U.S. Supreme Court
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.
Argued April 1, 1987
Decided June 19, 1987
482 U.S. 656
In 1973, petitioners in No. 85-1626 (hereinafter petitioners), including individual employees of Lukens Steel Co. (Lukens), brought suit in Federal District Court against Lukens and the employees' collective bargaining agents (Unions), asserting racial discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court held that Pennsylvania's 6-year statute of limitations governing contract claims applied to § 1981 claims, that Lukens had discriminated in certain respects, and that the Unions were also guilty of discriminatory practices in failing to challenge Lukens' discriminatory discharges of probationary employees, in failing and refusing to assert instances of racial discrimination as grievances, and in tolerating and tacitly encouraging racial harassment. The court entered injunctive orders against Lukens and the Unions, reserving damages issues for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania's 2-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions, rather than the 6-year statute, controlled the § 1981 claims, but affirmed the liability judgment against the Unions.
1. The Court of Appeals was correct in selecting the Pennsylvania 2-year limitations period governing personal injury actions as the most analogous state statute of limitations to govern all § 1981 suits. Section 1981 speaks not only to personal rights to contract, but also to personal rights to sue, to testify, and to equal rights under all laws for the security of persons and property; and all persons are to be subject to like punishments, taxes, and burdens of every kind. Cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261. The Court of Appeals also properly concluded that the 2-year statute should be applied retroactively to petitioners here, even though the court overruled its prior 1977 and 1978 decisions that refused to apply Pennsylvania's 2-year personal injury statute to the § 1981 claims involved in those cases. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, advises that nonretroactivity is appropriate in certain circumstances, including when the decision overrules clear Circuit precedent on which the complaining party is entitled to rely. However, until the Court of chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Appeals' 1977 decision, there had been no authoritative specification of which statute of limitations applied to an employee's § 1981 claims, and hence no clear precedent on which petitioners could have relied when they filed their complaint in 1973. As for the other Chevron factors, applying the 2-year statute here will not frustrate any federal law or result in inequity to the workers, who are charged with knowledge that it was an unsettled question as to how far back from the date of filing their complaint the damages period would reach. Pp. 482 U. S. 660-664.
2. The courts below properly held that the Unions violated Title VII and § 1981. Because both courts agreed on the facts pertaining to whether the Unions had treated blacks and whites differently and intended to discriminate on the basis of race, this Court will not examine the record, absent the Unions' showing of extraordinary reasons for doing so. There is no merit to the Unions' contention that the judgment rests on the erroneous legal premise that Title VII and § 1981 are violated if a union passively sits by and does not affirmatively oppose the employer's racially discriminatory employment practices. In fact, both courts below concluded that the case against the Unions was one of more than mere acquiescence, in that the Unions deliberately chose not to assert claims of racial discrimination by the employer. Nor is there any merit to the argument that the only basis for Title VII liability was § 703(c)(3)'s prohibition against a union's causing or attempting to cause illegal discrimination by an employer, which was not supported by the record. Both courts found that the Unions had discriminated on the basis of race by the way in which they represented the workers, and the Court of Appeals held that the deliberate choice not to process grievances violated § 703(c)(1), the plain language of which supports such conclusion. Furthermore, the District Court properly rejected the Unions' explanation that, in order not to antagonize the employer, they did not include racial discrimination claims in grievances claiming other contract violations. A union that intentionally fails to assert discrimination claims, either to avoid antagonizing the employer, and thus to improve chances of success on other issues, or in deference to the desires of its white membership, is liable under both Title VII and § 1981, regardless of whether, as a subjective matter, its leaders are favorably disposed toward minorities. Pp. 482 U. S. 664-669.
777 F.2d 113, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,and STEVENS, J., joined, in Part I of which POWELL and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
post, p. 482 U. S. 669. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in Parts I, II, III, and IV of which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 680. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post p. 689.