U.S. Supreme Court
Stairs v. Peaslee, 59 U.S. 18 How. 521 521 (1855)
Stairs v. Peaslee
59 U.S. (18 How.) 521
The Tariff Act of March 3, 1851, 9 Stat. 629, repealed so much of the former laws as provided that merchandise, when imported from a country other than that of production or manufacture, should be appraised at the market value of similar articles at the principal markets of the country of production or manufacture at the period of the exportation to the United States. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It must be appraised according to the value of the goods in the principal markets of the country from which they are exported.
Therefore, cutch, which is a product of the East Indies only, and the great market for which there is Calcutta, must he appraised not according to its value there, but at London and Liverpool, which are the principal markets of Great Britain, exclusive of India, and not at Halifax, from which place it was brought into the United States.
The word "country," mentioned above, embraces all the possessions of a foreign state, however widely separated, which are subject to the same supreme executive and legislative control.
It is for the merchant appraisers to decide what markets in these dominions are the principal ones for the goods in question, and their decision is final.
The penal duty of twenty percentum exacted by the 8th section of the Tariff Act of July 30, 1846, 9 Stat. 43, is properly levied upon goods entered at their invoice value if it is found to be ten percent below the dutiable value, as well as those goods where the importer makes an addition to the invoice value.
The case of Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263, commented upon.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary