a public carrier, intending to forward it as soon as delivery was made. Held that the transaction was in interstate commerce notwithstanding the contract was made and to be performed in Kentucky, and that the possibility that the purchaser might change its mind after delivery and sell the grain in Kentucky or consign it to some other place in that state did not affect the essential character of the transaction. P. 257 U. S. 292.
185 Ky. 386 reversed.
Error to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky which affirmed a judgment of a court of first instance on a verdict directed for the defendant in an action for damages for breach of contract brought by the plaintiff in error. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary