US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Respondent operators of two adult motion picture theaters brought this action against petitioner city officials for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality regarding two 1972 Detroit zoning ordinances that amended an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" adopted 10 years earlier. The 1972 ordinances provide that an adult theater may not (apart from a special waiver) be located within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area. The term "regulated uses" applies to 10 different kinds of establishments in addition to adult theaters, including adult book stores, cabarets, bars, taxi dance halls, and hotels. If the theater is used to present

"material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting . . . 'specified Sexual Activities' or 'specified Anatomical Areas,'"

it is an "adult" establishment. The District Court upheld the ordinances, and granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ordinances constituted a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication and violated equal protection. Respondents, in addition to asserting the correctness of that court's ruling with respect to those constitutional issues, contend that the ordinances are void for vagueness. While not attacking the specificity of the definitions of sexual activities or anatomical areas, respondents maintain (1) that they cannot determine how much of the described activity may be permissible before an exhibition is "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter, and (2) that the ordinances do not specify adequate procedures or standards for obtaining a waiver of the 1,000-foot restriction.

Held:

1. The ordinances, as applied to these respondents, do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground of vagueness. Pp. 427 U. S. 58-61.

(a) Neither of the asserted elements of vagueness has affected these respondents, both of which propose to offer adult fare on a regular basis and allege no ground for claiming or anticipating any waiver of the 1,000-foot restriction. Pp. 427 U. S. 58-59. chanrobles.com-red

Page 427 U. S. 51

(b) The ordinances will have no demonstrably significant effect on the exhibition of films protected by the First Amendment. To the extent that any area of doubt exists as to the amount of sexually explicit activity that may be portrayed before material can be said to be "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter, there is no reason why the ordinances are not "readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts." This would therefore be an inappropriate case to apply the principle urged by respondents that they be permitted to challenge the ordinances not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of the assumption that the ordinances' very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. Pp. 427 U. S. 59-61.

2. The ordinances are not invalid under the First Amendment as prior restraints on protected communication because of the licensing or zoning requirements. Though adult films may be exhibited commercially only in licensed theaters, that is also true of all films. That the place where films may be exhibited is regulated does not violate free expression, the city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property for commercial purposes being clearly adequate to support the locational restriction. Pp. 427 U. S. 62-63.

518 F.2d 1014, reversed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and WHITE, POWELL (except for Part III), and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 427 U. S. 73. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 427 U. S. 84. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 427 U. S. 88. chanrobles.com-red

Page 427 U. S. 52