U.S. Supreme Court
Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658 (1926)
Virginian Railway Company v. United States
Nos. 281, 282
Argued October 29, 1926
Decided December 13, 1926
272 U.S. 658
1. Whether a rate is unjustly discriminatory is a question on which the finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission, supported by substantial evidence, is conclusive, unless there was some irregularity in the proceeding or some error in the application of rules of law. P. 272 U. S. 663.
2. The fact that the purpose of a carrier in making a trackage arrangement with another is to increase its own business is not a legal excuse for unjust discrimination in through rates, resulting from the arrangement, among shippers on the carrier's line. P. 272 U. S. 663.
3. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission for abatement of unjust discrimination among shippers on a carrier's line resulting from a trackage arrangement may be directed to that carrier as well as to the other with which the arrangement exists, although the latter alone may be responsible for the rates granted the favored shippers. P. 272 U. S. 665. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. A finding of the Commission that a rate is unreasonable is binding on this Court when supported by evidence, without regard to the soundness of the Commission's reasoning and conclusions or their consistency with findings in other proceedings. P. 272 U. S. 665.
5. Section 15(3) of the Act to Regulate Commerce does not require that the Commission make a special finding of public interest before it can prescribe how an existing through rate found to be unreasonable and discriminatory shall be made conformable to law. P. 272 U. S. 666.
6. The fact that an order of the Commission requiring a carrier to establish through rates from its lines over lines of two other carriers may result, through duplication of routes, in discrimination against shippers on lines of those carriers does not make it unreasonable or otherwise illegal. P. 272 U. S. 667.
7. The force and effect of a decree of a federal court dismissing a bill and dissolving an interlocutory injunction are not suspended as a mere consequence of an appeal to this Court, even if a supersedeas is allowed. P. 272 U. S. 668.
8. Under the Act of October 22, 1913, the district court of three judges has power to grant a stay of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission pending appeal to this Court from a decree refusing a temporary injunction and dismissing the bill. P. 272 U. S. 668.
9. The Act of 1913, in this respect, is in pari materia with § 266 of the Judicial Code, and to be similarly construed. P. 272 U. S. 671.
10. A stay of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission pending appeal from a decree refusing an injunction is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury may otherwise result to the appellant, and requires much stronger and more special reasons for its justification when the decree has dismissed the bill on the merits than where it is interlocutory. P. 272 U. S. 672.
11. When not otherwise apparent to the parties and the appellate court, the grounds of a decision of the district court should be indicated by an opinion -- particularly in equity matters involving complicated facts. P. 272 U. S. 675.
No. 281, affirmed.
No. 282 reversed.
Cross-appeals from a decree of the district court refusing a temporary injunction and dismissing the bill in a suit against the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission to enjoin an order of the latter respecting rates on coal. The appeal of the defendants was from chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
so much of the decree as restrained enforcement of the order pending the perfecting and determination of the primary appeal.