U.S. Supreme Court
Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956)
Brownell v. Tom We Shung
Argued November 13, 1956
Decided December 17, 1956
352 U.S. 180
Under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, an alien whose exclusion has been ordered administratively under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, and who neither claims citizenship nor holds a certificate of identity issued under § 360(b) of that Act, may obtain judicial review of such order by an action in a federal district court for a declaratory judgment. Pp. 352 U. S. 181-186.
1. Unless the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is to the contrary, exclusion orders may be challenged -- either by habeas corpus proceedings or by declaratory judgment actions under the Administrative Procedure Act. Pp. 352 U. S. 182-184.
2. The provision of § 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that the decision of a special inquiry officer excluding an alien from admission into the United States "shall be final unless reversed on appeal to the Attorney General" refers only to administrative finality, and it does not limit challenges of such decisions to habeas corpus proceedings. Pp. 352 U. S. 184-185.
3. The conclusion here reached is in full accord with reports made to Congress by those sponsoring and managing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 on the floor of each house of Congress. Pp. 352 U. S. 185-186.
4. Whether an alien seeks judicial review of an exclusion order by a habeas corpus proceeding or by an action for a declaratory judgment, the scope of the review is that of existing law. P. 352 U. S. 186.
97 U.S.App.D.C. 25, 227 F.2d 40, affirmed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary