U.S. Supreme Court
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)
Juidice v. Vail
Argued November 30, 1976
Decided March 22, 1977
430 U.S. 327
Following their failure to satisfy judgments against them in various civil actions in New York State courts, appellees, pursuant to provisions of the New York Judiciary Law, were held in contempt by appellant justices, and, except for appellees Ward and Rabasco, were fined and imprisoned for disobeying subpoenas to appear in supplemental proceedings brought by the respective judgment creditors in an attempt to collect the judgments. Appellees subsequently brought a class action against appellants in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to have the statutory provisions authorizing contempt enjoined on federal constitutional grounds not raised in the state proceedings. By the time this action was filed all the appellees, except Ward and Rabasco, had paid their fines and were released from jail, whereas Ward and Rabasco alleged that they were threatened with imprisonment. The District Court declared the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.
1. Only appellees Ward and Rabasco have standing to seek injunctive relief, since they are subject to pending proceedings in the state courts. The other appellees, absent any allegation or finding that they were threatened with further proceedings, have no standing, since, having been released from jail, they no longer have a live controversy with appellants or other state officials as to either the contempt citations or the short periods of incarceration that would entitle them to injunctive relief. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, distinguished. Pp. 430 U. S. 331-333.
(a) The principles of federalism and comity enunciated in Younger and Huffman apply to a case in which the State's contempt process is involved. Whether disobedience of a court-sanctioned subpoena, and the resulting process leading to a finding of contempt of court, is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal, the salient fact is that federal court interference with the State's contempt process is "an offense to the State's interest . . . likely to be every bit as great as it would be were chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
this a criminal proceeding," Huffman, supra at 420 U. S. 604. Moreover, such interference with the contempt process not only "unduly interfere[s] with the [State's] legitimate activities," Younger, supra at 401 U. S. 44, but also "can readily be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.'" Huffman, supra at 420 U. S. 604. Pp. 430 U. S. 333-336.
(b) Appellees clearly had an opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings, and no more is required to invoke Younger abstention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, distinguished. Pp. 430 U. S. 336-337.
(c) The exceptions to application of the Younger and Huffman principles are not present here, where it cannot be said that the New York statutes in question are flagrantly and patently unconstitutional, and where there are neither allegations, proof, nor findings that appellants are enforcing the contempt procedures in bad faith or are motivated by a desire to harass. Pp. 430 U. S. 338-339.
406 F.Supp. 951, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which BURGER, C.J.,and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 430 U. S. 339. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 430 U. S. 341. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 430 U. S. 347.