US SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
OCTOBER TERM, 1994
Per Curiam
AUSTIN v. UNITED STATES
ON MOTION OF THOMAS N. COCHRAN FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
No. -. Decided October 31,1994
Having determined that no meritorious grounds existed for an appeal of Anthony Austin's criminal conviction, Thomas Cochran, his appointed counsel, filed a brief in the Fourth Circuit raising only the issue of sentence computation. Mter the Fourth Circuit affirmed Austin's conviction and sentence, Cochran informed him of his right to petition for certiorari, but applied to this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel before the deadline for filing the petition.
Held: Cochran's application is granted. Under a plan adopted pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act (Act), the Fourth Circuit has a Rule governing the duration of service by appointed counsel. Cochran is correct that the Fourth Circuit Rule imposes a mandatory duty to file a petition even if the legal arguments are frivolous and, thus, conflicts with this Court's Rule 42.2, which allows an award of damages or costs against him for filing such a petition. Nothing in the Act compels counsel to file papers in contravention of this Court's Rules against frivolous filings. If necessary, the Circuits' Criminal Justice Plans should be revised to allow a lawyer to be relieved of the duty to file a petition for certiorari that would present only frivolous claims. The Act does not compel a particular approach. However, from an administrative point of view, it is preferable for a plan to require that the court of appeals approve a withdrawal, because attorneys are more likely to avail themselves of this avenue for relief if they have the court's endorsement to back up their own judgment.
Application granted.
PER CURIAM.
Anthony Austin pleaded guilty to possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 151 months' imprisonment. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Thomas Cochran, who had been appointed as Austin's counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A, submitted a brief in accordance with Anders v. Gal ifornia, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). That brief raised the issue of
Per Curiam
sentence computation, but concluded that no meritorious issues existed for appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Austin's conviction and sentence. Cochran then informed Austin of the right to petition for certiorari. Austin responded with a request to file a petition on his behalf. In advance of the deadline for filing the petition, Cochran applied to this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel. We grant his application.
The Criminal Justice Act directs each district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the Circuit, to implement "a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation." 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(a). The Fourth Circuit plan contains a provision governing the duration of service by appointed counsel. Specifically, it provides:
"2. Appellate Counsel. Every attorney, including retained counsel, who represents a defendant in this court shall continue to represent his client after termination of the appeal unless relieved of further responsibility by the Supreme Court. Where counsel has not been relieved:
"If the judgment of this court is adverse to the defendant, counsel shall inform the defendant, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. If the defendant, in writing, so requests, counsel shall prepare and file a timely petition for such a writ and transmit a copy to the defendant. Thereafter, unless otherwise instructed by the Supreme Court or its clerk, or unless any applicable rule, order or plan of the Supreme Court shall otherwise provide, counsel shall take whatever further steps are necessary to protect the rights of the defendant, until the petition is granted or denied." 4th Circuit Rules App. II, Rule \1.2.
Cochran argues that the Rule subjects him to conflicting obligations. On the one hand, the Rule imposes a mandatory duty to file a petition even if the legal arguments are frivo-
