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PANAMA REFINING CO. v. RYAN, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)

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U.S. Supreme Court

PANAMA REFINING CO. v. RYAN, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)

293 U.S. 388

PANAMA REFINING CO. et al.
v.
RYAN et al.

AMAZON PETROLEUM CORPORATION et al.
v.
SAME.

Nos. 135, 260.
Argued Dec. 10, 11, 1934.
Decided Jan. 7, 1935.

Page 293 U.S. 388, 391

Messrs. J. N. Saye, of Longview, Tex., and F. W. Fischer, of Tyler, Tex., for petitioners.

Page 293 U.S. 388, 398

Mr. Harold M. Stephens, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

Page 293 U.S. 388, 405

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

On July 11, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6199 (15 USCA 709 note), prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly

Page 293 U.S. 388, 406

authorized agency of a State.' [Footnote 1] This action was based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 200, 15 U.S.C. tit. 1, 709(c), 15 USCA 709(c). That section provides:

    'Sec. 9. ...
    '(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.'

On July 14, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6204 (15 USCA 709 note), authorized the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the President 'for the purpose of en-

Page 293 U.S. 388, 407

forcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order' of July 11, 1933, 'including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.' [Footnote 2] That order was made under section 10(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 200, 15 U.S.C. 710(a), 15 USCA 710(a), authorizing the President 'to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes' of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act and providing that 'any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.'

On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out the President's orders of July 11 and 14, 1933. These regulations were amended by orders

Page 293 U.S. 388, 408

of July 25, 1933, and August 21, 1933, prior to the commencement of these suits. Regulation IV provided, in substance, that every producer of petroleum should file a monthly statement under oath, beginning August 15, 1933, with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior giving information with respect to the residence and post office address of the producer, the location of his producing properties and wells, the allowable production as prescribed by state authority, the amount of daily production, all deliveries of petroleum, and declaring that no part of the petroleum or products produced and shipped had been produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state authority. Regulation V required every purchaser, shipper (other than a producer), and refiner of petroleum, including processors, similarly to file a monthly statement under oath, giving information as to residence and post office address, the place and date of receipt, the parties from whom and the amount of petroleum received and the amount held in storage, the disposition of the petroleum, particulars as to deliveries, and declaring, to the best of the affiant's information and belief, that none of the petroleum so handled had been produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of that allowed by state authority. Regulation VII provided that all persons embraced within the terms of section 9(c) of the act, 15 USCA 709(a) and the executive orders and regulations issued thereunder, should keep 'available for inspection by the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior adequate books and records of all transactions involving the production and transportation of petroleum and the products thereof.'

On August 19, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6256, stating that his action was taken under title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved a 'Code of

Page 293 U.S. 388, 409

Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.' [Footnote 3] By a further Executive Order of August 28, 1933, the President designated the Secretary of the Interior as Administrator, and the Department of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise on behalf of the President all the powers vested in him under that act and code. Section 3(f) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 USCA 703(f), provides that, when a code of fair competition has been approved or prescribed by the President under that title, 'any violation of any provision thereof in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall

Page 293 U.S. 388, 410

be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.'

This 'Petroleum Code' (in its original form and as officially printed) provided in section 3 of article III relating to 'Production' for estimates of 'required production of crude oil to balance consumer demand for petroleum products' to be made at intervals by the federal agency. This 'required production' was to be 'equitably allocated' among the several states. These estimates and allocations, when approved by the President, were to be deemed to be 'the net reasonable market demand,' and the allocations were to be recommended 'as the operating schedules for the producing States and for the industry.' By section 4 of article III, the subdivision, with respect to producing properties, of the production allocated to each state, was to be made within the state. The second paragraph of that section further provided:

    'If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any State shall be made within a State any production by any person, as person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair trade practice and in violation of this code.'

By an Executive Order of September 13, 1933, No. 6284-a, modifying certain provisions of the Petroleum Code, this second paragraph of section 4 of article III was eliminated. It was reinstated by Executive Order of September 25, 1934, No. 6855

These suits were brought in October, 1933.

In No. 135, the Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, and its coplaintiff, a producer having oil and gas leases in Texas, sued to restrain the defendants, who were federal officials, from enforcing Regulations IV, V, and VII prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior under section 9(c) of the National Industrial

Page 293 U.S. 388, 411

Recovery Act. Plaintiffs attacked the validity of section 9(c) as an unconstitutional delegation to the President of legislative power and as transcending the authority of the Congress under the commerce clause. The regulations, and the attempts to enforce them by coming upon the properties of the plaintiffs, gauging their tanks, digging up pipe lines, and otherwise, were also assailed under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.

In No. 260, the Amazon Petroleum Corporation and its coplaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas and owning separate properties, sued to enjoin the Railroad Commission of that state, its members and other state officers, and the other defendants who were federal officials, from enforcing the state and federal restrictions upon the production and disposition of oil. The bill alleged that the legislation of the state and the orders of its commission in curtailing production violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. As to the federal requirements, the bill not only attacked section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior thereunder, upon substantially the same grounds as those set forth in the bill of the Panama Refining Company, but also challenged the validity of provisions of the Petroleum Code. While a number of these provisions were set out in the bill, the contest on the trial related to the limitation of production through the allocation of quotas pursuant to section 4 of article III of the code.

As the case involved the constitutional validity of orders of the state commission and an interlocutory injunction was sought, a court of three judges was convened under section 266 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C . 380 (28 USCA 380)). That court decided that the cause of action against the federal officials was not one within section 266, but was for the consideration of the District Judge alone. The parties agreed that the causes of action should be severed and that each cause

Page 293 U.S. 388, 412

should be submitted to the tribunal having jurisdiction of it. Hearing was had both on the applications for interlocutory injunction and upon the merits. The court of three judges, sustaining the state orders, denied injunction, and dismissed the bill as against the state authorities. Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm. (D.C.) 5 F.Supp. 633, 634, 639.

In both cases against the federal officials, that of the Panama Refining Company and that of the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, heard by the District Judge, a permanent injunction was granted. 5 F.Supp. 639. In the case of the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, the court specifically enjoined the defendants from enforcing section 4 of article III of the Petroleum Code; both plaintiffs and defendants and the court being unaware of the amendment of September 13, 1933.

The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decrees against the federal officials and directed that the bills be dismissed. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F.(2d) 1; Ryan v. Panama Refining Co., 71 F.(2d) 8. The cases come here on writs of certiorari granted on October 8, 1934, 293 U.S. 539, 55 S.Ct. 102, 79 L.Ed. --; 293 U.S. 539, 55 S.Ct. 83, 79 L.Ed. --.

First. The controversy with respect to the provision of section 4 of article III of the Petroleum Code was initiated and proceeded in the courts below upon a false assumption. That assumption was that this section still contained the paragraph (eliminated by the Executive Order of September 13, 1933) by which production in excess of assigned quotas was made an unfair practice and a violation of the code. Whatever the cause of the failure to give appropriate public notice of the change in the section, with the result that the persons affected, the prosecuting authorities, and the courts, were alike ignorant of the alteration, the fact is that the attack in this respect was upon a provision which did not exist. The government's announcement that, by reason of the elimination of this paragraph, the government 'cannot, and therefore it does not intend to, prosecute petitioners or other producers of oil in Texas, criminally or otherwise,

Page 293 U.S. 388, 413

for exceeding, at any time prior to September 25, 1934, the quotas of production assigned to them under the laws of Texas,' but that, if 'petitioners, or other producers, produce in excess of such quotas after September 25, 1934, the government intends to prosecute them,' cannot avail to import into the present case the amended provision of that date. [Footnote 4] The case is not one where a subsequent law is applicable to a pending suit and controls its disposition. [Footnote 5] When this suit was brought and when it was heard, there was no cause of action for the injunction sought with respect to the provision of section 4 of article III of the code; as to that, there was no basis for real controversy. See California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314, 13 S.Ct. 876; United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116, 40 S.Ct. 448; Barker Painting Co. v. Local No. 734, Brotherhood of Painters, etc., 281 U.S. 462, 50 S.Ct. 356. If the government undertakes to enforce the new provision, the petitioners, as well as others, will have an opportunity to present their grievance, which can then be considered, as it should be, in the light of the facts as they will then appear.

For this reason, we pass to the other questions presented, and we express no opinion as to the interpretation or validity of the provisions of the Petroleum Code.

Second. Regulations IV, V, and VII, issued by the Secretary of the Interior prior to these suits, have since been amended. But the amended regulations continue sub-

Page 293 U.S. 388, 414

stantially the earlier requirements and expand them. They present the same constitutional questions, and the cases as to these are not moot. Southern Pacific Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 433, 452, 31 S. Ct. 288; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 514-516, 31 S.Ct. 279; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181, 182 S., 47 S.Ct. 319, 50 A.L.R. 1.

The original regulations of July 15, 1933, as amended July 25, 1933, and August 21, 1933, were issued to enforce the Executive Orders of July 11 and July 14, 1933. The Executive Order of July 11, 1933, was made under section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Executive Order of July 14, 1933, under section 10(a) of that act, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations, was for the purpose of enforcing section 9(c) and the Executive Order of July 11, 1933. The amended regulations have been issued for the same purpose. The fundamental question as to these regulations thus turns upon the validity of section 9( c) and the executive orders to carry it out.

Third. The statute provides that any violation of any order of the President issued under section 9(c) shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both. We think that these penalties would attach to each violation, and in this view the plaintiffs were entitled to invoke the equitable jurisdiction to restrain enforcement, if the statute and the executive orders were found to be invalid. Philadelphia Company v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620, 621 S., 32 S.Ct. 340; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214-216, 44 S. Ct. 15; Hygrade Provision Company v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 499, 500 S., 45 S.Ct. 141.

Fourth. Section 9[c] is assailed upon the ground that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The section purports to authorize the President to pass a prohibitory law. The subject to which this authority relates is defined. It is the transportation in interstate and

Page 293 U.S. 388, 415

foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum products which are produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state authority. Assuming for the present purpose, without deciding, that the Congress has power to interdict the transportation of that excess in interstate and foreign commerce, the question whether that transportation shall be prohibited by law is obviously one of legislative policy. Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President's action; whether the Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition.

Section 9(c) is brief and unambiguous. It does not attempt to control the production of petroleum and petroleum products within a state. It does not seek to lay down rules for the guidance of state Legislatures or state officers. It leaves to the states and to their constituted authorities the determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify the President's authority by reference to the basis or extent of the state's limitation of production. Section 9(c) does not state whether or in what circumstances or under what conditions the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the state's permission. It establishes no creterion to govern the President's course. It does not require any finding by the President as a condition of his action. The Congress in section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess production. So far as this section is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.

Page 293 U.S. 388, 416

We examine the context to ascertain if it furnishes a declaration of policy or a standard of action, which can be deemed to relate to the subject of section 9(c) and thus to imply what is not there expressed. It is important to note that section 9 (15 USCA 709) is headed 'Oil Regulation'-that is, section 9 is the part of the National Industrial Recovery Act which particularly deals with that subject-matter. But the other provisions of section 9 afford no ground for implying a limitation of the broad grant of authority in section 9(c). Thus section 9(a) authorizes the President to initiate before the Interstate Commerce Commission 'proceedings necessary to prescribe regulations to control the operations of oil pipe lines and to fix reasonable, compensatory rates for the transportation of petroleum and its products by pipe lines,' and the Interstate Commerce Commission is to grant preference 'to the hearings and determination of such cases.' Section 9(b) authorizes the President to institute proceedings 'to divorce from any holding company any pipe-line company controlled by such holding company which pipeline company by unfair practices or by exorbitant rates in the transportation of petroleum or its products tends to create a monopoly.' It will be observed that each of these provisions contains restrictive clauses as to their respective subjects. Neither relates to the subject of section 9(c).

We turn to the other provisions of title 1 of the act. The first section (15 USCA 701) is a 'declaration of policy.' [Footnote 6] It declares that a national emergency exists which is 'pro-

Page 293 U.S. 388, 417

ductive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American people.' It is declared to be the policy of Congress 'to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof;' 'to provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups;' 'to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision;' 'to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources.'

This general outline of policy contains nothing as to the circumstances or conditions in which transportation of petroleum or petroleum products should be prohibited-nothing as to the policy of prohibiting or not prohibiting the transportation of production exceeding what the

Page 293 U.S. 388, 418

states allow. The general policy declared is 'to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce.' As to production, the section lays down no policy of limitation. It favors the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries. It speaks, parenthetically, of a possible temporary restriction of production, but of what, or in what circumstances, it gives no suggestion. The section also speaks in general terms of the conservation of natural resources, but it prescribes no policy for the achievement of that end. It is manifest that this broad outline is simply an introduction of the act, leaving the legislative policy as to particular subjects to be declared and defined, if at all, by the subsequent sections.

It is no answer to insist that deleterious consequences follow the transportation of 'hot oil'-oil exceeding state allowances. The Congress did not prohibit that transportation. The Congress did not undertake to say that the transportation of 'hot oil' was injurious. The Congress did not say that transportation of that oil was 'unfair competition.' The Congress did not declare in what circumstances that transportation should be forbidden, or require the President to make any determination as to any facts or circumstances. Among the numerous and diverse objectives broadly stated, the President was not required to choose. The President was not required to ascertain and proclaim the conditions prevailing in the industry which made the prohibition necessary. The Congress left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased. The effort by ingenious and diligent construction to supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the President the functions of a Legislature rather than those of an executive or administrative

Page 293 U.S. 388, 419

officer executing a declared legislative policy. We find nothing in section 1 which limits or controls the authority conferred by section 9(c).

We pass to the other sections of the act. Section 2 (15 USCA 702) relates to administrative agencies which may be constituted. Section 3 (15 USCA 703) provides for the approval by the President of 'codes' for trades or industries. These are to be codes of 'fair competition' and the authority is based upon certain express conditions which require findings by the President. Action under section 9(c) is not made to depend on the formulation of a code under section 3. In fact, the President's action under section 9(c) was taken more than a month before a Petroleum Code was approved. Subdivision (e) of section 3 (15 USCA 703(e) authorizes the President, on his own motion or upon complaint, as stated, in case any article is being imported into the United States 'in substantial quantities or increasing ratio to domestic production of any competitive article,' under such conditions as to endanger the maintenance of a code or agreement under title 1, to cause an immediate investigation by the Tariff Commission. The authority of the President to act, after such investigation, is conditioned upon a finding by him of the existence of the underlying facts, and he may permit entry of the articles concerned upon such conditions and with such limitations as he shall find it necessary to prescribe in order that the entry shall not tend to render the code or agreement ineffective. Section 4 (15 USCA 704) relates to agreements and licenses for the purposes stated. Section 5 (15 USCA 705) refers to the application of the anti-trust laws. Sections 6 and 7 (15 USCA 706, 707) impose limitations upon the application of title 1, bearing upon trade associations and other organizations and upon the relations between employers and employees. Section 8 (15 USCA 708), contains provisions with respect to the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933 (7 USCA 601 et seq.).

Page 293 U.S. 388, 420

None of these provisions can be deemed to prescribe any limitation of the grant of authority in section 9(c).

Fifth. The question whether such a delegation of legislative power is permitted by the Constitution is not answered by the argument that it should be assumed that the President has acted, and will act, for what he believes to be the public good. The point is not one of motives, but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute. While the present controversy relates to a delegation to the President, the basic question has a much wider application. If the Congress can make a grant of legislative authority of the sort attempted by section 9(c), we find nothing in the Constitution which restricts the Congress to the selection of the President as grantee. The Congress may vest the power in the officer of its choice or in a board or commission such as it may select or create for the purpose. Nor, with respect to such a delegation, is the question concerned merely with the transportation of oil, or of oil produced in excess of what the state may allow. If legislative power may thus be vested in the President or other grantee as to that excess of production, we see no reason to doubt that it may similarly be vested with respect to the transportation of oil without reference to the state's requirements. That reference simply defines the subject of the prohibition which the President is authorized to enact or not to enact as he pleases. And, if that legislative power may be given to the President or other grantee, it would seem to follow that such power may similarly be conferred with respect to the transportation of other commodities in interstate commerce with or without reference to state action, thus giving to the grantee of the power the determination of what is a wise policy as to that transportation, and authority to permit or prohibit it, as the person or board or commission so chosen may

Page 293 U.S. 388, 421

think desirable. In that view, there would appear to be no ground for denying a similar prerogative of delegation with respect to other subjects of legislation.

The Constitution provides that 'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' Article 1, 1. And the Congress is empowered 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18. The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.

The Court has had frequent occasion to refer to these limitations and to review the course of congressional action. At the very outset, amid the disturbances due to war in Europe, when the national safety was imperiled

Page 293 U.S. 388, 422

and our neutrality was disregarded, the Congress passed a series of acts, as a part of which the President was authorized, in stated circumstances, to lay and revoke embargoes, to give permits for the exportation of arms and military stores, to remit and discontinue the restraints and prohibitions imposed by acts suspending commercial intercourse with certain countries, and to permit or interdict the entrance into waters of the United States of armed vessels belonging to foreign nations. [Footnote 7] These early acts were not the subject of judicial decision, and, apart from that, they afford no adequate basis for a conclusion that the Congress assumed that it possessed an unqualified power of delegation. They were inspired by the vexations of American commerce through the hostile enterprises of the belligerent powers,8 they were directed to the effective execution of policies repeatedly declared by the Congress, and they confided to the President, for the purposes and under the conditions stated, an authority which was cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign relations of the government. [Footnote 9]

Page 293 U.S. 388, 423

The first case relating to an authorization of this description was that of The Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch, 382, 388. The cargo of that vessel had been condemned as having been imported from Great Britain in violation of the Nonintercourse Act of March 1, 1809 (2 Stat. 528). That act expired on May 1, 1810,10 when Congress passed another

Page 293 U.S. 388, 424

act (2 Stat. 605, 606) providing that, in case either Great Britain or France before March 3, 1811, 'shall ... so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which fact the President of the United States shall declare by proclamation, and if the other nation shall not within three months thereafter so revoke or modify her edicts in like manner' (section 4), then, with respect to that nation, as stated, the provisions of the act of 1809, after three months from that proclamation, 'shall ... be revived and have full force and effect.' On November 2, 1810, the President issued his proclamation declaring that France had so revoked or modified her edicts, and it was contended that the provisions of the act of 1809, as to the cargo in question, had thus been revived. The Court said that it could see no sufficient reason why the Legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of 1809, 'either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.' The provision of that act declaring 'that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer,' could not restrict the power of the Legislature to extend its operation 'without limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.' This was a decision, said the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683, 12 S.Ct. 495, 501, 'that it was competent for congress to make the revival of an act depend upon the proclamation of the president, showing the ascertainment by him of the fact that the edicts of certain nations had been so revoked or modified that they did not violate the neutral commerce of the United States.'

In Field v. Clark, supra, the Court applied that ruling to the case of 'the suspension of an act upon a contingency to be ascertained by the president, and made known by his proclamation.' The Court was dealing with section 3 of the Act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, 612.

Page 293 U.S. 388, 425

That section provided that, 'with a view to secure reciprocal trade' with countries producing certain articles, 'whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied' that the government of any country producing them imposed 'duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States' which, in view of the free list established by the act, the President 'may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty,' to suspend the free introduction of those articles by proclamation to that effect, and that during that suspension the duties specified by the section should be levied. The validity of the provision was challenged as a delegation to the President of legislative power. The Court reviewed the early acts to which we have referred, as well as later statutes considered to be analogous. [Footnote 11] While sustaining the provision, the Court emphatically declared that the principle that 'congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president' is 'universally

Page 293 U.S. 388, 426

recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution.' The Court found that the act before it was not inconsistent with that principle; that it did not 'in any real sense, invest the president with the power of legislation.' As 'the suspension was absolutely required when the president ascertained the existence of a particular fact,' it could not be said 'that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.' 'He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.' Id., pages 692, 693 of 143 U.S., 12 S.Ct. 495, 504, 505. The Court referred with approval to the distinction pointed out by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati, Wilmington, etc., Railroad v. Clinton County Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88, between 'the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.'

Applying that principle, authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed have constantly been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy; that is, as Chief Justice Marshall expressed it, 'to fill up the details' under the general provisions made by the Legislature. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43. In Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496, 24 S.Ct. 349, 352, the Act of March 2, 1897 (29 Stat. 604, 605, 3 (see 21 USCA 43)), was upheld, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of a board of experts, to 'establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness

Page 293 U.S. 388, 427

for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States.' The Court construed the statute as expressing 'the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or presumably so because of their inferior quality.' The Congress, the Court said, thus fixed 'a primary standard' and committed to the Secretary of the Treasury 'the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute.' 'Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.' See Red 'C' Oil Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina, 222 U.S. 380, 394, 32 S.Ct. 152.

Another notable illustration is that of the authority given to the Secretary of War to determine whether bridges and other structures constitute unreasonable obstructions to navigation and to remove such obstructions. Act of March 3, 1899, 18, 30 Stat. 1153, 1154 (33 USCA 502). By that statute the Congress declared 'a general rule and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining what particular cases came within the rule' as thus laid down. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 386, 27 S.Ct. 367; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 193, 30 S.Ct. 356; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 638, 32 S.Ct. 340. Upon this principle rests the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the execution of the declared policy of the Congress in enforcing reasonable rates, in preventing undue preferences and unjust discriminations, in requiring suitable facilities for transportation in interstate commerce, and in exercising other powers held to have been validly conferred. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287, 28 S.Ct. 616; Inter-Mountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476, 486, 34 S.Ct. 986; Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130, 45 S.Ct. 34; New York Central Securities Corporation

Page 293 U.S. 388, 428

v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24, 25 S., 53 S.Ct. 45. Upon a similar ground the authority given to the President, in appropriate relation to his functions as Commander-in-Chief, by the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1918 (40 Stat. 460, 12 (50 USCA Appendix 12)), with respect to the disposition of enemy property, was sustained. 'The determination,' said the Court, 'of the terms of sales of enemy properties in the light of facts and conditions from time to time arising in the progress of war was not the making of a law; it was the application of the general rule laid down by the act.' United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 12, 47 S.Ct. 1, 5.12

The provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 (44 Stat. 1162, 1163), providing for assignments of frequencies or wave lengths to various stations, afford another instance. In granting licenses, the Radio Commission is required to act 'as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.' Section 4. In construing this provision, the Court found that the statute itself declared the policy as to 'equality of radio broadcasting service, both of transmission and of reception,' and that it conferred authority to make allocations and assignments in order to secure, according to stated criteria, an equitable adjustment in the distribution of facilities. [Footnote 13] The standard set up was not so indefinite 'as to confer an unlimited power.' Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279, 285 S., 53 S.Ct. 627, 634.

So also, from the beginning of the government, the Congress has conferred upon executive officers the power to make regulations-'not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern.' United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 31 S.Ct. 480, 483. Such regulations become, indeed, binding rules of con-

Page 293 U.S. 388, 429

duct, but they are valid only as subordinate rules and when found to be within the framework of the policy which the Legislature has sufficiently defined. In the case of Grimaud, supra, a regulation made by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring permits for grazing sheep on a forest reserve of lands belonging to the United States was involved. The Court referred to the various acts for the establishment and management of forest reservations and the authorization of rules which would 'insure the objects of such reservations,' that is, 'to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.' The Court observed that 'it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management,' and that, in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet local conditions, Congress 'was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative power.' Id., pages 515, 516 of 220 U. S., 31 S.Ct. 480, 482. The Court quoted with approval the statement of the principle in Field v. Clark, supra, that the Congress cannot delegate legislative power, and upheld the regulation in question as an administrative rule for the appropriate execut