U.S. Supreme Court
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
DeJonge v. Oregon
Argued December 9, 1936
Decided January 4, 1937
299 U.S. 353
1. The practice of substituting for the evidence a stipulation of facts not shown to have received the approval of the court below is disapproved. P. 299 U. S. 358.
2. Upon appeal from a judgment of a state supreme court sustaining a conviction, this Court in this case takes the indictment as construed by the court below. P. 299 U. S. 360.
3. Criminal punishment under a state statute for participation in the conduct of a public meeting, otherwise lawful, merely because the meeting was held under the auspices of an organization which teaches or advocates the use of violence, or other unlawful acts chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
or methods to effect industrial or political change or revolution, though no such teaching or advocacy attended the meeting in question, violates the constitutional principles of free speech and assembly. P. 299 U. S. 362.
The Criminal Syndicalism Law of Oregon, as applied in this case, is invalid.
4. The rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are fundamental rights which are safeguarded against state interference by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 299 U. S. 364.
5. The fact that these rights are guaranteed specifically by the First Amendment against abridgment by Congress does not argue their exclusion from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
6. The legislature may protect against abuses of the rights of free speech and assembly by dealing with the abuses; the rights themselves must not be curtailed. Id.
152 Ore. 315; 51 P. (2d) 674, reversed.
APPEAL from the affirmance of a conviction under the Criminal Syndicalism Law of Oregon. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary