US LAWS, STATUTES & CODES ON-LINE

Example (2).  M, a private foundation which uses the calendar year as the taxable year, has undistributed income of $300 for 1981, $200 for 1982, and $400 for 1983. On January 14, 1983, M makes its first qualifying distribution in 1983 when it sets aside (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section) $700 for construction of a hospital. On February 24, 1983 a notice of deficiency with respect to the excise taxes imposed by section 4942 (a) and (b) in regard to M's undistributed income for 1981 is mailed to M under section 6212(a). M notifies the Commissioner in writing on March 24, 1983, that it is making an election under subparagraph (2) of this paragraph to have its distribution of January 14th applied first against its undistributed income for 1982, next against its undistributed income for 1981, and last against its undistributed income for 1983. Thus, $200 of the $700 qualifying distribution is treated as made out of the undistributed income for 1982; $300, out of undistributed income for 1981; and $200 ($700 less the sum of $200 and $300), out of the undistributed income for 1983. Thus, an initial excise tax of $45 (15 percent of $300) is imposed under section 4942(a). Since M made the election described above, the $300 (treated as distributed out of undistributed income for 1981) corrects (within the meaning of section 4963(d)(2)) the taxable act because the undistributed income for 1981 is reduced to zero. Furthermore, correction is effected within the correction period (as defined in section 4963(e)(1) and §53.4963–1(e)). Therefore, under the provisions of section 4961(a), the additional tax imposed by section 4942(b) will not be assessed.

(e) Carryover of excess qualifying distributions—(1) In general. If in any taxable year for which an organization is subject to the initial excise tax imposed by section 4942(a) there is created an excess of qualifying distributions (as determined under subparagraph (2) of this paragraph), such excess may be used to reduce distributable amounts in any taxable year of the adjustment period (as defined subparagraph (3) of this paragraph). For purposes of section 4942, including paragraph (d) of this section, the distributable amount for a taxable year in the adjustment period shall be reduced to the extent of the lesser of (i) the excess of qualifying distributions made in prior taxable years to which such adjustment period applies or (ii) the remaining undistributed income at the close of such taxable year after applying any qualifying distributions made in such taxable year to the distributable amount for such taxable year (determined without regard to this paragraph). If during any taxable year of the adjustment period there is created another excess of qualifying distributions, such excess shall not be taken into account until any earlier excess of qualifying distributions has been completely applied against distributable amounts during its adjustment period.

(2) Excess qualifying distributions. An excess of qualifying distributions is created for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1969, if:

(i) The total qualifying distributions treated (under paragraph (d) of this section) as made out of the undistributed income for such taxable year or as made out of corpus with respect to such taxable year (other than amounts distributed by an organization in satisfaction of section 170(b)(1)(E)(ii) or paragraph (c) of this section, or applied to a prior taxable year by operation of the elections contained in paragraphs (c)(2)(iv) and (d)(2) of this section), exceeds

(ii) The distributable amount for such taxable year (determined without regard to this paragraph).

(3) Adjustment period. For purposes of this paragraph, the taxable years in the adjustment period are the 5 taxable years immediately following the taxable year in which the excess of qualifying distributions is created. Thus, an excess (within the meaning of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph) for any 1 taxable year cannot be carried over beyond the succeeding 5 taxable years. However, if during any taxable year in the adjustment period an organization ceases to be subject to the initial excise tax imposed by section 4942(a), any portion of the excess of qualifying distributions, which prior to such taxable year has not been applied against distributable amounts, may not be carried over to such taxable year or subsequent taxable years in the adjustment period, even if during any of such taxable years the organization again becomes subject to the initial excise tax imposed by section 4942(a).

(4) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  (i) F, a private foundation which was created in 1967 and which uses the calendar year as the taxable year, has distributable amounts and qualifying distributions for 1970 through 1976 as follows:

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in example (1), except that in 1974 F receives a contribution of $300 from G, a private foundation which controls F (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3) of this section), and F distributes such contribution in 1975 in satisfaction of paragraph (c) of this section. Under these circumstances, there would be no excess of qualifying distributions for 1975 with respect to such distribution, since such distribution is excluded from the computation of an excess of qualifying distributions by operation of subparagraph (2)(i) of this paragraph.

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in example (1), except that in 1972 F is treated as an operating foundation (as such term is defined in section 4942(j)(3)). In accordance with subparagraph (3) of this paragraph since F is not subject to the initial excise tax imposed by section 4942(a) for 1972, the 1971 excess cannot be carried forward to 1972 or any subsequent year in the adjustment period with respect to the 1971 excess, even if F is subsequently treated as a private nonoperating foundation for any year during the period 1973 through 1976.

[T.D. 7256, 38 FR 3323, Feb. 5, 1973, as amended by T.D. 7486, 42 FR 24265, May 13, 1977; T.D. 7849, 47 FR 50857, Nov. 10, 1982; T.D. 7938, 49 FR 3848, Jan. 31, 1984; T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16302, May 2, 1986]

(a) Operating foundation defined—(1) In general. For purposes of section 4942 and the regulations thereunder, the term “operating foundation” means any private foundation which, in addition to satisfying the assets test, the endowment test or the support test set forth in §53.4942(b)–2 (a), (b) and (c), makes qualifying distributions (within the meaning of §53.4942(a)–3(a)(2)) directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose equal in value to:

(i) For taxable years beginning before January 1, 1982, substantially all of the foundation's adjusted net income (as defined in §53.4942(a)–2(d)); and

(ii) For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1981, substantially all of the lesser of the foundation's adjusted net income (as defined in §53.4942(a)–2(d)) or minimum investment return (as defined in §53.4942(a)–2(c)). If the foundation's qualifying distributions exceed its minimum investment return (but are less than the foundation's adjusted net income) substantially all of such qualifying distributions must be made directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational or other similar exempt purpose. However, if the foundation's minimum investment return is less than its adjusted net income and the foundation's qualifying distributions equal or exceed such adjusted net income, only that portion of the qualifying distributions equal to substantially all of the foundation's adjusted net income must be made directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational or other similar exempt purpose.

(2) Certain elderly care facilities described in section 4942(j)(6)—(i) In general. For purposes of the distribution requirements of section 4942 (but no other provision of the Internal Revenue Code) and for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969, the term “operating foundation” includes a private foundation which:

(A) On or before May 26, 1969, and continuously thereafter to the close of the taxable year, operates and maintains, as its principal functional purpose, residential facilities for the long-term care, comfort, maintenance, or education of permanently and totally disabled persons, elderly persons, needy widows, or children, and

(B) Satisfies the endowment test set forth in §53.4942(b)–2 (b).

(ii) Principal functional purpose. For purposes of section 4942(j)(6) and this subparagraph (2), an organization's “principal functional purpose” is operating and maintaining residential facilities for the long-term care, comfort, maintenance, or education of permanently and totally disabled persons, elderly persons, needy widows, or children, if it is organized for the principal purpose of operating and maintaining such residential facilities and is primarily engaged directly in the operation and maintenance of those facilities. An organization will be treated as being primarily engaged directly in the operation and maintenance of the described residential facilities if at least 50% of the qualifying distributions (as defined in §53.4942(a)–3(a)(2)) normally made by the organization are expended for the operation and maintenance of the facilities.

(b) Active conduct of activities constituting the exempt purpose—(1) In general. For purposes of this section, except as provided in subparagraph (2) or (3) of this paragraph, qualifying distributions are not made by a foundation “directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose” unless such qualifying distributions are used by the foundation itself, rather than by or through one or more grantee organizations which receive such qualifying distributions directly or indirectly from such foundation. Thus, grants made to other organizations to assist them in conducting activities which help to accomplish their charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose are considered an indirect, rather than direct, means of carrying out activities constituting the charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose of the grantor foundation, regardless of the fact that the exempt activities of the grantee organization may assist the grantor foundation in carrying out its own exempt activities. However, amounts paid to acquire or maintain assets which are used directly in the conduct of the foundation's exempt activities, such as the operating assets of a museum, public park, or historic site, are considered direct expenditures for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities. Likewise, administrative expenses (such as staff salaries and traveling expenses) and other operating costs necessary to conduct the foundation's exempt activities (regardless of whether they are “directly for the active conduct” of such exempt activities) shall be treated as qualifying distributions expended directly for the active conduct of such exempt activities if such expenses and costs are reasonable in amount. Conversely, administrative expenses and operating costs which are not attributable to exempt activities, such as expenses in connection with the production of investment income, are not treated as such qualifying distributions. Expenses attributable to both exempt and nonexempt activities shall be allocated to each such activity on a reasonable and consistently applied basis. Any amount set aside by a foundation for a specific project, such as the acquisition and restoration, or construction, of additional buildings or facilities which are to be used by the foundation directly for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities, shall be deemed to be qualifying distributions expended directly for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities if the initial setting aside of the funds constitutes a set-aside within the meaning of paragraph (b) of §53.4942(a)–3.

(2) Payments to individual beneficiaries—(i) In general. If a foundation makes or awards grants, scholarships, or other payments to individual beneficiaries (including program related investments within the meaning of section 4944(c) made to individuals or corporate enterprises) to support active programs conducted to carry out the foundation's charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose, such grants, scholarships, or other payments will be treated as qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of exempt activities for purposes of paragraph (a) of this section only if the foundation, apart from the making or awarding of the grants, scholarships, or other payments, otherwise maintains some significant involvement (as defined in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph) in the active programs in support of which such grants, scholarships, or other payments were made or awarded. Whether the making or awarding of grants, scholarships, or other payments constitutes qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities is to be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The test applied is a qualitative, rather than a strictly quantitative, one. Therefore, if the foundation maintains a significant involvement (as defined in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph) it will not fail to meet the general rule of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph solely because more of its funds are devoted to the making or awarding of grants, scholarships, or other payments than to the active programs which such grants, scholarships, or other payments support. However, if a foundation does no more than select, screen, and investigate applicants for grants or scholarships, pursuant to which the recipients perform their work or studies alone or exclusively under the direction of some other organization, such grants or scholarships will not be treated as qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities. The administrative expenses of such screening and investigation (as opposed to the grants or scholarships themselves) may be treated as qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities.

(ii) Definition. For purposes of this subparagraph, a foundation will be considered as maintaining a “significant involvement” in a charitable, educational, or other similar exempt activity in connection with which grants, scholarships, or other payments are made or awarded if:

(A) An exempt purpose of the foundation is the relief of poverty or human distress, and its exempt activities are designed to ameliorate conditions among a poor or distressed class of persons or in an area subject to poverty or national disaster (such as providing food or clothing to indigents or residents of a disaster area), the making or awarding of the grants or other payments to accomplish such exempt purpose is direct and without the assistance of an intervening organization or agency, and the foundation maintains a salaried or voluntary staff of administrators, researchers, or other personnel who supervise and direct the activities described in this subdivision (A) on a continuing basis; or

(B) The foundation has developed some specialized skills, expertise, or involvement in a particular discipline or substantive area (such as scientific or medical research, social work, education, or the social sciences), it maintains a salaried staff of administrators, researchers, or other personnel who supervise or conduct programs or activities which support and advance the foundation's work in its particular area of interest, and, as a part of such programs or activities, the foundation makes or awards grants, scholarships, or other payments to individuals to encourage and further their involvement in the foundation's particular area of interest and in some segment of the programs or activities carried on by the foundation (such as grants under which the recipients, in addition to independent study, attend classes, seminars, or conferences sponsored or conducted by the foundation, or grants to engage in social work or scientific research projects which are under the general direction and supervision of the foundation).

(3) Payment of section 4940 tax. For purposes of section 4942(j)(3) (A) and (B)(ii), payment of the tax imposed upon a foundation under section 4940 shall be considered a qualifying distribution which is made directly for the active conduct of activities constituting the foundation's charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose.

(c) Substantially all. For purposes of this section, the term “substantially all” shall mean 85 percent or more. Thus, if a foundation makes qualifying distributions directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose in an amount equal to at least 85 percent of its adjusted net income, it will be considered as satisfying the income test described in this section even if it makes grants to organizations or engages in other activities with the remainder of its adjusted net income and with other funds. In determining whether the amount of qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of such exempt activities equals at least 85 percent of a foundation's adjusted net income, a foundation is not required to trace the source of such expenditures to determine whether they were derived from income or from contributions.

(d) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples. It is assumed that none of the organizations described in these examples is described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3).

Example (1).  N, an exempt museum described in section 501(c)(3), was founded by the gift of an endowment from a single contributor. N uses 90 percent of its adjusted net income to operate the museum. If N satisfies one of the tests set forth in §53.4942(b)–2 it may be classified as an operating foundation since substantially all of the qualifying distributions made by N are used directly for the active conduct of N's exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

Example (2).  M, an exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3), was created to improve conditions in a particular urban ghetto. M receives its funds primarily from a limited number of wealthy contributors interested in helping carry out its exempt purpose. M's program consists of making a survey of the problems of the ghetto to determine the areas in which its funds may be applied most effectively. Approximately 10 percent of M's adjusted net income is used to conduct this survey. The balance of its income is used to make grants to other nonprofit organizations doing work in the ghetto in those areas determined to have the greatest likelihood of resulting in improved conditions. Under these circumstances, since only 10 percent of M's adjusted net income may be considered as constituting qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of M's exempt activities, M cannot qualify as an operating foundation.

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in example (2), except that M uses the remaining 90 percent of its adjusted net income for the following purposes: (1) M maintains a salaried staff of social workers and researchers who analyze its surveys and make recommendations as to methods for improving ghetto conditions; (2) M makes grants to independent social scientists who assist in these analyses and recommendations; (3) M publishes periodic reports indicating the results of its surveys and recommendations; (4) M makes grants to social workers and others who act as advisers to nonprofit organizations, as well as small business enterprises, functioning in the community (these advisers acting under the general direction of M attempt to implement M's recommendations through their advice and assistance to the nonprofit organizations and small business enterprises); and (5) M makes grants to other social scientists who study and report on the success of the various enterprises which attempt to implement M's recommendations. Under these circumstances, M satisfies the requirements of paragraph (b) (2) of this section, and the various grants it makes constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of its exempt activities. Thus, if M satisfies one of the tests set forth in §53.4942(b)–2 it may be classified as an operating foundation.

Example (4).  P, an exempt educational organization described in section 501(c)(3), was created for the purpose of training teachers for institutions of higher education. Each year P awards a substantial number of fellowships to students for graduate study leading toward their M.A. or Ph. D. degrees. The applicants for these fellowships are carefully screened by P's staff, and only those applicants who indicate a strong interest in teaching in colleges or universities are chosen. P publishes and circulates various pamphlets encouraging a development of interest in college teaching and describing its fellowships. P also conducts annual summer seminars which are attended by its fellowship recipients, its staff, consultants, and other interested parties. The purpose of these seminars is to foster and encourage the development of college teaching. P publishes a report of the seminar proceedings along with related studies written by those who attended. Despite the fact that a substantial portion of P's adjusted net income is devoted to granting fellowships, its commitment to encouraging individuals to become teachers at institutions of higher learning, its maintenance of a staff and programs designed to further this purpose, and the granting of fellowships to encourage involvement both in its own seminars and in its exempt purpose indicate a significant involvement by P beyond the mere granting of fellowships. Thus, the fellowship grants made by P constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of P's exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b) (2) of this section.

Example (5).  Q, an exempt organization described in section 501(c) (3), is composed of professional organizations interested in different branches of one academic discipline. Q trains its own professional staff, conducts its own program of research, selects research topics, screens and investigates grant recipients, makes grants to those selected, and sets up and conducts conferences and seminars for the grantees. Q has particular knowledge and skill in the given discipline, carries on activities to advance its study of that discipline, and makes grants to individuals to enable them to participate in activities which it conducts in carrying out its exempt purpose. Under these circumstances, Q's grants constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of Q's exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b) (2) of this section.

Example (6).  R, an exempt medical research organization described in section 501 (c) (3), was created to study and perform research concerning heart disease. R has its own research center in which it carries on a broad number of research projects in the field of heart disease with its own professional staff. Physicians and scientists who are interested in special projects in this area present the plans for their projects to R. The directors of R study these plans and decide if the project is feasible and will further the work being done by R. If it is, R makes a grant to the individual to enable him to carry out his project, either at R's facilities or elsewhere. Reports of the progress of the project are made periodically to R, and R exercises a certain amount of supervision over the project. The resulting findings of these projects are usually published by R. Under these circumstances, the grants made by R constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of R's exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b) (2) of this section.

Example (7).  S, an exempt organization described in section 501(c) (3), maintains a large library of manuscripts and other historical reference material relating to the history and development of the region in which the collection is located. S makes a limited number of annual grants to enable post-doctoral scholars and doctoral candidates to use its library. Sometimes S obtains the right to publish the scholar's work, although this is not a prerequisite to the receipt of a grant. The primary criterion for selection of grant recipients is the usefulness of the library's resources to the applicant's field of study. Under these circumstances, the grants made by S constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of S's exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b) (2) of this section.

Example (8).  T, an exempt charitable organization described in section 501(c)(3), was created by the members of one family for the purpose of relieving poverty and human suffering. T has a large salaried staff of employees who operate offices in various areas throughout the country. Its employees make gifts of food and clothing to poor persons in the area serviced by each office. On occasion, T also provides temporary relief in the form of food and clothing to persons in areas stricken by natural disasters. If conditions improve in one poverty area, T transfers the resources of the office in that area to another poverty area. Under these circumstances, the gifts of food and clothing made by T constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of T's exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b) (2) of this section.

Example (9).  U, an exempt scientific organization described in section 501(c) (3), was created for the principal purpose of studying the effects of early childhood brain damage. U conducts an active and continuous research program in this area through a salaried staff of scientists and physicians. As part of its research program, U awards scholarships to young people suffering mild brain damage to enable them to attend special schools equipped to handle such problems. The recipients are periodically tested to determine the effect of such schooling upon them. Under these circumstances, the scholarships awarded by U constitute qualifying distributions made directly for the active conduct of U's exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b) (2) of this section.

Example (10).  O, an exempt charitable organization described in section 501(c) (3), was created for the purpose of giving scholarships to children of the employees of X Corporation who meet the standards set by O. O not only screens and investigates each applicant to make sure that he complies with the academic and financial requirements set for scholarship recipients, but also administers an examination which each applicant must take—90 percent of O's adjusted net income is used in awarding these scholarships to the chosen applicants. O does not conduct any activities of an educational nature on its own. Under these circumstances, O is not using substantially all of its adjusted net income directly for the active conduct of its exempt activities within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section. Thus, O is not an operating foundation because it fails to satisfy the income test set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.

[T.D. 7249, 38 FR 768, Jan. 4, 1973, as amended by T.D. 7718, 45 FR 58520, Sept. 4, 1980; 46 FR 11254, Feb. 6, 1981; T.D. 7878, 48 FR 11943, Mar. 22, 1983]

(a) Assets test—(1) In general. A private foundation will satisfy the assets test under the provisions of this paragraph if substantially more than half of the foundation's assets:

(i) Are devoted directly (A) to the active conduct of activities constituting the foundation's charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose, (B) to functionally related businesses (as defined in paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of §53.4942(a)–2), or (C) to any combination thereof;

(ii) Are stock of a corporation which is controlled by the foundation (within the meaning of section 368(c)) and substantially all the assets of which (within the meaning of paragraph (c) of §53.4942(b)–1) are so devoted; or

(iii) Are in part assets which are described in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph and in part stock which is described in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph.

(2) Qualifying assets—(i) In general. For purposes of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, an asset is “devoted directly to the active conduct of activities constituting the foundation's charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose” only if the asset is actually used by the foundation directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose. Thus, such assets as real estate, physical facilities or objects (such as museum assets, classroom fixtures and equipment, and research facilities), and intangible assets (such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks) will be considered qualifying assets for purposes of this paragraph to the extent they are used directly for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities. However, assets which are held for the production of income, for investment, or for some other similar use (for example, stocks, bonds, interest-bearing notes, endowment funds, or, generally, leased real estate) are not devoted directly to the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities, even though the income derived from such assets is used to carry out such exempt activities. Whether an asset is held for the production of income, for investment, or for some other similar use rather than being used for the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities is a question of fact. For example, an office building used for the purpose of providing offices for employees engaged in the management of endowment funds of the foundation is not devoted to the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities. However, where property is used both for exempt purposes and for other purposes, if such exempt use represents 95 percent or more of the total use, such property shall be considered to be used exclusively for an exempt purpose. Property acquired by a foundation to be used in carrying out the foundation's exempt purpose may be considered as devoted directly to the active conduct of such purpose even though the property, in whole or in part, is leased for a limited period of time during which arrangements are made for its conversion to the use for which it was acquired, provided such income-producing use of the property does not exceed a reasonable period of time. Generally, 1 year shall be deemed to be a reasonable period of time for purposes of the immediately preceding sentence. Similarly, where property is leased by a foundation in carrying out its exempt purpose and where the rental income derived from such property by the foundation is less than the amount which would be required to be charged in order to recover the cost of purchase and maintenance of such property (taking into account the deductions permitted by paragraph (d)(4) of §53.4942(a)–2), such property shall be considered devoted directly to the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities.

(ii) Limitations. (A) Assets which are held for the purpose of extending credit or making funds available to members of a charitable class (including any interest in a program related-investment, except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of §53.4942(b)–1) are not considered assets devoted directly to the active conduct of activities constituting the foundation's charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose. For example, assets which are set aside in special reserve accounts to guarantee student loans made by lending institutions will not be considered assets devoted directly to the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities.

(B) Any amount set aside by a foundation within the meaning of paragraph (b) (1) of §53.4942(b)–1 shall not be treated as an asset devoted directly to the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities.

(3) Assets held for less than a taxable year. For purposes of this paragraph, any asset which is held by a foundation for part of a taxable year shall be taken into account for such taxable year by multiplying the fair market value of such asset (as determined pursuant to subparagraph (4) of this paragraph) by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of days in such taxable year that the foundation held such asset and the denominator of which is the number of days in such taxable year.

(4) Valuation. For purposes of this paragraph, all assets shall be valued at their fair market value. Fair market value shall be determined in accordance with the rules set forth in paragraph (c)(4) of §53.4942(a)–2, except in the case of assets which are devoted directly to the active conduct of the foundation's exempt activities and for which neither a ready market nor standard valuation methods exist (such as historical objects or buildings, certain works of art, and botanical gardens). In such cases, the historical cost (unadjusted for depreciation) shall be considered equal to fair market value unless the foundation demonstrates that fair market value is other than cost. In any case in which the foundation so demonstrates that the fair market value of an asset is other than historical cost, such substituted valuation may be used for the taxable year for which such new valuation is demonstrated and for each of the succeeding 4 taxable years if the valuation methods and procedures prescribed by paragraph (c)(4)(iv)(B) of §53.4942 (a)–2 are followed.

(5) Substantially more than half. For purposes of this paragraph, the term substantially more than half shall mean 65 percent or more.

(6) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples. It is assumed that none of the organizations described in these examples is described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3).

Example (1).  W, an exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3), is devoted to the maintenance and operation of a historic area for the benefit of the general public. W has acquired and erected facilities for lodging and other visitor accommodations in such area, which W operates through a wholly owned, separately incorporated, taxable entity. These facilities comprise substantially all of the subsidiary's assets. The operation of such accommodations constitutes a functionally related business within the meaning of paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of §53.4942(a)–2. Under these circumstances, the stock of the subsidiary will be considered as part of W's assets which may be taken into account by W in determining whether it satisfies the assets test described in this paragraph.

Example (2).  M, an exempt conservation organization described in section 501(c)(3), is devoted to acquiring, preserving, and otherwise making available for public use geographically diversified areas of natural beauty. M has acquired and erected facilities for lodging and other visitor accommodations in national park areas. The operation of such accommodations constitutes a functionally related business within the meaning of paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of §53.4942(a)–2. Therefore, M's assets which are directly devoted to such visitor accommodations may be taken into account by M in determining whether it satisfies the assets test described in this paragraph.

Example (3).  P, an exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3), is devoted to acquiring and restoring historic houses. To insure that the restored houses will be kept in the restored condition, and to make the houses more readily available for public display, P rents the houses rather than sells them once they have been restored. The rental income derived by P is substantially less than the amount which would be required to be charged in order to recover the cost of purchase, restoration, and maintenance of such houses. Therefore, such houses may be taken into account by P in determining whether it satisfies the assets test described in this paragraph.

Example (4).  Z, an exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3), is devoted to improving the public's understanding of Renaissance art. Z's principal assets are a number of paintings of this period which it circulates on an active and continuing basis to museums and schools for public display. These paintings constitute 80 percent of Z's assets. Under these circumstances, although Z does not have a building in which it displays these paintings, such paintings are devoted directly to the active conduct of activities constituting Z's exempt purpose. Therefore, Z has satisfied the assets test described in this paragraph.

(b) Endowment test—(1) In general. A foundation will satisfy the endowment test under the provisions of this paragraph if it normally makes qualifying distributions (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(2) of §53.4942(a)–3) directly for the active conduct of activities constituting its charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose in an amount not less than two-thirds of its minimum investment return (as defined in paragraph (c) of §53.4942(a)–2). In determining whether the amount of such qualifying distributions is not less than an amount equal to two-thirds of the foundation's minimum investment return, the foundation is not required to trace the source of such expenditures to determine whether they were derived from investment income or from contributions.

(2) Definitions. For purposes of this paragraph, the phrase directly for the active conduct of activities constituting the foundation's charitable, educational, or other similar exempt purpose shall have the same meaning as in paragraph (b) of §53.4942(b)–1.

(3) Example. This paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  X, an exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3) and not described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3), was created on July 15, 1970. X uses the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting. For 1971, the fair market value of X's assets not described in paragraph (c) (2) or (3) of §53.4942(a)–2 is $400,000. X makes qualifying distributions for 1971 directly for the active conduct of its exempt activities of $17,000. For 1971 two-thirds of X's minimum investment return is $16,000 (6 percent × $400,000 = $24,000; 2/3 × $24,000 = $16,000). Under these circumstances, X has satisfied the endowment test described in this paragraph for 1971. However, if X's qualifying distributions for 1971 directly for the active conduct of its exempt activities were only $15,000, X would not satisfy the endowment test for 1971, unless the fair market value of its assets not described in paragraph (c) (2) or (3) of §53.4942(a)–2 were no greater than $375,000 (6 percent × $375,000 = $22,500; 2/3 × $22,500 = $15,000).

(c) Support test—(1) In general. A foundation will satisfy the support test under the provisions of this paragraph if:

(i) Substantially all of its support (other than gross investment income as defined in section 509(e)) is normally received from the general public and from five or more exempt organizations which are not described in section 4946(a)(1)(H) with respect to each other or the recipient foundation;

(ii) Not more than 25 percent of its support (other than gross investment income) is normally received from any one such exempt organization; and

(iii) Not more than half of its support is normally received from gross investment income.

(2) Definitions and special rules. For purposes of this paragraph:

(i) Support. The term support shall have the same meaning as in section 509(d).

(ii) Substantially all. The term substantially all shall have the same meaning as in paragraph (c) of §53.4942(b)–1.

(iii) Support from exempt organizations. The support received from any one exempt organization may be counted towards satisfaction of the support test described in this paragraph only if the foundation receives support from no fewer than five exempt organizations. For example, a foundation which normally receives 20 percent of its support (other than gross investment income) from each of five exempt organizations may qualify under this paragraph even though it receives no support from the general public. However, if a foundation normally received 10 percent of its support from each of three exempt organizations and the balance of its support from sources other than exempt organizations, such support could not be taken into account in determining whether the foundation had satisfied the support test set forth in this paragraph.

(iv) Support from the general public. “Support” received from an individual, or from a trust or corporation (other than an exempt organization), shall be taken into account as support from the general public only to the extent that the total amount of the support received from any such individual, trust, or corporation during the period for determining the normal sources of the foundation's support (as set forth in §53.4942 (b)–3) does not exceed 1 percent of the foundation's total support (other than gross investment income) for such period. In applying this 1-percent limitation, all support received by the foundation from any person and from any other person or persons standing in a relationship to such person which is described in section 4946(a)(1) (C) through (G) and the regulations thereunder shall be treated as received from one person. For purposes of this paragraph, support received from a governmental unit described in section 170(c)(1) shall be treated as support received from the general public, but shall not be subject to the 1-percent limitation.

(a) In general. A foundation may satisfy the income test and either the assets, endowment, or support test by satisfying such tests for any 3 taxable years during a 4-year period consisting of the taxable year in question and the three immediately preceding taxable years or on the basis of an aggregation of all pertinent amounts of income or assets held, received, or distributed during such 4-year period. A foundation may not use one method for satisfying the income test described in paragraph (a) of §53.4942(b)–1 and another for satisfying either the assets, endowment, or support test described in §53.4942(b)–2. Thus, if a foundation satisfies the income test on the 3-out-of-4-year basis for a particular taxable year, it may not use the aggregation method for satisfying either the assets, endowment, or support test for such particular taxable year. However, the fact that a foundation has chosen one method for satisfying the tests under §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 for 1 taxable year will not preclude it from satisfying such tests for a subsequent taxable year by the alternate method. If a foundation fails to satisfy the income test and either the assets, endowment, or support test for a particular taxable year under either the 3-out-of-4-year method or the aggregation method, it shall be treated as a nonoperating foundation for such taxable year and for all subsequent taxable years until it satisfies the tests set forth in §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 for a taxable year occurring after the taxable year in which it was treated as a nonoperating foundation.

(b) New organizations—(1) In general. Except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, an organization organized after December 31, 1969, will be treated as an operating foundation only if it has satisfied the tests set forth in §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 for its first taxable year of existence. If an organization satisfies such tests for its 1st taxable year, it will be treated as an operating foundation from the beginning of such taxable year. If such is the case, the organization will be treated as an operating foundation for its 2d and 3d taxable years of existence only if it satisfies the tests set forth in §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 by the aggregation method for all such taxable years that it has been in existence.

(2) Special rule. An organization organized after December 31, 1969, will be treated as an operating foundation prior to the end of its 1st taxable year if such organization has made a good faith determination that it is likely to satisfy the income test set forth in paragraph (a) of §53.4942(b)–1 and one of the tests set forth in §53.4942(b)–2 for such 1st taxable year pursuant to subparagraph (1) of this paragraph. Such a “good faith determination” ordinarily will be considered as made where the determination is based on an affidavit or opinion of counsel of such organization that such requirements will be satisfied. Such an affidavit or opinion must set forth sufficient facts concerning the operations and support of such organization for the Commissioner to be able to determine that such organization is likely to satisfy such requirements. An organization which, pursuant to this subparagraph, has been treated as an operating foundation for its 1st taxable year, but actually fails to qualify as an operating foundation under subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for such taxable year, will be treated as a private foundation which is not an operating foundation as of the 1st day of its 2d taxable year for purposes of making any determination under the internal revenue laws with respect to such organization. The preceding sentence shall not apply if such organization establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that it is likely to qualify as an operating foundation on the basis of its 2d, 3d, and 4th taxable years. Thus, if such an organization fails to qualify as an operating foundation in its 2d, 3d, or 4th taxable year after having failed in its 1st taxable year, it will be treated as a private foundation which is not an operating foundation as of the 1st day of such 2d, 3d, or 4th taxable year in which it fails to qualify as an operating foundation, except as otherwise provided by paragraph (d) of this section. Such status as a private foundation which is not an operating foundation will continue until such time as the organization is able to satisfy the tests set forth in §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 by either the 3-out-of-4-year method or the aggregation method. For the status of grants or contributions made to such an organization with respect to sections 170 and 4942, see paragraph (d) of this section.

(c) Transitional rule for existing organizations. An organization organized before December 31, 1969 (including organizations deemed to be so organized by virtue of the principles of paragraph (e)(2) of §53.4942(a)–2), but which is unable to satisfy the tests under §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 for its first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1969 on the basis of its operations for taxable years prior to such taxable year by either the 3-out-of-4-year method or the aggregation method, will be treated as a new organization for purposes of paragraph (b) of this section only if:

(1) The organization changes its methods of operation prior to its first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1972 to conform to the requirements of §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942 (b)–2;

(2) The organization has made a good faith determination (within the meaning of paragraph (b) (2) of the section) that it is likely to satisfy the tests set forth in §§53.4942(b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 prior to its first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1972 on the basis of its income or assets held, received, or distributed during its taxable years beginning in 1970 through 1972; and

(3) Such good faith determination is attached to the return the organization is required to file under section 6033 for its taxable year beginning in 1972.

(d) Treatment of contributions—(1) In general. The status of grants or contributions made to an operating foundation with respect to sections 170 and 4942 will not be affected until notice of change of status of such organization is made to the public (such as by publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin), unless the grant or contribution was made after:

(i) The act or failure to act that resulted in the organization's inability to satisfy the requirements of §§53.4942 (b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2, and the grantor or contributor was responsible for, or was aware of, such act or failure to act, or

(ii) The grantor or contributor acquired knowledge that the Commissioner has given notice to such organization that it would be deleted from classification as an operating foundation.

(2) Exception. For purposes of subparagraph (1) (i) of this paragraph, a grantor or contributor will not be considered to be responsible for, or aware of, the act or failure to act that resulted in the grantee organization's inability to satisfy the requirements of §§53.4942 (b)–1 and 53.4942(b)–2 if such grantor or contributor has made his grant or contribution in reliance upon a written statement by the grantee organization that such grant or contribution would not result in the inability of such grantee organization to qualify as an operating foundation. Such a statement must be signed by a foundation manager (as defined in section 4946(b)) of the grantee organization and must set forth sufficient facts concerning the operations and support of such grantee organization to assure a reasonably prudent man that his grant or contribution will not result in the grantee organization's inability to qualify as an operating foundation.

Authority:  Secs. 4943 and 7805, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 917, 83 Stat. 507; 26 U.S.C. 4943, 7805.

Source:  T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, unless otherwise noted.

§ 53.4943-1   General rule; purpose.

Generally, under section 4943, the combined holdings of a private foundation and all disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946(a)) in any corporation conducting a business which is not substantially related (aside from the need of the foundation for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exempt purposes of the foundation are limited to 20 percent of the voting stock in such corporation. In addition, the combined holdings of a private foundation and all disqualified persons in any unincorporated business (other than a sole proprietorship) which is not substantially related (aside from the need of the foundation for income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exempt purposes of such foundation are limited to 20 percent of the beneficial or profits interest in such business. In the case of a sole proprietorship which is not substantially related (within the meaning of the preceding sentence), section 4943 provides that a private foundation shall have no permitted holdings. These general provisions are subject to a number of exceptions and special provisions which will be described in following sections.

(a) Imposition of initial tax—(1) In general—(i) Initial tax. Section 4943(a)(1) imposes an initial excise tax (the “initial tax”) on the excess business holdings of a private foundation for each taxable year of the foundation which ends during the taxable period defined in section 4943(d)(2). The amount of such tax is equal to 5 percent of the total value of all the private foundation's excess business holdings in each of its business enterprises. In determining the value of the excess business holdings of the foundation subject to tax under section 4943, the rules set forth in §§20.2031–1 through 20.2031–3 of this chapter (Estate Tax Regulations) shall apply.

(ii) Disposition of certain excess business holdings within ninety days. In any case in which a private foundation acquires excess business holdings, other than as a result of a purchase by the foundation, the foundation shall not be subject to the taxes imposed by section 4943, but only if it disposes of an amount of its holdings so that it no longer has such excess business holdings within 90 days from the date on which it knows, or has reason to know, of the event which caused it to have such excess business holdings. Similarly, a private foundation shall not be subject to the taxes imposed by section 4943 because of its purchase of holdings where it did not know, or have reason to know of prior acquisitions by disqualified persons, but only if the foundation disposes of its excess holdings within the 90-day period described previously, and its purchase would not have created excess business holding but for such prior acquisitions by disqualified persons. In determining whether for purposes of this (ii) the foundation has disposed of such excess business holdings during such 90-day period, any disposition of holdings, by a disqualified person during such period shall be disregarded.

(iii) Extension of ninety day period. The period described in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, during which no tax shall be imposed under section 4943, shall be extended to include the period during which a foundation is prevented by federal or state securities laws from disposing of such excess business holdings.

(iv) Effect of disposition subject to material restrictions. If a private foundation disposes of an interest in a business enterprise but imposes any material restrictions or conditions that prevent the transferee from freely and effectively using or disposing of the transferred interest, then the transferor foundation will be treated as owning such interest until all such restrictions or conditions are eliminated (regardless of whether the transferee is treated for other purposes of the Code as owning such interest from the date of the transfer). However, a restriction or condition imposed in compliance with federal or state securities laws, or in accordance with the terms or conditions of the gift or bequest through which such interest was acquired by the foundation, shall not be considered a material restriction or condition imposed by a private foundation.

(v) Foundation knowledge of acquisitions made by disqualified persons. (A) For purposes of paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, whether a private foundation will be treated as knowing, or having reason to know, of the acquisition of holdings by a disqualified person will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Factors which will be considered relevant to a determination that a private foundation did not know or had no reason to know of an acquisition are: the fact that it did not discover acquisitions made by disqualified persons through the use of procedures reasonably calculated to discover such holdings; the diversity of foundation holdings; and the existence of large numbers of disqualified persons who have little or no contact with the foundation or its managers.

(B) The provisions of paragraph (a)(1)(v)(A) of this section may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  By the fifteenth day of the fifth month after the close of each taxable year, the F Foundation sends to each foundation manager, substantial contributor, person holding more than a 20% interest (as described in section 4946(a)(1)(C) in a substantial contributor, and foundation described in section 4946(a)(1)(H), a questionnaire asking such persons to list all holdings, actual or constructive, in each business enterprise in which F had holdings during the taxable year in excess of those permitted by the 2 percent de minimis rule of section 4943(c)(2)(C). In preparing the list of such enterprises, F takes into account its constructive holdings only if, during the taxable year, F (along with all related foundations described in section 4946(a)(1)(H)) owned over 2% of the voting stock, profits interest or beneficial interest in the entity actually owning the holdings constructively held by F. The questionnaire asks each such person to list the holdings in such enterprises of any persons who, because of their relationship to such disqualified person, were themselves disqualified persons (i.e., members of the family (as defined in section 4946(d)), and any corporations, partnerships, trusts and estates described in section 4946(a)(1) (E) through (G) in which such person, or members of his family, had an interest). The questionnaire asks that constructive holdings be listed only if, during the taxable year, the disqualified person owned over 2% of the voting stock, profits interest or beneficial interest in the entity actually owning the holdings constructively held by such person. (Thus a disqualified person owning less than 2% of a mutual fund is not required to list his attributed share of all the securities in the portfolio of the fund.) If no response to the questionnaire is received, the foundation seeks the information requested by the questionnaire by mailing a second (but not a third) questionnaire. If a questionnaire which is returned to the foundation indicates that certain information was unavailable to the person completing the questionnaire, the foundation seeks that information directly. For example, if a disqualified person indicates that he could not find out whether a corporation described in section 4946(a)(1)(E) had holdings in the enterprise listed in the questionnaire, the foundation seeks to obtain this information directly from the corporation by mailing it a questionnaire. In such a case F may be found not to have reason to know of the acquisition of holdings by a disqualified person.

(vi) Holdings acquired other than by purchases. See section 4943(c)(6) and §53.4943–6 for rules relating to the acquisition of certain holdings other than by purchase by the foundation or a disqualified person.

(2) Special rules. In applying subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, the tax imposed by section 4943(a)(1):

(i) Shall be imposed on the last day of the private foundation's taxable year, but

(ii) The amount of such tax and the value of the excess business holdings subject to such tax shall be determined with respect to the foundation's holdings (based upon voting power, profits or beneficial interest, or value, whichever is applicable) in any business enterprise as of that day during the foundation's taxable year when the foundation's excess holdings in such enterprise were the greatest.

In applying subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph, if a foundation's excess business holdings in a business enterprise which constitute such foundation's greatest excess holdings in such enterprise for any taxable year are maintained for 2 or more days during such taxable year, the value of such excess holdings which is subject to tax under section 4943(a)(1) shall be the greatest value of such excess holdings in such enterprise as of any day on which such greatest excess holdings are maintained during such taxable year.

(3) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  Y is a private foundation reporting on a calendar year basis. On January 1, 1973, Y has 20 shares of common stock in corporation N, of which five shares constitute excess business holdings. On June 1, 1973, Y disposes of such five shares; however, because of additional acquisitions of N common stock on such date by disqualified persons with respect to Y, the remaining 15 shares of N common stock held by Y now constitute excess business holdings. There are no further acquisitions or dispositions of N common stock during 1973 by Y or its disqualified persons. Although Y's greatest holdings in N during 1973 are held between January 1, 1973, and May 31, 1973, Y's greatest excess holdings in N during 1973 are held between June 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973. Therefore, the tax specified in section 4943(a)(1) shall be computed on the basis of the greatest value of such greatest excess holdings as of any day between June 1 and December 31, 1973.

Example (2).  X is a private foundation reporting on a calendar year basis. On January 1, 1972, X has 100 shares of common stock in M corporation which are excess business holdings. On such date each share of M common stock has a fair market value of $100. On February 28, 1972, in an effort to dispose of such excess business holdings, X sells 70 shares of M common stock for $120 per share (the fair market value of each share on such date) to A, an individual who is not a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4946(a). The value of $120 per share is the highest fair market value between January 1 and February 28, 1972. X disposes of no more stock in M for the reminder of calendar year 1972. On December 31, 1972, the fair market value of each share of M common stock is $80. X calculates its tax on its excess business holdings in M for 1972 as follows:

Example (3).  Assume the same facts as in Example (2) except that the sale of X to A occurs on January 7, 1973, when the fair market value of each share of M corporation common stock equals $70. A value of $100 per share is the highest fair market value of the M common stock between January 1 and January 7, 1973. On may 9, 1973, X for the first time has excess business holdings in N corporation in the form of 200 shares of N common stock. The value per share of N common stock on May 9, 1973, equals $200. X makes no disposition of the N common stock during 1973, and the value of each share of N common stock as of December 31, 1973 equals $250 (the highest value of N common stock during 1973). X calculates its tax on its excess business holdings in both M and N for 1973 as follows:

(b) Additional tax. In any case in which the initial tax is imposed under section 4943(a) with respect to the holdings of a private foundation in any business enterprise, if, at the close of the taxable period (as defined in section 4943(d)(2) and §53.4943–9) with respect to such holdings the foundation still has excess business holdings in such enterprise, there is imposed a tax under section 4943(b) equal to 200 percent of the value of such excess holdings as of the last day of the taxable period.

[T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, as amended by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16302, May 2, 1986]

(a) Excess business holdings—(1) In general. For purposes of section 4943, the term “excess business holdings” means, with respect to the holdings of any private foundation in any business enterprise (as described in section 4943(d)(4)), the amount of stock or other interest in the enterprise which, except as provided in §53.4943–2(a)(1), the foundation, or a disqualified person, would have to dispose of, or cause the disposition of, to a person other than a disqualified person (as defined in section 4946(a)) in order for the remaining holdings of the foundation in such enterprise to be permitted holdings (as defined in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section). If a private foundation is required by section 4943 and the regulations thereunder to dispose of certain shares of a class of stock in a particular period of time and other shares of the same class of stock in a shorter period of time, any stock disposed of shall be charged first against those dispositions which must be made in such shorter period.

(2) Example. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  Corporation X has outstanding 100 shares of voting stock, with each share entitling the holder thereof to one vote. F, a private foundation, possesses 20 shares of X voting stock representing 20 percent of the voting power in X. Assume that the permitted holdings of F in X under paragraph (b)(1) of this section are 11 percent of the voting stock in X. F, therefore, possesses voting stock in X representing a percentage of voting stock in excess of the percentage permitted by such paragraph. Such excess percentage is 9 percent of the voting stock in X, determined by subtracting the percentage of voting stock representing the permitted holdings of F in X (i.e., 11 percent) from the percentage of voting stock held by F in X (I.E., 20 percent). (20%−11%=9%). The excess business holdings of F in X are an amount of voting stock representing such excess percentage, or 9 shares of X voting stock (9 percent of 100).

(b) Permitted holdings in an incorporated business enterprise—(1) In general—(i) Permitted holdings defined. Except as otherwise provided in section 4943(c) (2) and (4), the permitted holdings of any private foundation in an incorporated business enterprise (including a real estate investment trust, as defined in section 856) are:

(A) 20 percent of the voting stock in such enterprise reduced (but not below zero) by

(B) The percentage of voting stock in such enterprise actually or constructively owned by all disqualified persons.

(ii) Voting stock. For purposes of this section, the percentage of voting stock held by any person in a corporation is normally determined by reference to the power of stock to vote for the election of directors, with treasury stock and stock which is authorized but unissued being disregarded. Thus, for example, if a private foundation holds 20 percent of the shares of one class of stock in a corporation, which class is entitled to elect three directors, and such foundation holds no stock in the other class of stock, which is entitled to elect five directors, such foundation shall be treated as holding 7.5 percent of the voting stock because the class of stock it holds has 37.5 percent of such voting power, by reason of being able to elect three of the eight directors, and the foundation holds one-fifth of the shares of such class (20 percent of 37.5 percent is 7.5 percent). The fact that extraordinary corporate action (e.g., charter or by-law amendments) by a corporation may require the favorable vote of more than a majority of the directors, or of the outstanding voting stock, of such corporation shall not alter the determination of voting power of stock in such corporation in accordance with the two preceding sentences.

(2) Nonvoting stock as permitted holdings—(i) In general. In addition to those holdings permitted by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the permitted holdings of a private foundation in an incorporated business enterprise shall include any share of nonvoting stock in such enterprise held by the foundation in any case in which all disqualified persons hold, actually or constructively, no more than 20 percent (35 percent where third persons have effective control as defined in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section) of the voting stock in such enterprise. All equity interests which do not have voting power attributable to them shall, for purposes of section 4943, the classified as nonvoting stock. For this purpose, evidences of indebtedness (including convertible indebtedness), and warrants and other options or rights to acquire stock shall not be considered equity interests.

(ii) Stock with contingent voting rights and convertible nonvoting stock. Stock carrying voting rights which will vest only when conditions, the occurrence of which are indeterminate, have been met, such as preferred stock which gains such voting rights only if no dividends are paid thereon, will be treated as nonvoting stock until the conditions have occurred which cause the voting rights to vest. When such rights vest, the stock will be treated as voting stock that was acquired other than by purchase, but only if the private foundation or disqualified persons had no control over whether the conditions would occur. Similarly, nonvoting stock which may be converted into voting stock will not be treated as voting stock until such conversion occurs. For special rules where stock is acquired other than by purchase, see section 4943(c)(6) and the regulations thereunder.

(iii) Example. The provisions of this pararaph (2) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  Assume that F, a private foundation, holds 10 percent of the single class of voting stock of corporation X, and owns 20 shares of nonvoting stock in X. Assume further that A and B, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, hold 10 percent of the voting stock of X. Under the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of this section the 10 percent of X voting stock held by F will be classified as permitted holdings of F in X since 20 percent less the percentage of voting stock held by A and B in X is 10 percent. In addition, under the provisions of this (2), the 20 shares of X nonvoting stock will qualify as permitted holdings of F in X since the percentage of voting stock held by A and B in X is no greater than 20 percent.

(3) Thirty-five-percent rule where third person has effective control of enterprise—(i) In general. Except as provided in section 4943(c)(4), paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall be applied by substituting 35 percent for 20 percent if:

(A) The private foundation and all disqualified persons together do not hold, actually or constructively, more than 35 percent of the voting stock in the business enterprise, and

(B) The foundation establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that effective control (as defined in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this section) of the business enterprise is in one or more persons (other than the foundation itself) who are not disqualfied persons.

(ii) “Effective control” defined. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “effective control” means the possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a business enterprise, whether through the ownership of voting stock, the use of voting trusts, or contractual arrangements, or otherwise. It is the reality of control which is decisive and not its form or the means by which it is exercisable. Thus, where a minority interest held by individuals who are not disqualified persons has historically elected the majority of a corporation's directors, effective control is in the hands of those individuals.

(4) Two percent de minimis rule—(i) In general. Under section 4943(c)(2)(C), a private foundation is not treated as having excess business holdings in any incorporated business enterprise in which it (together with all other private foundations (including trusts described in section 4947(a)(2)) which are described in section 4946(a)(1)(H)) actually or constructively owns not more than 2 percent of the voting stock and not more than 2 percent in value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock. If, however, the private foundation, together with all other private foundations which are described in section 4946(a)(1)(H), actually or constructively owns more than 2 percent of either the voting stock or the value of the outstanding shares of all classes of stock in any incorporated business enterprise, all the stock in such business enterprise classified as excess business holding under section 4943 is treated as excess business holdings. For purposes of this paragraph, any stock owned by a private foundation which is treated as held by a disqualified person under section 4943(c)(4)(B), (5), or (6) shall be treated as actually owned by the private foundation. See paragraph (b)(1) of §53.4941(d)–4 for the determination of excess business holdings without regard to section 4943(c)(2)(C) for purposes of applying section 101(C)(2)(B) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (83 Stat. 533).

(ii) Examples. The provisions of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  F, a private foundation, owns 1 percent of the single class of voting stock and 1 percent in value of all the outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X corporation. No other private foundation described in section 4946(a)(1)(H) owns any stock in X. All of the stock owned by F in X would be excess business holdings under section 4943 (c)(1) if section 4943(c)(2)(C) were inapplicable. F owns no no other shares of stock in X. Since F owns more than 2 percent of the voting stock and no more than 2 percent in value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X, under section 4943(c)(2)(C) none of the stock in X owned by F is treated as excess business holdings.

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that F and T, a controlled private foundation under section 4946 (a)(1)(H), together own 1 percent of all the voting stock and 1 percent in value of all the outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. All of the stock in X owned by F and T would be excess business holdings under section 4943(c)(1) if section 4943(c)(2)(C) were inapplicable. Since F and T together owned no more than 2 percent of the voting stock and no more than 2 percent in value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X, under section 4943(c)(2)(C) none of the stock in X owned by either F or T is treated as excess business holdings.

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that F owns 3 percent of the voting stock in X, 2 percent of which is treated as held by P, a disqualified person of F, under section 4943(c)(4)(B). Under subdivision (i) of this subparagraph, the 2 percent of the stock in X owned by F which is treated as held by P under section 4943(c)(4)(B) is treated as actually owned by F for purposes of section 4943(c)(2)(C). Consequently, all of the X stock owned by F is treated as excess business holdings under section 4943(c)(2)(C). However, only 1 percent of the stock in X is subject to tax under section 4943(a), since the other 2 percent is treated as owned by a disqualified person under section 4943(c)(4)(B) for purposes of determining the tax upon F under section 4943(a).

(c) Permitted holdings in an unincorporated business enterprise—(1) In general. The permitted holdings of a private foundation in any business enterprise which is not incorporated shall, subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this paragraph, be determined under the principles of paragraph (b) of this section.

(2) Partnership or joint venture. In the case of a partnership (including a limited partnership) or joint venture. the terms “profits interest” and “capital interest” shall be substituted for “voting stock” and “nonvoting stock,” respectively, wherever those terms appear in paragraph (b) of this section. The interest in profits of such foundation (or such disqualified person) shall be determined in the same manner as its distributive share of partnership taxable income. See section 704(b) (relating to the determination of the distributive share by the income or loss ratio) and the regulations thereunder. In the absence of a provision in the partnership agreement, the capital interest of such foundation (or such disqualified person) in a partnership shall be determined on the basis of its interest in the assets of the partnership which would be distributable to such foundation (or such disqualified person) upon its withdrawal from the partnership, or upon liquidation of the partnership, whichever is the greater.

(3) Sole proprietorship. For purposes of section 4943, a private foundation shall have no permitted holdings in a sole proprietorship. In the case of a transfer by a private foundation of a portion of a sole proprietorship, see paragraph (c)(2) of this section (relating to permitted holdings in partnerships). For the treatment of a private foundation's ownership of a sole proprietorship prior to May 26, 1969, see §53.4943–4.

(4) Trusts and other unincorporated business enterprises—(i) In general. In the case of any unincorporated business enterprise which is not described in paragraph (c) (2) or (3) of this section, the term “beneficial interest” shall be substitued for “voting stock” wherever the term appears in paragraph (b) of this section. Any and all references to nonvoting stock in paragraph (b) of this section shall be inapplicable with respect to any unincorporated business enterprise described in this subparagraph.

(ii) Trusts. For purposes of section 4943, the beneficial interest of a private foundation or any disqualified person in a trust shall be the beneficial remainder interest of such foundation or person determined as provided in paragraph (b) of §53.4943–8.

(iii) Other unincorporated business enterprises. For purposes of section 4943, the beneficial interest of a private foundation or any disqualified person in an unincorporated business enterprise (other than a trust or an enterprise described in paragraph (c) (2) or (3) of this section) includes any right to receive a portion of distributions of profits of such enterprise, and, if the portion of distributions is not fixed by an agreement among the participants, any right to receive a portion of the assets (if any) upon liquidation of the enterprise, except as a creditor or employee. For purposes of this subparagraph, a right to receive distributions of profits includes a right to receive any amount from such profits (other than as a creditor or employee), whether as a sum certain or as a portion of profits realized by the enterprise. Where there is no agreement fixing the rights of the participants in such enterprise, the interest of such foundation (or such disqualified person) in such enterprise shall be determined by dividing the amount of all equity investments or contributions to the capital of the enterprise made or obligated to be made by such foundation (or such disqualified person) by the amount of all equity investments or contributions to capital made or obligated to be made by all participants in the enterprise.

(d) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  Corporation X has outstanding 100 shares of voting stock, with each share entitling the holder thereof to one vote. Assume that F, a private foundation, possesses 30 shares of X voting stock, and that A and B, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, together own 10 shares of X voting stock. The excess business holdings of F in X are 20 shares of X voting stock, determined as follows:

Example (2).  F, a private foundation, is a partner in P partnership. In addition, A and B, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, are partners in P. The partnership agreement of P contains no provisions regarding the sharing of profits by, and the respective capital interests of, the partners.

(i) assume that, under section 704(b), F's distributive share of P taxable income is determined to be 20 percent. In addition, assume that under such section, A and B are determined to have a 4-percent distributive share each of P taxable income. Accordingly, F holds a 20-percent profits interest in P, and A and B hold an 8-percent profits interest in P. Assuming that the provisions of section 4943(c)(2)(B) do not apply, the permitted holdings of F in P are 12 percent of the profits interest in P, determined by subtracting the percentage of the profits interest held by A and B in P (i.e., 8 percent) from 20 percent. (20 percent−8 percent=12 percent.) F, therefore, holds a percentage of the profits interest in P in excess of the percentage permitted by §53.4943–3(b)(1). The excess business holdings of F in P are a percentage of the profits interest in P equivalent to such excess percentage, or 8 percent of the profits interest in P, determined by subtracting the permitted holdings of F in P (i.e., 12 percent) from the percentage of the profit interest held by F in P (i.e., 20 percent) (20 percent−12 percent=8 percent.)

(a) Introduction—(1) Section 4943 (c)(4) in general. (i) Paragraph (4) of section 4943(c) prescribes transition rules for a private foundation which, but for such paragraph, would have excess business holdings on May 26, 1969. Section 4943(c)(4) provides such a foundation with protection from the initial tax on excess business holdings in two ways. First, the entire interest of such a foundation in any business enterprise in which such a foundation, but for section 4943(c)(4), would have had excess business holdings on May 26, 1969, is treated under section 4943(c)(4)(B) as held by disqualified persons for a certain period of time (the “first phase”). The effect of such treatment is to prevent a private foundation from being subject to the initial tax with respect to its May 26, 1969, interest during the first phase holding period and also to prevent the foundation from purchasing any additional business holdings in such business enterprise during such period (unless the combined holdings of the foundation and all disqualified persons fall below the 20 percent (or 35 percent, if applicable) figure prescribed by section 4943(c)(2)). Second, section 4943(c)(4)(A)(i) initially increases the percentage of permitted holdings of such a foundation to a percentage equal to the difference between:

(A) The percentage of combined holdings of the foundation and all disqualified persons in such business enterprise on May 26, 1969 (subject to a 50 percent maximum), and

(B) The percentage of holdings of all disqualified persons.

The percentage referred to in paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A) of this section is referred to in this section as the “substituted level”. This “substituted level” is then reduced by the “downward ratchet rule” prescribed by section 4943(c)(4)(A)(ii) and paragraph (d)(3) of this section for certain dispositions by such foundation or by disqualified persons. The primary purpose of the substituted level is to indicate what the permitted holdings in such business enterprise will be immediately after the expiration of the first phase holding period. Thereafter, the permitted holdings of a private foundation itself are further limited to a maximum 25 percent interest in such business enterprise by section 4943(c)(4)(D) as soon as the combined holdings of all disqualified persons in such business enterprise exceed 2 percent (of the voting stock). If the combined holdings of all disqualified persons at no time exceed 2 percent (of the voting stock) during the 15 years following the first phase (the “second phase”), then the substituted level is reduced to a 35 percent maximum after the second phase.

(ii) Paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  On May 26, 1969, private foundation P held a 5 percent interest in corporation X (voting stock and value). On such date disqualified persons held a 16 percent interest in X (voting stock and value). Assume that except for section 4943(c)(4), P would have had a 1 percent interest in X which would have consitituted excess business holdings. Therefore, section 4943(c)(4)(B) applies and P's 5 percent interest in X is treated as held by a disqualified person during the 10-year period beginning May 26, 1969. Since the entire 21 percent held by P and disqualified persons is now treated as held by disqualified persons, P's substituted level is 21 percent and its permitted holdings are zero (21%−21%). However, P has no excess business holdings in X, because during the 10-year period P is not treated as holding such interest. The only change in the interest in X occurs on January 2, 1972, when P disposes of 2 percent of its interest in X to A, an unrelated person. Since the interest held by P and all disqualified persons (21%−2%=19%) has decreased below 20 percent, P's substituted level is reduced to 20 percent and its permitted holdings are 1 percent (20%−19%) on such date. Therefore, if the other interests in X do not change, P will not have excess business holdings if P purchases no more than an additional 1 percent interest in X.

(2) Interaction of provisions of section 4943(c) (4), (5), and (6). During the first phase, a private foundation may acquire additional interests in a business enterprise, other than by purchase, which are entitled to be treated as held by disqualified persons for varying holding periods under section 4943(c) (5) or (6) (relating respectively to certain holdings aquired pursuant to the terms of a trust or will in effect on May 26, 1969, and to the 5-year period to dispose of certain gifts, bequests, etc.). In any case holdings which the private foundation disposes of shall be charged first against those holdings which it must dispose of in the shortest period in order to avoid the initial tax thereon. Further, acquisions of a private foundation under a pre-May 27, 1969, will or trust described in section 4943(3)(5) are treated in a manner similar to the treatment of interests actually held by a private foundation on May 26, 1969. See §§53.4943–5 and 53.4943–6.

(b) Present holdings in general. (1) Section 4943(c)(4)(B) provides that any interest in a business enterprise held by a private foundation on May 26, 1969, if the foundation on such date has excess business holdings (determined without regard to section 4943(c)(4)), shall (while held by the foundation) be treated as held by a disqualified person during a first phase. Therefore, no interest of a private foundation shall be treated as held by a disqualified person under section 4943(c)(4)(B) and this section unless:

(i) The private foundation was an entity (not including a revocable trust) in existence on May 26, 1969, even though it was not then treated as a private foundation under section 509 or section 4947;

(ii) Such interest was actually or constructively owned by such entity on such date; and

(iii) Without regard to section 4943(c)(4) such entitly had on such date an interest (considered in connection with the interests actually or constructively owned by all disqualified persons with respect to such entity on that date in the same business enterprise, determined as if the entity were then a private foundation) which exceeded the permitted holdings prescribed by section 4943(c) (2) or (3).

(See, however, section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5 for similar treatment for certain interests acquired by a private foundation under the terms of a trust or a will which were in effect on May 26, 1969.) If a private foundation owns an interest described by section 4943(c)(4)(B), then the length of the first phase for such an interest is prescribed by paragraph (c) of this section and shall not be affected by any interest acquired by the private foundation or any disqualified person in such business enterprise after May 26, 1969. In addition, the amount of permitted holdings in such business enterprise is prescribed by paragraph (d) of this section. An interest constructively held by a private foundation (or a disqualified person) on May 26, 1969, shall not cease to be an interest to which section 4943(c)(4) applies merely because it is later distributed to such foundation (or to such disqualified person). Nor shall an interest directly held by a private foundation (or to such disqualified person) on May 26, 1969, cease to be treated as an interest to which section 4943(c)(4) applies to the extent it remains actually or constructively held by such foundation (or such disqualified person) upon transfer of such interest, such as upon the incorporation of a sole proprietorship.

(2) The provision of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  A, a nonprofit research organization described in section 501(c)(3), was organized in 1966. On May 26, 1969, A held 50 percent of the stock of corporation B. For its taxable years 1970, 1971, and 1972, A is classified as an organization described in section 509(a)(2). However, for 1973 and subsequent years, A fails to satisfy the gross investment income limitation of section 509(a)(2)(B), and is thus classified as a private foundation. In such a case, section 4943(c)(4) applies, and a disqualified person shall be treated as holding A's stock in B during a first phase that begins on May 26, 1969.

(c) First Phase holding periods—(1) In general. If, on May 26, 1969, a private foundation has excess business holdings in any business enterprise (determined with regard to the 20 or 35 percent permitted holdings of section 4943(c)(2)), then all interest which such foundation holds, actually or constructively, in such enterprise on May 26, 1969, shall (while held by such foundation) be deemed held by a disqualified person during the following periods:

(i) The 20-year period beginning on May 26, 1969, if the private foundation holds, actually or constructively, more than 95 percent of the voting stock (or more than a 95 percent profits or beneficial interest in the case of an unincorporated enterprise) in such enterprise on such date;

(ii) Except as provided in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, the 15-year period beginning on May 26, 1969, if the private foundation and all disqualified persons hold, actually or constructively on such date more than 75 percent of the voting stock (or more than a 75 percent profits or beneficial interest in the case of any unincorporated enterprise) or 75 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in such enterprise (or more than a 75 percent profits and capital interest in the case of a partnership or joint venture); or

(iii) The 10-year period beginning on May 26, 1969, in any case not described in paragraph (c)(1) (i) or (ii) of this section.

The 20-year, 15-year, or 10-year period described in this subdivision (whichever applies) shall, for purposes of section 4943 and this section, be known as the “first phase.”

(2) Sole proprietorships. The 20-year period described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section shall apply with respect to any interest which a private foundation holds in a sole proprietorship on May 26, 1969. See paragraph (b) of this section for the effect of converting such an enterprise to a corporate, partnership, or other form.

(3) Suspension of first-phase periods. The 20-year, 15-year, or 10-year period described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section shall be suspended during the dependency of any judicial proceeding which is brought and diligently litigated by the private foundation and which is necessary to reform, or to excuse the foundation from compliance with, its governing instrument or any other instrument (as in effect on May 26, 1969) in order to allow disposition of any excess business holdings held by the foundation on May 26, 1969.

(4) Election to shorten the period during which certain holdings of private foundations are treated as held by disqualified persons. If, on May 26, 1969, the combined holdings of a private foundation and all disqualified persons in any one business enterprise are such as to make applicable the 15-year period referred to in paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section, and if, on such date, the foundation's holdings do not exceed 95 percent of the voting stock in such enterprise, then such 15-year period is shortened to the 10-year period referred to in paragraph (c)(1)(iii), if at any time before January 1, 1971, one or more individuals:

(i) Who are substantial contributors (as described in section 507(d)(2)), or members of the family within the meaning of section 4946(d) of one or more substantial contributors, to such private foundation, and

(ii) Who on May 26, 1969, held in the aggregate more than 15 percent of the voting stock in the enterprise, made an election in the manner described in 26 CFR 143.6 (rev. as of Apr. 1, 1974).

(5) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (c) may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  Assume that F, a private foundation, owns, on May 26, 1969, 50 shares of voting stock in corporation X respresenting 50 percent of the voting power in X and 25 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. Assume further that A and B, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, own five shares each of voting stock in X on such date. The 10 shares of voting stock in X owned by A and B together represent 10 percent of the voting power in X and 5 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. Under the provisions of §53.4943–3, the excess business holdings of F, in X (determined without regard to section 4943(c)(4)) as of such date are, therefore, 40 percent of X voting stock. Accordingly, since the combined holdings of F, A, and B in X are, on such date, less than 75 percent of the voting stock in X and less than 75 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X, under the provisions of section 4943(c)(4)(B)(iii), all holdings of F in X (i.e., 50 percent of X voting stock) will be treated as held by a disqualified person through May 25, 1979.

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that F, on December 15, 1969, purchases an additional 10 shares of voting stock in X representing 10 percent of X voting power. Assume, further, that there were no other transactions in the stock in X during 1969. While the 50 percent of X voting stock held by F on May 26, 1969, will be deemed held by a disqualified person through May 25, 1979, the additional 10 shares of X voting stock acquired by purchase by F on December 15, 1969, will no be deemed to be so held. Accordingly, since, under the provisions of §53.4943–3, such 10 shares represent excess business holding of F in X, such 10 shares will be subject to the imposition of tax under the provisions of section 4943(a).

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that F, on December 15, 1971 acquires an additional 10 shares of voting stock in X (representing 10 percent of X voting power) under the terms of a will which was executed before May 26, 1969, to which section 4943(c)(5) applies. While the 50 percent of X voting stock held by F on May 26, 1969, will be deemed held by a disqualified person through May 25, 1979, the additional 10 percent of X voting stock acquired by F on December 15, 1971, will, under the provisions of section 4943(c)(5), be deemed held by a disqualified person through December 14, 1981. See §53.4943–5.

Example (4).  Assume that F, a private foundation, owns on May 26, 1969, 50 shares of voting stock in corporation Y representing 50 percent of the voting power in Y. Assume further that C and D, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, own on such date 15 shares each of Y voting stock and that the 30 shares of Y voting stock owned by C and D together represent 30 percent of the voting power in Y. Under the provisions of §53.4943–3 the excess business holdings of F in Y (determined without regard to section 4943(c)(4)) as of such date are, therefore, 50 percent of Y voting stock. Accordingly, since the combined holdings of F, C, and D in Y represent, on such date, more than 75 percent of the voting stock in Y, under the provisions of section 4943(c)(4)(B)(ii), all holdings of F in Y (i.e., 50 percent of Y voting stock will be treated as held by a disqualified person through May 25, 1984.

Example (5).  M, a private foundation, owns on May 26, 1969, sole proprietorship S. Since, under the provisions of §53.5954–3, M's ownership of S constitutes excess business holdings (determined without regard to section 4943(c)(4) as of May 26, 1969, and since M's interest in S is greater than 95 percent on such date, under the provisions of this paragraph a disqualified person will be treated as the owner of S for the 20-year period beginning on such date. If S is later incorporated, that percentage of the interest in S retained by M, even though less than a 95-percent interest, shall continue to be treated as held by a disqualified person through May 25, 1989.

Example (6).  A and B, individuals, together own on May 26, 1969, 40 shares of voting stock in corporation X representng 40 percent of the voting power in X and 20 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. A and B are both disqualified persons with respect to F, a private foundation, which owns no stock in X on May 26, 1969. On January 1, 1973, A and B donate the 40 shares of X voting stock held by them to F. Since F had no excess business holdings on May 26, 1969, section 4943(c)(4) does not apply. See however, section 4943(c)(6) and §53.4943–6.

Example (7).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (6), except that F, on May 26, 1969, owns 50 shares of voting stock in X, representing 50 percent of the voting power in X and 25 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. Under the provisions of this paragraph, the 50 shares of X voting stock held by F on May 26, 1969 shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section 4943(c)(4), while the 40 shares of X voting stock acquired by F on January 1, 1973 shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section 4943(c)(6). See §53.4943–6.

(d) Permitted holdings under section 4943(c)(4)—(1) In general. The permitted holdings of a private foundation to which section 4943 (c)(4) applies in a business enterprise shall be as follows:

(i) The excess of the substituted combined voting level over the disqualified person voting level, and separately,

(ii) The excess of the substituted combined value level over the disqualified person value level.

(2) Definitions. For purposes of paragraph (d) of this section:

(i) The term disqualified person voting level on any given date means the percentage of voting stock held by all disqualified persons together on such date (including stock deemed held by such a person by reason of section 4943(c)(4), (5), or (6)).

(ii) The term disqualified person value level on any given date means the percentage of the total value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in a business enterprise held by all disqualified persons together on such date (including stock deemed held by such a person by reason of section 4943(c)(4), (5), or (6)).

(iii) The term foundation voting level prior to the second phase is equal to zero. After the first phase, such term on any given date means the lowest percentage of voting stock held by a private foundation (without regard to section 4943(c)(4)(B)) in a business enterprise on May 26, 1969, and at all times thereafter up to such date. See section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5 for the effect of the interests acquired pursuant to the terms of certain wills or trusts in effect on May 26, 1969.

(iv) The term foundation value level prior to the second phase is equal to zero. After the first phase, such term on any given date means the lowest percentage of the total value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock held by a private foundation (without regard to section 4943(c)(4)(B)) in a business enterprise on May 26, 1969, and at all times thereafter up to such date. See section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5 for the effect of interests acquired pursuant to the terms of certain wills or trusts in effect on May 26, 1969.

(v) The term substituted combined voting level means the lowest percentage to which the sum of the foundation voting level plus the disqualified person voting level has been reduced since May 26, 1969, by paragraph (d)(4) of this section to the following modifications (the “downward ratchet rule”), subject;

(A) In no event shall such substituted level exceed 50 percent; and

(B) Such substituted level shall be increased (but not above 50 percent) in accordance with section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5 for certain interests acquired by such foundation pursuant to the terms of a will or trust in effect on May 26, 1969.

(vi) The term substituted combined value level means the lowest percentage to which the sum of the foundation value level plus the disqualified person value level has been reduced since May 26, 1969, by paragraph (d)(4) of this section (the “downward ratchet rule”), subject to the following modifications:

(A) In no event shall such substituted level exceed 50 percent; and

(B) Such substituted level shall be increased (but not above 50 percent) in accordance with section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5 for certain interests acquired by such foundation pursuant to the terms of a will or trust in effect on May 26, 1969.

(vii) In the case of an interest in a partnership or joint venture, definitions (i) through (iv) of this subparagraph shall be applied by substituting “profit interests” for “voting stock” and “all partnership interests” for “all outstanding shares of all classes of stock.”

(viii) In the case of an interest in a business enterprise other than a corporation, partnership or joint venture, definitions (i) through (iv) of this subparagraph shall be applied by substituting “beneficial remainder interests” for “voting stock” and “all beneficial remainder interests” and “all outstanding shares of all classes of stock.”

(ix) Each level defined in paragaph (d)(2)(iii), (iv) and (v) and (vi) as of any date shall be carried over to the subsequent date subject to any adjustments prescribed for such level.

(3) Permitted holdings—First phase. Since during the first phase the substituted combined voting level generally does not exceed the disqualified person voting level, and the substituted combined value level generally does not exceed the disqualified person value level, the permitted holdings during the first phase are generally equal to zero. The permitted holdings during the first phase exceed zero only where the 20 percent (or 35 percent) limitation on the downward ratchet rule contained in paragraph (d)(4)(ii)(B) of this section applies.

(4) Downward ratchet rule—(i) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (d)(4)(ii) of this section and section 4943(c)(5):

(A) Scope of rule. In general, when the percentage of the holdings in a business enterprise held by a private foundation and all disqualified persons together to which section 4943(c)(4) applies decreases, or when the percentage of the holdings of the private foundation alone in such business enterprise decreases, such holdings may not be increased (except as provided under section 4943(c) (5) or (6)). This so-called “downward ratchet rule” is designed to prevent the private foundation from purchasing additional holdings in the business enterprise until the substituted combined voting level reduced to the 20-percent (or 35 percent) figure prescribed by section 4943(c)(2).

(B) Levels affected. Under the downward ratchet rule any decrease after May 26, 1969, in the percentage of holdings comprising either the substituted combined voting level, the substituted combined value level, the foundation voting level or the foundation value level shall cause the respective level to be decreased to such decreased percentage for purposes of determining the foundation's permitted holdings.

(C) Implementation of reductions. Thus, if at any time the sum of the foundation voting level and the disqualified peson voting level is less than the immediately preceding substituted combined voting level, the substituted level shall be decreased so that it equals such sum. For example, if on May 26, 1969, a foundation and all disqualified persons together have holdings in a business enterprise equal to 50 percent, on such date the substituted combined voting level and the disqualified person voting level equal 50 percent (since such holdings of the foundation are treated as held by a disqualified person). If the private foundation or a disqualified person on May 27, 1969, sold 2 percent of such holdings to a nondisqualified person, the disqualified person voting level would be decreased to 48 percent (50%−2%), causing the substituted combined voting level to be decreased to 48 percent. As a further example, assume that on May 26, 1969, a foundation and all disqualified persons together have holdings in a business enterprise equal to 50 percent, and when the first phase expires on May 26, 1979, the substituted combined voting level is still 50 percent, the foundation voting level is 10 percent, and the disqualified person voting level is 40 percent. If a disqualified person there- after sells 2 percent to a nondisqualified person so that the sum of the disqualified person voting level (40%−2%=38%) and the foundation voting level (10%) equals 48 percent (38%+10%), then the substituted combined voting level is decreased to 48 percent. Similarly, if at any time the sum of the foundation value level and the disqualified person value level is less than the immediately preceding substituted combined value level, the substituted combined value level shall be decreased so that it equals such sum.

(D) Restrictions on increases in levels. In addition, none of the four levels referred to in paragraph (d)(4)(i)(B) of this section may be adjusted upward to reflect any increase in the holdings comprising such level, except as provided in section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5. As a result, any transfer of May 26, 1969, holdings from a disqualified person to a private foundation shall not increase the foundation voting level or the foundation value level (unless the transfer qualifies under section 4943(c)(5)), and thus may reduce the substituted combined value level (and where appropriate, the substituted combined voting level). Thus, in the last preceding example, if the disqualified person, instead of selling the 2 percent interest to a nondisqualified person, had sold such interest to the foundation, the substituted combined voting level would still be reduced to 48 percent, since the disqualified person voting level would be reduced by 2 percent (to 38%) but the foundation voting level would not be increased by 2 percent (remaining at 10%). However, any transfer of May 26, 1969, holdings from a private foundation to a disqualified person under section 101(1)(2)(B) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, shall reduce the foundation value level (and, where appropriate, the foundation voting level), but will not reduce the substituted combined value level or the subsituted combined voting level. The disqualified person voting level and disqualified person value level are correspondingly increased, not being limited to interest held since May 26, 1969. In addition, a transfer of May 26, 1969, holdings from one disqualified person to another, for example, by bequest, shall not reduce the substituted combined voting level nor the substituted combined value level.

(ii) Exceptions—(A) One percent de minimus rule. If after May 26, 1969, there are one or more decreases in the holdings comprising any of the four levels referred to in paragraph (d)(4)(i)(B) of this section during any taxable year of a private foundation, and if such decreases are attributable to issuances of stock (or such issuances coupled with redemptions), then, unless the aggregate of such decreases equals or exceeds 1 percent, the determination of whether there is a decrease in such level for purposes of this paragraph (d)(4) shall be made only at the close of such taxable year. If, however, the aggregate of such decreases equals or exceeds 1 percent, such level shall be decreased at that time as if the previous sentence has never applied.

(B) Twenty percent (or 35 percent) floor. In no event shall the downward rachet rule contained in paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section decrease the substituted combined voting level or the substituted combined value level below 20 percent, or, for purposes of section 4943(c)(2)(B), below 35 percent.

(iii) Special rules—(A) Change of foundation managers. In the case of a foundation manager (as defined in section 4946(b)) who on May 26, 1969, owns holdings in a business enterprise and who is replaced by another foundation manager, the decrease in the substituted combined voting or value levels shall be limited to the excess, if any, of the departing foundation manager's holdings over his successor's holdings.

(B) Termination of private foundation status under section 507. If an organization gives the notification described in section 507(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the commencement of a 60-month termination period and fails to meet the requirements of section509(a)(1), (2) or (3) for the entire period, then such organization will be treated as a private foundation during the entire 60-month period for purposes of this paragraph (d)(4) and section 4946(a)(1)(H). For example, X, a private foundation gives notification of the commencement of a 60-month termination commencing on January 1, 1972. X and Y, another private foundation, are effectively controlled by the same persons within the meaning of section 4946(a)(1)(H). X and Y hold 25 percent each of the voting stock of Z corporation on May 26, 1969, so that the substituted combined voting level for X or Y is 50 percent on such date. If X meets the requirements of section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3) for the entire 60-month period, section 4946(a)(1)(H) is inapplicable to X, and, under the downward ratchet rule, the substituted combined voting level for Y is decreased by 25 percent. On the other hand, if X meets the requirements of section 509(a)(2) for its taxable years 1972 and 1973, but fails to meet the requirements of section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3) in 1974, 1975, and 1976, then solely for purposes of section 4943(c)(4)(A)(ii) and this paragraph (d)(4), X will be treated as a disqualified person with respect to Y, and Y will be treated as a disqualified person with respect to X, for taxable years 1972 through 1976 pursuant to section 4946(a)(1)(H). Thus, for purposes of section 4943(c)(4)(A)(ii) the substituted combined voting level for X or Y will not be decreased by reason of the fact that X was attempting to terminate under section 507(b)(1)(B), and assuming no other transportations, such level; will remain at 50 percent.

(iv) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (d)(4) may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  F, a private foundation, owns on May 26, 1969, 50 shares of voting stock in corporation X representing to 50 percent of the voting stock in X and 25 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. A and B, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, together own, on such date, 2 shares of voting stock in X representing 2 percent of the voting shock in X and 1 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. In addition, on such date, F owns 30 shares of nonvoting stock in X, representing 30 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X, and A and B together own 15 shares of nonvoting stock in X representing 15 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of classes of stock in X. The provisions of section 4943(c)(4)(B)(iii) apply and during the 10-year period beginning on May 26, 1969, a disqualified person is deemed to hold all interests of F in X. Assume that on February 1, 1972, F sells to C, unrelated in individual, 12 shares of voting stock in X representing 12 percent of the voting stock in X and 6 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X.

(i) Beginning on May 26, 1969, the disqualified person voting level is 52 percent, the foundation voting level is zero, and the substituted combined voting level is 50 percent; the disqualified person value level is 71 percent, the foundation value level is zero, and the substituted combined value level is 50 percent.

Example (2).  F, a private foundation on the calendar year basis, holds, on May 26, 1969, 30 percent of the voting stock in corporation Y. C and D, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, together hold, on such date, 10 percent of the voting stock in Y. The provisions of section 4943(c)(4)(B)(iii) apply with respect to F, and disqualified persons are deemed to hold all interests of F in Y for the 10-year period beginning on May 26, 1969, so that the substituted combined voting level as of such date is 40 percent. On February 1, 1973, a stock issuance by Y causes the combined holdings of voting power by F, C, and D in Y to decrease by 0.3 percent. on June 1, 1973, another such issuance causes such combined holdings to decrease by 0.5 percent. In September 1, 1973, an unrelated stock redemption by Y causes such combined holdings to increase by 0.4 percent. Under this paragraph the determination whether there is a decrease in the substituted combined voting level for purposes of the downward ratchet rule shall not be made before January 1, 1974, since the aggregate of the decreases occurring on February 1 and June 1 of 1973 is less than 1 percent (0.3%+0.5%). Therefore, the substituted combined voting level as of January 1, 1974, is 39.6 percent (40%−[(0.3%+0.5%)−0.4%].)

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (2), except that, on October 1, 1973, a stock issuance by Y causes the combined holdings of voting power by F, C, and D in Y to decrease by 0.3 percent. Since the aggregate of the decreases occurring on February 1, June 1, and October 1 of 1973 exceeds 1 percent, the determination whether there is a decrease in the substituted combined voting level shall be made as of October 1, 1973. At that time the substituted combined voting level shall be reduced to 39.2 percent (40%−0.3%−0.5%), the lowest actual combined holdings during the period that the de minimis rule was in effect.

(5) Permitted holdings—Second phase—(i) In general. For purposes of section 4943 and this section, the term “second phase” means the 15-year period immediately following the first phase. Upon the expiration of the first phase with respect to an interest to which section 4943(c)(4) applies, such interest shall no longer be treated as held by a disqualified person under section 4943(c)(4)(B). During the second phase, the manner of determining the permitted holdings of a private foundation to which section 4943(c)(4) applies shall be the same as applicable to the first phase, except that a 25 percent maximum shall apply under certain conditions specified in paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of this section. For these purposes the substituted combined voting level and the substituted combined value level in effect for the foundation at the end of the first phase shall be carried over to the second phase. The substituted levels are carried over because although there is a decrease in the disqualified person levels (since holdings are no longer treated as held by disqualified persons under section 4943(c)(4)(B)), a corresponding increase in the foundation levels occurs. For example, if a private foundation on May 26, 1969, held 10 percent of the voting stock in a corporation and disqualified persons held 40 percent of the voting stock, both the disqualified person voting level and the substituted combined voting level equal 50 percent (10%+40%). Assuming no transactions during the first phase, on May 26, 1979, the disqualified person voting level would be decreased to 40 percent (50%−10%), but the foundation voting level would be increased to 10 percent so that the substituted combined voting level would remain at 50 percent. In addition, the downward ratchet rule of paragraph (d)(4) of this section shall continue to apply, to prevent the foundation and disqualified persons from purchasing any additional interest in the same enterprise until the substituted combined voting level decreases below 20 percent.

(ii) 25 percent maximum on foundation holdings. If, or as soon as, the disqualified person voting level exceeds 2 percent after the expiration of the first phase, the permitted holdings shall not thereafter exceed 25 percent of the voting stock or 25 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock, even though the holdings of the foundation and all disqualified persons combined do not exceed the substituted level. Solely for purposes of determining whether the 25 percent limitation of this subdivision (ii) applies, the disqualified person voting level shall not be treated as exceeding 2 percent solely as a result of the holdings of a private foundation which are treated as held by a disqualified person by reason of section 4943(c) (5) or (6). For example, where under the constructive ownership rules for trusts in §53.4943–8(b), a private foundation is deemed to own more than 2 percent of the voting stock of a business enterprise but such stock is treated as held by a disqualified person under section 4943(c)(5), the determination of the substituted percentage for permitted holdings in the second phase will be as if the foundation owned the stock held by the trust. Similarly, where a private foundation is the only remainder beneficiary of a trust that is a disqualified person under section 4946(a)(1)(H), the disqualified person voting level shall not be treated as exceeding 2 percent solely as a result of the holdings of such a trust.

(6) Permitted holdings—Third phase. For purposes of section 4943 and this section, the term “third phase” means the entire period following the second phase. During the third phase the manner of determining the permitted holdings of a private foundation to which section 4943(c)(4) applies shall be the same as applicable to the second phase under paragraph (d)(5) of this section (including the carryover of levels from the earlier phase). However, if the 25 percent limit of paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of this section never applied during the second phase, the substituted combined voting level and the substituted combined value level each shall not exceed 35 percent during the third phase.

(7) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  F, a private foundation, owns on May 26, 1969, 30 shares of voting stock in corporation Z representing 30 percent of the voting power in Z and 15 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Z, and owns, on such date, 10 shares of nonvoting stock in Z representing 10 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Z. E and G, the only disqualified persons with respect to F, own, on such date, 5 shares each of nonvoting stock in Z. The 10 shares of nonvoting stock in Z owned by E and G together represent 10 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Z. Assume further that F cannot meet the requirements for the 35 percent test of section 4943(c)(2)(B). For purposes of applying section 4943(c)(4)(B) and this paragraph, F has excess business holdings in Z (determined without regard to section 4943(c)(4)), because under section 4943(c)(2)(A) F's permitted holdings are 20 percent (20%−0%) of the voting stock since disqualified persons have no holdings of voting stock. Therefore, section 4943(c)(4)(B) and this paragraph apply, and a disqualified person is treated as holding F's shares of both voting and nonvoting stock in Z for the 10-year period through May 25, 1979. Thus, since all holdings by F in Z are treated as held by a disqualified person during the first phase, F cannot be subject to tax under section 4943(a) on its May 26, 1969, holdings prior to the termination of the first phase, regardless of whether or not disqualified persons purchase additional shares of Z during the first phase.

Example (2).  Assume the same facts as in Example (1), and further assume that there were no transactions in the stock of Z during the first phase (May 26, 1969 through May 25, 1979). During the first phase the permitted holdings by F in Z for both the voting stock and the value is zero. The disqualified person voting level and the substituted combined voting level are each 30 percent, and the disqualified person value level and the substituted combined value level are each 35 percent (15%+10%+10%). The substituted levels are carried over into the second phase. The disqualified person voting level on May 26, 1979, the beginning of the second phase, is zero, because the voting shares held by F are no longer treated as held by a disqualified person. Therefore, F's permitted holdings on such date are 30 percent of the voting stock, because such percentage is equal to the excess of the substituted combined voting level (30%) over the disqualified person voting level (0%). The disqualified person value level on May 26, 1979, is 10 percent, because the voting and nonvoting shares held by F are no longer treated as held by a disqualified person. Therefore, F's permitted holdings on such date are 25 percent of the value of Z stock, because such percentage is equal to the excess of the substituted combined value level (35%) over the disqualified person value level (10%) as of such date.

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (2), except that E and G acquire, on February 1, 1970, 10 shares of Z voting stock representing 10 percent of the voting power in Z and 5 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Z. During the first phase such permitted holdings remain zero, and prior to May 25, 1979, the substituted combined voting level and substituted combined value level remain 30 and 35 percent, respectively, because such levels may not be increased by acquisitions by disqualified persons. However, the disqualified person voting level and the disqualified person value level are each increased to 40 percent (30%+10%) and 40 percent (35%+5%) respectively. During the first phase the excess of the disqualified person voting level over the substituted combined voting level (40%−30%) and the excess of the disqualified person value level over the substituted combined value level (40%−35%) indicate how much stock F must dispose of during the first phase to avoid the initial tax when it expires. On May 25, 1979, the last day of the first phase, F disposes of 12 shares of Z voting stock, representing 12 percent of the voting power in Z and 6 percent of the value of all such outstanding shares. The disposition by F reduces the interest F owns to 18 percent (30%−12%) of the voting power, and 19 percent (25%−6%) of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock, in Z. Since the disqualified person voting level decreases to 28 percent (40%−12%), the substituted combined voting level as of May 25, 1979, accordingly is decreased to 28 percent under the downward ratchet rule. Similarly, the substituted combined value level is decreased to 34 percent, as the disqualified person value level as of such date is 34 percent (40%−6%). On May 26, 1979, the disqualified person voting level is 10 percent (28%−18%), and the disqualified person value level is 15 percent (34%−19%), since the shares owned by F are no longer treated as held by a disqualified person as of such date. Accordingly, on May 26, 1979, the permitted holdings by F and Z are 18 percent of the voting power in Z, because such percentage is equal to the excess of the substituted combined voting level (28%) over the disqualified person voting level (10%) as of such date. Similarly, the permitted holdings of F in Z by value are 19 percent (34%−15%). If F had not disposed of the 12 shares, then on May 26, 1979, F's permitted holdings in voting power and value would be 20 percent (30%−10%) and 20 percent (35%−15%), respectively.

Example (4).  F, a private foundation, owns on May 26, 1969, 35 shares of voting stock in corporation Y representing 35 percent of the voting stock in Y and 17.5 percent of the value of all classes of stock in Y, and owns on such date 45 shares of nonvoting stock representing 22.5 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Y. No disqualified person with respect to F owns, on such date, any stock in Y. Assume further that Y cannot meet the requirements of the 35 percent test of section 4943(c)(2)(B). For purposes of applying section 4943(c)(4)(B) and this paragraph, F has excess business holdings in Y (determined without regard to section 4943(c)(4)), because under section 4943(c)(2)(A) F's permitted holdings are 20 percent (20%−0%) of the voting stock since disqualified persons have no holdings of voting stock. Therefore, section 4943(c)(4)(B) and this paragraph apply, and a disqualified person is treated as holding F's shares of both voting and nonvoting stock in Y for the 10-year period through May 25, 1979. During the first phase the permitted holdings by F in Y of both the voting stock and of value are zero. The disqualified person voting level and the substituted combined voting level are each 35 percent, and the disqualified person value level and the substituted combined value level are each 40 percent (17.5%+22.5%). The substituted levels are carried over into the second phase. The disqualified person voting level and value level on May 26, 1979, are both zero, because the shares held by F are no longer treated as held by a disqualified person. Therefore, F's permitted holdings on such date are 35 percent of the voting power (35%−0%) and 40 percent of the value (40%−0%). Assume that on February 1, 1981, A, a disqualified person, acquires 6 percent of the voting stock in Y representing 3 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Y. The permitted holdings by F in Z on February 1, 1981, are thus reduced to 25 percent of the voting stock (the lesser of the separate 25% second phase limitation or 29% (35% substituted combined voting level minus 6% disqualified person voting level)) and 25 percent of the value (the lesser of the separate 25% second phase limitation or 37% (40% substituted combined value level minus 3% disqualified person value level)). But see paragraph (d)(8) of this section for limitations on restrictions with respect to nonvoting stock.

Example (5).  Assume the same facts as in Example (4) except that A does not acquire the 6 shares of voting stock until February 1, 1996 (in the third phase), rather than on February 1, 1981. Thus, F's permitted holdings in Y would remain at 35 percent of the voting stock and 40 percent of the value during the second phase, which expired on May 25, 1994. Assume that on May 25, 1994, the last day of the second phase, F disposes of 10 shares of nonvoting stock representing 5 percent of the value of all outstanding shares in Y to meet the 35 percent third phase limit. In accordance with the downward ratchet rule, the substituted combined value level and F's permitted holdings in Y would be reduced to 35 percent of value. On February 1, 1996, F's permitted holdings in Y would be reduced to 25 percent of the voting stock (the lesser of the separate 25% third phase limitation or 29% (35% substituted combined voting level minus 6% disqualified person level)) and 25 percent of the value (the lesser of the separate 25% third phase limitation or 32% (35% substituted combined value level minus 3% disqualified person value level)). But see paragraph (d)(8) of this section for limitations on restrictions with respect to nonvoting stock.

(8) Special rule where all holdings are permitted under section 4943(c)(2). (i) Since section 4943(c)(4) and this paragraph provide transitional rules for foundations which would otherwise have had excess business holdings on May 26, 1969, no holdings shall cease to be permitted holdings under this paragraph where such holdings would be permitted holdings under section 4943(c)(2) and §53.4943–3. Thus, for example, where the substituted combined voting level had been reduced to 20 percent, the provisions of §53.4943–3(b)(2) concerning nonvoting stock as permitted holdings generally apply.

(ii) The provisions of this paragraph (d)(8) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  (A) F, a private foundation, owns, on May 26, 1969, 40 shares of voting stock in corporation X representing 40 percent of the voting stock in X and 20 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X, and owns, on such date, 60 shares of nonvoting stock in X, representing 30 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. A, the only disqualified person with respect to F, owns, on such date, 10 shares of voting stock in X, representing 10 percent of the voting stock in X and 5 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. Under section 4943(c)(4)(B)(iii), a disqualified person is deemed the owner of all holdings by F in X for the 10–year period beginning on May 26, 1969.

(B) Assume that the only transaction in X stock during the first phase is the disposition of 30 shares of voting stock by F on May 1, 1975. The voting stock held by F is permitted holdings under §53.4943–3 and under such section since all disqualified persons together do not own more than 20 percent of the voting stock in X, all nonvoting stock held by F shall also be treated as permitted holdings. Therefore, all the stock held by F is permitted holdings.

(9) Special rule for certain private foundations. In the case of a private foundation:

(i) Which was incorporated before January 1, 1951.

(ii) Substantially all of the assets of which on May 26, 1969, consisted of more than 90 percent of the stock of an incorporated business enterprise which is licensed and regulated, the sales or contracts of which are regulated, and the professional representatives of which are licensed, by State regulatory agencies in at least 10 States;

(iii) Which acquired such stock solely by gift, devise, or bequest;

(iv) Which does not purchase any stock or other interest in such enterprise after May 26, 1969, and does not acquire any stock or other interest in any other business enterprise which constitutes excess business holdings under §53.4943–3; and

(v) Which, in the last 5 taxable years ending on or before December 31, 1970, expended substantially all of its adjusted net income (as defined in section 4942(f)) for the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated;

paragraph (d) (1) through (5) of this section (permitted holdings during the first and second phase) shall be applied with respect to the holdings of such foundation in such incorporated business enterprise by substituting “51 percent” for “50 percent,” and section 4943(c)(4)(D) (third phase) shall not apply with respect to such holdings. For purposes of the preceding sentence, stock of such enterprise in a trust created before May 27, 1969, of which the foundation is the remainder beneficiary shall be deemed to be held by such foundation on May 26, 1969, if such foundation held (without regard to such trust) more than 20 percent of the stock of such enterprise on May 26, 1969.

(10) Special rule for changes in the relative values of stock of different classes. (i) In the case of a corporation that has more than one class of stock outstanding, if the percentage of value held by the private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both, increases over a period of time solely as a result of changes in the relative values of the stock of different classes, then the foundation value level, the disqualified person value level, and the substituted combined value level, as defined in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, shall be adjusted to reflect such increase. An increase in the percentage of value held shall not be considered to have occurred solely as a result of changes in the relative values of the stock of different classes if:

(A) There has been any increase during the period in the percentage of any class of stock held by the private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both, or

(B) There has been any issuance, redemption, or purchase by the issuing corporation of any stock during the period.

See §53.4943–6(d) for rules relating to increases caused by readjustments.

(ii) Example. The provisions of this paragraph (b)(10) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  (i) At all times since May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, has held 25% (500,000 shares) of the outstanding class of voting stock of X corporation. No disqualified person with respect to F holds any voting stock of X. In addition X has had outstanding since May 26, 1969, a class of non-voting preferred stock, none of which is held by F or a disqualified person. X is an active business corporation and third parties do not have effective control of X. On May 26, 1969, the voting stock (2 million shares outstanding) was trading for $5 a share on the New York Stock Exchange. The non-voting preferred stock, not publicly traded, was valued at $1 million. The total value of all outstanding stock was $11 million ($10 million voting stock plus $1 million non-voting preferred). On May 26, 1969, F held 22.73% of the value of X's outstanding stock ($2.5 million/$11 million).

(ii) On October 31, 1982, X's voting stock is trading for $20 a share and the nonvoting stock is valued at $3 million. At all times during the period May 26, 1969, through October 31, 1982, F has held 25 percent of the voting stock and none of the nonvoting stock of X. No stock of X is owned by disqualified persons. No stock of X has been issued, redeemed or purchased by X during this period. On October 13, 1982, the total value of X's outstanding stock (is $43 million ($40 million voting stock and $3 million nonvoting stock) and F holds 23.26 percent of the value of X's outstanding stock ($10 million/$43 million). F's foundation value level and the substituted combined value level are increased from 22.73 percent to 23.26 percent to reflect this change.

[T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, as amended by T.D. 7944, 49 FR 6478, Feb. 22, 1984]

(a) Interests to which section 4943(c)(5) applies—(1) In general. Section 4943(c)(5) provides that section 4943(c)(4) (other than the 20-year first phase holding period) applies to an interest in a business enterprise acquired after May 26, 1969 by a private foundation under the terms of a trust which was irrevocable on May 26, 1969, or under the terms of a will executed on or before May 26, 1969, which were in effect on May 26, 1969, and at all times thereafter, as if such interest were held on May 26, 1969. However the first phase holding period prescribed by §53.4943–4(c)(1) (ii) or (iii) shall commence for such an interest on the date of distribution to the foundation. Unlike section 4943(c)(4) and §53.4943–4, section 4943(c)(5) and this section treat only the interest so acquired (and not the entire interest held by the foundation in such enterprise on the date of distribution) as held by a disqualified person during a first phase holding period. (See, however, section 4943(c)(6) and paragraph (b)(2) of §53.4943–6 for the treatment of other holdings of the foundation in the same enterprise if an interest to which section 4943(c)(5) applies is acquired from a person who was not a disqualified person prior to the acquisition.) In addition, section 4943(c)(5) and this section shall not apply if after the acquisition of such an interest the foundation would not have excess business holdings (determined without regard to section 4943(c) (4), (5), or (6)).

(2) After-acquired interests. Section 4943(c)(5) and this section shall not apply to any interest acquired after May 26, 1969, by an estate or trust, other than by reason of the death of the decedent. For example, where a foundation is a residuary beneficiary under the terms of a will executed before May 26, 1969, and the residue of the estate consists of cash, then stock subsequently purchased with cash for distribution to the foundation will not be treated as an interest acquired under the terms of a will executed on or before May 26, 1969.

(3) Certain revocable trusts. If an interest in a business enterprise actually passes to a private foundation under a trust which would have met the tests referred to in paragraph (a)(1) of this section but for the fact that the trust was revocable (even though it was not in fact revoked) and such interest would have passed to such foundation under a will that meets those tests but for the fact that the grantor died without having revoked the trust, then for purposes of section 4943(c)(5) and this section, such an interest shall be treated as having been acquired by the foundation under the will.

(4) Modification of will—(i) In general. For purposes of section 4943(c)(5) and this section, an amendment or republication of a will which was executed on or before May 26, 1969, does not prevent any interest in a business enterprise which was to pass under the terms (which were in effect on May 26, 1969, and at all times there- after) of such will from being treated as a present holding under section 4943(c) (4) or (5):

(A) Solely because there is a reduction in the interest in the business enterprise which the foundation was to receive under the terms of the will (for example, if the foundation is to receive the residuary estate, and if one class of stock is disposed of by the decedent during his lifetime or by a subsequent codicil);

(B) Solely because such amendment or republication is necessary in order to comply with section 508(e) and the regulations thereunder;

(C) Solely because there is a change in the executor of the will; or

(D) Solely because of any other change which does not otherwise change the rights of the foundation with respect to such interest in the business enterprise.

However, if under such amendment or republication there is an increase in the interest in the business enterprise which the foundation was to receive under the terms of the will in effect on May 26, 1969, such increase shall not be treated as present holdings under section 4943(c) (4) or (5). Under such circumstances the interest which would have been acquired before such increase shall remain present holdings. See section 4943(c)(6) and §53.4943–6 with respect to the treatment of such increase in holdings of a private foundation.

(ii) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph (a)(4) may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  On May 9, 1985, A modifies by codicil his will which was in effect on May 26, 1969, and was unchanged until such modification. The purpose of the codicil was, in the event of A's death, to increase the number of shares in X Corporation that would pass to the W foundation from 70 percent of all the voting power and value to 80 percent. Under these facts, if A dies without further modifying the terms of the will which apply to W's interest in X, section 4943(c)(5) will apply to 70 percent of the X voting power and value and section 4943(c)(6) will apply to 10 percent of the X voting power and value, since 10 percent of the X voting power and value would not pass under a provision of the will which was in effect on May 26, 1969, and at all times thereafter. Accordingly, if the stock is distributed to W on July 6, 1988, then, assuming that on May 26, 1969, W and all disqualified persons owned less than 75% of the voting stock in X, an amount of such stock representing 70 percent of X voting power and value shall be treated as held by a disqualified person through July 5, 1998, and an amount of such stock representing 10 percent of X voting power and value shall be treated as held by a disqualified person through July 5, 1993.

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that the sole purpose of the codicil was to change the executor of the will. Under paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, such codicil will not prevent the X voting stock which was bequeathed to W from being treated as held by a disqualified person through July 5, 1998.

(b) Holding periods—(1) In general. An interest to which section 4943(c)(5) applies shall be entitled to a 15-year holding period starting on the date of distribution only if the interests actually or constructively owned by a private foundation and all disqualified persons on May 26, 1969, in a business enterprise exceed 75 percent of the voting stock (or of the profits or beneficial interest) or 75 percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock (or of the profits and capital interest) in such enterprise. For purposes of the preceding sentence, interests held by the foundation on May 26, 1969, shall be deemed to include an interest to which section 4943(c)(5) applies and which has been acquired (on or before the date of distribution for the interest in question) from a person who was not a disqualified person on May 26, 1969. Therefore, if under the terms of a will in effect on May 26, 1969, and at all times thereafter, a private foundation is created on July 1, 1975, and receives 76 percent of the voting stock of a business enterprise on that date, such stock shall be treated as held by a disqualified person until June 30, 1990. Any interest to which section 4943(c)(5) applies but which is not entitled to a 15-year holding period shall be entitled to a 10-year holding period starting on the date of distribution. For purposes of this paragraph the date of distribution shall be deemed to occur no later than the date on which the trust or estate is considered to be terminated under §1.641(b)–(3) of this chapter (Income Tax Regulations).

(2) Constructive ownership prior to date of distribution. To the extent that an interest to which section 4943(c)(5) applies is constructively held by a private foundation under section 4943(d)(1) and §53.4943–8 prior to the date of distribution, it shall be treated as held by a disqualified person prior to such date by reason of section 4943(c)(5). In addition, in the case of a foundation's interest in a trust which was irrevocable on May 26, 1969, and to which both sections 4943 (c)(4) and (c)(5) apply, the first phase holding period for such interest shall end with whichever such period under section 4943(c) (4) or (5) ends later. For example, if under the terms of such a trust, 96 percent of the voting stock in a business enterprise was constructively held by a private foundation on May 26, 1969, and was distributed to such foundation on June 30, 1970, such interest is entitled to a 20-year holding period beginning on May 26, 1969.

(c) Permitted holdings—(1) In general. The permitted holdings of a private foundation which has an interest in a business enterprise to which section 4943(c)(5) applies shall be determined in accordance with the rules of paragraph (d) of §53.4943–4. The levels referred to in such paragraph shall be adjusted to take into account the acquisition of such an interest as if it were treated as held by a disqualified person from May 26, 1969, until the date of acquisition. See also §53.4943–6(b)(2) for the special rule for interests held by a private foundation at the time it acquires a section 4943(c)(5) interest from a nondisqualified person. Thus, for example, if on June 30, 1975, the disqualified person voting level and the substituted combined voting level in corporation X with respect to foundation F are 45 percent, and a nondisqualified person's 10 percent voting interest in X is acquired by F on July 1, 1975, in a transaction to which section 4943(c)(5) applies, the above-mentioned levels shall be increased to 55 and 50 percent respectively, on July 1, 1975. However, if such interest had been acquired from a person who was a disqualified person on May 26, 1969, rather than from a nondisqualified person, no adjustments in such levels would have taken place on July 1, 1975. In such a case, though, at the beginning of the second phase on July 1, 1985, the foundation voting level would be increased by 10 percent, and the disqualified person voting level decreased by 10 percent (assuming that none of the acquired stock had been disposed of prior to such date).

(2) Separate phases. The phases for each interest to which section 4943(c)(5) applies start independently from those for any other interest of the foundation in the same enterprise to which section 4943(c) (4) or (5) applies. Therefore, until an interest enters its own second phase, the 25 percent limit described in paragraph (d)(5) of §53.4943–4 shall not apply to such interest since such interest (and any subsequently acquired section 4943(c)(5) interest in the first phase) is still treated as held by a disqualified person for purposes of that 25 percent limit. In addition, if such an interest enters its second phase and at such time all disqualified persons together do not have holdings in excess of 2 percent of the voting stock in the same business enterprise, then the 25 percent limit of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i) shall not then apply to such interest, even though such limit may have been applicable to an interest with an earlier second phase. Moreover, the 35 percent limit of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(ii) shall cause only interests which have entered the third phase to become excess business holdings, taking into account, however, interests in prior phases in determining the holdings subject to such limit.

(3) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples: (After each example is a chart setting forth the chronological changes in the various levels referred to in paragraph (d) of §53.4943–4.)

Example (1).  On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns no stock in M Corporation, and A, a disqualified person owns 40 percent of the voting stock (voting power and value) in M. A dies on May 1, 1971, leaving 30 percent of the voting stock in M to F and leaving the other 10 percent to a disqualified person. Distribution is made on June 1, 1972, and assume that section 4943(c)(5) applies. No transactions in the stock of M, other than those described in this example, occur. On May 26, 1969, the substituted combined voting level is 40 percent, the disqualified person voting level is deemed to be 40 percent, and the permitted holdings by F in M is deemed to be 0 percent (40%−40%). On May 1, 1971 (the date that F acquired the M stock by reason of its constructive ownership of A's estate), the various levels remain unchanged. On May 1, 1971, the 30 percent interest is treated as held by a disqualified person for a period extending through May 31, 1982. On June 1, 1981, F disposes of 6 percent of the voting stock to a nondisqualified person. The substituted combined voting level and the disqualified person voting level thereby are reduced to 34 percent (40%−6%) each. On June 1, 1982, at the beginning of the second phase, the foundation voting level increases to 24 percent (30%−6%) and the disqualified person voting level is reduced to 10 percent (34%−10%). The substituted combined voting level as of June 1, 1982, remains at 34 percent. The permitted holdings as of such date are 24 percent (34%−10%). If F had not disposed of any holdings prior to June 1, 1982, F's permitted holdings would have been 25 percent, the lesser of 25 percent (the limitation of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i)), or 30 percent (40%−10%). Since on such date the 30 percent interest would no longer have been treated as held by a disqualified person, F would have had excess business holdings of 5 percent (30%−25%).

Example (2).  (i) On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns 30 percent of the voting stock of N Corporation (voting power and value) and disqualified persons own 20 percent of the voting stock of N Corporation. On May 1, 1971, B, a disqualified person, dies leaving 15 percent of the voting stock to F. Assume the distribution was made on June 1, 1972, and that section 4943(c)(5) applies. On May 26, 1969, the substituted combined voting level and the disqualified person voting levels are each 50 percent and the permitted holdings are 0 percent (50%−50%). On May 1, 1971, and June 1, 1972, these levels remain unchanged. On May 1, 1971, the 15 percent interest is treated as held by a disqualified person for a period extending through May 31, 1982.

(ii) On July 1, 1978, F sells 6 percent of the F stock to a nondisqualified person, thereby reducing the disqualified person voting level and the substituted combined voting level to 44 percent (50%−6%). On May 26, 1979, at the beginning of the second phase for F's 1969 holdings, the foundation voting level is 24 percent (30%−6%), the substituted combined voting level is still 44 percent, and the disqualified person voting level is 20 percent (44%−24%). The permitted holdings are 24 percent (44%−20%). In addition F's 24 percent holdings do not exceed the 25 percent limitation of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i) and paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of §53.4943–4.

Example.  (3). (i) On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation owns 5 percent of the voting stock of O Corporation (voting power and value), and disqualified persons own 45 percent of the voting stock. C, a disqualified person, dies on May 1, 1971, and leaves 41 percent of the voting stock of O to F. Assume that distribution is made on June 1, 1972, and that section 4943(c)(5) applies. On May 26, 1969, the substituted combined voting level and the disqualified person voting level are 50 percent and the permitted holdings are 0 percent (50%−50%). On May 1, 1971, and June 1, 1972, the various levels remain unchanged. On May 1, 1971, the 41 percent interest is treated as held by a disqualified person for a period extending through May 31, 1982. On May 26, 1979, at the beginning of the second phase for F's 1969 holdings of 5 percent, the 5 percent is no longer treated as held by a disqualified person, the foundation voting level is 5 percent, the disqualified person voting level is reduced to 45 percent (50%−5%), and the substituted combined voting level remains at 50 percent. On such date F's permitted holdings are 5 percent (50%−45%). Since the 41 percent interest is treated as held by a disqualified person, the interest treated as held by F (5%) does not exceed the 25 percent limitation of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i).

(ii) On August 1, 1981, F sells 22 percent of the O stock to a nondisqualified person, thereby reducing the foundation voting level to 0 percent. Since the reductions are first applied to the 1969 holdings of 5 percent, 17 percent (22%−5%) applies to the 41 percent interest, reducing such interest to 24 percent (41%−17%), and reducing the disqualified person voting level to 28 percent (45%−17%). The substituted combined voting level is reduced to 28 percent (0%+28%). On June 1, 1982, at the beginning of the second phase for F's holdings acquired by will, the substituted combined voting level remains at 28 percent, the foundation voting level is 24 percent, the disqualified person voting level is reduced to 4 percent (28%−4%).

Example (4).  (i) On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns 30 percent of the voting stock in P Corporation (voting power and value), and disqualified persons own 20 percent. On May 1, 1971, D, a disqualified person, dies leaving 18 percent of the voting stock to F. Assume that distribution was made on June 1, 1972, and that section 4943 (c)(5) applies. On May 26, 1969, the substituted combined voting level and the disqualified person voting level are each 50 percent and the permitted holdings are 0 percent (50%−50%). On May 1, 1971, and June 1, 1972, these levels remain unchanged. On May 1, 1971, the 18 percent interest is treated as held by a disqualified person for a period extending through May 31, 1982. On May 26, 1979, the foundation voting level increases to 30 percent, the disqualified person voting level decreases to 20 percent (50%−30%), and the permitted holdings are 30 percent (50%−20%). On June 1, 1982, the foundation voting level increases to 48 percent, the disqualified person voting level decreases to 2 percent and the permitted holdings are 48 percent (50%−2%). Since at no time during the second phase for F's 1969 holdings did all disqualified persons together have holdings in excess of 2 percent of the voting stock of P, the 25 percent limitation of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i) did not apply to F's 1969 holdings.

(ii) On July 1, 1993, F disposes of 16 percent of the stock in P, thereby reducing the substituted combined voting level to 34 percent (50%−16%), and reducing the permitted holdings to 32 percent (34%−2%). If F had not disposed of the 16 percent of the stock of P prior to May 26, 1994, on such date, under section 4943(c)(4)(D)(ii), F's substituted combined voting level for its 1969 holdings would have been 35 percent, and the permitted holdings would have been 33 percent (35%−2%). Since none of F's holdings of 48 percent would have been treated as held by a disqualified person on such date (the beginning of the third phase for F's 1969 holdings), F would have had excess business holdings of 15 percent, the lesser of 30 percent (F's 1969 holdings in the third phase), of 15 percent (the excess of F's 48 percent holdings over the permitted holdings of 33 percent).

Example (5).  (i) On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns 5 percent of the voting stock in Q Corporation (voting power and value), and disqualified persons own 45 percent. On May 1, 1971, E, a disqualified person, dies leaving 43 percent of the voting stock to F. Assume that distribution was made on June 2, 1972, and that section 4943(c)(5) applies. On May 26, 1969, the substituted combined voting level and the disqualified person voting level are each 50 percent and the permitted holdings are 0 percent (50%−50%). On May 1, 1971, and June 1, 1972, these levels remain unchanged. On May 1, 1971, the 43 percent interest is treated as held by a disqualified person for a period extending through May 31, 1982. On May 26, 1979, the foundation voting level increases to 5 percent, the disqualified person voting level decreases to 45 percent, and the permitted holdings are 5 percent (50%−45%). On June 1, 1982, the foundation voting level increases to 48 percent, the disqualified person voting level decreases to 2 percent, and the permitted holdings are 48 percent (50%−2%). At no time during the second phase for F's 1969 holdings did all disqualified persons together have holdings in excess of 2 percent of the voting stock of Q. Therefore, the 25 percent limitation of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i) did not apply.

(ii) On July 1, 1993, F sells 6 percent of the stock in Q to a nondisqualified person. This reduces the substituted combined voting level to 44 percent and reduces the permitted holdings to 42 percent (44%−2%). If F had not disposed of the 6 percent of the stock in 1993, on May 26, 1994, at the beginning of the third phase for F's 1969 holdings, F would have had 5 percent excess business holdings. The excess business holdings are 5 percent because although the excess business holdings computed for the third phase are 15 percent (the excess of F's actual holdings (48%) over the permitted holdings of 33 percent (35%−2%)), only 5 percent of the holdings are in this phase and subject to the 35 percent combined holdings limitation.

Example (6).  (i) On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns 30 percent of the voting stock in R Corporation (voting power and value), and disqualified persons own 20 percent. On August 1, 1978, F disposes of 6 percent of the stock to a nondisqualified person. On May 1, 1981, G, a disqualified person, dies leaving 15 percent of the voting stock to F. Assume that distribution was made on June 1, 1982, and that section 4943(c)(5) applies. On May 26, 1969, the substituted combined voting level and the disqualified person voting level are each 50 percent, and the permitted holdings are 0 percent (50%−50%). On August 1, 1978, these levels decrease to 44 percent (50%−6%). On May 26, 1979, the foundation voting level increases to 24 percent (30%−6%), the disqualified person voting level decreases to 20 percent (44%−24%), and the permitted holdings are 24 percent (44%−20%). If F had not disposed of the 6 percent of the stock prior to May 26, 1979, on May 26, 1979, the beginning of the second phase for F's 1969 holdings, F's permitted holdings would have been 25 percent, the lesser of 25 percent (under section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i)) or 30 percent (50%−20%). Since the 30 percent interest would no longer have been treated as held by a disqualified person on such date, F would have had excess business holdings of 5 percent (30%−25%).

(ii) On May 1, 1981, and June 1, 1982 (assuming F had disposed of the 6 percent holdings), the foundation voting level, the disqualified person voting level, the substituted combined voting level and permitted holdings remain respectively 24 percent, 20 percent, 44 percent and 24 percent. On May 1, 1981, the 15 percent interest is treated as held by a disqualified person for a period extending through May 31, 1992. On July 1, 1991, F sells 16 percent of the voting stock in R to a nondisqualified person, thereby reducing the substituted combined voting level to 28 percent (44%−16%), and reducing the foundation voting level to 8 percent (24%−16%). The disqualified person voting level remains at 20 percent. On June 1, 1992, at the beginning of the second phase for F's holdings acquired by will, the substituted combined voting level remains at 28 percent, the foundation voting level increases to 23 percent (8%+15%) and the disqualified person voting level decreases to 5 percent (20%−15%). The permitted holdings on such date are 23 percent (28%−5%). If F had not disposed of the 16 percent interest prior to June 1, 1992, F's permitted holdings would have been 25 percent, the lesser of 25 percent (under section 4943 (c)(4)(D)(i)) or 39 percent (44%−5%). Since as of such date, F's entire holdings of 39 percent would no longer have been treated as held by a disqualified person, F would have had excess business holdings of 14 percent (39%−25%).

Example (7).  (i) On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns 5 percent of the voting stock in S Corporation (voting power and value), and disqualified persons own 45 percent. On May 1, 1980, H, a disqualified person, dies leaving 41 percent of the voting stock to F. Assume that distribution is made on June 1, 1981, and that section 4943(c)(5) applies. On May 26, 1969, the substituted combined voting level and disqualified person voting levels are each 50 percent. On May 26, 1979, the disqualified person voting level decreases to 45 percent, the foundation voting level increases to 5 percent, and the permitted holdings are 5 percent (50%−45%). On May 1, 1980, and June 1, 1981, the levels remain the same. Since the 41 percent holdings are treated as held by a disqualified person for the period beginning on May 1, 1980, and extending through May 31, 1991, F's remaining holdings of 5 percent do not exceed the 25 percent limitation of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i).

(ii) On August 1, 1990, F sells 22 percent of the voting stock of S to a nondisqualified person, reducing the 5 percent foundation voting level to zero, leaving 17 percent (22%−5%) to reduce the disqualified person voting level to 28 percent (45%−17%) so that the substituted combined voting level equals 28 percent (50%−22%). On June 1, 1991, the beginning of the second phase for the remaining 24 percent (41%−17%) of F's holdings acquired by will, the foundation voting level increases from zero to 24 percent, the disqualified person voting level decreases to 4 percent (28%−24%), the substituted combined voting level remains at 28 percent, and the permitted holdings equal 24 percent (28%−4%).

(a) In general—(1) Application. (i) Paragraph (6) of section 4943(c) prescribes transition rules for a private foundation, which, but for such paragraph, would have excess business holdings as a result of a change in the holdings in a business enterprise after May 26, 1969 (other than by purchase by such private foundation or by a disqualified person) to the extent that section 4943(c)(5) (relating to certain holdings acquired under a pre-May 27, 1969, will on trust) does not apply.

(ii) Subparagraph (A) of section 4943(c)(6) applies where, immediately prior to a change in holdings described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the foundation has no excess business holdings in such enterprise (determined without regard to section 4943(c) (4), (5), or (6)). In such a case, the entire interest of the foundation in such enterprise (immediately after such change) shall (while held by the foundation) be treated as held by a disqualified person (rather than by the foundation) during the five-year period beginning on the date of such change.

(iii) Subparagraph (B) of section 4943(c)(6) applies where the foundation has excess business holdings in such enterprise (determined without regard to section 4943(c) (4), (5), or (6)) immediately prior to a change in holdings described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section. In such a case, the interest of the foundation in such enterprise (immediately after such change) shall (while held by the foundation) be treated as held by a disqualified person (rather than the foundation) during the five-year period beginning on the date of such change, except that if and as soon as any holdings in such enterprise become excess business holdings during such period (determined without regard to such change (and the resulting application of section 4943(c)(6) to the foundation's interest in such enterprise)), such holdings shall no longer be treated as held by a disqualified person under this section, but shall constitute excess business holdings subject to the initial tax. In applying the preceding sentence, if holdings of the foundation which (but for such change in holdings (and the resulting application of section 4943(c)(6) to the foundation's interest in such enterprise)) would be subject to the 25 percent limit prescribed by section 4943(c)(4)(D) after the expiration of the first phase, such holdings shall be treated as subject to such percentage limitation for purposes of determining excess business holdings. For example, if a private foundation in 1978 has present holdings of 28 percent in a busines enterprise to which section 4943(c)(4) applies, and such holdings would exceed the 25 percent limit of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i) on May 26, 1979, a gift of 5 percent to the foundation in 1978 of an interest in such enterprise shall not prevent the 3 percent (28%−25%) excess over the 25 percent limit from constituting excess business holdings on May 26, 1979, if on such date disqualified persons hold more than a 2 percent interest in such enterprise (and no other transaction has taken place).

(2) Acquisitions that are not purchases. Section 4943(c)(6) does not apply if a change in holdings in a business enterprise is the result of a purchase by the private foundation or a disqualified person. For purposes of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the term “purchase” shall not include any acquisition by gift, devise, bequest, legacy, or interstate succession. Paragraph (d) of this section provides rules for the treatment of increases in holdings received in a readjustment (as defined in §53.4943–7(d)(1)).

(3) Examples. The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  On January 4, 1985, A, an individual, makes a contribution to F, a private foundation, of 200 shares of X Corporation common stock. Assume that F had no X stock before January 4, 1985, and under section 4943(c)(1) the receipt of the X stock by F would cause some or all of the 200 shares of the X stock to be classified as excess business holdings. Under the provisions of section 4943(c)(6)(A) and this paragraph (a), since the contribution of the X stock to F is a gift and not a purchase, the X stock in F's hands is treated as held by disqualified persons and not by F through January 3, 1990.

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1) except that F receives the X stock as a bequest pursuant to the terms of A's will executed on April 1, 1980. A dies on June 3, 1984, and the stock is distributed to F on February 16, 1985. As in Example (1), the bequest of X to F is not a purchase under this paragraph (a). Consequently, the X stock in F's hands is treated as held by disqualified persons and not by F through February 15, 1990.

Example (3).  On February 1, 1980, F, a private foundation, owns 15 percent of the voting stock of X Corporation, and disqualified persons own 4 percent of the voting stock of X Corporation. On February 2, 1980, B, a nondisqualified person, contributes 8 percent of the voting stock of X to F in a transaction to which section 4943(c)(5) does not apply. Assuming that the 35 percent limit of section 4943(c)(2)(B) does not apply, under the provisions of section 4943(c)(6)(A) and paragraph (a) of this section the 23 percent voting stock owned by F on such date is treated as held by a disqualified person through February 1, 1985, since F would have had excess business holdings of 7 percent as a result of the contribution (23% actual holdings less 16% (20%−4%) permitted holdings). On March 1, 1984, C, another nondisqualified person, contributes 6 percent of the voting stock of X Corporation to F. But for this second contribution and the resulting application of section 4943(c)(6) to F's interest in X, F would have excess business holdings of 7 percent (23%−16%) within the five-year period beginning on the date of such contribution. Accordingly, under section 4943(c)(6)(B) and paragraph (a) of this section, all 29 percent (6%+23%) of the stock held by F on March 1, 1984, will be treated as held by a disqualified person until March 1, 1989, except that 7 percent will cease to be so treated on February 2, 1985. If prior to February 2, 1985, no further transactions occurred in the stock of X, F would have excess business holdings of 7 percent subject to the initial tax, since the amount still treated as held by disqualified persons (29%−7%) plus the amount actually held by disqualified persons (4%) already exceed 20 percent.

(b) Special rules for acquisitions by will or trust—(1) In general. In the case of an acquisition of holdings in a business enterprise by a private foundation pursuant to the terms of a will or trust, the five-year period described in section 4943(c)(6) and in this section shall not commence until the date on which the distribution of such holdings from the estate or trust to the foundation occurs. See §53.4943–5(b)(1) for rules relating to the determination of the date of distribution under the terms of a will or trust. For purposes of this subparagraph, holdings in a business enterprise will not be treated as acquired by a private foundation pursuant to the terms of a will where the holdings in the business enterprise were not held by the decedent. Thus, in the case of after-acquired property, this subparagraph shall not apply, the five-year period described in section 4943(c)(6) and this section shall commence on the date of acquisition of such holdings by the estate, and such five-year period may expire prior to the date of distribution of such holdings from the estate. To the extent that an interest to which section 4943(c)(6) and this paragraph (b)(1) apply is constructively held by a private foundation under section 4943(d)(1) and §53.4943–8 prior to the date of distribution, it shall be treated as held by a disqualified person prior to such date by reason of section 4943(c)(6). See §53.4943–8 for rules relating to constructive holdings held in an estate or trust for the benefit of the foundation.

(2) Special rule for section 4943(c)(5) interests acquired from a nondisqualified person. (i) In the case of holdings of a private foundation in a business enterprise to which section 4943(c)(5) (relating to certain holdings acquired under a pre-May 27, 1969, will or trust) applies which are acquired from a nondisqualified person, the interest of the foundation in such enterprise (immediately after such acquisition) shall (while held by the foundation) be treated as held by a disqualified person (rather than the foundation) under section 4943(c)(6)(B) and paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section from the date of acquisition until the end of the fifth year following the date of distribution of such holdings. Thereafter, only the holdings to which section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5(a)(1) apply shall continue to be treated as held by a disqualified person until the end of the first phase with respect thereto.

(ii) The provisions of paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns 5 percent of the voting stock of Corporation X and no disqualified persons own any stock in X. On June 30, 1977, a nondisqualified person bequeaths to F 33 percent of the voting stock in X to which section 4943(c)(5) applies. This 33 percent interest is distributed to F on August 17, 1978. Under section 4943(c)(6)(A) the entire 38 percent (5%+33%) of the X voting stock shall be treated as held by a disqualified person from June 30, 1977 (the date the 33 percent interest is contructively acquired by F) until August 17, 1983 (five years after the date of distribution of the 33 percent interest to F). However, assuming that the 35 percent limit of section 4943(c)(2)(B) does not apply, the substituted combined voting level on June 30, 1977 is only 33 percent because there was no interest to which section 4943(c) (4) or (5) applied immediately before that date and thus there was no substituted combined voting level at that time. In that case, since the 3-phase holding period is only available for the interest acquired by will (33%) under section 4943(c)(5), the substituted combined voting level on June 30, 1977 is only 33 percent, not 38 percent. Assuming that the substituted combined voting level remains 33 percent at all relevant times, and prior to August 17, 1983, no further transactions occur in the stock of X, F on that date would have excess business holdings of 5 percent subject to the initial tax. The amount treated as held by disqualified persons at that time (33%) would equal the substituted combined voting level at that time (33%), and thus permitted holdings would be zero. Under section 4943(c)(5) the 33 percent interest will continue to be treated as held by a disqualified person until August 17, 1988 (10 years after the date of distribution).

Example (2).  On May 26, 1969, F, a private foundation, owns 29 percent of the stock (voting power and value) of Corporation X, and on June 30, 1977, a nondisqualified person bequeaths to F 23 percent of the stock (voting power and value) in X to which section 4943(c)(5) does apply. This 23 percent interest is distributed to F on August 17, 1978. Disqualified persons hold no stock of X. Although the substituted combined voting and value levels cannot exceed 50 percent on May 26, 1979 (at the start of the second phase with respect to the 29 percent interest), under section 4943(c)(6)(B) the entire 52 percent (29%+23%) of the X voting stock shall be treated as held by a disqualified person from June 30, 1977 (the date the 23% interest is constructively acquired by F) until August 17, 1983 (five years after the date of distribution of the 23% interest to F). On June 1, 1980, during such second phase, D, a disqualified person, purchases 3 percent of the X stock (voting power and value). On such date, but for the acquisition by F of the 23 percent interest, F would have had excess business holdings of 4 percent. The purchase by D of more than 2 percent of the voting stock of X causes the 25 percent limit of section 4943(c)(4)(D)(i) to apply to the 29 percent interest (29%−25%=4%). Thus, on June 1, 1980, 4 percent of the X voting stock held by F since May 27, 1969, shall cease to be treated as held by a disqualified person under section 4943(c)(6)(B) and become excess business holdings subject to the initial tax. See §53.4943–2(a)(1)(ii) for the 90-day period in which to dispose of these excess business holdings resulting from the purchase by the disqualified person.

(c) Exceptions. (1) Section 4943(c)(6) and this section shall not apply to any transfer of holdings in a business enterprise by one private foundation to another private foundation which is related to the first foundation within the meaning of section 4946(a)(1)(H).

(2) Section 4943(c)(6) and this section shall not apply to an increase in the holdings of a private foundation in a business enterprise that is part of a plan whereby disqualified persons will purchase additional holdings in the same enterprise during the five-year period beginning on the date of such change, e.g., to maintain control of such enterprise, since such increase shall be treated as caused in part by the purchase of such additional holdings.

(3) The purchase of holdings by an entity whose holdings are treated as constructively owned by a foundation, its disqualified persons, or both, under section 4943(d)(1) shall be treated as a purchase by a disqualified person if the foundation, its disqualified persons or both have effective control of the entity or otherwise can control the purchase. For example, if a foundation is the beneficiary of a specific bequest of $20,000 and its consent is required for the estate to make a purchase using such cash, then a purchase by the estate using such cash would be treated as a purchase by a disqualified person. Similarly, if an executor of an estate is a disqualified person with respect to a private foundation, any purchase by the estate would be treated as a purchase by a disqualified person.

(4) If a private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both, hold an interest in specific property under the terms of a will or trust, and if the private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both, consent or otherwise agree to the substitution of holdings in a business enterprise for such specific property, such holdings shall be treated as acquired by purchase by a disqualified person. For example, if a private foundation is the beneficiary of a specific bequest of $20,000 and the private foundation agrees to accept certain of the estate's holdings in a business enterprise in satisfaction of such specific bequest, such holdings will be treated as acquired by purchase by a disqualified person even if such holdings were held by the decedent.

(d) Readjustments and distributions—(1) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, any increase in holdings in a business enterprise that is the result of a readjustment (as defined in §53.4943–7(d)(1)) shall be treated as acquired other than by purchase. However, holdings that are attributable to holdings owned by the private foundation that would have been excess business holdings except for the fact that such holdings were treated as held by a disqualified person prior to the readjustment shall in no event be treated as held by a disqualified person after the date on which the holdings to which the change is attributable would have ceased to be treated as held by a disqualified person.

(2) Exceptions. Any increase in holdings in a business enterprise that is the result of a readjustment (as defined in §53.4943–7(d)(1)), including any change resulting from application of the rule in §53.4943–8(c)(3), shall be treated as occurring by purchase by a disqualified person:

(i) To the extent the increase is attributable to holdings that were excess business holdings prior to the readjustment, and separately

(ii) To the full extent of the increase if the readjustment includes a prohibited transaction, unless the foundation establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissoner that effective control of all parties to the transaction was, at the time of the transaction, in one or more persons (other than the foundation) who are not disqualified persons with respect to the foundation. See §53.4943–7(d)(2) for the definition of prohibited transaction.

(3) Section 4943(c)(6) holdings. If, immediately prior to a readjustment (as defined in §53.4943–7(d)(1)), a private foundation has holdings in a business enterprise that are treated under section 4943(c)(6) as held by a disqualified person, then any holdings in a business enterprise that are received in the readjustment in exchange for such section 4943(c)(6) holdings shall be treated as the holdings surrendered in the exchange to the same extent as provided in §53.4943–7 with respect to exchanges involving holdings to which section 4943(c) (4) or (5) applies. Rules similar to those in §53.4943–7(a)(2) shall be applied to determine when holdings are treated as surrendered or received in a readjustment for purposes of this paragraph.

(4) Redemption by a corporation that is a disqualified person. If a foundation holds an interest in a corporation that is a disqualified person, an increase in the holdings of the private foundation, its disqualified person, or both, as a result of a redemption or a purchase of stock of the disqualified person corporation by such corporation shall not be treated as acquired by purchase by a disqualified person based solely on the status of the corporation as a disqualified person.

(5) One percent rule for redemptions. If the holdings of a foundation, its disqualified persons, or both, in a business enterprise are increased as a result of one or more redemptions during any taxable year then, unless the aggregate of such increases equals or exceeds one percent of the outstanding voting stock or one percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock, the determination of whether such increases cause the foundation to have excess business holdings shall be made only at the close of the private foundation's taxable year. The five-year period described in section 4943(c)(6) or the 90-day period described in §53.4943–2(a)(1)(ii), whichever is applicable, shall begin on the last day of such taxable year. If, however, the aggregate of such increases equals or exceeds one percent of the outstanding voting stock or one percent of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock, the determination of whether such increases cause the foundation to have excess business holdings shall be made, and the applicable five-year or 90-day period shall begin, as of the date the increases, in the aggregate, equal or exceed one percent.

(6) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph are illustrated in §53.4943–7(f) and by the following examples:

Example (1).  (i) F, a private foundation, holds 20% of the voting stock of X corporation, an active business enterprise. No disqualified person with respect to F holds any X stock. In 1980, X redeems 10% of its outstanding shares, increasing F's holdings to 22% of the X stock. Assume the redemption by X is not a prohibited transaction.

(ii) All of F's holdings before the redemption are permitted holdings under section 4943(c)(2). There is no effective control of X by third parties so the 35% permitted holdings rule is inapplicable. F's holdings after the redemption exceed the permitted holdings under section 4943 (c)(2) (20%). Because the increase is attributable to stock that was permitted holdings prior to the readjustment, and the readjustment does not involve a prohibited transaction, the 2% increase in F's holdings of X stock is treated as acquired other than by purchase. Therefore, under section 4943(c)(6) and this section, F will have 5 years from the date of the redemption to dispose of the 2% excess.

Example (2).  (i) Assume the same facts as in Example (1) except that the 20% of X stock held by F was donated by X corporation, was worth more than $5,000 and represented 20% of the contributions received by the foundation through the end of the taxable year in which the gift of stock was made.

(ii) X corporation is a disqualified person with respect to F under section 4946(a)(1)(A). Under subparagraph (4), the redemption of X stock is not treated as a purchase by a disqualified person merely because X is a disqualified person with respect to F. Therefore the rules of this paragraph apply as if the redemption were made by a corporation which is not a disqualified person. The analysis and result are the same as in Example (1).

Example (3).  (i) On May 1, 1990, F, a private foundation, received a donation of 40% of the stock of X corporation, a business enterprise. Neither F nor any disqualified person with respect to F holds any other interest in X. On June 1, 1992, the X corporation redeemed F's 40% interest in exchange for 100% of the stock of Y corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of X. Assume the redemption by X is not a prohibited transaction.

(ii) Under section 4943(c)(6), the X stock acquired by gift is treated as held by disqualified persons through April 30, 1995. Under subparagraph (3) of this paragraph (d), 40% of the 100% interest in Y received in exchange for F's 40% interest in X is treated as F's 40% interest in X and is therefore treated as held by disqualified persons through April 30, 1995. In addition, under subparagraph (1) of this paragraph (d), the 60% interest in Y that represents an increase in holdings above the 40% held before the readjustment will be treated as acquired other than by purchase. However, F's 20% interest in X in excess of 20% permitted holdings under 4943(c)(2) would have been excess business holdings if such interest had not been treated as held by as disqualified person on June 1, 1992. Therefore, to the extent of a 30% interest in Y, ( i.e. , the portion of the increased holdings in Y attributable to F's 20% holdings in X) the increased holdings will be treated as held by disqualified person only through April 30, 1995, since this is the latest date on which F's original 40% interest in X would have been treated as held by disqualified persons. The remaining 30% interest in Y will be treated as held by disqualified persons for five years from the date of the exchange (through May 31, 1997).

(e) Constructive holdings. Any change in holdings in a business enterprise that occurs because a corporation ceases to be actively engaged in a trade or business, thus causing its holdings to be constructively owned by its shareholders, shall be treated as acquired other than by purchase.

(f) Certain transactions treated as purchases; cross references. For the application of section 4943(c)(6) to holdings that were not an interest in a business enterprise when acquired but that subsequently become holdings in a business enterprise, see §53.4943–10(d)(2).

[T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, as amended by T.D. 7944, 49 FR 6479, Feb. 22, 1984]

(a) General rules—(1) Readjustments. Except to the extent provided in paragraph (b) of this section, if a private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both together have holdings in a corporation to which section 4943(c) (4) or (5) applies, stock of a corporation received by the foundation, its disqualified persons, or both together in a readjustment (as defined in paragraph (d)(1) of this section) in exchange for such holdings to which section 4943 (c) (4) or (5) applies shall be treated, for purposes of section 4943 (c) (4) or (5), as the stock surrendered in the exchange.

(2) No exchange necessary. Paragraph (a)(1) of this section shall apply to all readjustments even if no exchange occurs. For purposes of this section, all stock held (directly or indirectly) before a readjustment in any corporation involved in the readjustment shall be treated as stock surrendered in the readjustment and all stock held (directly or indirectly) after the readjustment in any corporation involved in the readjustment shall be treated as stock received in the readjustment in exchange for the stock treated as surrendered.

(b) Exceptions and limitations—(1) Limitation on increases in percentage of voting stock. (i) If the percentage of voting stock in a business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by a private foundation by reason of its ownership of stock received in an exchange described in paragraph (a) of this section exceeds the greatest percentage of voting stock in any business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by the private foundation prior to such exchange by reason of its ownership of the stock surrendered by it in the exchange, then:

(A) That portion of the stock received by the private foundation in the exchange which represents such excess is to be treated as an increase in the holdings of the private foundation in accordance with §53.4943–6 (d), and

(B) Only the remaining portion of the stock received by the private foundation in the exchange shall be treated as the stock surrendered by the private foundation in the exchange.

(ii) If the sum of the percentage of voting stock in a business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by disqualified persons by reason of their ownership of stock received in an exchange described in paragraph (a) of this section plus the percentage of voting stock in the business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by the private foundation by reason of its ownership of stock received in the exchange and treated as the stock surrendered under paragraph (b) (1) (i) of this section exceeds the greatest percentage of voting stock in any business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by the private foundation and its disqualified person in combination by reason of their ownership of the stock surrendered by them in the exchange, then:

(A) That portion of the stock received by the disqualified persons in the exchange which represents such excess is to be treated as an increase in the holdings of the disqualified persons in accordance with §53.4943–6(d), and

(B) Only the remaining portion of the stock received by the disqualified persons in the exchange is to be treated as the stock surrendered by the disqualified persons in the exchange.

(2) Limitation on increase in percentage of value. (i) If the percentage of value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in a business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by a private foundation by reason of its ownership of stock received in an exhange described in paragraph (a) of this section exceeds the greatest percentage of such value in any business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by the private foundation prior to such exchange by reason of its ownership of the stock surrendered by it in the exchange, then:

(A) That portion of the stock received by the private foundation in the exchange which represents such excess is to be treated as an increase in the holdings of the private foundation in accordance with §53.4943–6(d), and

(B) Only the remaining portion of the stock received by the private foundation in the exchange shall be treated as the stock surrendered by the private foundation in the exchange.

(ii) If the sum of the percentage of value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in a business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by disqualified persons by reason of their ownership of stock received in an exchange described in paragraph (a) of this section plus the percentage of such value in the business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by the private foundation by reason of its ownership of stock received in the exchange and treated as the stock surrendered under paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section exceeds the greatest percentage of such value in any business enterprise owned (directly or indirectly) by the private foundation and its disqualified persons in combination prior to the exchange by reason of their ownership of the stock surrendered by them in the exchange, then:

(A) That portion of the stock received by the disqualified persons in the exchange which represents such excess is to be treated as an increase in the holdings of the disqualified persons in accordance with §53.4943–6(d), and

(B) Only the remaining portion of the stock received by the disqualified persons in the exchange is to be treated as the stock surrendered by the disqualified persons in the exchange.

(3) Increases in percentage of both voting stock and value. (i) If, as the result of an exchange described in paragraph (a) of this section, a private foundation has excesses determined under both paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(2)(i) of this section, then:

(A) That portion of the stock received by the private foundation in the exchange that represents the larger excess is to be treated as an increase in the holdings of the private foundation in accordance with §53.4943–6(d), and

(B) Only the remaining portion of the stock received by the private foundation in the exchange is to be treated as the stock surrendered by the private foundation in the exchange.

(ii) If as the result of an exchange described in paragraph (a) of this section, disqualified persons have excesses determined under both paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2)(ii) of this section, then:

(A) That portion of the stock received by the disqualified persons in the exchange that represents the larger excess is to be treated as an increase in the holdings of the disqualified persons in accordance with §53.4943–6(d), and

(B) Only the remaining portion of the stock received by disqualified persons in the exchange is to be treated as the stock surrendered by disqualified persons in the exchange.

(4) Exception for prohibited transactions. If a readjustment includes a prohibited transaction, as defined in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, then this paragraph shall be applied substituting, for purposes of paragraph (b)(1) and (b)(2), the lowest percentage of voting power or value owned prior to the exchange in any business enterprise involved in the readjustment to which the exchange relates for the greatest percentage of voting power or value in any business enterprise owned by reason of ownership of the stock surrendered in the exchange.

(5) Voting and value levels. After an exchange described in paragraph (a) of this section, the private foundation voting and value levels, and the substituted combined voting and value levels (as defined in §53.4943–4(d)(2)) shall be the lesser of each respective level immediately prior to the exchange with respect to the stock surrendered in the exchange and each such respective level determined immediately after the exchange by taking into account only the stock received in the exchange that is treated under this paragraph as the stock surrendered in the exchange. If the stock of more than one corporation is surrendered in exchange for stock of one corporation, the highest of each voting or value level determined immediately prior to the exchange with respect to the stock of the corporations surrendered in the exchange shall be treated as such level immediately prior to the exchange.

(6) Determination of phases—(i) In general. Stock received in an exchange described in paragraph (a) of this section that is treated as stock surrendered in the exchange under this paragraph shall be treated as subject to the same first, second, and third phases that were applicable to the stock surrendered for it. For purposes of determining the applicable phases, stock received in an exchange shall be treated as received in exchange for particular holdings of stock surrendered based on the terms of the exchange. Where only a portion of the stock received is treated as the stock surrendered, such portion of the stock received shall be treated as exchanged for particular holdings of stock surrendered in the same proportions as the total stock received was exchanged for particular holdings of stock surrendered. For example, if 20 shares of X stock owned by a private foundation, subject to a first phase beginning on January 1, 1978 and ending on December 31, 1987, are exchanged for 20 shares of Y stock, and 40 shares of X stock owned by the private foundation, subject to a first phase beginning on June 1, 1980 and ending on May 31, 1990, are exchanged for 40 shares of Y stock, then 1/3 of the Y stock received by the private foundation is treated as received in exchanged for X stock having the January 1, 1978–December 31, 1987 first phase and 2/3 of the Y stock received by the private foundation is treated as received in exchange for the X stock having the June 1, 1980–May 31, 1990 first phase. If only 30 shares of the Y stock received by the private foundation are treated as the stock surrendered, then 1/3 (10 Y shares) will be subject to the January 1, 1978–December 31, 1987 first phase and 2/3 (20 Y shares) will be subject to the June 1, 1980–May 31, 1990 first phase.

(ii) Transitional rule. In any case in which holdings subject to section 4943(c)(4) or 4943(c)(5) have been consolidated prior to May 22, 1984, then the longest first phase applicable to any of the holdings surrendered in the consolidation shall be applied to the holdings received by the foundation in the consolidation that are treated as the holdings surrendered in the consolidation. For purposes of this clause, a consolidation is any readjustment that results in a reduction in the number of entities in which the foundation has direct holdings.

(c) Plan to dispose of excess business holdings. (1) Notwithstanding §53.4943–4(d)(i)(4)(D) (relating to restrictions on increases in levels) and paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, if a readjustment occurs under an approved plan to dispose of stock to which section 4943(c) (4) or (5) applies, in order to meet the requirements of section 4943(c)(4) (i.e., to meet the reduced limits that will be applicable after the first phase holding period described in §53.4943–4(c)) or to meet the requirements of section 4943(c)(2), all of the stock received in the readjustment shall be treated as held by disqualified persons through the end of the longest first phase holding period applicable to stock surrendered in the readjustment. The foundation and substituted combined voting and value levels shall not be increased on account of the readjustment.

(2) For purposes of this paragraph, a plan is an approved plan only if it is approved by the Commissioner and may be subject to such conditions as the Commissioner determines. A plan must be approved prior to any exchange or distribution pursuant to the plan except for a showing of good cause such as a business emergency.

(d) Definitions—(1) Readjustments. For purposes of this section, the term “readjustment” includes, but is not limited to:

(i) A merger or consolidation;

(ii) A recapitalization;

(iii) An acquisition of stock or assets;

(iv) A transfer of assets;

(v) A change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected;

(vi) A redemption;

(vii) A distribution of assets or of stock, including a distribution to which section 301, 302, 331, or 355 applies or a distribution of stock of the distributing corporation.

(2) Prohibited transaction. A prohibited transaction is any transaction involving a private foundation that has holdings in a business enterprise which:

(i) Acquires stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity) or assets of a business enterprise or redeems its own stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity) using cash or other property transferred to the acquiring business enterprise (e.g., as a contribution to capital) by the private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both;

(ii) Acquires stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity) or assets of a business enterprise or redeems its own stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity) using the proceeds of a loan made to, or guaranteed by, the private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both;

(iii) Acquires 40 percent or more of the voting stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity), 40 percent or more of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity), or 40 percent or more of the assets of a business enterprise if the acquiring business enterprise's net assets used in its trade or business prior to such acquisition are insubstantial when compared to the net assets acquired or when compared to the net assets of the business enterprise, the stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity) of which was acquired. For this purpose, an insubstantial ratio means a ratio that is 15% or less; or

(iv) Is used as a device to acquire or expand excess business holdings. The determination of whether a business enterprise is used as a device to acquire or expand excess business holdings shall be determined based on all the facts and circumstances. A business enterprise shall be presumed to have been used as a device to acquire or expand excess business holdings if it acquires 40 percent or more of the voting stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity), 40 percent or more of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity), or 40 percent or more of the assets of a business enterprise if the consideration for the acquisition consists primarily of nonvoting stock (or similar interest in the case of an unincorporated entity) of the acquiring business enterprise.

(3) Corporation involved in a readjustment. A corporation shall be treated as involved in a readjustment if, as part of the readjustment, any stock of the corporation is issued or redeemed, or any stock or assets of the corporation are distributed, exchanged, purchased, sold, acquired, or otherwise transferred.

(e) Application to unincorporated business enterprise. The rules of this section shall apply equally to partnerships and other unincorporated business enterprises, applying the rules and substitutions provided in §53.4943–3(c)(2), (3), and (4).

(f) Examples. The provisions of this section and §53.4943–6(d) are illustrated by the following examples, which assume no prohibited transactions are involved unless otherwise stated:

Example (1).  (i) F, a private foundation, has owned 80% of the one outstanding class of stock of X corporation since 1965. The X is subject to section 4943(c)(4) with a first phase ending on May 25, 1984. On January 1, 1982, X merges with Y corporation to form Z corporation. X, Y, and Z are active business corporations. F owns no Y stock. No disqualified person with respect to F owns any stock in Y.Y, or Z. After the merger, F owns 25% of the one outstanding class of Z stock. Third parties do not control Z so that the 35% permitted holdings rule under section 4943(c)(2) is inapplicable

(ii) F's percentage of voting power and value in Z after the merger (25%) are less than F's percentages of voting power and value in X before the merger (80%). Therefore, under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, all of F's holdings in Z are treated as the X stock surrendered. Therefore, the Z stock is treated as subject to section 4943(c)(4) with a first phase ending on May 25, 1984. Under downward ratchet of paragraph (a)(5) of this section, the foundation voting and value levels and the substituted combined voting and value levels are reduced to 25%.

Example (2).  (i) F, a private foundation, owns 100% of the one outstanding class of stock in X corporation and 30% of the one outstanding class of stock in Y corporation. F has held this stock continuously since 1960, and no disqualified person has even owned any stock in X or Y. Under section 4943(c)(4), F's holdings in X are treated as held by disqualified persons through the end of the first phase on May 25, 1989, and F's holdings in Y are permitted holdings during the second phase, which began on May 25, 1989, and F's holdings in Y are permitted holdings during the second phase, which began on May 26, 1979. On January 1, 1985, X and Y consolidate, forming a new corporation Z. In the consolidation, F acquires 50% of the one class of outstanding stock of Z, 40% in exchange for F's 100% interest in X and 10% in exchange for F's 30% interest in Y. Unrelated parties hold the remaining 50% of Z.

(ii) F's percentage of voting power and value in Z after the merger (50%) are less than F's percentages of voting power and value in X before the merger (100%). Thus, under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the 50% interest in Z held by F is treated as the stock surrendered in the exchange for purposes of section 4943(c)(4). Under paragraph (b)(6) of this section, the 10% interest in Z received for the Y stock is subject to the same second phase period as the surrendered Y stock. The 40% interest first phase period as the surrendered X stock.

Example (3).  (i) F, a private foundation, owns 50% of the one class of outstanding stock in X corporation which F has held continuously since 1935. No disqualified person with respect to F owns any stock in X. Neither F nor any disqualified person with respect to F owns any stock in Y corporation. On July 1, 1982, X and Y enter into an agreement to consolidate their businesses in a reorganization to which section 368(a)(1)(A) will apply. As a result of the contemplated consolidation, F will own 60% of the voting stock in Z, the resulting corporation. In addition, parties unrelated to F will own the remaining 40% of the Z voting stock and 100% of a new issue of nonvoting preferred stock in Z. Assume for purposes of this example, that the 60% of the voting stock to be held by F in Z will represent 50% of the fair market value of the outstanding Z stock.

(ii) Under the provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, that portion of the Z stock held by F which represents a percentage of voting power equivalent to that held by F in X immediately prior to the consolidation (i.e., 50%) will be treated as the X stock held by F on May 26, 1969, for purposes of section 4943(c)(4). Therefore, 50% of the Y stock will be treated as subject to a second phase ending on May 25, 1994. The remaining portion of the Z voting stock held by F (10%) is subject to the provisions of §53.4943–6(d)(1). F will have five years from the date of the merger in which to dispose of 10% of the Z stock without incurring the tax on excess business holdings.

Example (4).  (i) F, a private foundation, owns 80% of the one class of outstanding stock in X corporation, an active business corporation. F has held this stock continuously since 1960 and no disqualified person with respect to F owns any stock in X. X has two operating divisions, one which manufacturers shoes and the other which manufactures refrigerators. On January 1, 1978, in a section 351(a) exchange, X transferred all of the assets of its shoe manufacturing division to Y, a corporation which X has formed for this purpose, and receives 100% of the stock of Y so that Y is a wholly-owned subsidiary of X. X then transfers all of the Y stock to F in exchange for all of F's holdings of X stock in a distribution to which section 355 applies.

(ii) Under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, 80% of the Y stock is treated as the X stock surrendered in the exchange for purposes of section 4943(c)(4). The 80% is treated under §53.4943–4(c) as held by disqualified persons through May 25, 1984, which constitutes the 15-year first phase holding period applicable to the 80% holding in X. The 80% of the Y stock must be reduced to the permitted holdings allowed during the second and third phase as provided by section 4943(c)(4)(D) in the same manner as F's holdings of X stock would have had to have been reduced.

Example (5).  (i) X corporation, an active business corporation, has outstanding 1,000 shares of one class of stock, of which 600 shares have been held by F1, a private foundation; 100 shares have been held by F2, another private foundation; and 100 shares have been held by D, a disqualified person with respect to both F1 and F2. Unrelated parties hold the remaining 200 shares. F1 and F2 are disqualified persons with respect to each other under section 4946(a)(1)(H). Thus, F1 holds 60% of the X stock (600/1000); F2 and D each hold 10% (100/1000); and the foundation group (F1, F2 and D) holds 80% of X (800/1000). The holdings of F1 and F2 were acquired on January 1, 1980 pursuant to a pre-1969 will and are subject to section 4943(c)(5). There have been no changes in holdings since January 1, 1980.

(ii) On January 1, 1985, pursuant to a plan to dispose of excess business holdings approved by the Commissioner under paragraph (c) of this section, X redeems for cash the 600 shares held by F1. After the redemption, D and F2 each hold 25% of X (100/400). F1 no longer holds any X stocks. The foundation group's holdings (F1, F2 and D) have decreased from 80% to 50% while holdings of unrelated parties have increased from 20% to 50%. At the same time F2's and D's holdings each have increased from 10% to 25%.

Example (6).  (i) X corporation, an active business corporation, has outstanding 1,000 shares of its one class of stock. Since 1960, 100 shares (10%) have been held by F, a private foundation and 350 shares (35%) have been held by D, a disqualified person with respect to F. All of the stock held by F is permitted holdings under section 4943(c)(4) and the substituted combined voting and value levels are 45% (10% + 35%). Because of disagreements concerning management of X between D and A, an unrelated party who holds 300 shares (30%) of the X stock, X redeems all of A's shares on December 1, 1981.

(ii) After the redemption, F holds 14.3% (100/700) of the X stock and D holds 50% (350/700), for combined holdings of 64.3%. Because the combined holdings exceed the substituted combined voting level (45%) by more than F's entire holdings, all of the F stock is excess business holdings. However, all of F's stock will be treated as acquired other than by purchase under §53.4943–6(d)(1) and therefore will be treated under section 4943(c)(6) and this section, as held by a disqualified person for five years from the date of the redemption (through November 30, 1986). If the combined holdings of F and its disqualified person are reduced to 45 percent by the end of the five year period, F may retain a portion of its holdings in X (limited to no more than the foundation voting and value level of 10 percent).

Example (7).  Assume the same facts as in Example (6), except that D loaned the money to X that was used to redeem A's shares. Under these facts, the increased holdings result from a prohibited transaction described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section. Therefore, all of F's stock will be treated as acquired by purchase by a disqualified person under §53.4943–6(d)(2). F will have 90 days after the redemption in which to dispose of its holdings or to reduce its holdings and the combined holdings to the levels held prior to the redemption as discussed in Example (6).

Example (8).  (i) F, a private foundation, has held 100% of the outstanding stock of X corporation since 1960. F also holds 15% of the voting stock of Y corporation. Both X and Y are active business corporations. X has $1 million in net assets used in its trade or business and Y has $6.7 million used in its trade or business. On June 1, 1985, Y is merged into X. After the merger F holds 25% of the voting stock of X. No person other than F controls X after the merger.

(ii) Because more than 40% of Y was acquired and the net assets of X, the acquiring corporation, used in its trade or business prior to the merger represent less than 15% of the net assets of Y used in its trade or business, the merger is a prohibited transaction described in paragraph (d)(2)(iii). Therefore, only 15% of the stock X is treated, pursuant to paragraph (b), as the stock held by F prior to the redemption. F's holding of 5% (the excess of F's 25% holdings over the 20% permitted holdings in X (determined under section 4943(c)(2)) are treated as purchased by a disqualified person pursuant to §53.4943–6(d)(2). F will have 90 days after June 1, 1985, in which to dispose of the 5% excess holdings.

[T.D. 7944, 49 FR 6480, Feb. 22, 1984]

(a) Constructive ownership—(1) In general. For purposes of section 4943, in computing the holdings in a business enterprise of a private foundation, or a disqualified person (as defined in section 4946), any stock or other interest owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a corporation, partnership, estate or trust shall be considered as being owned proportionately by or for its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries except as otherwise provied paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of this section. Any interest in a business enterprise actually or constructively owned by a shareholder of a corporation, a partner of a partnership, or beneficiary of an estate or trust shall not be considered as constructively held by the corporation, partnership, trust or estate. Further, if any corporation, partnership, estate or trust has a warrant or other option to acquire an interest in a business enterprise, such interest is not deemed to be constructively owned by such entity until the option is exercised. (See paragraph (b)(2) of §53.4943–3 for rules that options are not stock for purposes of determining excess business holdings.)

(2) Powers of appointment. Any interest in business enterprise over which a foundation or a disqualified person has a power of appointment exercisable in favor of the foundation or a disqualified person shall be considered owned by the foundation or disqualified person holding such power of appointment.

(3) Determination of extent of constructive ownership. If an interest in a business enterprise owned by a corporation is constructively owned by a shareholder, each shareholder's proportion of ownership is generally computed on the basis of the voting stock each shareholder has in the corporation. In determining holdings permitted under section 4943(c) (4) and (5), each shareholder's proportion of ownership in the business enterprise shall also be computed on the basis of value, taking into account both voting and nonvoting stock held by the shareholder.

(4) Nonvoting stock. If a private foundation, its disqualified persons, or both, own (directly or constructively) nonvoting stock of a parent corporation, the holdings of which are treated as constructively owned by its shareholders by reason of section 4943(d)(1) and this section, such nonvoting stock shall be treated as nonvoting stock of any corporation in which the parent corporation holds an interest for purposes of the limitation on the holding of nonvoting stock under section 4943(c)(2)(A) and §53.4943–3(b)(2).

(5) Interests held by certain disqualified persons. In the case of an entity that is a disqualified person (other than an entity described in section 4946(a)(1)(H)), the holdings of which are treated as constructively owned by its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries, for purposes of determining the total holdings of disqualified persons the holdings of the entity shall be considered held by a disqualified person only to the extent such holdings are treated as constructively owned by disqualified persons who are shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries of the entity. In the case of an entity described in section 4946(a)(1)(H) or an entity, the holdings of which are not treated as constructively owned by its shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries, all holdings of such entity shall be treated as held by a disqualified person if and only if the entity itself is a disqualified person.

(b) Estates and trusts—(1) In general. Any interest actually or constructively owned by an estate or trust is deemed constructively owned, in the case of an estate, by its beneficiaries or, in the case of a trust, by its remainder beneficiaries except as provided in paragraphs (b) (2), (3) and (4) of this section (relating to certain split-interest trusts described in section 4947(a)(2), to trusts of qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans described in section 401(a) and to revocable trusts). Thus, if a trust owns 100 percent of the stock of a corporation A, and if, on an actuarial basis, W's life interest in the trust is 15 percent, Y's life interest is 25 percent, and Z's remainder interest is 60 percent, under this paragraph (b), Z will be considered to be the owner of 100 percent of the stock of corporation A. See §53.4943–4, §53.4943–5 and §53.4943–6 for rules relating to certain actual or constructive holdings of a foundation being treated as held by a disqualified person. For the treatment of certain property acquired by an estate or trust after May 26, 1969, see paragraph (a)(2) of §53.4943–5.

(2) Split-interest trusts—(i) Amounts transferred in trust after May 26, 1969. In the case of an interest in a business enterprise which was transferred to a trust described in section 4947(a)(2) after May 26, 1969, for the benefit of a private foundation, no portion of such interest shall be considered as owned by the private foundation:

(A) If the foundation holds only an income interest in the trust, or

(B) If the foundation holds only a remainder interest in the trust (unless the foundation can exercise primary investment discretion with respect to such interest)

until such trust ceases to be so described. See section 4947(a)(2) and (b)(3) and the regulations thereunder for rules relating to such trusts. See also sections 4946(a)(1) (G) and (H) and the regulations thereunder for rules relating to when a trust described in this paragraph (b)(2) is itself a disqualified person.

(ii) Amounts transferred in trust on or before May 26, 1969. In the case of an interest in a business enterprise which was transferred to a trust described in section 4947(a)(2) (without regard to section 4947(a)(2)(C)) on or before May 26, 1969, for the benefit of a private foundation, no portion of such interest shall be considered as owned by the foundation until it is actually distributed to the foundation or until the trust ceases to be so described. See section 4943(c)(5) and §53.4943–5 for rules relating to certain trusts which were irrevocable on May 26, 1969.

(3) Employee benefit trusts. An interest in a business enterprise owned by a trust described in section 401(a) (pension and profit-sharing plans) shall not be considered as owned by its beneficiaries, unless disqualified persons (within the meaning of section 4946) control the investment of the trust assets.

(4) Revocable trusts. An interest in a business enterprise owned by a revocable trust shall be treated as owned by the grantor of such trust.

(5) Estates. For purposes of applying section 4943(d)(1) to estates, the term “beneficiary” includes any person (including a private foundation) entitled to receive property of a decedent pursuant to a will or pursuant to laws of descent and distribution. However, a person shall no longer be considered a beneficiary of an estate when all the property to which he is entitled has been received by him, when he no longer has a claim against the estate and when there is only a remote possibility that it will be necessary for the estate to seek the return of property or to seek payment from him by contribution or otherwise to satisfy claims against the estate or expenses of administration. When pursuant to the preceding sentence, a person (including a private foundation) ceases to be a beneficiary, stock or another interest in a business enterprise owned by the estate shall not thereafter be considered owned by such person. If any person is the constructive owner of an interest in a business enterprise actually held by an estate, the date of death of the testator or decedent intestate shall be the first day on which such person shall be considered a constructive owner of such interest. See §53.4943–5 for rules relating to wills executed on or before May 26, 1969.

(c) Corporation actively engaged in a trade or business—(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraphs (c)(2) and (3) of this section, any interest (whether or not in a separate entity) owned by a corporation which is actively engaged in a trade or business shall not be deemed to be constructively owned by such corporation's shareholders.

(2) Actively engaged in a trade or business. For purposes of paragraph (c)(1) of this section:

(i) A corporation shall not be considerd to be actively engaged in a trade or business if the corporation is not a business enterprise by reason of section 4943(d)(3) (A) or (B) and §53.4943–10 (b) or (c);

(ii) In the case of a corporation which owns passive holdings and is actively engaged in a trade or business, such corporation shall not be considered to be actively engaged in a trade or business if the net assets used in such trade or business are insubstantial when compared to passive holdings.

(3) Exceptions. If a corporation has been involved in a prohibited transaction, any interest in a business enterprise owned by such corporation shall be treated as constructively owned by its shareholders, whether or not such corporation is actively engaged in a trade or business. For a definition of prohibited transaction, see §53.4943–7 (d)(2).

(4) Affiliated group. In applying this paragraph to the common parent in an affiliated group (as defined in §53.4943–10 (c)(3)(ii)), the assets and activities of the affiliated group shall be treated as the assets and activities of the common parent.

(d) Partnerships. Any interest in a business enterprise which is owned by a partnership shall be deemed to be constructively owned by the partners in such partnerships.

(e) Examples. The provisions of this section are illustrated by the following examples.

Example (1).  F, a private foundation, directly owns voting stock of X, a holding company described in section 4943(d)(3)(B). That stock represents 40% of the voting power in X and 20% of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. F also owns nonvoting stock in X that represents 10% of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in X. D, a disqualified person, owns voting stock of X that represents 40% of the voting power in X and 20% of the value. D does not own any nonvoting stock in X. X corporation's only holding is stock of Y corporation. The Y voting stock held by X represents 50% of the voting power in Y and 25% of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Y. X also owns nonvoting stock in Y that represents 25% of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Y. Under paragraph (a)(3) of this section, F and D each constructively owns 20% of the voting power in Y through their voting interest in X (40% of X's 50% of Y). F also constructively owns 15% of the value of all outstanding shares of all classes of stock in Y through F's interest in X (F's 30% of the value of X multiplied by X's 50% of the value of Y), while D constructively owns 10% of the value of Y (D's 20% of the value of X multiplied by X's 50% of the value of Y).

Example (2).  (i) F, a private foundation, owns 50% of the one class of nonvoting stock of X corporation, a corporation described in section 4943(d)(3)(B) and paragraph (c)(2)(i) above. D, a disqualified person with respect to F as described in section 4946(a)(1)(A), owns 40% of the one class of voting stock of X. X corporation is a disqualified person with respect to F because D owns more than 35% of the voting of X. (See section 4946(a)(1)(E)). On January 1, 1980, X purchases for cash 40% of the only class of stock of Y corporation, a retail clothing store, from unrelated third parties.

(ii) Under paragraph (a)(4) of this section, F is treated as owning nonvoting stock of Y. Although X is a disqualified person, its holdings are not treated as held by disqualified persons except as constructive holdings. Therefore, the “deemed” nonvoting stock in Y is a permitted holding because D, a disqualified person with respect to F, constructively owns only 16% of the voting stock of Y (less than 20% permitted under section 4943(c)(2)).

Example (3).  (i) The facts are the same as in Example (2), except that X purchases 100% of this stock of Y corporation. Under paragraph (a)(4) of this section, F is treated as owning nonvoting stock of Y. The “deemed” nonvoting stock in Y is not a permitted holdings because D, a disqualified person with respect to F, constructively owns 40% of the voting stock of Y.

Example (4).  (i) D, a disqualified person with respect to F, owns 40% of the one class of stock in X corporation, an active business. X is a disqualified person with respect to F. X acquires 40% of the voting stock in Y corporation. Under paragraph (a)(5) of this section, the holdings of X in Y are treated as held by a disqualified person. F cannot hold any Y stock, voting or nonvoting.

[T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, as amended by T.D. 7944, 49 FR 6484, Feb. 22, 1984]

(a) Taxable period—(1) In general. For purposes of section 4943, the term “taxable period” means, with respect to any excess business holdings of a private foundation in a business enterprise, the period beginning with the first day on which there are such excess business holdings and ending on the earliest of:

(i) The date of mailing of a notice of deficiency under section 6212 with respect to the tax imposed on the holdings by the section 4943(a);

(ii) The date on which the excess is eliminated; or

(iii) The date on which the tax imposed by section 4943(a) is assessed.

For example, M, a private foundation, first has excess business holdings in X, a corporation, on February 5, 1972. A notice of deficiency is mailed under section 6212 to M on June 1, 1974. With respect to M's excess business holdings in X, the taxable period begins on February 5, 1972, and ends on June 1, 1974.

(2) Special rule. Where a notice of deficiency referred to in subparagraph (1)(i) of this paragraph is not mailed because there is a waiver of the restrictions on assessment and collection of a deficiency, or because the deficiency is paid, the date of filing of the waiver or the date of such payment, respectively, shall be treated as the end of the taxable period.

(3) Suspension of taxable period for 90 days. In any case in which a private foundation has excess business holdings solely because of the acquisition of an interest in a business enterprise to which paragraph (a)(1) (ii) or (iii) of §53.4943–2 applies, the taxable period described in paragraph (a) of this section shall be suspended for the 90-day period (as extended) starting with the date on which the foundation knows or has reason to know of the acquisition, provided that at the end of such period the foundation has disposed of such excess holdings.

(b) Cross reference. For rules relating to taxable events that are corrected within the correction period, defined in section 4863(e), see section 4861(a) and the regulations thereunder.

(c) Correction. For purposes of section 4943, correction shall be considered as made when no interest in the enterprise held by the foundation is classified as an excess business holdings under section 4943(c)(1). In any case where the private foundation has excess business holdings which are constructively held for it under section 4943(c)(1), correction shall be considered made when either a corporation, partnership, estate, or trust in which holdings in such enterprise are constructively held for the foundation or a disqualified person; the foundation itself; or a disqualified person disposes of a sufficient interest in the enterprise so that no interest in the enterprise held by the foundation is classified as excess business holdings under section 4943(c)(1).

[T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, as amended by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16302, May 2, 1986]

(a) In general. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section under section 4943(d)(4) the term “business enterprise” includes the active conduct of a trade or business, including any activity which is regularly carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services and which constitutes an unrelated trade or business under section 513. For purposes of the preceding sentence, where an activity carried on for profit constitutes an unrelated trade or business, no part of such trade or business shall be excluded from the classification of a business enterprise merely because it does not result in a profit.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1) of this section, a bond or other evidence of indebtedness does not constitute a holding in a business enterprise unless such bond or evidence of indebtedness is otherwise determined to be an equitable interest in such enterprise. Similarly, a lease-hold interest in real property does not constitute an interest in a business enterprise, even though rent payable under such lease is dependent, in whole or in part, upon the income or profits derived by another from such property, unless such leasehold interest constitutes an interest in the income or profits of an unrelated trade or business under section 513.

(b) Certain program-related activities. For purposes of section 4943(d)(4) the term “business enterprise” does not include a functionally related business as defined in section 4942(j)(5). See §53.4942(a)–2(c)(3)(iii). In addition, business holdings do not include program-related investments (such as investments in small businesses in central cities or in corporations to assist in neighborhood renovation) as defined in section 4944(c) and the regulations thereunder.

(c) Income derived from passive sources—(1) In general. For purposes of section 4943(d)(4), the term “business enterprise” does not include a trade or business at least 95 percent of the gross income of which is derived from passive sources; except that if in the taxable year in question less than 95 percent of the income of a trade or business is from passive sources, the foundation may, in applying this 95 percent test, substitute for the passive source gross income in such taxable year the average gross income from passive sources for the 10 taxable years immediately preceding the taxable year in question (or for such shorter period as the entity has been in existence). Thus, stock in a passive holding company is not to be considered a holding in a business enterprise even if the company is controlled by the foundation. Instead, the foundation is treated as owning its proportionate share of any interests in a business enterprise held by such company under section 4943(d)(1).

(2) Gross income from passive sources. Gross income from passive sources, for purposes of this paragraph, includes the items excluded by section 512(b)(1) (relating to dividends, interest, and annuities), 512(b)(2) (relating to royalties), 512(b)(3) (relating to rent) and 512(b)(5) (relating to gains or losses from the disposition of certain property). Any income classified as passive under this paragraph does not lose its character merely because section 512(b)(4) or 514 (relating to unrelated debt-financed income) applies to such income. In addition, income from passive sources includes income from the sale of goods (including charges or costs passed on at cost to purchasers of such goods or income received in settlement of a dispute concerning or in lieu of the exercise of the right to sell such goods) if the seller does not manufacture, produce, physically receive or deliver, negotiate sales of, or maintain inventories in such goods. Thus, for example, where a corporation purchases a product under a contract with the manufacturer, resells it under contract at a uniform markup in price, and does not physically handle the product, the income derived from that markup meets the definition of passive income for purposes of this paragraph. On the other hand, income from individually negotiated sales, such as those made by a broker, would not meet such definition even if the broker did not physically handle the goods.

(3) Affiliated group. (i) For a common parent corporation in an affiliated group, substitute “consolidated gross income” in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph.

(ii) For purposes of this section, the term affiliated group shall have the same meaning as in section 1504(a), without regard to section 1504 (b) through (e).

(iii) Section 53.4943–11(d) provides a transitional rule for certain parent corporations.

(d) Application of section 4943(c)(6)—(1) Program related activities. If a private foundation holds an interest which is not an interest in a business enterprise because of paragraph (b) of this section (relating to program related activities), and such interest later becomes an interest in a business enterprise solely by reason of failing to meet the requirements of such paragraph (b), such interest will then be subject to section (regardless of when it was originally acquired) and will be treated as having been acquired other than by purchase for purposes of section 4943(c)(6).

(2) Passive holdings, etc. (i) Except as provided in subdivision (ii), if a private foundation holds an interest that is not an interest in a business enterprise, and the interest later becomes an interest in a business enterprise (other than by reason of a readjustment as defined in §53.4943–7(d)(1)), the interest will be treated as having been acquired by purchase by a disqualified person at the time the interest becomes an interest in a business enterprise. The treatment of an interest that becomes an interest in a business enterprise by reason of a readjustment shall be determined under §53.4943–6 and §53.4943–7.

(ii) If a private foundation establishes that the events which caused an interest not originally a business enterprise to become a business enterprise were not effectively controlled by the private foundation, then such interest shall be treated as acquired other than by purchase from the time of the change for purposes of section 4943(c)(6).

(iii) See §53.4943–3(b)(3)(ii) for the definition of effective control.

(e) Sole proprietorship. For purposes of section 4943 and the regulations thereunder, the term “sole proprietorship” means any business enterprise (as defined in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section:

(1) Which is actually and directly owned by a private foundation,

(2) In which the foundation has a 100 percent equity interest, and

(3) Which is not held by a corporation, trust, or other business entity for such foundation.

A foundation may be considered to own a sole proprietorship even though the foundation is itself a corporation or a trust. However, a sole proprietorship which is owned by a foundation shall cease to be treated as a sole proprietorship when the foundation no longer has a 100-percent interest in the equity of the business enterprise. Thus, if and when a foundation sells a 10-percent interest in a sole proprietorship, such business enterprise shall be treated as a partnership under section 4943 and the regulations thereunder.

[T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, as amended by T.D. 7944, 49 FR 6484, Feb. 22, 1984]

(a) In general. Section 4943 and §§53.4943–1 through 53.4943–11 shall take effect for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969, except as otherwise provided by such sections.

(b) Special transitional rule. In the case of any acquisition of excess holdings prior to February 2, 1973, section 4943(a)(1) shall not apply if correction occurs (within the meaning of paragraph (c) of §53.4943–9) within a period ending 90 days after July 5, 1977 extended (prior to the expiration of the original period) by any period which the Commissioner determines is reasonable and necessary (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of §53.4943–9) to bring about such correction.

(c) Special transitional rule for acquisition by will, etc. (1) The rule in §53.4943–6(b)(1) whereby holdings not held by a decedent are not treated as acquired under a will shall not apply to acquisitions of after-acquired property of a decedent's estate occurring on or before May 22, 1984.

(2) The rule in §53.4943–6(b)(1) treating a purchase by an estate as a purchase by a disqualified person where the executor is a disqualified person shall not apply to purchases occurring on or before May 22, 1984.

(d) Special transitional rule for affiliated groups. If on or before May 22, 1984 a foundation holds an interest in a common parent corporation in an affiliated group, as defined in §53.4943–10(c)(3)(ii), the foundation may elect to have both §53.4943–8(c)(4) and §53.4943–10(c)(3) not apply to such common parent corporation. No election may be made to have only one section not apply. Such election shall be made by the governing body of the private foundation at any time prior to February 22, 1985.

(e) Special transitional rule for changes to a business enterprise. Any interest that is not an interest in a business enterprise which becomes an interest in a business enterprise under §53.4943–10(d)(2) prior to May 22, 1984 will be treated as having been acquired other than by purchase for purposes of section 4943(c)(6).

[T.D. 7496, 42 FR 46285, Sept. 15, 1977, as amended by T.D. 7944, 49 FR 6485, Feb. 22, 1984]

Source:  T.D. 7240, 37 FR 28747, Dec. 27, 1972, unless otherwise noted.

§ 53.4944-1   Initial taxes.

(a) On the private foundation—(1) In general. If a private foundation (as defined in section 509) invests any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes, section 4944(a) (1) of the Code imposes an excise tax on the making of such investment. This tax is to be paid by the private foundation and is at the rate of 5 percent of the amount so invested for each taxable year (or part thereof) in the taxable period (as defined in section 4944(e) (1)). The tax imposed by section 4944(a)(1) and this paragraph shall apply to investments of either income or principal.

(2) Jeopardizing investments. (i) Except as provided in section 4944(c), §53.4944–3, §53.4944–6(a), and subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph, an investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a private foundation if it is determined that the foundation managers, in making such investment, have failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt purposes. In the exercise of the requisite standard of care and prudence the foundation managers may take into account the expected return (including both income and appreciation of capital), the risks of rising and falling price levels, and the need for diversification within the investment portfolio (for example, with respect to type of security, type of industry, maturity of company, degree of risk and potential for return). The determination whether the investment of a particular amount jeopardizes the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a foundation shall be made on an investment by investment basis, in each case taking into account the foundation's portfolio as a whole. No category of investments shall be treated as a per se violation of section 4944. However, the following are examples of types or methods of investment which will be closely scrutinized to determine whether the foundation managers have met the requisite standard of care and prudence: Trading in securities on margin, trading in commodity futures, investments in working interests in oil and gas wells, the purchase of “puts,” “calls,” and “straddles,” the purchase of warrants, and selling short. The determination whether the investment of any amount jeopardizes the carrying out of a foundation's exempt purposes is to be made as of the time that the foundation makes the investment and not subsequently on the basis of hindsight. Therefore, once it has been ascertained that an investment does not jeopardize the carrying out of a foundation's exempt purposes, the investment shall never be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of such purposes, even though, as a result of such investment, the foundation subsequently realizes a loss. The provisions of section 4944 and the regulations thereunder shall not exempt or relieve any person from compliance with any Federal or State law imposing any obligation, duty, responsibility, or other standard of conduct with respect to the operation or administration of an organization or trust to which section 4944 applies. Nor shall any State law exempt or relieve any person from any obligation, duty, responsibility, or other standard of conduct provided in section 4944 and the regulations thereunder.

(ii)(a) Section 4944 shall not apply to an investment made by any person which is later gratuitously transferred to a private foundation. If such foundation furnishes any consideration to such person upon the transfer, the foundation will be treated as having made an investment (within the meaning of section 4944(a)(1)) in the amount of such consideration.

(b) Section 4944 shall not apply to an investment which is acquired by a private foundation solely as a result of a corporate reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a).

(iii) For purposes of section 4944, a private foundation which, after December 31, 1969, changes the form or terms of an investment (regardless of whether subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph applies to such investment), will be considered to have entered into a new investment on the date of such change, except as provided in subdivision (ii)(b) of this subparagraph. Accordingly, a determination, under subdivision (i) of this subparagraph, whether such change in the investment jeopardizes the carrying out of the foundation's exempt purposes shall be made at such time.

(iv) It is not intended that the taxes imposed under Chapter 42 be exclusive. For example, if a foundation purchases a sole proprietorship in a business enterprise within the meaning of section 4943(d)(4), in addition to tax under section 4943, the foundation may be liable for tax under section 4944 if the investment jeopardizes the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes.

(b) On the management—(1) In general. In any case in which a tax is imposed by section 4944(a)(1) and paragraph (a) of this section, section 4944 (a)(2) of the Code imposes on the participation of any foundation manager in the making of the investment, knowing that it is jeopardizing the carrying out of any of the foundation's exempt purposes, a tax equal to 5 percent of the amount so invested for each taxable year of the foundation (or part thereof) in the taxable period (as defined in section 4944(e)(1)), subject to the provisions of section 4944(d) and §53.4944–4, unless such participation is not willful and is due to reasonable cause. The tax imposed under section 4944(a)(2) shall be paid by the foundation manager.

(2) Definitions and special rules—(i) Knowing. For purposes of section 4944, a foundation manager shall be considered to have participated in the making of an investment “knowing” that it is jeopardizing the carrying out of any of the foundation's exempt purposes only if:

(a) He has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon such facts, such investment would be a jeopardizing investment under paragraph (a)(2) of this section,

(b) He is aware that such an investment under these circumstances may violate the provisions of federal tax law governing jeopardizing investments, and

(c) He negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the investment is a jeopardizing investment, or he is in fact aware that it is such an investment.

For purposes of this part and Chapter 42, the term knowing does not mean “having reason to know”. However, evidence tending to show that a foundation manager has reason to know of a particular fact or particular rule is relevant in determining whether he had actual knowledge of such fact or rule. Thus, for example, evidence tending to show that a foundation manager has reason to know of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon such facts, an investment would be a jeopardizing investment is relevant in determining whether he has actual knowledge of such facts.

(ii) Willful. A foundation manager's participation in a jeopardizing investment is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional. No motive to avoid the restrictions of the law or the incurrence of any tax is necessary to make such participation willfull. However, a foundation manager's participation in a jeopardizing investment is not willful if he does not know that it is a jeopardizing investment under paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

(iii) Due to reasonable cause. A foundation manager's actions are due to reasonable cause if he has exercised his responsibility on behalf of the foundation with ordinary business care and prudence.

(iv) Participation. The participation of any foundation manager in the making of an investment shall consist of any manifestation of approval of the investment.

(v) Advice of counsel. If a foundation manager, after full disclosure of the factual situation to legal counsel (including house counsel), relies on the advice of such counsel expressed in a reasoned written legal opinion that a particular investment would not jeopardize the carrying out of any of the foundation's exempt purposes (because, as a matter of law, the investment is excepted from such classification, for example, as a program-related investment under section 4944(c)), then although such investment is subsequently held to be a jeopardizing investment under paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the foundation manager's participation in such investment will ordinarily not be considered “knowing” or “willfull” and will ordinarily be considered “due to reasonable cause” within the meaning of section 4944(a) (2). In addition, if a foundation manager, after full disclosure of the factual situation to qualified investment counsel, relies on the advice of such counsel, such advice being derived in a manner consistent with generally accepted practices of persons who are such a qualified investment counsel and being expressed in writing that a particular investment will provide for the long and short term financial needs of the foundation under paragraph (a)(2) of this section, then although such investment is subsequently held not to provide for such long and short term financial needs, the foundation manager's participation in failing to provide for such long and short term financial needs will ordinarily not be considered “knowing” or “willful” and will ordinarily be considered “due to reasonable cause” within the meaning of section 4944(a)(2). For purposes of this subdivision, a written legal opinion will be considered “reasoned” even if it reaches a conclusion which is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as such opinion addresses itself to the facts and applicable law. However, a written legal opinion will not be considered “reasoned” if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. However, the absence of advice of legal counsel or qualified investment counsel with respect to the investment shall not, by itself, give rise to any inference that a foundation manager participated in such investment knowingly, willfully, or without reasonable cause.

(vi) Cross reference. For provisions relating to the burden of proof in cases involving the issue whether a foundation manager has knowingly participated in the making of a jeopardizing investment, see section 7454(b).

(c) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  A is a foundation manager of B, a private foundation with assets of $100,000. A approves the following three investments by B after taking into account with respect to each of them B's portfolio as a whole: (1) An investment of $5,000 in the common stock of corporation X; (2) an investment of $10,000 in the common stock of corporation Y; and (3) an investment of $8,000 in the common stock of corporation Z. Corporation X has been in business a considerable time, its record of earnings is good and there is no reason to anticipate a diminution of its earnings. Corporation Y has a promising product, has had earnings in some years and substantial losses in others, has never paid a dividend, and is widely reported in investment advisory services as seriously undercapitalized. Corporation Z has been in business a short period of time and manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by others, and must compete with a well-established alternative product that serves the same purpose. Z's stock is classified as a high-risk investment by most investment advisory services with the possibility of substantial long-term appreciation but with little prospect of a current return. A has studied the records of the three corporations and knows the foregoing facts. In each case the price per share of common stock purchased by B is favorable to B. Under the standards of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, the investment of $10,000 in the common stock of Y and the investment of $8,000 in the common stock of Z may be classified as jeopardizing investments, while the investment of $5,000 in the common stock of X will not be so classified. B would then be liable for an initial tax of $500 (i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period for the investment in Y, and an initial tax of $400 (i.e., 5 percent of $8,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period for the investment in Z. Further, since A had actual knowledge that the investments in the common stock of Y and Z were jeopardizing investments, A would then be liable for the same amount of initial taxes as B.

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that: (1) In the case of corporation Y, B's investment will be made for new stock to be issued by Y and there is reason to anticipate that B's investment, together with investments required by B to be made concurrently with its own, will satisfy the capital needs of corporation Y and will thereby overcome the difficulties that have resulted in Y's uneven earnings record; and (2) in the case of corporation Z, the management has a demonstrated capacity for getting new businesses started successfully and Z has received substantial orders for its new product. Under the standards of paragraph (a) (2) (i) of this section, neither the investment in Y nor the investment in Z will be classified as a jeopardizing investment and neither A nor B will be liable for an initial tax on either of such investments.

Example (3).  D is a foundation manager of E, a private foundation with assets of $200,000. D was hired by E to manage E's investments after a careful review of D's training, experience and record in the field of investment management and advice indicated to E that D was well qualified to provide professional investment advice in the management of E's investment assets. D, after careful research into how best to diversify E's investments, provide for E's long-term financial needs, and protect against the effects of long-term inflation, decides to allocate a portion of E's investment assets to unimproved real estate in selected areas of the country where population patterns and economic factors strongly indicate continuing growth at a rapid rate. D determines that the short-term financial needs of E can be met through E's other investments. Under the standards of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, the investment of a portion of E's investment assets in unimproved real estate will not be classified as a jeopardizing investment and neither D nor E will be liable for an initial tax on such investment.

[T.D. 7240, 37 FR 28747, Dec. 29, 1972, as amended by T.D. 7299, 38 FR 35304, Dec. 27, 1973]

(a) On the private foundation. Section 4944(b)(1) of the Code imposes an excise tax in any case in which an initial tax is imposed by section 4944(a)(1) and §53.4944–1(a) on the making of a jeopardizing investment by a private foundation and such investment is not removed from jeopardy within the taxable period (as defined in section 4944(e)(1)). The tax imposed under section 4944(b)(1) is to be paid by the private foundation and is at the rate of 25 percent of the amount of the investment. This tax shall be imposed upon the portion of the investment which has not been removed from jeopardy within the taxable period.

(b) On the management. Section 4944(b)(2) of the Code imposes an excise tax in any case in which an additional tax is imposed by section 4944 (b)(1) and paragraph (a) of this section and a foundation manager has refused to agree to part or all of the removal of the investment from jeopardy. The tax imposed under section 4944(b)(2) is at the rate of 5 percent of the amount of the investment, subject to the provisions of section 4944(d) and §53.4944–4. This tax is to be paid by any foundation manager who has refused to agree to the removal of part or all of the investment from jeopardy, and shall be imposed upon the portion of the investment which has not been removed from jeopardy within the taxable period.

(c) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  X is a foundation manager of Y, a private foundation. On the advice of X, Y invests $5,000 in the common stock of corporation M. Assume that both X and Y are liable for the taxes imposed by section 4944(a) on the making of the investment. Assume further that no part of the investment is removed from jeopardy within the taxable period and that X refused to agree to such removal. Y will be liable for an additional tax of $1,250 (i.e., $5,000×25%). X will be liable for an additional tax of $250 (i.e., $5,000×5%).

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that X is not liable for the tax imposed by section 4944(a)(2) for his participation in the making of the investment, because such participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause. X will nonetheless be liable for the tax of $250 imposed by section 4944(b)(2) since an additional tax has been imposed upon Y and since X refused to agree to the removal of the investment from jeopardy.

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that Y removes $2,000 of the investment from jeopardy within the taxable period, with X refusing to agree to the removal from jeopardy of the remaining $3,000 of such investment. Y will be liable for an additional tax of $750, imposed upon the portion of the investment which has not been removed from jeopardy within the taxable period (i.e., $3,000×25%). Further X will be liable for an additional tax of $150, also imposed upon the same portion of the investment (i.e., $3,000×5%).

[T.D. 7240, 37 FR 28747, Dec. 27, 1972, as amended by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16302, May 2, 1986]

(a) In general. (1) For purposes of section 4944 and §§53.4944–1 through 53.4944–6, a “program-related investment” shall not be classified as an investment which jeopardizes the carrying out of the exempt purposes of a private foundation. A program-related investment is an investment which possesses the following characteristics:

(i) The primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B);

(ii) No significant purpose of the investment is the production of income or the appreciation of property; and

(iii) No purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D).

(2)(i) An investment shall be considered as made primarily to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) if it significantly furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation's exempt activities and if the investment would not have been made but for such relationship between the investment and the accomplishment of the foundation's exempt activities. For purposes of section 4944 and §§53.4944–1 through 53.4944–6, the term purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) shall be treated as including purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) whether or not carried out by organizations described in section 170(c).

(ii) An investment in an activity described in section 4942(j)(5)(B) and the regulations thereunder shall be considered, for purposes of this paragraph, as made primarily to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B).

(iii) In determining whether a significant purpose of an investment is the production of income or the appreciation of property, it shall be relevant whether investors solely engaged in the investment for profit would be likely to make the investment on the same terms as the private foundation. However, the fact that an investment produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property.

(iv) An investment shall not be considered as made to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D) if the recipient of the investment appears before, or communicates to, any legislative body with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to such recipient, provided that the expense of engaging in such activities would qualify as a deduction under section 162.

(3)(i) Once it has been determined that an investment is “program-related” it shall not cease to qualify as a “program-related investment” provided that changes, if any, in the form or terms of the investment are made primarily for exempt purposes and not for any significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. A change made in the form or terms of a program-related investment for the prudent protection of the foundation's investment shall not ordinarily cause the investment to cease to qualify as program-related. Under certain conditions, a program-related investment may cease to be program-related because of a critical change in circumstances, as, for example, where it is serving an illegal purpose or the private purpose of the foundation or its managers. For purposes of the preceding sentence, an investment which ceases to be program-related because of a critical change in circumstances shall in no event subject the foundation making the investment to the tax imposed by section 4944(a)(1) before the 30th day after the date on which such foundation (or any of its managers) has actual knowledge of such critical change in circumstances.

(ii) If a private foundation changes the form or terms of an investment, and if, as a result of the application of subdivision (i) of this subparagraph, such investment no longer qualifies as program-related, the determination whether the investment jeopardizes the carrying out of exempt purposes shall be made pursuant to the provisions of §53.4944–1(a)(2).

(b) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  X is a small business enterprise located in a deteriorated urban area and owned by members of an economically disadvantaged minority group. Conventional sources of funds are unwilling or unable to provide funds to X on terms it considers economically feasible. Y, a private foundation, makes a loan to X bearing interest below the market rate for commercial loans of comparable risk. Y's primary purpose for making the loan is to encourage the economic development of such minority groups. The loan has no significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. The loan significantly furthers the accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the loan and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, the loan is a program-related investment even though Y may earn income from the investment in an amount comparable to or higher than earnings from conventional portfolio investments.

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that after the date of execution of the loan Y extends the due date of the loan. The extension is granted in order to permit X to achieve greater financial stability before it is required to repay the loan. Since the change in the terms of the loan is made primarily for exempt purposes and not for any significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property, the loan shall continue to qualify as a program-related investment.

Example (3).  X is a small business enterprise located in a deteriorated urban area and owned by members of an economically disadvantaged minority group. Conventional sources of funds are unwilling to provide funds to X at reasonable interest rates unless it increases the amount of its equity capital. Consequently, Y, a private foundation, purchases shares of X's common stock. Y's primary purpose in purchasing the stock is to encourage the economic development of such minority group, and no significant purpose involves the production of income or the appreciation of property. The investment significantly furthers the accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the investment and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, the purchase of the common stock is a program-related investment, even though Y may realize a profit if X is successful and the common stock appreciates in value.

Example (4).  X is a business enterprise which is not owned by low-income persons or minority group members, but the continued operation of X is important to the economic well-being of a deteriorated urban area because X employes a substantial number of low-income persons from such area. Conventional sources of funds are unwilling or unable to provide funds to X at reasonable interest rates. Y, a private foundation, makes a loan to X at an interest rate below the market rate for commercial loans of comparable risk. The loan is made pursuant to a program run by Y to assist low-income persons by providing increased economic opportunities and to prevent community deterioration. No significant purpose of the loan involves the production of income or the appreciation of property. The investment significantly furthers the accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the loan and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, the loan is a program-related investment.

Example (5).  X is a business enterprise which is financially secure and the stock of which is listed and traded on a national exchange. Y, a private foundation, makes a loan to X at an interest rate below the market rate in order to induce X to establish a new plant in a deteriorated urban area which, because of the high risks involved, X would be unwilling to establish absent such inducement. The loan is made pursuant to a program run by Y to enhance the economic development of the area by, for example, providing employment opportunities for low-income persons at the new plant, and no significant purpose involves the production of income or the appreciation of property. The loan significantly furthers the accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the loan and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, even though X is large and established, the investment is program-related.

Example (6).  X is a business enterprise which is owned by a nonprofit community development corporation. When fully operational, X will market agricultural products, thereby providing a marketing outlet for low-income farmers in a depressed rural area. Y, a private foundation, makes a loan to X bearing interest at a rate less than the rate charged by financial institutions which have agreed to lend funds to X if Y makes the loan. The loan is made pursuant to a program run by Y to encourage economic redevelopment of depressed areas, and no significant purpose involves the production of income or the appreciation of property. The loan significantly furthers the accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the loan and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, the loan is a program-related investment.

Example (7).  X, a private foundation, invests $100,000 in the common stock of corporation M. The dividends received from such investment are later applied by X in furtherance of its exempt purposes. Although there is a relationship between the return on the investment and the accomplishment of X's exempt activities, there is no relationship between the investment per se and such accomplishment. Therefore, the investment cannot be considered as made primarily to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) and cannot qualify as program-related.

Example (8).  S, a private foundation, makes an investment in T, a business corporation, which qualifies as a program-related investment under section 4944(c) at the time that it is made. All of T's voting stock is owned by S. T experiences financial and management problems which, in the judgment of the foundation, require changes in management, in financial structure or in the form of the investment. The following three methods of resolving the problems appear feasible to S, but each of the three methods would result in reduction of the exempt purposes for which the program-related investment was initially made:

(a) Sale of stock or assets. The foundation sells its stock to an unrelated person. Payment is made in part at the time of sale; the balance is payable over an extended term of years with interest on the amount outstanding. The foundation receives a purchase-money mortgage.

Example (9).  X is a socially and economically disadvantaged individual. Y, a private foundation, makes an interest-free loan to X for the primary purpose of enabling X to attend college. The loan has no significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. The loan significantly furthers the accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the loan and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, the loan is a program-related investment.

Example (10).  Y, a private foundation, makes a high-risk investment in low-income housing, the indebtedness with respect to which is insured by the Federal Housing Administration. Y's primary purpose in making the investment is to finance the purchase, rehabilitation, and construction of housing for low-income persons. The investment has no significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. The investment significantly furthers the accomplishment of Y's exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between the investment and Y's exempt activities. Accordingly, the investment is program-related.

(a) Joint and several liability. In any case where more than one foundation manager is liable for the tax imposed under section 4944 (a)(2) or (b)(2) with respect to any one jeopardizing investment, all such foundation managers shall be jointly and severally liable for the tax imposed under each such paragraph with respect to such investment.

(b) Limits on liability for management. With respect to anyone jeopardizing investment, the maximum aggregate amount of tax collectible under section 4944(a)(2) from all foundation managers shall not exceed $5,000, and the maximum aggregate amount of tax collectible under section 4944(b)(2) from all foundation managers shall not exceed $10,000.

(c) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  A, B, and C are foundation managers of X, a private foundation. Assume that A, B, and C are liable for both initial and additional taxes under sections 4944(a)(2) and 4944(b)(2), respectively, for the following investments by X: an investment of $5,000 in the common stock of corporation M, and an investment of $10,000 in the common stock of corporation N. A, B, and C will be jointly and severally liable for the following initial taxes under section 4944(a)(2): a tax of $250 (i.e., 5 percent of $5,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period (as defined in section 4944(e)(1)) for the investment in M, and a tax of $500 (i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period for the investment in N. Further, A, B, and C will be jointly and severally liable for the following additional taxes under section 4944(b)(2): a tax of $250 (i.e., 5 percent of $5,000) for the investment in M, and a tax of $500 (i.e., 5 percent of $10,000) for the investment in N.

Example (2).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that X has invested $500,000 in the common stock of M, and $1 million in the common stock of N. A, B, and C will be jointly and severally liable for the following initial taxes under section 4944(a)(2): a tax of $5,000 for the investment in M, and a tax of $5,000 for the investment in N. Further, A, B, and C will be jointly and severally liable for the following additional taxes under section 4944(b) (2): a tax of $10,000 for the investment in M, and a tax of $10,000 for the investment in N.

(a) Taxable period—(1) In general. For purposes of section 4944, the term “taxable period” means, with respect to any investment which jeopardizes the carrying out of a private foundation's exempt purposes, the period beginning with the date on which the amount is invested and ending on the earliest of:

(i) The date of mailing of a notice of deficiency under section 6212 with respect to the tax imposed on the making of the investment by section 4944(a)(1);

(ii) The date on which the amount invested is removed from jeopardy; or

(iii) The date on which the tax imposed by section 4944(a)(1) is assessed.

(2) Special rule. Where a notice of deficiency referred to in subparagraph (1) (i) of this paragraph is not mailed because there is a waiver of the restrictions on assessment and collection of a deficiency, or because the deficiency is paid, the date of filing of the waiver or the date of such payment, respectively, shall be treated as the end of the taxable period.

(b) Removal from jeopardy. An investment which jeopardizes the carrying out of a private foundation's exempt purposes shall be considered to be removed from jeopardy when:

(1) The foundation sells or otherwise disposes of the investment, and

(2) The proceeds of such sale or other disposition are not themselves investments which jeopardize the carrying out of such foundation's exempt purposes.

A change by a private foundation in the form or terms of a jeopardizing investment shall result in the removal of the investment from jeopardy if, after such change, the investment no longer jeopardizes the carrying out of such foundation's exempt purposes. For purposes of section 4944, the making by a private foundation of one jeopardizing investment and a subsequent exchange by the foundation of such investment for another jeopardizing investment will be treated as only one jeopardizing investment, except as provided in §53.4944–6 (b) and (c). For the treatment of a jeopardizing investment which is removed from jeopardy or otherwise transferred by a private foundation by the making of a grant or by bargain-sale, see sections 4941 and 4945 and the regulations thereunder. A jeopardizing investment cannot be removed from jeopardy by a transfer from a private foundation to another private foundation which is related to the transferor foundation within the meaning of section 4946(a) (1)(H) (i) or (ii), unless the investment is a program-related investment in the hands of the transferee foundation.

(c) Examples. The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  X, a private foundation on the calendar year basis, makes a $1,000 jeopardizing investment on January 1, 1970. X thereafter sells the investment for $1,000 on January 3, 1971. The taxable period is from January 1, 1970, to January 3, 1971. X will be liable for an initial tax of $100, that is, a tax of 5 percent of the amount of the investment for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period.

Example (2).  Assume that both C and D are investments which jeopardize exempt purposes. X, a private foundation, purchases C in 1971 and later exchanges C for D. Such exchange does not constitute a removal of C from jeopardy. In addition, no new taxable period will arise with respect to D, since, for purposes of section 4944, only one jeopardizing investment has been made.

Example (3).  Assume the facts as stated in Example (2), except that X sells C for cash and later reinvests such cash in D. Two separate investments jeopardizing exempt purposes have resulted. Since the cash received in the interim is not of a jeopardizing nature, the amount invested in C has been removed from jeopardy and, thus, the taxable period with respect to C has been terminated. The subsequent reinvestment of such cash in D gives rise to a new taxable period with respect to D.

(d) Cross reference. For rules relating to taxable events that are corrected within the correction period, defined in section 4963(e), see section 4961(a) and the regulations thereunder.

[T.D. 7240, 37 FR 28747, Dec. 27, 1972, as amended by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16303, May 2, 1986]

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section, an investment made by a private foundation prior to January 1, 1970, shall not be subject to the provisions of section 4944.

(b) If the form or terms of an investment made by a private foundation prior to January 1, 1970, are changed (other than as described in paragraph (c) of this section) on or after such date, the provisions of §53.4944–1(a)(2)(iii) shall apply with respect to such investment.

(c) In the case of an investment made by a private foundation prior to January 1, 1970, which is exchanged on or after such date for another investment, for purposes of section 4944 the foundation will be considered to have made a new investment on the date of such exchange, unless the post-1969 investment is described in §53.4944–1(a)(2)(ii)(b). Accordingly, a determination, under §53.4944–1(a) (2)(i), whether the investment jeopardizes the carrying out of the foundation's exempt purposes shall be made at such time.

Source:  T.D. 7215, 37 FR 23161, Oct. 31, 1972, unless otherwise noted.

§ 53.4945-1   Taxes on taxable expenditures.

(a) Imposition of initial taxes—(1) Tax on private foundation. Section 4945(a)(1) of the Code imposes an excise tax on each taxable expenditure (as defined in section 4945(d)) of a private foundation. This tax is to be paid by the private foundation and is at the rate of 10 percent of the amount of each taxable expenditure.

(2) Tax on foundation manager—(i) In general. Section 4945(a)(2) of the Code imposes, under certain circumstances, an excise tax on the agreement of any foundation manager to the making of a taxable expenditure by a private foundation. This tax is imposed only in cases in which the following circumstances are present:

(a) A tax is imposed by section 4945(a)(1);

(b) Such foundation manager knows that the expenditure to which he agrees is a taxable expenditure, and

(c) Such agreement is willfull and is not due to reasonable cause.

However, the tax with respect to any particular expenditure applies only to the agreement of those foundation managers who are authorized to approve, or to exercise discretion in recommending approval of, the making of the expenditure by the foundation and to those foundation managers who are members of a group (such as the foundation's board of directors or trustees) which is so authorized. For the definition of the term foundation manager, see section 4946(b) and the regulations thereunder.

(ii) Agreement. The agreement of any foundation manager to the making of a taxable expenditure shall consist of any manifestation of approval of the expenditure which is sufficient to constitute an exercise of the foundation manager's authority to approve, or to exercise discretion in recommending approval of, the making of the expenditure by the foundation, whether or not such manifestation of approval is the final or decisive approval on behalf of the foundation.

(iii) Knowing. For purposes of section 4945, a foundation mangager shall be considered to have agreed to an expenditure “knowing” that it is a taxable expenditure only if:

(a) He has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon such facts, such expenditure would be a taxable expenditure,

(b) He is aware that such an expenditure under these circumstances may violate the provisions of federal tax law governing taxable expenditures, and

(c) He negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the expenditure is a taxable expenditure, or he is in fact aware that it is such an expenditure.

For purposes of this part and Chapter 42, the term knowing does not mean “having reason to know”. However, evidence tending to show that a foundation manager has reason to know of a particular fact or particular rule is relevant in determining whether he had actual knowledge of such fact or rule. Thus, for example, evidence tending to show that a foundation manager has reason to know of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon such facts, an expenditure would be a taxable expenditure is relevant in determining whether he has actual knowledge of such facts.

(iv) Willful. A foundation manager's agreement to a taxable expenditure is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional. No motive to avoid the restrictions of the law or the incurrence of any tax is necessary to make an agreement willful. However, a foundation manager's agreement to a taxable expenditure is not willful if he does not know that it is a taxable expenditure.

(v) Due to reasonable cause. A foundation manager's actions are due to reasonable cause if he has exercised his responsibility on behalf of the foundation with ordinary business care and prudence.

(vi) Advice of counsel. If a foundation manager, after full disclosure of the factual situation to legal counsel (including house counsel), relies on the advice of such counsel expressed in a reasoned written legal opinion that an expenditure is not a taxable expenditure under section 4945 (or that expenditures conforming to certain guidelines are not taxable expenditures), although such expenditure is subsequently held to be a taxable expenditure (or that certain proposed reporting procedures with respect to an expenditure will satisfy the tests of section 4945(h), although such procedures are subsequently held not to satisfy such section), the foundation manager's agreement to such expenditure (or to grants made with provision for such reporting procedures which are taxable solely because of such inadequate reporting procedures) will ordinarily not be considered “knowing” or “willful” and will ordinarily be considered “due to reasonable cause” within the meaning of section 4945(a)(2). For purposes of the subdivision, a written legal opinion will be considered “reasoned” even if it reaches a conclusion which is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as such opinion addresses itself to the facts and applicable law. However, a written legal opinion will not be considered “reasoned” if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. However, the absence of advice of counsel with respect to an expenditure shall not, by itself, give rise to any inference that a foundation manager agreed to the making of the expenditure knowingly, willfully, or without reasonable cause.

(vii) Rate and incidence of tax. The tax imposed under section 4945(a)(2) is at the rate of 21/2 percent of the amount of each taxable expenditure to which the foundation manager has agreed. This tax shall be paid by the foundation manager.

(viii) Cross reference. For provisions relating to the burden of proof in cases involving the issue whether a foundation manager has knowingly agreed to the making of a taxable expenditure, see section 7454(b).

(b) Imposition of additional taxes—(1) Tax on private foundation. Section 4945(b)(1) of the Code imposes an excise tax in any case in which an initial tax is imposed under section 4945(a)(1) on a taxable expenditure of a private foundation and the expenditure is not corrected within the taxable period (as defined in section 4945(i)(2)). The tax imposed under section 4945(b)(1) is to be paid by the private foundation and is at the rate of 100 percent of the amount of each taxable expenditure.

(2) Tax on foundation manager. Section 4945(b)(2) of the Code imposes an excise tax in any case in which a tax is imposed under section 4945(b)(1) and a foundation manager has refused to agree to part or all of the correction of the taxable expenditure. The tax imposed under section 4945(b)(2) is at the rate of 50 percent of the amount of the taxable expenditure. This tax is to be paid by any foundation manager who has refused to agree to part or all of the correction of the taxable expenditure.

(c) Special rules—(1) Joint and several liability. In any case where more than one foundation manager is liable for tax imposed under section 4945 (a) (2) or (b)(2) with respect to the making of a taxable expenditure, all such foundation managers shall be jointly and severally liable for the tax imposed under such paragraph with respect to such taxable expenditure.

(2) Limits on liability for management. The maximum aggregate amount of tax collectible under section 4945(a)(2) from all foundation managers with respect to any one taxable expenditure shall be $5,000, and the maximum aggregate amount of tax collectible under section 4945(b) (2) from all foundation managers with respect to any one taxable expenditure shall be $10,000.

(3) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  A, B, and C comprise the board of directors of Foundation M. They vote unanimously in favor of a grant of $100,000 to D, a business associate of each of the directors. The grant is to be used by D for travel and educational purposes and is not made in accordance with the requirements of section 4945(g). Each director knows that D was selected as the recipient of the grant solely because of his friendship with the directors and is aware that some grants made for travel, study, or other similar purposes may be taxable expenditures. Also, none of the directors makes any attempt to consult counsel, or to otherwise determine, whether this grant is a taxable expenditure. Initial taxes are imposed under paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 4945(a). The tax to be paid by the foundation is $10,000 (10 percent of $100,000). The tax to be paid by the board of directors is $2,500 (21/2 percent of $100,000). A, B, and C are jointly and severally liable for this $2,500 and this sum may be collected by the Service from any one of them.

Example (2).  Assume the same facts as in example (1). Further assume that within the taxable period A makes a motion to correct the taxable expenditure at a meeting of the board of directors. The motion is defeated by a two-to-one vote, A voting for the motion and B and C voting against it. In these circumstances an additional tax is imposed on the private foundation in the amount of $100,000 (100 percent of $100,000). The additional tax imposed on B and C is $10,000 (50 percent of $100,000 subject to a maximum of $10,000). B and C are jointly and severally liable for the $10,000, and this sum may be collected by the Service from either of them.

(d) Correction—(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (d) (2) or (3) of this paragraph, correction of a taxable expenditure shall be accomplished by recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, and, where full recovery cannot be accomplished, by any additional corrective action which the Commissioner may prescribe. Such additional corrective action is to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case and may include the following:

(i) Requiring that any unpaid funds due the grantee be withheld;

(ii) Requiring that no further grants be made to the particular grantee;

(iii) In addition to other reports that are required, requiring periodic (e.g., quarterly) reports from the foundation with respect to all expenditures of the foundation (such reports shall be equivalent in detail to the reports required by section 4945(h)(3) and §53.4945–5(d));

(iv) Requiring improved methods of exercising expenditure responsibility;

(v) Requiring improved methods of selecting recipients of individual grants; and

(vi) Requiring such other measures as the Commissioner may prescribe in a particular case.

The foundation making the expenditure shall not be under any obligation to attempt to recover the expenditure by legal action if such action would in all probability not result in the satisfaction of execution on a judgment.

(2) Correction for inadequate reporting. If the expenditure is taxable only because of a failure to obtain a full and complete report as required by section 4945(h)(2) or because of a failure to make a full and detailed report as required by section 4945(h)(3), correction may be accomplished by obtaining or making the report in question. In addition, if the expenditure is taxable only because of a failure to obtain a full and complete report as required by section 4945(h)(2) and an investigation indicates that no grant funds have been diverted to any use not in furtherance of a purpose specified in the grant, correction may be accomplished by exerting all reasonable efforts to obtain the report in question and reporting the failure to the Internal Revenue Service, even though the report is not finally obtained.

(3) Correction for failure to obtain advance approval. Where an expenditure is taxable under section 4945(d)(3) only because of a failure to obtain advance approval of procedures with respect to grants as required by section 4945(g), correction may be accomplished by obtaining approval of the grant making procedures and establishing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that:

(i) no grant funds have been diverted to any use not in furtherance of a purpose specified in the grant;

(ii) the grant making procedures instituted would have been approved if advance approval of such procedures had been properly requested; and

(iii) where advance approval of grant making procedures is subsequently required, such approval will be properly requested.

(e) Certain periods—(1) Taxable period. For purposes of section 4945, the term “taxable period” means, with respect to any taxable expenditure, the period beginning with the date on which the taxable expenditure occurs and ending on the earlier of:

(i) The date of mailing of a notice of deficiency under section 6212 with respect to the tax imposed on taxable expenditures by section 4945(a)(1); or

(ii) The date on which the tax imposed by section 4945(a)(1) is assessed.

(2) Cross reference. For rules relating to taxable events that are corrected within the correction period, defined in section 4963(e), see section 4961(a) and the regulations thereunder.

[T.D. 7215, 37 FR 23161, Oct. 31, 1972, as amended by T.D. 7299, 38 FR 35305, Dec. 27, 1973; T.D. 7527, 42 FR 64625, Dec. 27, 1977; T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16303, May 2, 1986]

(a) Propaganda influencing legislation, etc.—(1) In general. Under section 4945(d)(1) the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation to carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt, to influence legislation. An expenditure is an attempt to influence legislation if it is for a direct or grass roots lobbying communication, as defined in §56.4911–2 (without reference to §§56.4911–2(b)(3) and 56.4911–2(c)) and §56.4911–3. See, however, paragraph (d) of this section for exceptions to the general rule of this paragraph (a)(1).

(2) Expenditures for membership communications. Section 56.4911–5, which provides special rules for electing public charities' communications with their members, does not apply to private foundations. Thus, whether a private foundation's communications with its members (assuming it has any) are lobbying communications is determined solely under §56.4911–2 and without reference to §56.4911–5. However, where a private foundation makes a grant to an electing public charity, §56.4911–5 applies to the electing public charity's communications with its own members. Therefore, in the limited context of determining whether a private foundation's grant to an electing public charity is a taxable expenditure under section 4945, the §56.4911–5 membership rules apply. For example, if the grant is specifically earmarked for a communication from the electing public charity to its members and the communication is, because of §56.4911–5, a nonlobbying communication, the grant is not a taxable expenditure under section 4945.

(3) Jointly funded projects. A private foundation will not be treated as having paid or incurred any amount to attempt to influence legislation merely because it makes a grant to another organization upon the condition that the recipient obtain a matching support appropriation from a governmental body. In addition, a private foundation will not be treated as having made taxable expenditures of amounts paid or incurred in carrying on discussions with officials of governmental bodies provided that:

(i) The subject of such discussions is a program which is jointly funded by the foundation and the Government or is a new program which may be jointly funded by the foundation and the Government,

(ii) The discussions are undertaken for the purpose of exchanging data and information on the subject matter of the programs, and

(iii) Such discussions are not undertaken by foundation managers in order to make any direct attempt to persuade governmental officials or employees to take particular positions on specific legislative issues other than such program.

(4) Certain expenditures by recipients of program-related investments. Any amount paid or incurred by a recipient of a program-related investment (as defined in §53.4944–3) in connection with an appearance before, or communication with, any legislative body with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to such recipient shall not be attributed to the investing foundation, if:

(i) The foundation does not earmark its funds to be used for any activities described in section 4945(d) (1) and

(ii) A deduction under section 162 is allowable to the recipient for such amount.

(5) Grants to public organizations—(i) In general. A grant by a private foundation to an organization described in section 509(a) (1), (2) or (3) does not constitute a taxable expenditure by the foundation under section 4945(d), other than under section 4945(d)(1), if the grant by the private foundation is not earmarked to be used for any activity described in section 4945(d) (2) or (5), is not earmarked to be used in a manner which would violate section 4945(d) (3) or (4), and there does not exist an agreement, oral or written, whereby the grantor foundation may cause the grantee to engage in any such prohibited activity or to select the recipient to which the grant is to be devoted. For purposes of this paragraph (a)(5)(i), a grant by a private foundation is earmarked if the grant is given pursuant to an agreement, oral or written, that the grant will be used for specific purposes. For the expenditure responsibility requirements with respect to organizations other than those described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3), see §53.4945–5. For rules for determining whether grants to public charities are taxable expenditures under section 4945(d)(1), see paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(6) and (a)(7) of this section.

(ii) Certain “public” organizations. For purposes of this section, an organization shall be considered a section 509(a)(1) organization if it is treated as such under subparagraph (4) of §53.4945–5(a).

(6) Grants to public organizations that attempt to influence legislation—(i) General support grant. A general support grant by a private foundation to the organization described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3) (a “public charity” for purposes of paragraphs (a) (6) and (7) of this section) does not constitute a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1) to the extent that the grant is not earmarked, within the meaning of §53.4945–2(a)(5)(i), to be used in an attempt to influence legislation. The preceding sentence applies without regard to whether the public charity has made the election under section 501(h).

(ii) Specific project grant. A grant, by a private foundation to fund a specific project of a public charity is not a taxable expenditure by the foundation under section 4945(d)(1) to the extent that—

(A) The grant is not earmarked, within the meaning of §53.4945–2(a)(5)(i), to be used in an attempt to influence legislation, and

(B) The amount of the grant, together with other grants by the same private foundation for the same project for the same year, does not exceed the amount budgeted, for the year of the grant, by the grantee organization for activities of the project that are not attempts to influence legislation. If the grant is for more than one year, the preceding sentence applies to each year of the grant with the amount of the grant measured by the amount actually disbursed by the private foundation in each year or divided equally between years, at the option of the private foundation. The same method of measuring the annual amount must be used in all years of a grant. This paragraph (a)(6)(ii) applies without regard to whether the public charity has made the election under section 501(h).

(iii) Reliance upon grantee's budget. For purposes of determining the amount budgeted by a prospective grantee for specific project activities that are not attempts to influence legislation under paragraph (a)(6)(ii) of this section, a private foundation may rely on budget documents or other sufficient evidence supplied by the grantee organization (such as a signed statement by an authorized officer, director or trustee of such grantee organization) showing the proposed budget of the specific project, unless the private foundation doubts or, in light of all the facts and circumstances, reasonably should doubt the accuracy or reliability of the documents.

(7) Grants to organizations that cease to be described in 501(c)(3)—(i) Not taxable expenditure; conditions. A grant to a public charity (as defined in paragraph (a)(6)(i) of this section) that thereafter ceases to be an organization described in section 501(c)(3) by reason of its attempts to influence legislation is not a taxable expenditure if—

(A) The grant meets the requirements of paragraph (a)(6) of this section,

(B) The recipient organization had received a ruling or determination letter, or an advance ruling or determination letter, that it is described in sections 501(c)(3) and 509(a),

(C) Notice of a change in the recipient organization's status has not been made to the public (such as by publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin), and the private foundation has not acquired knowledge that the Internal Revenue Service has given notice to the recipient organization that it will be deleted from such status; and

(D) The recipient organization is not controlled directly or indirectly by the private foundation. A recipient organization is controlled by a private foundation for this purpose if the private foundation and disqualified persons (defined in section 4946(a)(1) (A) through (H) with reference to the private foundation, by aggregating their votes or positions of authority, can cause or prevent action on legislative issues by the recipient.

(ii) Examples. The provisions of paragraphs (a)(6) and (a)(7) of this section are illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  W, a private foundation, makes a general support grant to Z, a public charity described in section 509(a)(1). Z informs W that, as an insubstantial portion of its activities, Z attempts to influence the State legislature with regard to changes in the mental health laws. The use of the grant is not earmarked by W to be used in a manner that would violate section 4945(d)(1). Even if the grant is subsequently devoted by Z to its legislative activities, the grant by W is not a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d).

Example (2).  X, a private foundation, makes a specific project grant to Y University for the purpose of conducting research on the potential environmental effects of certain pesticides. X does not earmark the grant for any purpose that would violate section 4945(d)(1) and there is no oral or written agreement or understanding whereby X may cause Y to engage in any activity described in section 4945(d) (1), (2), or (5), or to select any recipient to which the grant may be devoted. Further, X determines, based on budget information supplied by Y, that Y's budget for the project does not contain any amount for attempts to influence legislation. X has no reason to doubt the accuracy or reliability of the budget information. Y uses most of the funds for the research project; however, Y expends a portion of the grant funds to send a representative to testify at Congressional hearings on a specific bill proposing certain pesticide control measures. The portion of the grant funds expended with respect to the Congressional hearings is not treated as a taxable expenditure by X under section 4945(d)(1).

Example (3).  M, a private foundation, makes a specific project grant of $150,000 to P, a public charity described in section 509(a)(1). In requesting the grant from M, P stated that the total budgeted cost of the project is $200,000, and that of this amount $20,000 is allocated to attempts to influence legislation related to the project. M relies on the budget figures provided by P in determining the amount P will spend on influencing legislation and M has no reason to doubt the accuracy or reliability of P's budget figures. In making the grant, M did not earmark any of the funds from the grant to be used for attempts to influence legislation. M's grant of $150,000 to P will not constitute a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1) because M did not earmark any of the funds for attempts to influence legislation and because the amount of its grant ($150,000) does not exceed the amount allocated to specific project activities that are not attempts to influence legislation ($200,000−$20,000=$180,000).

Example (4).  Assume the same facts as in example (3), except that M's grant letter to P provides that M has the right to renegotiate the terms of the grant if there is a substantial deviation from those terms. This additional fact does not make M's grant a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1).

Example (5).  Assume the same facts as in example (3), except that M made a specific project grant of $200,000 to P. Part of M's grant of $200,000 will constitute a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1). The amount of the grant ($200,000) exceeds by $20,000 the amount P allocated to specific project activities that are not attempts to influence legislation ($180,000). M has made a taxable expenditure of $20,000.

Example (6).  Assume the same facts as example (3), except that M made a specific project grant of $180,000, and received from P an enforceable commitment that grant funds would not be used in connection with attempts to influence legislation. M's grant is not a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1).

Example (7).  Assume the same facts as in example (3) except that M directed P to hire A, an individual, to expend $20,000 from the grant to engage in direct lobbying (within the meaning of §56.4911–2(b)) and grass roots lobbying (within the meaning of §56.4911–2(c)). P does not expend any other grant funds for lobbying activities. The $20,000 that is earmarked for direct lobbying and grass roots lobbying is a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1).

Example (8).  R, a public charity described in section 509(a)(1), requested N, a private foundation, to make a general purpose grant to it to aid R in carrying out its exempt purpose. In making this request, R notified N that it had elected the expenditure test under section 501(h) and that it expected to attempt to influence legislation in areas related to its exempt purpose. Since its formation, R generally has had exempt purpose expenditures (as defined in §56.4911–4) in excess of $7,000,000 in each of its taxable years, and has budgeted in excess of $7,000,000 of exempt purpose expenditures for the year of the grant. N made a grant of $200,000 to R. N did not earmark the funds for R's attempt to influence legislation. The general purpose grant by N does not constitute a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1).

Example (9).  Assume the same facts as in example (8), except that N learns that R has had excess lobbying expenditures (within the meaning of §56.4911–1(b)) in some prior years. N also learns that in no year has R's lobbying or grass roots expenditures (within the meaning of §56.4911–2 (a) and (c)) exceeded the corresponding ceiling amount (within the meaning of §1.501(h)–3(c) (3) and (6)). N then makes the grant to R. After receiving the grant, R spends a large portion of its funds on influencing legislation and, as a consequence, is denied exemption from tax, as an organization described in section 501(c)(3), under section 501(h) and §1.501(h)–3. No disqualified person with respect to N controlled, in whole or in part, R's attempts to influence legislation. The general purpose grant will not constitute a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1).

Example (10).  X, a private foundation, makes a specific project grant to Y, a public charity described in section 509(a). In requesting the grant, Y stated that it planned to use the funds to purchase a computer for purpose of computerizing its research files and that the grant will not be used to influence legislation. Two years after X makes the grant, X discovers that Y has also used the computer for purposes of maintaining and updating the mailing list for Y's lobbying newsletter. Because X did not earmark any of the grant funds to be used for attempts to influence legislation and because X had no reason to doubt the accuracy or reliability of Y's documents representing that the grant would not be used to influence legislation, X's grant is not treated as a taxable expenditure.

Example (11).  G, a private foundation, makes a specific project grant of $300,000 to L, a public charity described in section 509(a)(1) for a three-year specific project studying child care problems. L provides budget material indicating that the specific project will expend $200,000 in each of three years. L's budget materials indicate that attempts to influence legislation will amount to $10,000 in the first year, $20,000 in the second year and $100,000 in the third year. G intends to pay its $300,000 grant over three years as follows: $200,000 in the first year, $50,000 in the second year and $50,000 in the third year. The amount of the grant actually disbursed by G in the first year of the grant exceeds the nonlobbying expenditures of L in that year. However, because the amount of the grant in each of the three years, when divided equally among the three years ($100,000 for each year), is not more than the nonlobbying expenditures of L on the specific project for any of the three years, none of the grant is treated as a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1).

Example (12).  P, a private foundation, makes a $120,000 specific project grant to C, a public charity described in section 509(a) for a three-year project. P intends to pay its grant to C in three equal annual installments of $40,000. C provides budget material indicating that the specific project will expend $100,000 in each of three years. C's budget materials, which P reasonably does not doubt, indicate that the project's attempts to influence legislation will amount to $50,000 in each of the three years. After P pays the first annual installment to C, but before P pays the second installment to C, reliable information comes to P's attention that C has spent $90,000 of the project's $100,000 first-year budget on attempts to influence legislation. This information causes P to doubt the accuracy and reliability of C's budget materials. Because of the information, P does not pay the second-year installment to C. P's payment of the first installment of $40,000 is not a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1) because the grant in the first year is not more than the nonlobbying expenditures C projected in its budget materials that P reasonably did not doubt.

Example (13).  Assume the same facts as in Example (12), except that P pays the second-year installment of $40,000 to C. In the project's second year, C once again spends $90,000 of the project's $100,000 annual budget in attempts to influence legislation. Because P doubts or reasonably should doubt the accuracy or reliability of C's budget materials when P makes the second-year grant payment, P may not rely upon C's budget documents at that time. Accordingly, although none of the $40,000 paid in the first installment is a taxable expenditure, only $10,000 ($100,000 minus $90,000) of the second-year grant payment is not a taxable expenditure. The remaining $30,000 of the second installment is a taxable expenditure within the meaning of section 4945(d)(1).

Example (14).  B, a private foundation, makes a specific project grant to C, a public charity described in section 509(a), of $40,000 for the purpose of conducting a study on the effectiveness of seat belts in preventing traffic deaths. B did not earmark any of the grant for attempts to influence legislation. In requesting the grant from B, C submitted a budget of $100,000 for the project. The budget contained expenses for postage and mailing, computer time, advertising, consulting services, salaries, printing, advertising, and similar categories of expenses. C also submitted to B a statement, signed by an officer of C, that 30% of the budgeted funds would be devoted to attempts to influence legislation within the meaning of section 4945. B has no reason to doubt the accuracy of the budget figures or the statement. B may rely on the budget figures and signed statement provided by C in determining the amount C will spend on influencing legislation. B's grant to C will not constitute a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1), because the amount of the grant does not exceed the amount allocated to specific project activities that are not attempts to influence legislation.

(b)–(c) [Reserved]

(d) Exceptions—(1) Nonpartisan analysis, study, or research—(i) In general. A communication is not a lobbying communication, for purposes of §53.4945–2(a)(1), if the communication constitutes engaging in nonpartisan analysis, study or research and making available to the general public or a segment or members thereof or to governmental bodies, officials, or employees the results of such work. Accordingly, an expenditure for such a communication does not constitute a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(1) and §53.4945–2(a)(1).

(ii) Nonpartisan analysis, study, or research. For purposes of section 4945(e), “nonpartisan analysis, study, or research” means an independent and objective exposition of a particular subject matter, including any activity that is “educational” within the meaning of §1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(3). Thus, “nonpartisan analysis, study, or research” may advocate a particular position or viewpoint so long as there is a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts to enable the public or an individual to form an independent opinion or conclusion. On the other hand, the mere presentation of unsupported opinion does not qualify as “nonpartisan analysis, study, or research”.

(iii) Presentation as part of a series. Normally, whether a publication or broadcast qualifies as “nonpartisan analysis, study, or research” will be determined on a presentation-by-presentation basis. However, if a publication or broadcast is one of a series prepared or supported by a private foundation and the series as a whole meets the standards of subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph, then any individual publication or broadcast within the series will not result in a taxable expenditure even though such individual broadcast or publication does not, by itself, meet the standards of subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph. Whether a broadcast or publication is considered part of a series will ordinarily depend on all the facts and circumstances of each particular situation. However, with respect to broadcast activities, all broadcasts within any period of 6 consecutive months will ordinarily be eligible to be considered as part of a series. If a private foundation times or channels a part of a series which is described in this subdivision in a manner designed to influence the general public or the action of a legislative body with respect to a specific legislative proposal in violation of section 4945(d)(1), the expenses of preparing and distributing such part of the analysis, study, or research will be a taxable expenditure under this section.

(iv) Making available results of analysis, study, or research. A private foundation may choose any suitable means, including oral or written presentations, to distribute the results of its nonpartisan analysis, study, or research, with or without charge. Such means include distribution of reprints of speeches, articles, and reports (including the report required under section 6056); presentation of information through conferences, meetings, and discussions; and dissemination to the news media, including radio, television, and newspapers, and to other public forums. For purposes of this paragraph (d)(1)(iv), such communications may not be limited to, or be directed toward, persons who are interested solely in one side of a particular issue.

(v) Subsequent lobbying use of certain analysis, study, or research—(A) In general. Even though certain analysis, study or research is initially within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research, subsequent use of that analysis, study or research for grass roots lobbying may cause that analysis, study or research to be treated as a grass roots lobbying communication that is not within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research. This paragraph (d)(1)(v) of this section does not cause any analysis, study, or research to be considered a direct lobbying communication. For rules regarding when analysis, study, or research is treated as a grass roots lobbying communication that is not within the scope of the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research, see §56.4911–2(b)(2)(v).

(B) Special rule for grants to public charities. This paragraph (d)(1)(v)(B) of this section applies where a public charity uses a private foundation grant to finance, in whole or in part, a nonlobbying communication that is subsequently used in lobbying, causing the public charity's expenditures for the communication to be treated as lobbying expenditures under the subsequent use. In such a case, the private foundation's grant will ordinarily not be characterized as a lobbying expenditure by virtue of the subsequent use rule. The only situations where the private foundation's grant will be treated as a lobbying expenditure under the subsequent use rule are where the private foundation's primary purpose in making the grant to the public charity was for lobbying or where, at the time of making the grant, the private foundation knows (or in light of all the facts and circumstances reasonably should know) that the public charity's primary purpose in preparing the communication to be funded by the grant is for use in lobbying.

(vi) Directly encouraging action by recipients of a communication. A communication that reflects a view on specific legislation is not within the nonpartisan analysis, study, or research exception of this §53.4945–2(d)(1) if the communication directly encourages the recipient to take action with respect to such legislation. For purposes of this section, a communication directly encourages the recipient to take action with respect to legislation if the communication is described in one or more of §56.4911–2(b)(2)(iii)(A) through (C). As described in §56.4911–2(b)(2)(iv), a communication would encourage the recipient to take action with respect to legislation, but not directly encourage such action, if the communication does no more than specifically identify one or more legislators who will vote on the legislation as: opposing the communication's view with respect to the legislation; being undecided with respect to the legislation; being the recipient's representative in the legislature; or being a member of the legislative committee or subcommittee that will consider the legislation.

(vii) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  M, a private foundation, establishes a research project to collect information for the purpose of showing the dangers of the use of pesticides in raising crops. The information collected includes data with respect to proposed legislation, pending before several State legislatures, which would ban the use of pesticides. The project takes favorable positions on such legislation without producing a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts to enable the public or an individual to form an independent opinion or conclusion on the pros and cons of the use of pesticides. This project is not within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research because it is designed to present information merely on one side of the legislative controversy.

Example (2).  N, a private foundation, establishes a research project to collect information concerning the dangers of the use of pesticides in raising crops for the ostensible purpose of examining and reporting information as to the pros and cons of the use of pesticides in raising crops. The information is collected and distributed in the form of a published report which analyzes the effects and costs of the use and nonuse of various pesticides under various conditions on humans, animals, and crops. The report also presents the advantages, disadvantages, and economic cost of allowing the continued use of pesticides unabated, of controlling the use of pesticides, and of developing alternatives to pesticides. Even if the report sets forth conclusions that the disadvantages as a result of using pesticides are greater than the advantages of using pesticides and that prompt legislative regulation of the use of pesticides is needed, the project is within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study or research since it is designed to present information on both sides of the legislative controversy and presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts to enable the public or an individual to form an independent opinion or conclusion.

Example (3).  O, a private foundation, establishes a research project to collect information on the presence or absence of disease in humans from eating food grown with pesticides and the presence or absence of disease in humans from eating food not grown with pesticides. As part of the research project, O hires a consultant who prepares a “fact sheet” which calls for the curtailment of the use of pesticides and which addresses itself to the merits of several specific legislative proposals to curtail the use of pesticides in raising crops which are currently pending before State legislatures. The “fact sheet” presents reports of experimental evidence tending to support its conclusions but omits any reference to reports of experimental evidence tending to dispute its conclusions. O distributes 10,000 copies to citizens' groups. Expenditures by O in connection with this work of the consultant are not within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research.

Example (4).  P publishes a bi-monthly newsletter to collect and report all published materials, ongoing research, and new developments with regard to the use of pesticides in raising crops. The newsletter also includes notices of proposed pesticide legislation with impartial summaries of the provisions and debates on such legislation. The newsletter does not encourage recipients to take action with respect to such legislation, but is designed to present information on both sides of the legislative controversy and does present information fully and fairly. It is within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research.

Example (5).  X is satisfied that A, a member of the faculty of Y University, is exceptionally well qualified to undertake a project involving a comprehensive study of the effects of pesticides on crop yields. Consequently, X makes a grant to A to underwrite the cost of the study and of the preparation of a book on the effect of pesticides on crop yields. X does not take any position on the issues or control the content of A's output. A produces a book which concludes that the use of pesticides often has a favorable effect on crop yields, and on that basis argues against pending bills which would ban the use of pesticides. A's book contains a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts, including known or potential disadvantages of the use of pesticides, to enable the public or an individual to form an independent opinion or conclusion as to whether pesticides should be banned as provided in the pending bills. The book does not directly encourage readers to take action with respect to the pending bills. Consequently, the book is within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research.

Example (6).  Assume the same facts as Example (2), except that, instead of issuing a report, X presents within a period of 6 consecutive months a two-program television series relating to the pesticide issue. The first program contains information, arguments, and conclusions favoring legislation to restrict the use of pesticides. The second program contains information, arguments, and conclusions opposing legislation to restrict the use of pesticides. The programs are broadcast within 6 months of each other during commensurate periods of prime time. X's programs are within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research. Although neither program individually could be regarded as nonpartisan, the series of two programs constitutes a balanced presentation.

Example (7).  Assume the same facts as Example (6), except that X arranged for televising the program favoring legislation to restrict the use of pesticides at 8 p.m. on a Thursday evening and for televising the program opposing such legislation at 7 a.m. on a Sunday morning. X's presentation is not within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study, or research, since X disseminated its information in a manner prejudicial to one side of the legislative controversy.

Example (8).  Organization Z researches, writes, prints and distributes a study on the use and effects of pesticide X. A bill is pending in the U.S. Senate to ban the use of pesticide X. Z's study leads to the conclusion that pesticide X is extremely harmful and that the bill pending in the U.S. Senate is an appropriate and much needed remedy to solve the problems caused by pesticide X. The study contains a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts, including known or potential advantages of the use of pesticide X, to enable the public or an individual to form an independent opinion or conclusion as to whether pesticides should be banned as provided in the pending bills. In its analysis of the pending bill, the study names certain undecided Senators on the Senate committee considering the bill. Although the study meets the three part test for determining whether a communication is a grass roots lobbying communication, the study is within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study or research, because it does not directly encourage recipients of the communication to urge a legislator to oppose the bill.

Example (9).  Assume the same facts as in Example (8), except that, after stating support for the pending bill, the study concludes: “You should write to the undecided committee members to support this crucial bill.” The study is not within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study or research because it directly encourages the recipients to urge a legislator to support a specific piece of legislation.

Example (10).  Organization X plans to conduct a lobbying campaign with respect to illegal drug use in the United States. It incurs $5,000 in expenses to conduct research and prepare an extensive report primarily for use in the lobbying campaign. Although the detailed report discusses specific pending legislation and reaches the conclusion that the legislation would reduce illegal drug use, the report contains a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts to enable the public or an individual to form an independent conclusion regarding the effect of the legislation. The report does not encourage readers to contact legislators regarding the legislation. Accordingly, the report does not, in and of itself, constitute a lobbying communication.

Copies of the report are available to the public at X's office, but X does not actively distribute the report or otherwise seek to make the contents of the report available to the general public. Whether or not X's distribution is sufficient to meet the requirement in §53.4945–2(d)(1)(iv) that a nonpartisan communication be made available, X's distribution is not substantial (for purposes of §§53.4945–2(D)(1)(v) and 56.4911–2(b)(2)(v)) in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the normal distribution pattern of similar nonpartisan reports. X then mails copies of the report, along with a letter, to 10,000 individuals on X's mailing list. In the letter, X requests that individuals contact legislators urging passage of the legislation discussed in the report. Because X's research and report were primarily undertaken by X for lobbying purposes and X did not make a substantial distribution of the report (without an accompanying lobbying message) prior to or contemporaneously with the use of the report in lobbying, the report is a grass roots lobbying communication that is not within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study or research. Thus, the expenditures for preparing and mailing both the report and the letter are taxable expenditures under section 4945.

Example (11).  Assume the same facts as in Example (10), except that before using the report in the lobbying campaign, X sends the research and report (without an accompanying lobbying message) to universities and newspapers. At the same time, X also advertises the availability of the report in its newsletter. This distribution is similar in scope to the normal distribution pattern of similar nonpartisan reports. In light of all of the facts and circumstances, X's distribution of the report is substantial. Because of X's substantial distribution of the report, X's primary purpose will be considered to be other than for use in lobbying and the report will not be considered a grass roots lobbying communication. Accordingly, only the expenditures for copying and mailing the report to the 10,000 individuals on X's mailing list, as well as for preparing and mailing the letter, are expenditures for grass roots lobbying communications, and are thus taxable expenditures under section 4945.

Example (12).  Organization M pays for a bumper sticker that reads: “STOP ABORTION: Vote NO on Prop. X!” M also pays for a 30-second television advertisement and a billboard that similarly advocate opposition to Prop. X. In light of the limited scope of the communications, none of the communications is within the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study or research. First, none of the communications rises to the level of analysis, study or research. Second, none of the communications is nonpartisan because none contains a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts to enable the public or an individual to form an independent opinion or conclusion. Thus, each communication is a lobbying communication.

(2) Technical advice or assistance—(i) In general. Amounts paid or incurred in connection with providing technical advice or assistance to a governmental body, a governmental committee, or a subdivision of either of the foregoing, in response to a written request by such body, committee, or subdivision do not constitute taxable expenditures for purposes of this section. Under this exception, the request for assistance or advice must be made in the name of the requesting governmental body, committee or subdivision rather than an individual member thereof. Similarly, the response to such request must be available to every member of the requesting body, committee or subdivision. For example, in the case of a written response to a request for technical advice or assistance from a congressional committee, the response will be considered available to every member of the requesting committee if the response is submitted to the person making such request in the name of the committee and it is made clear that the response is for the use of all the members of the committee.

(ii) Nature of technical advice or assistance. “Technical advice or assistance” may be given as a result of knowledge or skill in a given area. Because such assistance or advice may be given only at the express request of a governmental body, committee or subdivision, the oral or written presentation of such assistance or advice need not qualify as nonpartisan analysis, study or research. The offering of opinions or recommendations will ordinarily qualify under this exception only if such opinions or recommendations are specifically requested by the governmental body, committee or subdivision or are directly related to the materials so requested.

(iii) Examples. The provisions of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  A congressional committee is studying the feasibility of legislation to provide funds for scholarships to U.S. students attending schools abroad. X, a private foundation which has engaged in a private scholarship program of this type, is asked, in writing, by the committee to describe the manner in which it selects candidates for its program. X's response disclosing its methods of selection constitutes technical advice or assistance.

Example (2).  Assume the same facts as Example (1), except that X's response not only includes a description of its own grant-making procedures, but also its views regarding the wisdom of adopting such a program. Since such views are directly related to the subject matter of the request for technical advice or assistance, expenditures paid or incurred with respect to the presentation of such views would not constitute taxable expenditures. However, expenditures paid or incurred with respect to a response which is not directly related to the subject matter of the request for technical advice or assistance would constitute taxable expenditures unless the presentation can qualify as the making available of nonpartisan analysis, study or research.

Example (3).  Assume the same facts as Example (1), except that X is requested, in addition, to give any views it considers relevant. A response to this request giving opinions which are relevant to the committee's consideration of the scholarship program but which are not necessarily directly related to X's scholarship program, such as discussions of alternative scholarships programs and their relative merits, would qualify as “technical advice or assistance”, and expenditures paid or incurred with respect to such response would not constitute taxable expenditures.

Example (4).  A, an official of the State Department, makes a written request in his official capacity for information from foundation Y relating to the economic development of country M and for the opinions of Y as to the proper position of the United States in pending negotiations with M concerning a proposed treaty involving a program of economic and technical aid to M. Y's furnishing of such information and opinions constitutes technical advice or assistance.

Example (5).  In response to a telephone inquiry from Senator X's staff, organization B sends Senator X a report concluding that the Senate should not advise and consent to the nomination of Z to serve as a Supreme Court Justice. Because the request was not in writing, and also because the request was not from the Senate itself or from a committee or subcommittee, B's report is not within the scope of the exception for responses to requests for technical advice. Accordingly, B's report is a lobbying communication unless the report is within the scope of the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study or research.

Example (6).  Assume the same facts as in Example (5), except that B's report is sent in response to a written request that Senator X sends to B. The request from Senator X is a request from the Senator as an individual member of the Senate rather than from the Senate itself or from a committee or subcommittee. Accordingly, B's report is not within the scope of the exception for responses to requests for technical advice and is a lobbying conmmunication unless the report is within the scope of the exception for nonpartisan analysis, study or research.

Example (7).  Assume the same facts as in Example (6), except that B's report is sent in response to a written request from the Senate committee that is considering the nomination for an evaluation of the nominee's legal writings and a recommendation as to whether the candidate is or is not qualified to serve on the Supreme Court. The report is within the scope of the exception for responses to requests for technical advice and is not a lobbying communication.

(3) Decisions affecting the powers, duties, etc., of a private foundation—(i) In general. Paragraph (c) of this section does not apply to any amount paid or incurred in connection with an appearance before, or communication with, any legislative body with respect to a possible decision of such body which might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deductibility of contributions to such foundation. Under this exception, a foundation may communicate with the entire legislative body, committees or subcommittees of such legislative body, individual congressmen or legislators, members of their staffs, or representatives of the executive branch, who are involved in the legislative process, if such communication is limited to the prescribed subjects. Similarly, the foundation may make expenditures in order to initiate legislation if such legislation concerns only matters which might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deductibility of contributions to such foundation.

(ii) Examples. The provisions of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  A bill is being considered by Congress which would, if enacted, restrict the power of a private foundation to engage in transactions with certain related persons. Under the proposed bill a private foundation would lose its exemption from taxation if it engages in such transactions. W, a private foundation, writes to the congressional committee considering the bill, arguing that the enactment of such a bill would not be advisable, and subsequently appears before such committee to make its arguments. In addition, W requests that the congressional committee consider modification of the 2 percent de minimis rule of section 4943(c) (2) (C). Expenditures paid or incurred with respect to such submissions do not constitute taxable expenditures since they are made with respect to a possible decision of Congress which might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to such foundation.

Example (2).  A bill being considered in a State legislature is designed to implement the requirements of section 508(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Under such section, a private foundation is required to make certain amendments to its governing instrument. X, a private foundation, makes a submission to the legislature which proposes alternative measures which might be taken in lieu of the proposed bill. X also arranges to have its president contact certain State legislators with regard to this bill. Expenditures paid or incurred in making such submission and in contacting the State legislators do not constitute taxable expenditures since they are made with respect to a possible decision of such State legislature which might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to such foundation.

Example (3).  A bill is being considered by a State legislature under which the State would assume certain responsibilities for nursing care of the aged. Y, a private foundation which hitherto has engaged in such activities, appears before the State legislature and contends that such activities can be better performed by privately supported organizations. Expenditures paid or incurred with respect to such appearance are not made with respect to possible decisions of the State legislature which might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to such foundation, but rather merely affect the scope of the private foundation's future activities.

Example (4).  A State legislature is considering the annual appropriations bill. Z, a private foundation which had hitherto performed contract research for the State, appears before the appropriations committee in order to attempt to persuade the committee of the advisability of continuing the program. Expenditures paid or incurred with respect to such appearance are not made with respect to possible decisions of the State legislature which might affect the existence of the private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to such foundation, but rather merely affect the scope of the private foundation's future activities.

(4) Examination and discussions of broad social, economic, and similar problems. Examinations and discussions of broad social, economic, and similar problems are neither direct lobbying communications under §56.4911–2(b)(1) nor grass roots lobbying communications under §56.4911–2(b)(2) even if the problems are of the type with which government would be expected to deal ultimately. Thus, under §§56.4911–2(b) (1) and (2), lobbying communications do not include public discussion, or communications with members of legislative bodies or governmental employees, the general subject of which is also the subject of legislation before a legislative body, so long as such discussion does not address itself to the merits of a specific legislative proposal and so long as such discussion does not directly encourage recipients to take action with respect to legislation. For example, this paragraph (d)(4) excludes from grass roots lobbying under §56.4911(b)(2) an organization's discussions of problems such as environmental pollution or population growth that are being considered by Congress and various State legislatures, but only where the discussions are not directly addressed to specific legislation being considered, and only where the discussions do not directly encourage recipients of the communication to contact a legislator, an employee of a legislative body, or a government official or employee who may participate in the formulation of legislation.

[T.D. 7215, 37 FR 23161, Oct. 31, 1972; 37 FR 23918, Nov. 11, 1972, as amended by T.D. 8308, 55 FR 35594, Aug. 31, 1990]

(a) Expenditures to influence elections or carry on voter registration drives—(1) In general. Under section 4945(d) (2), the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation to influence the outcome of any specific public election or to carry on, directly or indirectly, any voter registration drive, unless such amount is paid or incurred by an organization described in section 4945(f). However, for treatment of nonearmarked grants to public organizations, see §53.4945–2(a) (5) and for treatment of certain earmarked grants to organizations described in section 4945(f), see paragraph (b) (2) of this section.

(2) Influencing the outcome of a specific public election. For purposes of this section, an organization shall be considered to be influencing the outcome of any specific public election if it participates or intervenes, directly or indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office. The term candidate for public office means an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective public office, whether such office be national, State or local. Activities which constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate include, but are not limited to:

(i) Publishing or distributing written or printed statements or making oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate;

(ii) Paying salaries or expenses of campaign workers; and

(iii) Conducting or paying the expenses of conducting a voter-registration drive limited to the geographic area covered by the campaign.

(b) Nonpartisan activities carried on by certain organizations—(1) In general. If an organization meets the requirements described in section 4945(f), an amount paid or incurred by such organization shall not be considered a taxable expenditure even though the use of such amount is otherwise described in section 4945(d) (2). Such requirements are:

(i) The organization is described in section 501(c) (3) and exempt from taxation under section 501(a);

(ii) The activities of the organization are nonpartisan, are not confined to one specific election period, and are carried on in five or more States;

(iii) The organization expends at least 85 percent of its income directly for the active conduct (within the meaning of section 4942(j) (3) and the regulations thereunder) of the activities constituting the purpose or function for which it is organized and operated;

(iv) The organization receives at least 85 percent of its support (other than gross investment income as defined in section 509(e)) from exempt organizations, the general public, governmental units described in section 170(c) (1), or any combination of the foregoing; the organization does not receive more than 25 percent of its support (other than gross investment income) from any one exempt organization (for this purpose treating private foundations which are described in section 4946(a) (1) (H) with respect to each other as one exempt organization); and not more than half of the support of the organization is received from gross investment income; and

(v) Contributions to the organization for voter registration drives are not subject to conditions that they may be used only in specified States, possessions of the United States, or political subdivisions or other areas of any of the foregoing, or the District of Columbia, or that they may be used in only one specific election period.

(2) Grants to section 4945(f) organizations. If a private foundation makes a grant to an organization described in section 4945(f) (whether or not such grantee is a private foundation as defined in section 509(a)), such grant will not be treated as a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d) (2) or (4). Even if a grant to such an organization is earmarked for voter registration purposes generally, such a grant will not be treated as a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d) (2) or (4) as long as such earmarking does not violate section 4945(f) (5).

(3) Period for determining support—(i) In general. The determination whether an organization meets the support test in section 4945(f) (4) for any taxable year is to be made by aggregating all amounts of support received by the organization during the taxable year and the immediately preceding four taxable years. However, the support received in any taxable year which begins before January 1, 1970, shall be excluded.

(ii) New organizations and organizations with no preceding taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969. Except as provided in subparagraph (4) of this paragraph, in the case of a new organization or an organization with no taxable years that begin after December 31, 1969, and immediately precede the taxable year in question, the requirements of the support test in section 4945(f)(4) will be considered as met for the taxable year if such requirements are met by the end of the taxable year.

(iii) Organization with three or fewer preceding taxable years. In the case of an organization which has been in existence for at least 1 but fewer than 4 preceding taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969, the determination whether such organization meets the requirements of the support test in section 4945(f)(4) for the taxable year is to be made by taking into account all the support received by such organization during the taxable year and during each preceding taxable year beginning after December 31, 1969.

(4) Advance rulings. An organization will be given an advance ruling that it is an organization described in section 4945(f) for its first taxable year of operation beginning after October 30, 1972, or for its first taxable year of operation beginning after December 31, 1969, if it submits evidence establishing that it can reasonably be expected to meet the tests under section 4945(f) for such taxable year. An organization which, pursuant to this subparagraph, has been treated as an organization described in section 4945(f) for a taxable year (without withdrawal of such treatment by notification from the Internal Revenue Service during such year), but which actually fails to meet the requirements of section 4945(f) for such taxable year, will not be treated as an organization described in section 4945(f) as of the first day of its next taxable year (for purposes of making any determination under the internal revenue laws with respect to such organization) and until such time as the organization does meet the requirements of section 4945(f). For purposes of section 4945, the status of grants or contributions with respect to grantors or contributors to such organization will not be affected until notice of change of status of such organization is made to the public (such as by publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin). The preceding sentence shall not apply, however, if the grantor or contributor was responsible for, or was aware of, the fact that the organization did not satisfy section 4945(f) at the end of the taxable year with respect to which the organization had obtained an advance ruling or a determination letter that it was a section 4945(f) organization, or acquired knowledge that the Internal Revenue Service had given notice to such organization that it would be deleted from classification as a section 4945(f) organization.

[T.D. 7215, 37 FR 23161, Oct. 31, 1972; 37 FR 23918, Nov. 11, 1972]

(a) Grants to individuals—(1) In general. Under section 4945(d) (3) the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation as a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes by such individual unless the grant satisfies the requirements of section 4945(g). Grants to individuals which are not taxable expenditures because made in accordance with the requirements of section 4945(g) may result in the imposition of excise taxes under other provisions of chapter 42.

(2) “Grants” defined. For purposes of section 4945, the term “grants” shall include, but is not limited to, such expenditures as scholarships, fellowships, internships, prizes, and awards. Grants shall also include loans for purposes described in section 170(c) (2) (B) and “program related investments” (such as investments in small businesses in central cities or in businesses which assist in neighborhood renovation). Similarly, “grants” include such expenditures as payments to exempt organizations to be used in furtherance of such recipient organizations' exempt purposes whether or not such payments are solicited by such recipient organizations. Conversely, “grants” do not ordinarily include salaries or other compensation to employees. For example, “grants” do not ordinarily include educational payments to employees which are includible in the employees' incomes pursuant to section 61. In addition, “grants” do not ordinarily include payments (including salaries, consultants' fees and reimbursement for travel expenses such as transportation, board, and lodging) to persons (regardless of whether such persons are individuals) for personal services in assisting a foundation in planning, evaluating or developing projects or areas of program activity by consulting, advising, or participating in conferences organized by the foundation.

(3) Requirements for individual grants—(i) Grants for other than section 4945(d)(3) purposes. A grant to an individual for purposes other than those described in section 4945(d) (3) is not a taxable expenditure within the meaning of section 4945(d) (3). For example, if a foundation makes grants to indigent individuals to enable them to purchase furniture, such grants are not taxable expenditures within the meaning of section 4945(d) (3) even if the requirements of section 4945(g) are not met.

(ii) Grants for section 4945(d) (3) purposes. Under section 4945(g), a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes is not a “taxable expenditure” only if:

(a) The grant is awarded on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis (within the meaning of paragraph (b) of this section);

(b) The grant is made pursuant to a procedure approved in advance by the Commissioner; and

(c) It is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that:

(1) The grant constitutes a scholarship or fellowship grant which is excluded from gross income under section 117(a) and is to be utilized for study at an educational institution described in section 151(e) (4);

(2) The grant constitutes a prize or award which is excluded from gross income under section 74(b), and the recipient of such prize or award is selected from the general public (within the meaning of section 4941(d) (2) (G) (i) and the regulations thereunder); or

(3) The purpose of the grant is to achieve a specific objective, produce a report or other similar product, or improve or enhance a literary, artistic, musical, scientific, teaching, or other similar capacity, skill, or talent of the grantee.

If a grant is made to an individual for a purpose described in section 4945(g) (3) and such grant otherwise meets the requirements of section 4945(g), such grant shall not be treated as a taxable expenditure even if it is a scholarship or a fellowship grant which is not excludable from income under section 117 or if it is a prize or award which is includible in income under section 74.

(iii) Renewals. A renewal of a grant which satisfied the requirements of subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph shall not be treated as a grant to an individual which is subject to the requirements of this section, if:

(a) The grantor has no information indicating that the original grant is being used for any purpose other than that for which it was made,

(b) Any reports due at the time of the renewal decision pursuant to the terms of the original grant have been furnished, and

(c) Any additional criteria and procedures for renewal are objective and nondiscriminatory.

For purposes of this section, an extension of the period over which a grant is to be paid shall not itself be regarded as a grant or a renewal of a grant.

(4) Certain designated grants—(i) In general. A grant by a private foundation to another organization, which the grantee organization uses to make payments to an individual for purposes described in section 4945(d)(3), shall not be regarded as a grant by the private foundation to the individual grantee if the foundation does not earmark the use of the grant for any named individual and there does not exist an agreement, oral or written, whereby such grantor foundation may cause the selection of the individual grantee by the grantee organization. For purposes of this subparagraph, a grant described herein shall not be regarded as a grant by the foundation to an individual grantee even though such foundation has reason to believe that certain individuals would derive benefits from such grant so long as the grantee organization exercises control, in fact, over the selection process and actually makes the selection completely independently of the private foundation.

(ii) Certain grants to “public charities”. A grant by a private foundation to an organization described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3), which the grantee organization uses to make payments to an individual for purposes described in section 4945(d)(3), shall not be regarded as a grant by the private foundation to the individual grantee (regardless of the application of subdivision (i) of this subparagraph) if the grant is made for a project which is to be undertaken under the supervision of the section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3) organization and such grantee organization controls the selection of the individual grantee. This subdivision shall apply regardless of whether the name of the individual grantee was first proposed by the private foundation, but only if there is an objective manifestation of the section 509(a), (1), (2), or (3) organization's control over the selection process, although the selection need not be made completely independently of the private foundation. For purposes of this subdivision, an organization shall be considered a section 509(a)(1) organization if it is treated as such under subparagraph (4) of §53.4945–5(a).

(iii) Grants to governmental agencies. If a private foundation makes a grant to an organization described in section 170(c)(1) (regardless of whether it is described in section 501(c)(3)) and such grant is earmarked for use by an individual for purposes described in section 4945(d)(3), such grant is not subject to the requirements of section 4945(d)(3) and (g) and this section (regardless of the application of subdivision (i) of this subparagraph) if the section 170(c)(1) organization satisfies the Commissioner in advance that its grant-making program:

(a) Is in furtherance of a purpose described in section 170(c)(2)(B),

(b) Requires that the individual grantee submit reports to it which would satisfy paragraph (c)(3) of this section, and

(c) Requires that the organization investigate jeopardized grants in a manner substantially similar to that described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section.

(iv) Examples. The provisions of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  M, a university described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), requests that P, a private foundation, grant it $100,000 to enable M to obtain the services of a particular scientist for a research project in a special field of biochemistry in which he has exceptional qualifications and competence. P, after determining that the project deserves support, makes the grant to M to enable it to obtain the services of this scientist. M is authorized to keep the funds even if it is unsuccessful in attempting to employ the scientist. Under these circumstances P will not be treated as having made a grant to the individual scientist for purposes of section 4945(d)(3) and (g), since the requirements of subdivision (i) of this subparagraph have been satisfied. Even if M were not authorized to keep the funds if it is unsuccessful in attempting to employ the scientist, P would not be treated as having made a grant to the individual scientist for purposes of section 4945(d)(3) and (g), since it is clear from the facts and circumstances that the selection of the particular scientist was made by M and thus the requirements of subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph would have been satisfied.

Example (2).  Assume the same facts as Example (1), except that there are a number of scientists who are qualified to administer the research project, P suggests the name of the particular scientist to be employed by M, and M is not authorized to keep the funds if it is unsuccessful in attempting to employ the particular scientist. For purposes of section 4945(d)(3) and (g), P will be treated as having made a grant to the individual scientist whose name it suggested, since it is clear from the facts and circumstances that selection of the particular scientist was made by P.

Example (3).  X, a private foundation, is aware of the exceptional research facilities at Y University, an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii). Officials of X approach officials of Y with an offer to give Y a grant of $100,000 if Y will engage an adequately qualified physicist to conduct a specific research project. Y's officials accept this proposal, and it is agreed that Y will administer the funds. After examining the qualifications of several research physicists, the officials of Y agree that A, whose name was first suggested by officials of X and who first suggested the specific research project to X, is uniquely qualified to conduct the project. X's grant letter provides that X has the right to renegotiate the terms of the grant if there is a substantial deviation from such terms, such as breakdown of Y's research facilities or termination of the conduct of the project by an adequately qualified physicist. Under these circumstances, X will not be treated as having made a grant to A for purposes of section 4945(d)(3) and (g), since the requirements of subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph have been satisfied.

Example (4).  Professor A, a scholar employed by University Y, an organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii), approaches Foundation X to determine the availability of grant funds for a particular research project supervised or conducted by Professor A relevant to the program interests of Foundation X. After learning that Foundation X would be willing to consider the project if University Y were to submit the project to X, Professor A submits his proposal to the appropriate administrator of University Y. After making a determination that it should assume responsibility for the project, that Professor A is qualified to conduct the project, and that his participation would be consistent with his other faculty duties, University Y formally adopts the grant proposal and submits it to Foundation X. The grant is made to University Y which, under the terms of the grant, is responsible for the expenditure of the grant funds and the grant project. In such a case, and even if Foundation X retains the right to renegotiate the terms of the grant if the project ceases to be conducted by Professor A, the grant shall not be regarded as a grant by Foundation X to Professor A since University Y has retained control over the selection process within the meaning of subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph.

(5) Earmarked grants to individuals. A grant by a private foundation to an individual, which meets the requirements of section 4945(d)(3) and (g), is a taxable expenditure by such foundation under section 4945(d) only if:

(i) The grant is earmarked to be used for any activity described in section 4945(d) (1), (2), or (5), or is earmarked to be used in a manner which would violate section 4945(d) (3) or (4),

(ii) There is an agreement, oral or written, whereby such grantor foundation may cause the grantee to engage in any such prohibited activity and such grant is in fact used in a manner which violates section 4945(d), or

(iii) The grant is made for a purpose other than a purpose described in section 170(c)(2)(B).

For purposes of this subparagraph, a grant by a private foundation is earmarked if such grant is given pursuant to an agreement, oral or written, that the grant will be used for specific purposes.

(b) Selection of grantees on “an objective and nondiscriminatory basis”—(1) In general. For purposes of this section, in order for a foundation to establish that its grants to individuals are made on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis, the grants must be awarded in accordance with a program which, if it were a substantial part of the foundation's activities, would be consistent with:

(i) The existence of the foundation's exempt status under section 501(c)(3);

(ii) The allowance of deductions to individuals under section 170 for contributions to the granting foundation; and

(iii) The requirements of subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this paragraph.

(2) Candidates for grants. Ordinarily, selection of grantees on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis requires that the group from which grantees are selected be chosen on the basis of criteria reasonably related to the purposes of the grant. Furthermore, the group must be sufficiently broad so that the giving of grants to members of such group would be considered to fulfill a purpose described in section 170(c)(2)(B). Thus, ordinarily the group must be sufficiently large to constitute a charitable class. However, selection from a group is not necessary where taking into account the purposes of the grant, one or several persons are selected because they are exceptionally qualified to carry out these purposes or it is otherwise evident that the selection is particularly calculated to effectuate the charitable purpose of the grant rather than to benefit particular persons or a particular class of persons. Therefore, consistent with the requirements of this subparagraph, the foundation may impose reasonable restrictions on the group of potential grantees. For example, selection of a qualified research scientist to work on a particular project does not violate the requirements of section 4945(d)(3) merely because the foundation selects him from a group of three scientists who are experts in that field.

(3) Selection from within group of potential grantees. The criteria used in selecting grant recipients from the potential grantees should be related to the purpose of the grant. Thus, for example, proper criteria for selecting scholarship recipients might include (but are not limited to) the following: Prior academic performance; performance on tests designed to measure ability and aptitude for college work; recommendations from instructors; financial need; and the conclusions which the selection committee might draw from a personal interview as to the individual's motivation, character, ability, and potential.

(4) Persons making selections. The person or group of persons who select recipients of grants should not be in a position to derive a private benefit, directly or indirectly, if certain potential grantees are selected over others.

(5) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  X company employs 100,000 people of whom 1,000 are classified by the company as executives. The company has organized the X company foundation which, as its sole activity, provides 100 4-year college scholarships per year for children of the company's employees. Children of all employees (other than disqualified persons with respect to the foundation) who have worked for the X company for at least 2 years are eligible to apply for these scholarships. In previous years, the number of children eligible to apply for such scholarships has averaged 2,000 per year. Selection of scholarship recipients from among the applicants is made by three prominent educators, who have no connection (other than as members of the selection committee) with the company, the foundation or any of the employees of the company. The selections are made on the basis of the applicants' prior academic performance, performance on certain tests designed to measure ability and aptitude for college work, and financial need. No disproportionate number of scholarships has been granted to relatives of executives of X company. Under these circumstances, the operation of the scholarship program by the X company foundation: (1) Is consistent with the existence of the foundation's exempt status under section 501(c) (3) and with the allowance of deductions under section 170 for contributions to the foundation; (2) utilizes objective and nondiscriminatory criteria in selecting scholarship recipients from among the applicants; and (3) utilizes a selection committee which appears likely to make objective and nondiscriminatory selections of grant recipients.

Example (2).  Assume the same facts as Example (1), except that the foundation establishes a program to provide 20 college scholarships per year for members of a certain ethnic minority. All members of this minority group (other than disqualified persons with respect to the foundation) living in State Z are eligible to apply for these scholarships. It is estimated that at least 400 persons will be eligible to apply for these scholarships each year. Under these circumstances, the operation of this scholarship program by the foundation: (1) Is consistent with the existence of the foundation's exempt status under section 501(c)(3) and with the allowance of deductions under section 170 for contributions to the foundation; (2) utilizes objective and nondiscriminatory criteria in selecting scholarship recipients from among the applicants; and (3) utilizes a selection committee which appears likely to make objective and nondiscriminatory selections of grant recipients.

(c) Requirements of a proper procedure—(1) In general. Section 4945(g) requires that grants to individuals must be made pursuant to a procedure approved in advance. To secure such approval, a private foundation must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that:

(i) Its grant procedure includes an objective and nondiscriminatory selection process (as described in paragraph (b) of this section);

(ii) Such procedure is reasonably calculated to result in performance by grantees of the activities that the grants are intended to finance; and

(iii) The foundation plans to obtain reports to determine whether the grantees have performed the activities that the grants are intended to finance.

No single procedure or set of procedures is required. Procedures may vary depending upon such factors as the size of the foundation, the amount and purpose of the grants and whether one or more recipients are involved.

(2) Supervision of scholarship and fellowship grants. Except as provided in subparagraph (5) of this paragraph, with respect to any scholarship or fellowship grants, a private foundation must make arrangements to receive a report of the grantee's courses taken (if any) and grades received (if any) in each academic period. Such a report must be verified by the educational institution attended by the grantee and must be obtained at least once a year. In cases of grantees whose study at an educational institution does not involve the taking of courses but only the preparation of research papers or projects, such as the writing of a doctoral thesis, the foundation must receive a brief report on the progress of the paper or project at least once a year. Such a report must be approved by the faculty member supervising the grantee or by another appropriate university official. Upon completion of a grantee's study at an educational institution, a final report must also be obtained.

(3) Grants described in section 4945(g)(3). With respect to a grant made under section 4945(g)(3), the private foundation shall require reports on the use of the funds and the progress made by the grantee toward achieving the purposes for which the grant was made. Such reports must be made at least once a year. Upon completion of the undertaking for which the grant was made, a final report must be made describing the grantee's accomplishments with respect to the grant and accounting for the funds received under such grant.

(4) Investigation of jeopardized grants. (i) Where the reports submitted under this paragraph or other information (including the failure to submit such reports) indicates that all or any part of a grant is not being used in furtherance of the purposes of such grant, the foundation is under a duty to investigate. While conducting its investigation, the foundation must withhold further payments to the extent possible until any delinquent reports required by this paragraph have been submitted and where required by subdivision (ii) or (iii) of this subparagraph.

(ii) In cases in which the grantor foundation determines that any part of a grant has been used for improper purposes and the grantee has not previously diverted grant funds to any use not in furtherance of a purpose specified in the grant, the foundation will not be treated as having made a taxable expenditure solely because of the diversion so long as the foundation:

(a) Is taking all reasonable and appropriate steps either to recover the grant funds or to insure the restoration of the diverted funds and the dedication (consistent with the requirements of (b) (1) and (2) of this subdivision) of other grant funds held by the grantee to the purposes being financed by the grant, and

(b) Withholds any further payments to the grantee after the grantor becomes aware that a diversion may have taken place (hereinafter referred to as “further payments”) until it has:

(1) Received the grantee's assurances that future diversions will not occur, and

(2) Required the grantee to take extraordinary precaution to prevent future diversions from occurring.

If a foundation is treated as having made a taxable expenditure under this subparagraph in a case to which this subdivision applies, then unless the foundation meets the requirements of (a) of this subdivision the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of the diversion plus the amount of any further payments to the same grantee. However, if the foundation complies with the requirements of (a) of this subdivision but not the requirements of (b) of this subdivision, the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of such further payments.

(iii) In cases where a grantee has previously diverted funds received from a grantor foundation, and the grantor foundation determines that any part of a grant has again been used for improper purposes, the foundation will not be treated as having made a taxable expenditure solely by reason of such diversion so long as the foundation:

(a) Is taking all reasonable and appropriate steps to recover the grant funds or to insure the restoration of the funds and the dedication (consistent with the requirements of (b) (2) and (3) of this subdivision) of other grant funds held by the grantee to the purposes being financed by the grant, and

(b) Withholds further payments until:

(1) Such funds are in fact so recovered or restored,

(2) It has received the grantee's assurances that future diversions will not occur, and

(3) It requires the grantee to take extraordinary precautions to prevent future diversions from occurring.

If a foundation is treated as having made a taxable expenditure under this subparagraph in a case to which this subdivision applies, then unless the foundation meets the requirements of (a) of this subdivision, the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of the diversion plus the amount of any further payments to the same grantee. However, if the foundation complies with the requirements of (a) of this subdivision, but fails to withhold further payments until the requirements of (b) of this subdivision are met, the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of such further payments.

(iv) The phrase “all reasonable and appropriate steps” in subdivisions (ii) and (iii) of this subparagraph includes legal action where appropriate but need not include legal action if such action would in all probability not result in the satisfaction of execution on a judgment.

(5) Supervision of certain scholarship and fellowship grants. Subparagraphs (2) and (4) of this paragraph shall be considered satisfied with respect to scholarship or fellowship grants under the following circumstances:

(i) The scholarship or fellowship grants are described in section 4945(g) (1);

(ii) The grantor foundation pays the scholarship or fellowship grants to an educational institution described in section 151(e) (4); and

(iii) Such educational institution agrees to use the grant funds to defray the recipient's expenses or to pay the funds (or a portion thereof) to the recipient only if the recipient is enrolled at such educational institution and his standing at such educational institution is consistent with the purposes and conditions of the grant.

(6) Retention of records. A private foundation shall retain records pertaining to all grants to individuals for purposes described in section 4945(d) (3). Such records shall include:

(i) All information the foundation secures to evaluate the qualification of potential grantees;

(ii) Identification of grantees (including any relationship of any grantee to the foundation sufficient to make such grantee a disqualified person of the private foundation within the meaning of section 4946(a) (1));

(iii) Specification of the amount and purpose of each grant; and

(iv) The follow-up information which the foundation obtains in complying with subparagraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this paragraph.

(7) Example. The provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  The X foundation grants 10 scholarships each year to graduates of high schools in its area to permit the recipients to attend college. It makes the availability of its scholarships known by oral or written communications each year to the principals of three major high schools in the area. The foundation obtains information from each high school on the academic qualifications, background, and financial need of applicants. It requires that each applicant be recommended by two of his teachers or by the principal of his high school. All application forms are reviewed by the foundation officer responsible for making the awards and scholarships are granted on the basis of the academic qualifications and financial need of the grantees. The foundation obtains annual reports on the academic performance of the scholarship recipient from the college or university which he attends. It maintains a file on each scholarship awarded, including the original application, recommendations, a record of the action taken on the application, and the reports on the recipient from the institution which he attends. The described procedures of the X foundation for the making of grants to individuals qualify for Internal Revenue Service approval under section 4945(g). Furthermore, if the X foundation's scholarship program meets the requirements of subparagraph (5) of this paragraph, X foundation will not have to obtain reports on the academic performance of the scholarship recipients.

(d) Submission of grant procedure—(1) Contents of request for approval of grant procedures. A request for advance approval of a foundation's grant procedures must fully describe the foundation's procedures for awarding grants and for ascertaining that such grants are used for the proper purposes. The approval procedure does not contemplate specific approval of particular grant programs but instead one-time approval of a system of standards, procedures, and follow-up designed to result in grants which meet the requirements of section 4945(g). Thus, such approval shall apply to a subsequent grant program as long as the procedures under which it is conducted do not differ materially from those described in the request to the Commissioner. The request must contain the following items:

(i) A statement describing the selection process. Such statement shall be sufficiently detailed for the Commissioner to determine whether the grants are made on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis under paragraph (b) of this section.

(ii) A description of the terms and conditions under which the foundation ordinarily makes such grants, which is sufficient to enable the Commissioner to determine whether the grants awarded under such procedures would meet the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 4945(g).

(iii) A detailed description of the private foundation's procedure for exercising supervision over grants, as described in paragraph (c) (2) and (3) of this section.

(iv) A description of the foundation's procedures for review of grantee reports, for investigation where diversion of grant funds from their proper purposes is indicated, and for recovery of diverted grant funds, as described in paragraph (c) (4) of this section.

(2) Place of submission. Request for approval of grant procedures shall be submitted to the District Director.

(3) Internal Revenue Service action on request for approval of grant procedures. The 45th day after a request for approval of grant procedures has been properly submitted to the Internal Revenue Service, the organization has not been notified that such procedures are not acceptable, such procedures shall be considered as approved from the date of submission until receipt of actual notice from the Internal Revenue Service that such procedures do not meet the requirements of this section. If a grant to an individual for a purpose described in section 4945(d) (3) is made after notification to the organization by the Internal Revenue Service that the procedures under which the grant is made are not acceptable, such grant is a taxable expenditure under this section.

(e) Effective dates—(1) In general. This section shall apply to all grants to individuals for travel, study, or other similar purposes which are made by private foundations more than 90 days after October 30, 1972.

(2) Transitional rules—(i) Grants committed prior to January 1, 1970. Section 4945(d) (3) and (g) and this section shall not apply to a grant for section 170(c) (2) (B) purposes made on or after January 1, 1970, if the grant was made pursuant to a commitment entered into prior to such date, but only if such commitment was made in accordance with the foundation's usual practices and is reasonable in amount in light of the purposes of the grant. For purposes of this subdivision, a commitment will be considered entered into prior to January 1, 1970, if prior to such date, the amount and nature of the payments to be made and the name of the payee were entered on the records of the payor, or were otherwise adequately evidenced, or the notice of the payment to be received was communicated to the payee in writing.

(ii) Grants awarded on or after January 1, 1970. In the case of a grant awarded on or after January 1, 1970, but prior to the expiration of 90 days after October 30, 1972, and paid within 48 months after the award of such grant, the requirements of section 4945(g) that an individual grant be awarded on an objective and nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to a procedure approved in advance by the Commissioner will be deemed satisfied if the grantor utilizes any procedure in good faith in awarding a grant to an individual which, in fact, is reasonably calculated to provide objectivity and nondiscrimination in the awarding of such grant and to result in a grant which complies with the conditions of section 4945(g) (1), (2), or (3).

(a) Grants to nonpublic organizations—(1) In general. Under section 4945(d)(4) the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation as a grant to an organization (other than an organization described in section 509(a) (1), (2) or (3)), unless the private foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant in accordance with section 4945(h). However, the granting foundation does not have to exercise expenditure responsibility with respect to amounts granted to organizations described in section 4945(f).

(2) “Grants” described. For a description of the term “grants”, see §53.4945–4(a)(2).

(3) Section 509(a) (1), (2), and (3) organizations. See section 508(b) and the regulations thereunder for rules relating to when a grantor may rely on a potential grantee's characterization of its status as set forth in the notice described in section 508(b).

(4) Certain “public” organizations. For purposes of this section, an organization will be treated as a section 509(a)(1) organization if:

(i) It qualifies as such under paragraph (a) of §1.509(a)–2 of this chapter;

(ii) It is an organization described in section 170(c)(1) or 511(a)(2)(B), even if it is not described in section 501(c)(3); or

(iii) It is a foreign government, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, or an international organization designated as such by Executive order under 22 U.S.C. 288, even if it is not described in section 501(c)(3).

However, any grant to an organization referred to in this subparagraph must be made exclusively for charitable purposes as described in section 170(c)(2)(B).

(5) Certain foreign organizations. If a private foundation makes a grant to a foreign organization which does not have a ruling or determination letter that it is an organization described in section 509(a)(1), (2), or (3), such grant will not be treated as a grant made to an organization other than an organization described in section 509(a)(1), (2), or (3) if the grantor private foundation has made a good faith determination that the grantee organization is an organization described in section 509(a)(1), (2), or (3). Such a “good faith determination” ordinarily will be considered as made where the determination is based on an affidavit of the grantee organization or an opinion of counsel (of the grantor or the grantee) that the grantee is an organization described in section 509(a)(1), (2), or (3). Such an affidavit or opinion must set forth sufficient facts concerning the operations and support of the grantee for the Internal Revenue Service to determine that the grantee would be likely to qualify as an organization described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3). See paragraphs (b)(5) and (b)(6) of this section for other special rules relating to foreign organizations.

(6) Certain earmarked grants—(i) In general. A grant by a private foundation to a grantee organization which the grantee organization uses to make payments to another organization (the secondary grantee) shall not be regarded as a grant by the private foundation to the secondary grantee if the foundation does not earmark the use of the grant for any named secondary grantee and there does not exist an agreement, oral or written, whereby such grantor foundation may cause the selection of the secondary grantee by the organization to which it has given the grant. For purposes of this subdivision, a grant described herein shall not be regarded as a grant by the foundation to the secondary grantee even though such foundation has reason to believe that certain organizations would derive benefits from such grant so long as the original grantee organization exercises control, in fact, over the selection process and actually makes the selection completely independently of the private foundation.

(ii) To governmental agencies. If a private foundation makes a grant to an organization described in section 170(c)(1) and such grant is earmarked for use by another organization, the granting foundation need not exercise expenditure responsibility with respect to such grant if the section 170(c)(1) organization satisfies the Commissioner in advance that:

(a) Its grant-making program is in furtherance of a purpose described in section 170(c)(2)(B), and

(b) The section 170(c)(1) organization exercises “expenditure responsibility” in a manner that would satisfy this section if it applied to such section 170(c)(1) organization.

However, with respect to such grant, the granting foundation must make the reports required by section 4945(h)(3) and paragraph (d) of this section, unless such grant is earmarked for use by an organization described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3).

(b) Expenditure responsibility—(1) In general. A private foundation is not an insurer of the activity of the organization to which it makes a grant. Thus, satisfaction of the requirements of sections 4945(d)(4) and (h) and of subparagraph (3) or (4) of this paragraph, will ordinarily mean that the grantor foundation will not have violated section 4945(d) (1) or (2). A private foundation will be considered to be exercising “expenditure responsibility” under section 4945(h) as long as it exerts all reasonable efforts and establishes adequate procedures:

(i) To see that the grant is spent solely for the purpose for which made,

(ii) To obtain full and complete reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent, and

(iii) To make full and detailed reports with respect to such expenditures to the Commissioner.

In cases in which pursuant to paragraph (a)(6) of this section a grant is considered made to a secondary grantee rather than the primary grantee, the grantor foundation's obligation to obtain reports from the grantee pursuant to section 4945(h)(2) and this section will be satisfied if appropriate reports are obtained from the secondary grantee. For rules relating to expenditure responsibility with respect to transfers of assets described in section 507(b)(2), see section 507(b)(2) and the regulations thereunder.

(2) Pre-grant inquiry—(i) Before making a grant to an organization with respect to which expenditure responsibility must be exercised under this section, a private foundation should conduct a limited inquiry concerning the potential grantee. Such inquiry should be complete enough to give a reasonable man assurance that the grantee will use the grant for the proper purposes. The inquiry should concern itself with matters such as: (a) The identity, prior history and experience (if any) of the grantee organization and its managers; and (b) any knowledge which the private foundation has (based on prior experience or otherwise) of, or other information which is readily available concerning, the management, activities, and practices of the grantee organization. The scope of the inquiry might be expected to vary from case to case depending upon the size and purpose of the grant, the period over which it is to be paid, and the prior experience which the grantor has had with respect to the capacity of the grantee to use the grant for the proper purposes. For example, if the grantee has made proper use of all prior grants to it by the grantor and filed the required reports substantiating such use, no further pregrant inquiry will ordinarily be necessary. Similarly, in the case of an organization, such as a trust described in section 4947(a)(2), which is required by the terms of its governing instrument to make payments to a specified organization exempt from taxation under section 501(a), a less extensive pregrant inquiry is required than in the case of a private foundation possessing discretion with respect to the distribution of funds.

(ii) The provisions of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  Officials of M, a newly established organization which is described in section 501(c)(4), request a grant from X foundation to be used for a proposed program to combat drug abuse by establishing neighborhood clinics in certain ghetto areas of a city. Before making a grant to M, X makes an inquiry concerning the identity, prior history and experience of the officials of M. X obtains information pertaining to the officials of M from references supplied by these officials. Since one of the references indicated that A, an official of M, has an arrest record, police records are also checked and A's probation officer is interviewed.

The inquiry also shows M has no previous history of administering grants and that the officials of M have had no experience in administering programs of this nature. However, in the opinion of X's managers, M's officials (including A who appears to be fully rehabilitated after having been convicted of a narcotics violation several years ago) are well qualified to conduct this program since they are members of the communities in which the clinics are to be established and are more likely to be trusted by drug users in these communities than are outsiders. Under these circumstances X has complied with the requirements of this subparagraph and a grant to M for its proposed program will not be treated as a taxable expenditure solely because of the operation of this subparagraph.

Example (2).  Foundation Y wishes to make a grant to foundation R for use in R's scholarship program. Y has made similar grants to R annually for the last several years and knows that R's managers have observed the terms of the previous grants and have made all requested reports with respect to such grants. No changes in R's management have occurred during the past several years. Under these circumstances, Y has enough information to have such assurance as a reasonable man would require that the grant to R will be used for proper purposes. Consequently, Y is under no obligation to make any further pregrant inquiry pursuant to this subparagraph.

Example (3).  S foundation requests a grant from Z foundation for use in S's program of providing medical research fellowships. S has been engaged in this program for several years and has received large numbers of grants from other foundations. Z's managers know that the reputations of S and of S's officials are good. Z's managers also have been advised by managers of W foundation that W had recently made a grant to S and that W's managers were satisfied that such grant has been used for the purposes for which it was made. Under these circumstances Z has enough information to have such assurance as a reasonable man would require that the grant to S will be used for proper purposes. Consequently, Z is under no obligation to make any further pregrant inquiry pursuant to this subparagraph.

(3) Terms of grants. Except as provided in subparagraph (4) of this paragraph, in order to meet the expenditure responsibility requirements of section 4945(h), a private foundation must require that each grant to an organization, with respect to which expenditure responsibility must be exercised under this section, be made subject to a written commitment signed by an appropriate officer, director, or trustee of the grantee organization. Such commitment must include an agreement by the grantee:

(i) To repay any portion of the amount granted which is not used for the purposes of the grant,

(ii) To submit full and complete annual reports on the manner in which the funds are spent and the progress made in accomplishing the purposes of the grant, except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section,

(iii) To maintain records of receipts and expenditures and to make its books and records available to the grantor at reasonable times, and

(iv) Not to use any of the funds:

(a) To carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt, to influence legislation (within the meaning of section 4945(d)(1)),

(b) To influence the outcome of any specific public election, or to carry on, directly or indirectly, any voter registration drive (within the meaning of section 4945(d)(2)),

(c) To make any grant which does not comply with the requirements of section 4945(d) (3) or (4), or

(d) To undertake any activity for any purpose other than one specified in section 170(c)(2)(B).

The agreement must also clearly specify the purposes of the grant. Such purposes may include contributing for capital endowment, for the purchase of capital equipment, or for general support provided that neither the grants nor the income therefrom may be used for purposes other than those described in section 170(c)(2)(B).

(4) Terms of program-related investments. In order to meet the expenditure responsibility requirements of section 4945(h), with regard to the making of a program-related investment (as defined in section 4944 and the regulations thereunder), a private foundation must require that each such investment with respect to which expenditure responsibility must be exercised under section 4945(d)(4) and (h) and this section be made subject to a written commitment signed by an appropriate officer, director, or trustee of the recipient organization. Such commitment must specify the purpose of the investment and must include an agreement by the organization:

(i) To use all the funds received from the private foundation (as determined under paragraph (c)(3) of this section) only for the purposes of the investment and to repay any portion not used for such purposes, provided that, with respect to equity investments, such repayment shall be made only to the extent permitted by applicable law concerning distributions to holders of equity interests,

(ii) At least once a year during the existence of the program-related investment, to submit full and complete financial reports of the type ordinarily required by commercial investors under similar circumstances and a statement that it has complied with the terms of the investment,

(iii) To maintain books and records adequate to provide information ordinarily required by commercial investors under similar circumstances and to make such books and records available to the private foundation at reasonable times, and

(iv) Not to use any of the funds:

(a) To carry on propaganda, or otherwise to attempt, to influence legislation (within the meaning of section 4945(d)(1)),

(b) To influence the outcome of any specific public election, or to carry on directly or indirectly, and voter registration drive (within the meaning of section 4945(d)(2)), or

(c) With respect to any recipient which is a private foundation (as defined in section 509(a)), to make any grant which does not comply with the requirements of section 4945 (d) (3) or (4).

(5) Certain grants to foreign organizations. With respect to a grant to a foreign organization (other than an organization described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3) or treated as so described pursuant to paragraph (a)(4) or (a)(5) of this section), subparagraph (3)(iv) or (4)(iv) of this paragraph shall be deemed satisfied if the agreement referred to in subparagraph (3) or (4) of this paragraph imposes restrictions on the use of the grant substantially equivalent to the limitations imposed on a domestic private foundation under section 4945(d). Such restrictions may be phrased in appropriate terms under foreign law or custom and ordinarily will be considered sufficient if an affidavit or opinion of counsel (of the grantor or grantee) is obtained stating that, under foreign law or custom, the agreement imposes restrictions on the use of the grant substantially equivalent to the restrictions imposed on a domestic private foundation under subparagraph (3) or (4) of this paragraph.

(6) Special rules for grants by foreign private foundations. With respect to activities in jurisdictions other than those described in section 170(c)(2)(A), the failure of a foreign private foundation which is described in section 4948(b) to comply with subparagraph (3) or (4) of this paragraph with respect to a grant to an organization shall not constitute an act or failure to act which is a prohibited transaction (within the meaning of section 4948(c)(2)).

(7) Expenditure responsibility with respect to certain transfers of assets described in section 507—(i) Transfers of assets described in section 507(b)(2). For rules relating to the extent to which the expenditure responsibility rules contained in section 4945 (d)(4) and (h) and this section apply to transfers of assets described in section 507(b)(2), see §§1.507–3(a)(7), 1.507–3 (a)(8)(ii)(f), and 1.507–3(a)(9) of this chapter.

(ii) Certain other transfers of assets. For rules relating to the extent to which the expenditure responsibility rules contained in section 4945 (d)(4) and (h) and this section apply to certain other transfers of assets described in §1.507–3(b) of this chapter, see §1.507–3(b) of this chapter.

(8) Restrictions on grants (other than program-related investments) to organizations not described in section 501(c)(3). For other restrictions on certain grants (other than program-related investments) to organizations which are not described in section 501(c)(3), see §53.4945–6(c).

(c) Reports from grantees—(1) In general. In the case of grants described in section 4945(d)(4), except as provided in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the granting private foundation shall require reports on the use of the funds, compliance with the terms of the grant, and the progress made by the grantee toward achieving the purposes for which the grant was made. The grantee shall make such reports as of the end of its annual accounting period within which the grant or any portion thereof is received and all such subsequent periods until the grant funds are expended in full or the period of the grantee for which such reports shall be furnished to the grantor within a reasonable period of time after the close of the annual accounting period of the grantee for which such reports are made. Within a reasonable period of time after the close of its annual accounting period during which the use of the grant funds is completed, the grantee must make a final report with respect to all expenditures made from such funds (including salaries, travel, and supplies), and indicating the progress made toward the goals of the grant. The grantor need not conduct any independent verification of such reports unless it has reason to doubt their accuracy or reliability.

(2) Capital endowment grants to exempt private foundations. If a private foundation makes a grant described in section 4945(d)(4) to a private foundation which is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) for endowment, for the purchase of capital equipment, or for other capital purposes, the grantor foundation shall require reports from the grantee on the use of the principal and the income (if any) from the grant funds. The grantee shall make such reports annually for its taxable year in which the grant was made and the immediately succeeding 2 taxable years. Only if it is reasonably apparent to the grantor that, before the end of such second succeeding taxable year, neither the principal, the income from the grant funds, nor the equipment purchased with the grant funds has been used for any purpose which would result in liability for tax under section 4945(d), the grantor may then allow such reports to be discontinued.

(3) Grantees' accounting and recordkeeping procedures. (i) A private foundation grantee exempt from taxation under section 501(a) (or the recipient of a program-related investment) need not segregate grant funds physically nor separately account for such funds on its books unless the grantor requires such treatment of the grant funds. If such a grantee neither physically segregates grant funds nor establishes separate accounts on its books, grants received within a given taxable year beginning after December 31, 1969, shall be deemed, for purposes of section 4945, to be expended before grants received in a succeeding taxable year. In such case expenditures of grants received within any such taxable year shall be prorated among all such grants.

In accounting for grant expenditures, private foundations may make the necessary computations on a cumulative annual basis (or, where appropriate, as of the date for which the computations are made). The rules set forth in the preceding three sentences shall apply to the extent they are consistent with the available records of the grantee and with the grantee's treatment of qualifying distributions under section 4942(h) and the regulations thereunder. The records of expenditures, as well as copies of the reports submitted to the grantor, must be kept for at least 4 years after completion of the use of the grant funds.

(ii) For rules relating to accounting and recordkeeping requirements for grantees other than those described in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph, see §§53.4945–5(b)(8) and 53.4945–6(c).

(4) Reliance on information supplied by grantee. A private foundation exercising expenditure responsibility with respect to its grants may rely on adequate records or other sufficient evidence supplied by the grantee organization (such as a statement by an appropriate officer, director or trustee of such grantee organization) showing, to the extent applicable, the information which the grantor must report to the Internal Revenue Service in accordance with paragraph (d)(2) of this section.

(d) Reporting to Internal Revenue Service by grantor—(1) In general. To satisfy the reportmaking requirements of section 4945(h)(3), a granting foundation must provide the required information on its annual information return, required to be filed by section 6033, for each taxable year with respect to each grant made during the taxable year which is subject to the expenditure responsibility requirements of section 4945(h). Such information must also be provided on such return with respect to each grant subject to such requirements upon which any amount or any report is outstanding at any time during the taxable year. However, with respect to any grant made for endowment or other capital purposes, the grantor must provide the required information only for any taxable year for which the grantor must require a report from the grantee under paragraph (c)(2) of this section. The requirements of this subparagraph with respect to any grant may be satisfied by submission with the foundation's information return of a report received from the grantee, if the information required by subparagraph (2) of this paragraph is contained in such report.

(2) Contents of report. The report required by this paragraph shall include the following information:

(i) The name and address of the grantee.

(ii) The date and amount of the grant.

(iii) The purpose of the grant.

(iv) The amounts expended by the grantee (based upon the most recent report received from the grantee).

(v) Whether the grantee has diverted any portion of the funds (or the income therefrom in the case of an endowment grant) from the purpose of the grant (to the knowledge of the grantor).

(vi) The dates of any reports received from the grantee.

(vii) The date and results of any verification of the grantee's reports undertaken pursuant to and to the extent required under paragraph (c)(1) of this section by the grantor or by others at the direction of the grantor.

(3) Recordkeeping requirements. In addition to the information included on the information return, a granting foundation shall make available to the Internal Revenue Service at the foundation's principal office each of the following items:

(i) A copy of the agreement covering each “expenditure responsibility” grant made during the taxable year.

(ii) A copy of each report received during the taxable year from each grantee on any “expenditure responsibility” grant, and

(iii) A copy of each report made by the grantor's personnel or independent auditors of any audits or other investigations made during the taxable year with respect to any “expenditure responsibility” grant.

(4) Reports received after the close of grantor's accounting year. Data contained in reports required by this paragraph, which reports are received by a private foundation after the close of its accounting year but before the due date of its information return for that year, need not be reported on such return, but may be reported on the grantor's information return for the year in which such reports are received from the grantee.

(e) Violations of expenditure responsibility requirements—(1) Diversions by grantee. (i) Any diversion of grant funds (including the income therefrom in the case of an endowment grant) by the grantee to any use not in furtherance of a purpose specified in the grant may result in the diverted portion of such grant being treated as a taxable expenditure of the grantor under section 4945(d)(4). However, for purposes of this section, the fact that a grantee does not use any portion of the grant funds as indicated in the original budget projection shall not be treated as a diversion if the use to which the funds are committed is consistent with the purpose of the grant as stated in the grant agreement and does not result in a violation of the terms of such agreement required to be included by paragraph (b)(3) or (b)(4) of this section.

(ii) In any event, a grantor will not be treated as having made a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(4) solely by reason of a diversion by the grantee, if the grantor has complied with subdivision (iii) (a) and (b) or (iv) (a) and (b) of this subparagraph, whichever is applicable.

(iii) In cases in which the grantor foundation determines that any part of a grant has been used for improper purposes and the grantee has not previously diverted grant funds, the foundation will not be treated as having made a taxable expenditure solely by reason of the diversion so long as the foundation:

(a) Is taking all reasonable and appropriate steps either to recover the grant funds or to insure the restoration of the diverted funds and the dedication (consistent with the requirements of (b) (1) and (2) of this subdivision) of the other grant funds held by the grantee to the purposes being financed by the grant, and

(b) Withholds any further payments to the grantee after the grantor becomes aware that a diversion may have taken place (hereinafter referred to as “further payments”) until it has:

(1) Received the grantee's assurances that future diversions will not occur, and

(2) Required the grantee to take extraordinary precautions to prevent future diversions from occurring.

If a foundation is treated as having made a taxable expenditure under this subparagraph in a case to which this subdivision applies, then unless the foundation meets the requirements of (a) of this subdivision the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of the diversion (for example, the income diverted in the case of an endowment grant, or the rental value of capital equipment for the period of time for which diverted) plus the amount of any further payments to the same grantee. However, if the foundation complies with the requirements of (a) of this subdivision but not the requirements of (b) of this subdivision, the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of such further payments.

(iv) In cases where a grantee has previously diverted funds received from a grantor foundation, and the grantor foundation determines that any part of a grant has again been used for improper purposes, the foundation will not be treated as having made a taxable expenditure solely by reason of such diversion so long as the foundation:

(a) Is taking all reasonable and appropriate steps to recover the grant funds or to insure the restoration of the diverted funds and the dedication (consistent with the requirements of (b) (2) and (3) of this subdivision) of other grant funds held by the grantee to the purposes being financed by the grant, except that if, in fact, some or all of the diverted funds are not so restored or recovered, then the foundation must take all reasonable and appropriate steps to recover all of the grant funds, and

(b) Withholds further payments until:

(1) Such funds are in fact so recovered or restored,

(2) It has received the grantee's assurances that future diversions will not occur, and

(3) It requires the grantee to take extraordinary precautions to prevent future diversions from occurring.

If a foundation is treated as having made a taxable expenditure under this subparagraph in a case to which this subdivision applies, then unless the foundation meets the requirements of (a) of this subdivision, the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of the diversion plus the amount of any further payments to the same grantee. However, if the foundation complies with the requirements of (a) of this subdivision, but fails to withhold further payments until the requirements of (b) of this subdivision are met, the amount of the taxable expenditure shall be the amount of such further payments.

(v) The phrase “all reasonable and appropriate steps” (as used in subdivisions (iii) and (iv) of this subparagraph) includes legal action where appropriate but need not include legal action if such action would in all probability not result in the satisfaction of execution on a judgment.

(2) Grantee's failure to make reports. A failure by the grantee to make the reports required by paragraph (c) of this section (or the making of inadequate reports) shall result in the grant's being treated as a taxable expenditure by the grantor unless the grantor:

(i) Has made the grant in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section,

(ii) Has complied with the reporting requirements contained in paragraph (d) of this section,

(iii) Makes a reasonable effort to obtain the required report, and

(iv) Withholds all future payments on this grant and on any other grant to the same grantee until such report is furnished.

(3) Violations by the grantor. In addition to the situations described in subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph, a grant which is subject to the expenditure responsibility requirements of section 4945(h) will be considered a taxable expenditure of the granting foundation if the grantor:

(i) Fails to make a pregrant inquiry as described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section,

(ii) Fails to make the grant in accordance with a procedure consistent with the requirements of paragraph (b) (3) or (4) of this section, or

(iii) Fails to report to the Internal Revenue Service as provided in paragraph (d) of this section.

(f) Effective dates—(1) In general. This section shall apply to all grants which are subject to the expenditure responsibility requirements of section 4945(d)(4) and (h) and which are made by private foundations more than 90 days after October 30, 1972.

(2) Transitional rules—(i) Certain grants awarded prior to May 27, 1969. Section 4945(d)(4) and (h) and this section shall not apply to a grant to a private foundation which is not controlled, directly or indirectly, by the grantor foundation or one or more disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) with respect to the grantor foundation, provided that such grant:

(a) Is made pursuant to a written commitment which was binding on May 26, 1969, and at all times thereafter,

(b) Is made for one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B), and

(c) Is to be paid out to such grantee foundation on or before December 31, 1974.

(ii) Grants or expenditures committed prior to January 1, 1970. Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2)(i) of §53.4945–4, section 4945 shall not apply to a grant or an expenditure for section 170(c)(2)(B) purposes made on or after January 1, 1970, if the grant or expenditure was made pursuant to a commitment entered into prior to such date, but only if (in the case of a grant or an expenditure other than an unlimited general-purpose grant to an organization) such commitment is reasonable in amount in light of the purposes of the grant. For purposes of this subdivision, a commitment will be considered entered into prior to January 1, 1970, if prior to such date, the amount and nature of the payments to be made and the name of the payee were entered on the records of the payor, or were otherwise adequately evidenced, or the notice of the payment to be received was communicated to the payee in writing.

(iii) Grants awarded on or after January 1, 1970. Paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this section shall not apply to grants awarded on or after January 1, 1970, but prior to the expiration of 90 days after October 30, 1972, if the grantor has made reasonable efforts, and has established adequate procedures such as a prudent man would adopt in managing his own property, to see that the grant is spent solely for the purpose for which made, to obtain full and complete reports from the grantee on how the funds are spent, and to make full and detailed reports with respect to such grant to the Commissioner. With respect to any return filed with the Internal Revenue Service before the expiration of 90 days after October 30, 1972, the grantor may treat reports which satisfy the requirements of the statement to be attached to Form 4720 for the year 1970 under “Specific Instructions—Question B” (items (1) through (5)) as satisfying the grantor reporting requirements with respect to “expenditure responsibility” grants. In the case of a private foundation required to file an annual return for a taxable year ending after January 1, 1970, and before December 31, 1970, the reporting requirements imposed by section 4945(h)(3) for such period shall be regarded as satisfied if such reports are made on the annual return for its first taxable year beginning after December 31, 1969.

[T.D. 7215, 37 FR 23161, Oct. 31, 1972; 37 FR 23918, Nov. 10, 1972, as amended by T.D. 7233, 37 FR 28162, Dec. 21, 1972; T.D. 7290, 38 FR 31834, Nov. 19, 1973]

(a) In general. Under section 4945(d)(5) the term “taxable expenditure” includes any amount paid or incurred by a private foundation for any purpose other than one specified in section 170(c)(2)(B). Thus, ordinarily only an expenditure for an activity which, if it were a substantial part of the organization's total activities, would cause loss of tax exemption is a taxable expenditure under section 4945(d)(5). For purposes of this section and §§53.4945–1 through 53.4945–5, the term “purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B)” shall be treated as including purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) whether or not carried out by an organization described in section 170(c).

(b) Particular expenditures. (1) The following types of expenditures ordinarily will not be treated as taxable expenditures under section 4945(d)(5):

(i) Expenditures to acquire investments entered into for the purpose of obtaining income or funds to be used in furtherance of purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B),

(ii) Reasonable expenses with respect to investments described in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph,

(iii) Payment of taxes,

(iv) Any expenses which qualify as deductions in the computation of unrelated business income tax under section 511,

(v) Any payment which constitutes a qualifying distribution under section 4942(g) or an allowable deduction under section 4940,

(vi) Reasonable expenditures to evaluate, acquire, modify, and dispose of program-related investments, or

(vii) Business expenditures by the recipient of a program-related investment.

(2) Conversely, any expenditures for unreasonable administrative expenses, including compensation, consultant fees, and other fees for services rendered, will ordinarily be taxable expenditures under section 4945(d)(5) unless the foundation can demonstrate that such expenses were paid or incurred in the good faith belief that they were reasonable and that the payment or incurrence of such expenses in such amounts was consistent with ordinary business care and prudence. The determination whether an expenditure is unreasonable shall depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.

(c) Grants to “noncharitable” organizations—(1) In general. Since a private foundation cannot make an expenditure for a purpose other than a purpose described in section 170(c)(2)(B), a private foundation may not make a grant to an organization other than an organization described in section 501(c)(3) unless

(i) The making of the grant itself constitutes a direct charitable act or the making of a program-related investment, or

(ii) Through compliance with the requirements of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the grantor is reasonably assured that the grant will be used exclusively for purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B).

For purposes of this paragraph, an organization treated as a section 509(a)(1) organization under §53.4945–5(a)(4) shall be treated as an organization described in section 501(c)(3).

(2) Grants other than transfers of assets described in §1.507–3(c)(1). (i) If a private foundation makes a grant which is not a transfer of assets pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization or reorganization to any organization (other than an organization described in section 501(c)(3) except an organization described in section 509(a)(4)), the grantor is reasonably assured (within the meaning of subparagraph (1)(ii) of this paragraph) that the grant will be used exclusively for purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) only if the grantee organization agrees to maintain and, during the period in which any portion of such grant funds remain unexpended, does continuously maintain the grant funds (or other assets transferred) in a separate fund dedicated to one or more purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B). The grantor of a grant described in this paragraph must also comply with the expenditure responsibility provisions contained in sections 4945(d) and (h) and §53.4945–5.

(ii) For purposes of this paragraph, a foreign organization which does not have a ruling or determination letter that it is an organization described in section 501(c)(3) (other than section 509(a)(4)) will be treated as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) (other than section 509(a)(4)) if in the reasonable judgment of a foundation manager of the transferor private foundation, the grantee organization is an organization described in section 501(c)(3) (other than section 509(a)(4)). The term “reasonable judgment” shall be given its generally accepted legal sense within the outlines developed by judicial decisions in the law of trusts.

(3) Transfers of assets described in §1.507–3(c)(1). If a private foundation makes a transfer of assets (other than a transfer described in subparagraph (1)(i) of this paragraph) pursuant to any liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or other adjustment, organization, or reorganization to any person, the transferred assets will not be considered used exclusively for purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) unless the assets are transferred to a fund or organization described in section 501(c)(3) (other than an organization described in section 509(a)(4)) or treated as so described under section 4947(a)(1).

[T.D. 7215, 37 FR 23161, Oct. 31, 1972, as amended by T.D. 7233, 37 FR 28162, Dec. 21, 1972]

(a) Disqualified person. (1) For purposes of Chapter 42 and the regulations thereunder, the following are disqualified persons with respect to a private foundation:

(i) All substantial contributors to the foundation, as defined in section 507 (d)(2) and the regulations thereunder.

(ii) All foundation managers of the foundation as defined in section 4946 (b)(1) and paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this section,

(iii) An owner of more than 20 percent of:

(a) The total combined voting power of a corporation,

(b) The profits interest of a partnership,

(c) The beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise.

which is (during such ownership) a substantial contributor to the foundation, as defined in section 507(d)(2) and the regulations thereunder,

(iv) A member of the family, as defined in section 4946(d) and paragraph (h) of this section, of any of the individuals described in subdivision (i), (ii), or (iii) of this subparagraph,

(v) A corporation of which more than 35 percent of the total combined voting power is owned by persons described in subdivision (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this subparagraph,

(vi) A partnership of which more than 35 percent of the profits interest is owned by persons described in subdivision (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this subparagraph, and

(vii) A trust, estate, or unincorporated enterprise of which more than 35 percent of the beneficial interest is owned by persons described in subdivision (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this subparagraph.

(2) For purposes of subparagraphs (1)(iii) (b) and (vi) of this paragraph, the profits interest of a partner shall be equal to his distributive share of income of the partnership, as determined under section 707(b)(3) and the regulations thereunder as modified by section 4946(a)(4).

(3) For purposes of subparagraph (1) (iii)(c) and (vii) of this paragraph, the beneficial interest in an unincorporated enterprise (other than a trust or estate) includes any right to receive a portion of distributions from profits of such enterprise, and, if the portion of distributions is not fixed by an agreement among the participants, any right to receive a portion of the assets (if any) upon liquidation of the enterprise, except as a creditor or employee. For purposes of this subparagraph, a right to receive distributions of profits includes a right to receive any amount from such profits other than as a creditor or employee, whether as a sum certain or as a portion of profits realized by the enterprise. Where there is no agreement fixing the rights of the participants in such enterprise, the fraction of the respective interests of each participant in such enterprise shall be determined by dividing the amount of all investments or contributions to the capital of the enterprise made or obligated to be made by such participant by the amount of all investments or contributions to capital made or obligated to be made by all of them.

(4) For purposes of subparagraph (1) (iii) (c) and (vii) of this paragraph, a person's beneficial interest in a trust shall be determined in proportion to the actuarial interest of such person in the trust.

(5) For purposes of subparagraph (1) (iii) (a) and (v) of this paragraph, the term “combined voting power” includes voting power represented by holdings of voting stock, actual or constructive (under section 4946(a)(3)), but does not include voting rights held only as a director or trustee.

(6) For purposes of subparagraph (1) (iii) (a) and (v) of this paragraph, the term “voting power” includes outstanding voting power and does not include voting power obtainable but not obtained, such as, for example, voting power obtainable by converting securities or nonvoting stock into voting stock or by exercising warrants or options to obtain voting stock, and voting power which will vest in preferred stockholders only if and when the corporation has failed to pay preferred dividends for a specified period of time or has otherwise failed to meet specified requirements. Similarly, for purposes of subparagraph (1)(iii) (b) and (c), (vi), and (vii) of this paragraph, the terms “profits interest” and “beneficial interest” include any such interest that is outstanding, but do not include any such interest that is obtainable but has not been obtained.

(7) For purposes of sections 170(b) (1)(E)(iii), 507(d)(1), 508(d), 509(a) (1) and (3), and Chapter 42, the term “disqualified person” shall not include an organization which is described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3), or any other organization which is wholly owned by such section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3) organization.

(8) For purposes of section 4941 only, the term “disqualified person” shall not include any organization which is described in section 501(c)(3) (other than an organization described in section 509(a)(4)).

(b) Section 4943. (1) For purposes of section 4943 only, the term “disqualified person” includes a private foundation:

(i) Which is effectively controlled (within the meaning of §1.482–1(a)(3) of this chapter), directly or indirectly, by the same person or persons (other than a bank, trust company, or similar organization acting only as a foundation manager) who control the private foundation in question, or

(ii) Substantially all the contributions to which were made, directly or indirectly, by persons described in subdivision (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of paragraph (a)(1) of this section who made, directly or indirectly, substantially all of the contributions to the private foundation in question.

(2) For purposes of subparagraph (1)(ii) of this paragraph, one or more persons will be considered to have made substantially all of the contributions to a private foundation, if such persons have contributed or bequeathed at least 85 percent (and each such person has contributed or bequeathed at least 2 percent) of the total contributions and bequests (within the meaning of section 507(d)(2) and the regulations thereunder) which have been received by such private foundation during its entire existence.

(3) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  A, a private foundation, has a board of directors made up of X, Y, Z, M, N, and O. Foundation B's board of directors is made up of Y, M, N, and O. The board of directors in each case has plenary power to determine the manner in which the foundation is operated. For purposes of section 4943, foundation A is a disqualified person with respect to foundation B, and foundation B, is a disqualified person with respect to foundation A.

Example (2).  Private foundation A has received contributions of $100,000 throughout its existence: $35,000 from X, $51,000 from Y (who is X's father), and $14,000 from Z (an unrelated person). Private foundation B has received $100,000 in contributions during its existence: $50,000 from X and $50,000 from W, X's wife.

For purposes of section 4943, private foundation A is a disqualified person with respect to private foundation B, and private foundation B is a disqualified person with respect to private foundation A.

(c) Section 4941. For purposes of section 4941, a government official, as defined in section 4946(c) and paragraph (g) of this section, is a disqualified person.

(d) Attribution of stockholdings. (1) For purposes of paragraph (a)(1)(iii) (a) and (v) of this section, indirect stockholdings shall be taken into account under section 267(c) and the regulations thereunder. However, for purposes of this paragraph:

(i) Section 267(c)(4) shall be treated as though it provided that the members of the family of an individual are the members within the meaning of section 4946(d) and paragraph (h) of this section; and

(ii) Any stockholdings which have been counted once (whether by reason of actual or constructive ownership) in applying section 4946(a)(1)(E) shall not be counted a second time.

For purposes of paragraph (a)(1)(v) or this section, section 267(c) shall be applied without regard to section 267(c)(3), and stock constructively owned by an individual by reason of the application of section 267(c)(2) shall not be treated as owned by him if he is described in section 4946(a)(1)(D) but not also in section 4946(a)(1) (A), (B), or (C).

(2) Examples. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  D is a substantial contributor to private foundation Y. D owns 20 percent of the outstanding stock of corporation P. E, D's wife, owns none of the outstanding stock of P. F, E's father, owns 10 percent of the outstanding stock of P. E is treated under section 507(d)(2) as a substantial contributor to Y. E is also treated under section 267(c)(2) as owning both D's 20 percent and F's 10 percent of P, but E is treated as owning nothing for purposes of section 4946(a)(1)(E) because D's 20 percent and F's 10 percent have already been taken into account once (because of their actual ownership of the stock of P) for such purposes. Hence, corporation P is not a disqualified person under section 4946(a)(1)(E) with respect to private foundation Y because persons described in section 4946(a)(1) (A), (B), (C), and (D) own only 30 percent of the stock of P.

Example (2).  I, a substantial contributor to private foundation X, is the son of J. I owns 100 percent of the stock of corporation R, which in turn owns 18 percent of the stock of corporation S. J owns 18 percent of the stock of S. I constructively owns 36 percent of the stock of S (J's 18 percent plus R's 18 percent). Both J's actual holdings and R's actual holdings are counted in determining I's constructive holdings because this does not result in counting either of the holdings more than once for purposes of section 4946 (a)(1)(E). Therefore, S is a disqualified person with respect to private foundation X, since I, a substantial contributor, constructively owns more than 35 percent of S's stock.

(e) Attribution of profits or beneficial interests. (1) For purposes of paragraph (a) (1) (iii) (b), (iii) (c) (vi), and (vii) of this section, ownership of profits or beneficial interests shall be taken into account as though such ownership related to stockholdings, if such stockholdings would be taken into account under section 267(c) and the regulations thereunder, except that section 267(c)(3) shall not apply to attribute the ownership of one partner to another solely by reason of such partner relationship. However, for purposes of this paragraph:

(i) Section 267(c)(4) shall be treated as though it provided that the members of the family of an individual are the members within the meaning of section 4946(d) and paragraph (h) of this section; and

(ii) Any profits interest or beneficial interest which has been counted once (whether by reason of actual or constructive ownership) in applying section 4946(a)(1) (F) or (G) shall not be counted a second time.

For purposes of paragraph (a)(1) (vi) and (vii) of this section, profits or beneficial interests constructively owned by an individual by reason of the application of section 267(c)(2) shall not be treated as owned by him if he is described in section 4946(a)(1)(D) but not in section 4946(a)(1)(A), (B) or (C).

(2) Example. The provisions of this paragraph may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  Partnership S is a substantial contributor to private foundation X. Trust T, of which G is sole beneficiary, owns 12 percent of the profits interest of S. G's husband, H, owns 10 percent of the profits interest of S. H is a disqualified person with respect to X (under section 4946(a)(1)(C)) because he is considered to own 22 percent of the profits interest of S (10 percent actual ownership, plus G's 12 percent constructively under section 267(c)(2)). G is a disqualified person with respect to X (under section 4946(a)(1)(C) because she is considered to own 22 percent of the profits interest of S (12 percent constructively by reason of her beneficial interest in trust T, plus 10 percent constructively under section 267(c)(2) by reason of being a member of the family of H).

(f) Foundation manager. (1) For purposes of Chapter 42 and the regulations thereunder, the term “foundation manager” means:

(i) An officer, director, or trustee of a foundation (or a person having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers, directors, or trustees of the foundation), and

(ii) With respect to any act or failure to act, any employee of the foundation having final authority or responsibility (either officially or effectively) with respect to such act or failure to act.

(2) For purposes of subparagraph (1)(i) of this paragraph, a person shall be considered an officer of a foundation if:

(i) He is specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, bylaws, or other constitutive documents of the foundation; or

(ii) He regularly exercises general authority to make administrative or policy decisions on behalf of the foundation.

With respect to any act or failure to act, any person described in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph who has authority merely to recommend particular administrative or policy decisions, but not to implement them without approval of a superior, is not an officer. Moreover, such independent contractors as attorneys, accountants, and investment managers and advisers, acting in their capacities as such, are not officers within the meaning of subparagraph (1)(i) of this paragraph.

(3) For purposes of subparagraph (1)(ii) of this paragraph, an individual rendering services to a private foundation shall be considered an employee of the foundation only if he is an employee within the meaning of section 3121(d)(2).

(4) Since the definition of the term “disqualified person” contained in section 4946(a)(1)(B) incorporates only so much of the definition of the term “foundation manager” as is found in section 4946(b)(1) and subparagraph (1)(i) of this paragraph, any references, in section 4946 and this section, to “disqualified persons” do not constitute references to persons who are “foundation managers” solely by reason of the definition of that term contained in section 4946(b)(2) and subparagraph (1)(ii) of this paragraph.

(g) Government official—(1) In general. Except as provided in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, for purposes of section 4941 and paragraph (c) of this section, the term “government official” means, with respect to an act of selfdealing described in section 4941, an individual who, at the time of such act, is described in subdivision (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of this subparagraph (other than a “special Government employee” as defined in 18 U.S.C. 202(a)):

(i)(a) An individual who holds an elective public office in the executive or legislative branch of the Government of the United States.

(b) An individual who holds an office in the executive or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, appointment to which was made by the President.

(ii) An individual who holds a position in the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the Government of the United States:

(a) Which is listed in schedule C of rule VI of the Civil Service Rules, or

(b) The compensation for which is equal to or greater than the lowest rate prescribed for GS–16 of the General Schedule under 5 U.S.C. 5332.

(iii) An individual who holds a position under the House of Representatives or the Senate of the United States, as an employee of either of such bodies, who receives gross compensation therefrom at an annual rate of $15,000 or more.

(iv) The holder of an elective or appointive public office in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government of a State, possession of the United States, or political subdivision or other area of any of the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia, for which the gross compensation is at an annual rate of $15,000 or more, who is described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph.

(v) The holder of a position as personal or executive assistant or secretary to any individual described in subdivision (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) of this subparagraph.

(2) Public office—(i) Definition. In defining the term “public office” for purposes of section 4946(c)(5) and subparagraph (1)(iv) of this paragraph, such term must be distinguished from mere public employment. Although holding a public office is one form of public employment, not every position in the employ of a State or other governmental subdivision (as described in section 4946 (c)(5)) constitutes a “public office”. Although a determination whether a public employee holds a public office depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, the essential element is whether a significant part of the activities of a public employee is the independent performance of policymaking functions. In applying this subparagraph, several factors may be considered as indications that a position in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government of a State, possession of the United States, or political subdivision or other area of any of the foregoing, or of the District of Columbia, constitutes a “public office”. Among such factors to be considered in addition to that set forth above, are that the office is created by the Congress, a State constitution, or the State legislature, or by a municipality or other governmental body pursuant to authority conferred by the Congress, State constitution, or State legislature, and the powers conferred on the office and the duties to be discharged by such office are defined either directly or indirectly by the Congress, State constitution, or State legislature, or through legislative authority.

(ii) Illustrations. The following are illustrations of positions of public employment which do not involve policymaking functions within the meaning of subdivision (i) of this subparagraph and which are thus not a “public office” for purposes of section 4946(c)(5) and subparagraph (1)(iv) of this paragraph:

(a) The chancellor, president, provost, dean, and other officers of a State university who are appointed, elected, or otherwise hired by a State Board of Regents or equivalent public body and who are subject to the direction and supervision of such body;

(b) Professors, instructors, and other members of the faculty of a State educational institution who are appointed, elected, or otherwise hired by the officers of the institution or by the State Board of Regents or equivalent public body;

(c) The superintendent of public schools and other public school officials who are appointed, elected, or otherwise hired by a Board of Education or equivalent public body and who are subject to the direction and supervision of such body;

(d) Public school teachers who are appointed, elected, or otherwise hired by the superintendent of public schools or by a Board of Education or equivalent public body;

(e) Physicians, nurses, and other professional persons associated with public hospitals and State boards of health who are appointed, elected, or otherwise hired by the governing board or officers of such hospitals or agencies; and

(f) Members of police and fire departments, except for those department heads who, under the facts and circumstances of the case, independently perform policymaking functions as a significant part of their activities.

(3) Certain government officials on leave of absence. For purposes of this paragraph, an individual who is otherwise described in section 4946(c) and this paragraph who was on leave of absence without pay on December 31, 1969, from his position or office pursuant to a commitment entered into on or before such date to engage in certain activities for which he is paid by one or more private foundations, is not to be treated as holding such position or office for any continuous period after December 31, 1969, and prior to January 1, 1971, during which such individual remains on leave of absence to engage in the same activities for which he is paid by such foundations. For purposes of this subparagraph, a commitment is considered entered into on or before December 31, 1969, if on or before such date, the amount and nature of the payments to be made and the name of the individual receiving such payments were entered on the records of the payor, or were otherwise adequately evidenced, or the notice of the payment to be received was communicated to the payee orally or in writing.

(h) Members of the family. For purposes of this section, the members of the family of an individual include only:

(1) His spouse,

(2) His ancestors,

(3) His lineal descendants, and

(4) Spouses of his lineal descendants.

For example, a brother or sister of an individual is not a member of his family for purposes of this section. However, for example, the wife of a grandchild of an individual is a member of his family for such purposes. For purposes of this paragraph, a legally adopted child of an individual shall be treated as a child of such individual by blood.

[T.D. 7241, 37 FR 28744, Dec. 29, 1972]

(a) In general. Section 4947 subjects trusts which are not exempt from taxation under section 501(a), all or part of the unexpired interests in which are devoted to one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B), and which have amounts in trust for which a deduction was allowed under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 to the same requirements and restrictions as are imposed on private foundations. The basic purpose of section 4947 is to prevent these trusts from being used to avoid the requirements and restrictions applicable to private foundations. For purposes of this section, a trust shall be presumed (in the absence of proof to the contrary) to have amounts under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 if a deduction would have been allowable under one of these sections. Also for purposes of this section and §53.4947–2, the term “purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B)” shall be treated as including purposes described in section 170(c)(1).

(b) Charitable trusts—(1) General rule. (i) For purposes of this section and §53.4947–2, a charitable trust, within the meaning of section 4947(a)(1), is a trust which is not exempt from taxation under section 501(a), all of the unexpired interests in which are devoted to one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B), and for which a deduction was allowed under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 (or the corresponding provisions of prior law). A trust is one for which a deduction was allowed under section 642(c), within the meaning of section 4947(a)(1), once a deduction is allowed under section 642(c) to the trust for any amount paid or permanently set aside. (See sections 642(c) and §1.642–4 for the limitation on such deduction in certain cases.) A charitable trust (as defined in this paragraph) shall be treated as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) and, if it is determined under section 509 that the trust is a private foundation, then Part II of Subchapter F of chapter 1 of the Code (other than section 508 (a), (b) and (c) and Chapter 42 shall apply to the trust. However, the charitable trust is not treated as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) for purposes of exemption from taxation under section 501(a). Thus, the trust is subject to the excise tax on its investment income under section 4940(b) rather than the tax imposed by section 4940(a). For purposes of satisfying the organizational test described in §1.501 (c)(3)–1(b) when a charitable trust seeks an exemption from taxation under section 501(a), a charitable trust (as defined in this paragraph) shall be considered organized on the day it first becomes subject to section 4947(a)(1). However, for purposes of the special and transistional rules in section 4940(c)(4)(B), 4942(f)(4), 4943(c)(4)(A)(i) and (B) and section 101(1)(2)(A), (B), (C), and (D), and (1)(3) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a charitable trust (as defined in this paragraph) shall be considered organized on the first day it has amounts in trust for which a deduction was allowed (within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this section) under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522. Thus, under this rule, a trust may be treated as a private foundation in existence on a date governing one of the applicable special and transistional rules even though the trust did not otherwise become subject to the provisions of Chapter 42 until a later date.

(ii) The provisions of paragraph (b)(1) of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  On January 30, 1970, X creates an inter vivos trust under which M receives 50 percent and N receives 50 percent of the trust's income for 10 years, and upon the termination of which, at the end of the 10-year period, the corpus is to be distributed to O. M, N and O are all organizations described in section 501(c)(3) and X is allowed a deduction under section 170 for the value of all interests placed in trust. The trustees of the trust do not give notice to the Internal Revenue Service under the provisions of section 508(a), and the trust will therefore not be exempt from taxation under section 501(a). The trust is a charitable trust within the meaning of section 4947(a)(1) from the date of its creation.

Example (2).  On March 1, 1971, Y creates a charitable remainder annuity trust described in section 664(d)(1) under which Z, Y's son, receives $10,000 per year for life, remainder to be held in trust for P, an organization described in section 501(c)(3). Y is allowed a deduction under section 170 for the present value of the remainder interest to P. During Z's lifetime, the trust is a split-interest trust described in section 4947(a)(2) and paragraph (c) of this section. Upon the death of Z, all unexpected interests (consisting of P's remainder interest) will be devoted to section 170(c)(2)(B) purposes. Except as provided in §53.4947–1(b)(2)(iv) (relating to a reasonable period of settlement) the trust will be treated as a charitable trust within the meaning of section 4947(a)(1) from the date of the death of Z unless the trustees of the trust apply for recognition of section 501(c)(3) status under the provisions of section 508(a).

(2) Scope of application of section 4947(a)(1)—(i) In general. Subject to paragraph (b)(2) (ii) through (vii) of this section, section 4947(a)(1) applies to nonexempt trusts in which all unexpired interests are charitable. For purposes of this section, the term charitable when used to describe an interest or beneficiary refers to the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B). An estate from which the executor or administrator is required to distribute all of the net assets in trust to such beneficiaries will not be considered a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1) during the period of estate administration or settlement, except as provided in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section. A charitable trust created by will shall be considered a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1) as of the date of death of the decedent-grantor, except as provided in paragraph (b)(2)(v) of this section (relating to trusts which wind up. For the circumstances under which segregated amounts are treated as charitable trusts, see §53.4947–1(c)(3)(iii).

(ii) Estates. (A) When an estate from which the executor or administrator is required to distribute all of the net assets in trust for charitable beneficiaries, or free of trust to such beneficiaries, is considered terminated for Federal income tax purposes under §1.641(b)–3(a), then the estate will be treated as a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1) between the date on which the estate is considered terminated under §1.641(b)–3(a) and the date final distribution of all of the net assets is made to or for the benefit of the charitable beneficiaries. This (ii) does not affect the determination of the tax liability under Subtitle A of the beneficiaries of the estates.

(B) The provisions of this (ii) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  X bequeaths his entire estate, including 100 percent of the stock of a wholly-owned corporation, to M, an organization described in section 501(c)(3), under a will which gives his executor authority to hold the stock and manage the corporation for a period of up to 10 years for the benefit of M prior to its ultimate disposition. A deduction for the charitable bequest was allowed to X's estate under section 2055. The executor is vested with a full range of powers, including the power of sale. Upon the death of X, his executor distributes X's assets to M except for the stock of the corporation, which he holds for 5 years prior to its disposition. The continued holding of the stock of the corporation by the executor after the expiration of a reasonable time for performance of all the ordinary duties of administration causes the estate to be considered terminated for Federal income tax purposes pursuant to §1.641(b)–3(a) and thereby subjects it to the provisions of section 4947(a)(1) from the date of such termination to the date of final disposition of the stock of the corporation.

(iii) Certain split-interest trusts which wind up. A split-interest trust (as defined in paragraph (c) of this section) in which all of the unexpired interests are charitable remainder interests and in which the charitable beneficiaries have become entitled to distributions of corpus in trust or free of trust shall continue to be treated as as split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) until the date on which final distribution of all the net assets is made. However, if after the expiration of any intervening interests the trust is considered terminated for Federal income tax purposes under §1.641(b)–3(b), then the trust will be treated as a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1), rather than a split interest trust under section 4947(a)(2), between the date on which the trust is considered terminated under §1.641(b)–3(b) and the date on which such final distribution of all of the net assets is made to or for the benefit of the charitable remainder beneficiaries. This (iii) does not affect the determination of the tax liability under subtitle A of the beneficiaries of the trusts.

(iv) Split-interest trusts which become charitable trusts. (A) A split-interest trust (as defined in paragraph (c) of this section) in which all of the unexpired interests are charitable remainder interests and in which some or all of the charitable beneficiaries are not entitled to distributions of corpus within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section shall continue to be treated as a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) rather than a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1) for a reasonable period of settlement after the expiration of the noncharitable interest. Thus, a split-interest trust which under its terms is to continue to hold assets for charitable beneficiaries after the expiration of the noncharitable interest rather than distributing them as in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of this section is given a reasonable period of settlement before being treated as a charitable trust. For purposes of this paragraph, the term reasonable period of settlement means that period reasonably required (or if shorter, actually required) by the trustee to perform the ordinary duties of administration necessary for the settlement of the trust. These duties include, for example, the collection of assets, the payment of debts, taxes, and distributions, and the determination of the rights of the subsequent beneficiaries.

(B) This (iv) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  On January 15, 1971, A creates a charitable remainder annuity trust described in section 661(d)(1) under which the trustees are required to distribute $10,000 a year to B, A's wife, for life, remainder to be held in trust for the use of M, an organization described in section 501(c)(3). A is allowed a deduction under section 170 for the amount of the charitable interest, and the trust is, therefore, treated as a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) from the date of its creation. B dies on February 10, 1975. On April 15, 1975, the trustees complete performance of the ordinary duties of administration necessary for the settlement of the trust brought about by the death of B. These duties include, for example, an accounting for and payment to the estate of B of amounts accrued by B while alive during 1975. However, the trustees do not distribute the corpus to M by April 15, 1975. The trust shall continue to be treated as a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) until April 15, 1975. After April 15, 1975, the trust shall be treated as a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1).

(v) Certain revocable and testamentary trusts which wind up. A revocable trust that becomes irrevocable upon the death of the decedent-grantor, or a trust created by will, from which the trustee is required to distribute all of the net assets in trust for or free of trust to charitable beneficiaries is not considered a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1) for a reasonable period of settlement (within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of this section) after becoming irrevocable. After that period the trust is considered a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1).

(vi) Revocable trusts which become charitable trusts. A revocable trust that becomes irrevocable upon the death of the decedent-grantor in which all of the unexpired interests are charitable and under the terms of the governing instrument of which the trustee is required to hold some or all of the net assets in trust after becoming irrevocable solely for charitable beneficiaries is not considered a trust under section 4947(a)(1) for a reasonable period of settlement (within the meaning of paragraph (b)(2)(iv) of this section) after becoming irrevocable except that section 4941 may apply if the requirements of §53.4941(d)–1 (b)(3) are not met. After that period, the trust is considered a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1).

(vii) Trust devoted to 170(c) purposes. (A) A trust all of the unexpired interests in which are devoted to section 170 (c) (3) or (5) purposes together with section 170(c)(2)(B) purposes shall be considered a charitable trust except that payments under the terms of the governing instrument to an organization described in section 170(c) (3) or (5) shall not be considered a violation of section 4945(d)(5) or any other provisions of Chapter 42 and shall be considered qualifying distributions under section 4942.

(B) Example. The application of paragraph (b)(2)(vii) of this section may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  On January 30, 1970, H creates an inter vivos trust under the terms of the governing instruments of which M, an organization described in section 170(c)(3), and N, an organization described in section 501(c)(3), are each to receive 50 percent of the income for a period of 10 years. At the end of the 10 year period, the corpus is to be distributed to O, an organization also described in section 501(c)(3). H is allowed a deduction under section 170 for the value of all interests placed in trust. The payments to M do not constitute a violation of section 4945(d)(5) or any other provision of Chapter 42 and constitute qualifying distributions under section 4942. However, except as provided in the previous sentence, the trust shall be considered a charitable trust.

(3) Charitable trusts described in section 509(a)(3). For purposes of section 509(a)(3)(A), a charitable trust shall be treated as if organized on the day on which it first becomes subject to section 4947(a)(1). However, for purposes of applying §§1.509(a)–4(d) (2)(iv)(a), and 1.509(a)–4(i)(1) (ii) and (iii)(c) the previous relationship between the charitable trust and the section 509(a) (1) or (2) organizations it benefits or supports may be considered. If the charitable trust otherwise meets the requirements of section 509(a)(3), it may obtain recognition of its status as a section 509(a)(3) organization by requesting a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service. For the special rules pertaining to the application of the organizational test to organizations terminating their private foundation status under the 12-month or 60-month termination period provided under section 507(b)(1)(B) by becoming “public” under section 509(a)(3), see the regulations under section 507(b)(1).

(c) Split-interest trusts—(1) General rule—(i) Definition. For purposes of this section and §53.4947–2, a split-interest trust, within the meaning of section 4947(a)(2), is a trust which is not exempt from taxation under section 501(a), not all of the unexpired interests in which are devoted to one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B), and which has amounts in trust for which a deduction was allowed (within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this section) under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522. A trust is one which has amounts in trust for which a deduction was allowed under section 642(c) within the meaning of section 4947(a)(2) once a deduction is allowed under section 642(c) to the trust for any amount permanently set aside. This (i) also includes any trust which is not treated as a charitable trust by operation of paragraph (b)(2) (iii) or (iv) of this section (relating to split-interest trusts in the process of winding up or during a reasonable period of settlement). Section 4947(a)(1) shall apply to a trust described in this (i) (without regard to section 4947(a)(2)(A), (B), or (C)) from the first date upon which the provisions of paragraph (b)(2) (iii) or (iv) of this section are satisfied. For the circumstances under which a trust all of the unexpired interests in which are devoted to section 170(c) (3) or (5) purposes together with section 170(c)(2)(B) purposes is considered a charitable trust, see §53.4947–1(b)(2)(vii).

(ii) Applicability of statutory rules. A split-interest trust is subject to the provisions of section 507 (except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section), 508(e) (to the extent applicable to a split-interest trust), 4941, 4943 (except as provided in section 4947(b)(3)), 4944 (except as provided in section 4947(b)(3)), and 4945 in the same manner as if such trust were a private foundation.

(iii) Special rules. A newly created trust shall, for purposes of section 4947(a)(2), be treated as having amounts in trust for which a deduction was allowed under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 from the date of its creation, even if a deduction was allowed for such amounts only at a later date. For purposes of this (iii), the date of creation of a charitable remainder trust shall be determined by applying the rules in §1.664–1(a)(4).

(2) Exception for amounts payable to income beneficiaries. (i) Under section 4947(a)(2)(A), paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section does not apply to any amounts payable under the terms of a split-interest trust to income beneficiaries unless a deduction was allowed under section 170(f)(2)(B), 2055(e)(2) (B), or 2522(c)(2)(B) with respect to the income interest of any such beneficiary. See §1.170A–6(c), §20.2055(e)(2), and §25.2522(c)–3(c)(2) for rules regarding the allowance of these deductions. However, section 4947(a)(2)(A) does not apply when the value of all interests in property transferred in trust are deductible under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522.

(ii) The application of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  H creates a charitable remainder unitrust (described in section 664(d)(2)) which is required annually to pay W, H's wife, 5 percent of the net fair market value of the trust assets, valued annually, for her life; and to pay the remainder to Y, a section 501(c)(3) organization. A deduction under section 170(f)(2)(A) was allowed with respect to the remainder interest of Y. Under section 4947(a)(2)(A), each annual amount which becomes payable to W during her life is not subject to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section on or after the date upon which it becomes so payable and the payment of each amount to W is not an act of self-dealing under section 4941(d)(1) and does not violate any other provision of chapter 42. However, except as provided in the preceding sentence, the trust is subject to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section in the same manner as any other split-interest trust.

Example (2).  H bequeaths the residue of his estate in trust for the benefit of S, his son, and Y, an organization described in section 501(c)(3). A guaranteed annuity interest of $10,000 is to be paid to S for 20 years. A guaranteed annuity interest of $5,000 which meets the requirements contained in §20.2055–2(e)(2)(v)(a) is also to be paid to Y for 20 years. Upon termination of the 20-year term, the corpus is to be distributed to Z, another organization described in section 501(c)(3). The trust is a charitable remainder annuity trust as described in section 664(d)(1) and the regulations thereunder, and a deduction under section 2055(e)(2)(A) was allowed with respect to the remainder interest of Z. A deduction was also allowed under section 2055(e)(2)(B) with respect to the guaranteed annuity interest of Y. The assets in the trust are not segregated under section 4947(a)(2)(B) and paragraph (c)(3) of this section. Under section 4947(a)(2)(A), each payment of $10,000 to S is not subject to section 4947(a)(2) and paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section. The payment of each amount to S is not an act of self-dealing under section 4941(d)(1) and does not violate any other provision of chapter 42. However, except as provided in the preceding sentence, the trust is subject to section 4947(a)(2) and paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section in the same manner as any other split-interest trust.

Example (3).  H creates a trust under which the trustees are required to pay over an annuity interest of $20,000 to W. H's wife, for her life. A guaranteed annuity interest of $10,000 which meets the requirements contained in §25.2522(c)–3(c)(2)(v) is also to be paid X, an organization described in section 501(c)(3), for the life of W. Upon the death of W, the corpus of the trust, which consists of office buildings M and N, is to be distributed to S. H's son. H received a deduction under section 2522(c)(2)(B) for the value of X's income interest in the trust. The assets in the trust are not segregated under section 4947(a)(2)(B) and paragraph (c)(3) of this section. Under section 4947(a)(2)(A), each payment of $20,000 to W is not subject to section 4947(a)(2) and paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section. The payment of each amount to W is not an act of self-dealing under section 4941(d)(1) and does not violate any other provision of chapter 42. However, except as provided in the preceding sentence, the trust is subject to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section in the same manner as any other split-interest trust. See example (1) of paragraph (c)(3)(v) of this section for the application of section 4947(a)(2)(B) to a similar trust where the trustees segregate the assets of the trust.

(3) Exception for certain segregated amount—(i) In general. Under section 4947(a)(2)(B) paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section does not apply to assets held in trust (together with the income and capital gains derived from the assets), which are segregated from other assets held in trust for which a deduction was allowed for an income or remainder interest under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522.

(ii) Segregation of amounts. Amounts will generally be considered segregated (within the meaning of section 4947(a)(2)(B) if:

(A) Assets with respect to which no deduction was allowed (for an income or remainder interest) under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522, are separately accounted for under section 4947(a)(3) and paragraph (c)(4) of this section from assets for which such a deduction was allowed for any income or remainder interest and,

(B) By reason of the separate accounting the trust can be treated as two separate trusts, one of which is devoted exclusively to noncharitable income and remainder interests and the other of which is a charitable trust described in section 4947(a)(1) or a split-interest trust described in section 4947(a)(2).

Under these circumstances, only the “trust” which is devoted exclusively to noncharitable income and remainder interests will be considered a segregated amount which under section 4947(a)(2)(B), is not subject to section 4947(a)(2) and paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section.

(iii) Exclusively charitable amounts. If, under section 4947(a)(2)(B),

(A) An amount held in trust which is devoted exclusively to noncharitable income and remainder interests is segregated from

(B) An amount held in trust which is devoted exclusively to charitable income and remainder interests,

Then for purposes of this section the amount described in paragraph (c)(3)(iii)(B) of this section will be treated as a charitable trust which is subject to the provisions of section 4947(a)(1).

(iv) Charitable and noncharitable amounts. If, under section 4947(a) (2)(B),

(A) An amount held in trust which is devoted exclusively to noncharitable income and remainder interests is segregated from

(B) An amount held in trust which is devoted to both charitable income or remainder interests and noncharitable income or remainder interests,

Then for purposes of this section the amount described in paragraph (c)(3)(iv)(B) of this section will be treated as a split-interest trust which is subject to the provisions of section 4947(a)(2).

(v) Examples. The application of paragraph (c)(3) of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  H creates a trust under which the trustees are required to pay over annually 5 percent of the net fair market value of M building, valued annually, to W, H's wife, for life, remainder to S, H's son. The other asset in the trust is N building, with respect to which the trustees are required to pay over annually 5 percent of the net fair market value of the building, valued annually, to X, a section 501(c)(3) organization, for a period of 15 years, remainder to S. Each asset is separately accounted for under section 4947(a)(3) and paragraph (c)(4) of this section. He received a deduction under section 2522 for the value of X's income interest in N building. Under these circumstances, M building is considered segregated (within the meaning of section 4947(a)(2)(B)) from N building and is not subject to section 4947 (a)(2). The remainder interest of S in N building is not considered segregated from the income interest of X in N building, since both are interests in the same asset. N building is considered held in a split-interest trust which is subject to section 4947 (a)(2) and paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section.

Example (2).  H transfers $50,000 in trust to pay $2,500 per year to Z, a section 501(c)(3) organization, for a term of 20 years, remainder to S. H's son. H is allowed a deduction under section 2522 for the present value of Z's income interest. The income interest of Z in the trust asset cannot be segregated (within the meaning of section 4947(a)(2)(B)) from the remainder interest of S since both are interests in the same asset. Therefore, the entire trust is subject to section 4947(a)(2) and paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section.

(4) Accounting for segregated amounts—(i) General rule. Under section 4947(a)(2)(B), a trust with respect to which amounts are segregated within the meaning of paragraph (c)(3) of this section must separately account for the various income, deduction, and other items properly attributable to each segregated amount in the books of account and separately account to each of the beneficiaries of the trust.

(ii) Method. Separate accounting shall be made:

(A) According to the method regularly employed by the trust, if the method is reasonable, and

(B) In all other cases in a manner which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, is reasonable.

A method of separate accounting will be considered “regularly employed” by a trust when the method has been consistently followed in prior taxable years or when a trust which has never before maintained segregated amounts initiates a reasonable method of separate accounting for its segregated amounts and consistently follows such method thereafter. The trust shall keep permanent records and other data relating to the segregated amounts as are necessary to enable the district director to determine the correctness of the application of the rules prescribed in paragraph (c) (3) and (4) of this section.

(5) Amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969—(i) General rule. Under section 4947(a)(2)(C), paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section does not apply to any amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969. For purposes of this (5), an amount shall be considered to be transferred in trust only when the transfer is one which meets the requirements for the allowance of a deduction under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 (or the corresponding provisions of prior law). Income and capital gains which are derived at any time from amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969, shall also be excluded from the application of paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section. If an asset which was transferred in trust before May 27, 1969, is sold or exchanged after May 26, 1969, any asset received by the trust upon the sale or exchange shall be treated as an asset which was transferred in trust before May 27, 1969.

(ii) Requirement for separate accounting for amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969. If:

(A) Amounts are transferred in trust after May 26, 1969, and the trust to which the amounts are transferred also contains

(B) Amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969,

the general rule of paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section applicable to the amounts described in paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(B) of this section will apply only if the amounts described in paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(A) of this section (together with all income and capital gains derived therefrom) are separately accounted for (within the meaning of paragraph (c)(4) of this section) from the amounts described in paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(B) of this section, together with all income and capital gains derived therefrom. For the application of section 508(e) to a trust with respect to which amounts were transferred both before and after May 27, 1969, see section 508(e) and the regulations thereunder.

(iii) Exception for certain testamentary trusts. (A) Amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969 include amounts transferred in trust after May 26, 1969 when the transfer is made under the terms of a testamentary trust created by the will of a decedent who died before May 27, 1969, (regardless of whether the executors or the testamentary trustees are required to execute testamentary trusts by court order under applicable local law). Amounts transferred in trust before May 27, 1969, also include amounts transferred to a testamentary trust created by the will of a decedent who died after May 26, 1969 if the will was executed before May 27, 1969 and no dispositive provision of the will was amended (within the meaning of §20.2055–2(e)(4) and (5)) by the decedent by codicil or otherwise, after May 26, 1969, and the decedent was on May 27, 1969, and at all times thereafter under a mental disability (as defined in §1.642(c)–2(b)(3)(ii)) to amend the will by codicil or otherwise.

(B) The provisions of this (iii) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  X executed a will in 1960 which provided for the creation of a testamentary trust which meets the description of a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2). X died on April 15, 1969. Under the provisions of his will, the probate court permitted certain property in X's estate to be transferred to the testamentary trust at fixed intervals over a period of two years during the administration of the estate. Section 4947(a)(2) does not apply to any amount described in this example, including the amounts transferred after May 26, 1969, because, for purposes of section 4947(a)(2)(C), each such transfer will be treated as an amount transferred in trust before May 27, 1969, within the meaning of section 4947(a)(2)(C).

(6) Scope of application of section 4947(a)(2)—(i) In general. Subject to paragraph (c)(6) (ii), (iii), and (iv) of this section, section 4947(a)(2) applies to trusts in which some but not all unexpired interests are charitable. An estate from which the executor or administrator is required to distribute all of the net assets in trust or free of trust to both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries will not be considered to be a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) during the period of estate administration or settlement, except as provided in paragraph (c)(6)(ii) of this section. A split-interest trust created by will shall be considered a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) as of the date of death of the decedent-grantor, except as provided in paragraph (c)(6)(iv) of this section.

(ii) Estates. (A) When an estate from which the executor or administrator is required to distribute all of the net assets in trust or free of trust to both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries is considered terminated for Federal income tax purposes under §1.641(b)–3(a), then the estate will be treated as a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) (or a charitable trust under section 4957(a)(1), if applicable) between the date on which the estate is considered terminated under §1.641(b)–3(a) and the date on which final distribution of the net assets to the last remaining charitable beneficiary is made. This (ii) does not affect the determination of the tax liability under subtitle A of either charitable or noncharitable beneficiaries of the estates.

(B) The provisions of this (ii) may be illustrated by the following example:

Example.  X dies on January 15, 1973 and bequeaths $10,000 to M, an organization described in section 501(c)(3), and the residue of his estate to W, his wife. A deduction for the charitable bequest was allowed to X's estate under section 2055. Substantially all of X's estate consists of 100 percent of the stock of a wholly owned corporation, certain liquid assets such as marketable stocks and securities and bank accounts, and X's home, automobile, and other personal property. X's will gives his executor a full range of powers, including the power to sell the stock of the wholly owned corporation. After the death of X, his executor continues to manage the wholly owned corporation while attempting to sell the stock of the corporation. During this period, the executor makes no distributions to M. On May 24, 1978, the Internal Revenue Service determines under §1.641(b)–3(a) that the administration of the estate has been unduly prolonged and the estate is considered terminated as of that date for Federal income tax purposes. X's estate will be treated as a split-interest trust described in section 4947(a)(2) between May 24, 1978 and the date on which the $10,000 bequest to M is satisfied. X's estate will therefore be subject to the applicable private foundation provisions during that period and, for example, a sale of the house by the estate to any disqualified person (as defined in section 4946) will be an act of self-dealing under section 4941.

(iii) Revocable trusts which become split-interest trusts. A revocable trust that becomes irrevocable upon the death of the decedent-grantor under the terms of the governing instrument of which the trustee is required to hold some or all of its net assets in trust after becoming irrevocable for both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries is not considered a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) for a reasonable period of settlement after becoming irrevocable except that section 4941 may apply if the requirements of §53.4941(d)–1(b)(3) are not met.

After that period, the trust is considered a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2). For purposes of this (iii), the term reasonable period of settlement means that period reasonably required (or if shorter, actually required) by the trustee to perform the ordinary duties of administration necessary for the settlement of the trust. These duties include, for example, the collection of assets, the payment of debts, taxes, and distributions, and the determination of rights of the subsequent beneficiaries.

(iv) Certain revocable and testamentary trusts which wind up. A revocable trust that becomes irrevocable upon the death of the decedent-grantor, or a trust created by will, from which the trustee is required to distribute all of the net assets in trust or free of trust to both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries is not considered a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) for a reasonable period of settlement (within the meaning of paragraph (c)(6)(iii) of this section) after becoming irrevocable. After that period, the trust is considered a split-interest trust under section 4947(a)(2) (or a charitable trust under section 4947(a)(1), if applicable).

(d) Cross references; Governing instrument requirements and charitable deduction limitations. For the application of section 642(c)(6) (relating to section 170 limitations on charitable deductions of non-exempt private foundation trusts) to a trust described in section 4947(a)(1), see §1.642(c)–4. For the denial of a deduction under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 for a gift, a bequest, or an amount paid to (and the denial of a deduction under section 642(c) for an amount set aside in) a trust described in section 4947(a)(1) or (2) that fails to meet the applicable governing instrument requirements of section 508(e) by the end of the taxable year of the trust, see section 508(d)(2) and §1.508–2(b). Since a charitable remainder trust (as defined in section 664) is not exempt under section 501(a), it is subject to section 4947(a)(2), and thus to the governing instrument requirements of section 508(e) to the extent they are applicable.

(e) Application of section 507(a)—(1) General rule. The provisions of section 507(a) shall not apply to a trust described in section 4947(a) (1) or (2) by reason of any payment to a beneficiary that is directed by the terms of the governing instrument of the trust and is not discretionary with the trustee or, in the case of a discretionary payment, by reason of, or following, the expiration of the last remaining charitable interest in the trust.

(2) Examples. The provisions of this (e) may be illustrated by the following examples:

Example (1).  H creates a section 4947(a)(1) trust under which the income is to be paid for 15 years to R, a section 501(c)(3) organization. Upon the expiration of 15 years, the trust is to terminate and distribute all of its assets to S, another section 501(c)(3) organization. Distribution of the corpus of the trust to S will not be considered a termination of the trust's private foundation status within the meaning of section 507(a).

Example (2).  H creates a trust under which X, a section 501(c)(3) organization, receives $20,000 per year for a period of 20 years, remainder to S, H's son. H is allowed a deduction under section 2522 for the present value of X's interest.

When the final payment to X has been made at the end of the 20-year period in accordance with the terms of the trust, the provisions of section 4947(a)(2) will cease to apply to the trust because the trust no longer retains any amounts for which the deduction under section 2522 was allowed. However, the final payment to X will not be considered a termination of the trust's private foundation status within the meaning of section 507(a).

Example (3).  J creates a charitable remainder annuity trust described in section 664(d)(1) under which S, J's son, receives $10,000 per year for life, remainder to be distributed outright to P, an organization described in section 501(c)(3). J is allowed a deduction under section 170 for the value of the remainder interest placed in trust for the benefit of P, and the provisions of section 4947(a)(2) apply to the trust. At the death of S, the trust will terminate and all assets will be distributed to P. However, such final distribution to P will not be considered a termination of the trust's private foundation status within the meaning of section 507(a).

[T.D. 7431, 41 FR 35515, Aug. 23, 1976]

(a) Limit to segregated amounts. If any amounts held in trust are segregated within the meaning of §53.4947–1(c)(3), the value of the net assets for purposes of section 507(c)(2) and (g) shall be limited to the segregated amounts with respect to which a deduction under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 was allowed. See the regulations under section 507(c)(2) and (g).

(b) Applicability of section 4943 and 4944 to split-interests trusts—(1) General rule. Under section 4947(b)(3), section 4943 and 4944 do not apply to a split-interest trust described in section 4947(a)(2) if:

(i) All the income interest (and none of the remainder interest) of the trust is devoted solely to one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) and all amounts in the trust for which a deduction was allowed under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522 have an aggregate value (at the time for which the deduction was allowed) of not more than 60 percent of the aggregate fair market value of all amounts in the trust (after the payment of estate taxes and all other liabilities), or

(ii) A deduction was allowed under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2) or 2522 for amounts payable under the terms of the trust to every remainder beneficiary, but not to any income beneficiary.

This (1) shall apply to a trust described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section only if all amounts payable under the terms of the trust to every remainder beneficiary are to be devoted solely to one or more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B). After the expiration of all income interests in a trust described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section, the trust shall become subject to section 4947(a)(1) under §53.4947–1(b)(2), and section 4947(b)(3) shall no longer apply to the trust. A pooled income fund described in section 642(c)(5) will generally meet the requirements of paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section, as will a charitable remainder trust described in section 664(d)(1), if in either case it does not make payments to any income beneficiary described in section 170(c).

(2) Definitions. (i) For purposes of section 4947(b)(3)(A), the term “income interest” shall include an interest in property transferred in trust which is in the form of a guaranteed annuity interest or unitrust interest as described in §1.170A–6(c), §20.2055–2(e)(2) or §25.2522(c)–3(c)(2) and the term “remainder interest” shall include an interest which succeeds an “income interest” within the meaning of this (i).

(ii) For purposes of section 4947(b)(3)(B), the term “income beneficiary” shall include a recipient of payments described in section 642(c)(5)(F) from a pooled income fund, payments described in section 664(d)(1)(A) from a charitable remainder annuity trust, or payments described in section 664(d)(2)(A) or (3) from a charitable remainder unitrust. The term “remainder beneficiary” shall include a beneficiary of a remainder interest described in section 642(c)(5) or 664(d)(1)(C) or (2)(C).

(c) Effective date. Except as otherwise provided in §§53.4947–1 and 53.4947–2 and the regulations under sections 508 (d) and (e), §§53.4947–1 and 53.4947–2 shall take effect on January 1, 1970.

(Secs. 4947 and 7805, Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (68A Stat. 917: 26 U.S.C. 7805))

[T.D. 7431, 41 FR 35515, Aug. 23, 1976]

(a) Tax on income of certain foreign organizations. (1) In lieu of the tax imposed by section 4940 and the regulations thereunder, there is hereby imposed for each taxable year beginning after December 31, 1969, on the gross investment income (within the meaning of section 4940(c)(2) and the regulations thereunder) derived from sources within the United States (within the meaning of section 861 and the regulations thereunder) by every foreign organization which is a private foundation (within the meaning of section 509 and the regulations thereunder) and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) for the taxable year a tax equal to 4 percent of such income, except as provided in subparagraph (3) of this paragraph. The tax (if any) will be reported on the form the foundation is required to file under section 6033 and will be paid annually for the taxable year, at the time prescribed for filing such annual return (determined without regard to any extension of time for filing). For purposes of this section, the term foreign organization means any organization which is not described in section 170(o)(2)(A).

(2) With respect to the deduction and withholding of tax imposed by section 4948(a), see section 1443(b) and the regulations thereunder.

(3) Whenever there exists a tax treaty between the United States and a foreign country, and a foreign private foundation subject to section 4948(a) is a resident of such country or is otherwise entitled to the benefits of such treaty (whether or not such benefits are available to all residents), if the treaty provides that any item or items (or all items with respect to an organization exempt from income taxation) of gross investment income (within the meaning of section 4940(c)(2)) shall be exempt from income tax, such item or items shall not be taken into account by such foundation in computing the tax to be imposed under section 4948(a) for any taxable year for which the treaty is effective.

(b) Certain sections inapplicable. Section 507 (relating to termination of private foundation status), section 508 (relating to special rules with respect to section 501(c)(3) organizations), and Chapter 42 (other than section 4948) of the Code shall not apply to any foreign organization which from the date of its creation has received at least 85 percent of its support (as defined in section 509(d), other than section 509(d)(4)) from sources outside the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, gifts, grants, contributions, or membership fees directly or indirectly from a United States person (as defined in section 7701(a)(30)) are from sources within the United States.

(c) Denial of exemption to foreign organizations engaged in prohibited transactions—(1) In general. A foreign private foundation described in section 4948(b) and paragraph (b) of this section shall not be exempt from taxation under section 501(a) if it has engaged in a prohibited transaction (within the meaning of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph) after December 31, 1969.

(2) Prohibited transactions. (i) For purposes of this section, the term “prohibited transaction” means any act or failure to act (other than with respect to section 4942(e), relating to minimum investment return) which would subject a foreign private foundation described in paragraph (b) of this section, or a disqualified person (as defined in section 4946) with respect thereto, to liability for a penalty under section 6684 (relating to assessable penalties with respect to liability for tax under Chapter 42) or a tax under section 507 (relating to termination of private foundation status) if such foreign private foundation were a domestic private foundation.

(ii) For purposes of subdivision (i) of this subparagraph:

(a) Approval by an appropriate foreign government of grants by the foreign private foundation to individuals is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 4945(g) and the regulations thereunder.

(b) In determining whether a grantee of the foreign organization is a private foundation which is not an operating foundation for purposes of section 4942(g)(1)(A)(ii) or is an organization which is not described in section 509(a) (1), (2), or (3) for purposes of section 4945 (d)(4) and (h), a determination made by such foreign organization will be accepted if such determination is made in good faith after a reasonable effort to identify the status of its grantee.

(iii) For purposes of subdivision (i) of this subparagraph, in order for an act or failure to act (without regard to section 4942(e)) to be treated as a prohibited transaction under section 4948(c)(2) by reason of the application of section 6684(1), there must have been a prior act or failure to act (without regard to section 4942(e)), which:

(a) Would have resulted in liability for tax under Chapter 42 (other than section 4940 or 4948(a)) if the foreign private foundation had been a domestic private foundation, and

(b) Had been the subject of a warning from the Commissioner that a second act or failure to act (without regard to section 4942(e)) would result in a prohibited transaction.

The second act or failure to act (with respect to which a warning described in subparagraph (3)(i) of this paragraph is given) need not be related to the prior act or failure to act with respect to which a warning from the Commissioner was given under (b) of this subdivision.

(3) Taxable years affected. (i) Except as provided in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph, a foreign private foundation described in paragraph (b) of this section shall be denied exemption from taxation under section 501(a) by reason of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for all taxable years beginning with the taxable year during which it is notified by the Commissioner that it has engaged in a prohibited transaction. The Commissioner shall publish such notice in the Federal Register on the day on which he so notifies such foreign private foundation. In the case of an act or failure to act (without regard to section 4942(e)) which would result in a penalty under section 6684(1) if the foreign private foundation were a domestic private foundation, before giving notice under this subdivision the Commissioner shall warn such foreign private foundation that such act or failure to act may be treated as a prohibited transaction. However, such act or failure to act will not be treated as a prohibited transaction if it is corrected (within the meaning of Chapter 42 and the regulations thereunder) within 90 days after the making of such warning.

(ii)(a) Any foreign private foundation described in paragraph (b) of this section which is denied exemption from taxation under section 501(a) by reason of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph may, with respect to the second taxable year following the taxable year in which notice is given under subdivision (i) of this subparagraph (or any taxable year subsequent to such second taxable year), file a request for exemption from taxation under section 501(a) on Form 1023. In addition to the information generally required of an organization requesting exemption as an organization described in section 501(a), a request under this subdivision must contain or have attached to it a written declaration, made under the penalties of perjury, by a principal officer of such organization authorized to make such declaration, that the organization will not knowingly again engage in a prohibited transaction.

(b) If the Commissioner is satisfied that such organization will not knowingly again engage in a prohibited transaction and that the organization has satisfied all other requirements under section 501, the organization will be so notified in writing. In such case the organization shall not, with respect to taxable years beginning with the taxable year with respect to which a request under this subdivision is filed, be denied exemption from taxation under section 501(a) by reason of any prohibited transaction which was engaged in before the date on which notice was given under subdivision (i) of this subparagraph. Section 4948(c) provides that an organization denied exemption under such section will not be exempt from taxation under section 501(a) for the taxable year in which notice of loss of exemption is given and at least one immediately subsequent taxable year.

(d) Disallowance of certain charitable deductions. No gift, bequest, legacy, devise, or transfer shall be allowed as a deduction under section 170, 545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522, if made:

(1) To a foreign private foundation described in paragraph (b) of this section after the date on which the Commissioner publishes notice under paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section that he has notified such organization that it has engaged in a prohibited transaction, and

(2) In a taxable year of such organization for which it is not exempt from taxation under section 501(a) by reason of paragraph (c)(1) of this section.

For purposes of this paragraph, a bequest, legacy, devise, or transfer under section 2055 or 2106(a)(2) shall be treated as made on the date of death of the decedent. For example, assume that an individual gives money to a foreign private foundation described in section 4948(b) in January 1970, January 1971, and January 1972. The organization has a taxable year from June 1 through May 31. In February 1970, notice is duly published that the foreign organization has engaged in a prohibited transaction. In December 1970, the organization duly submits a request for exemption under paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(a) of this section which is granted for the taxable year ending May 31, 1972. The January 1970 gift is allowable as a deduction under section 2522 since it was made before the notice (February 1970). The January 1971 gift is not allowable as a deduction because the taxable year ending May 31, 1971, is a nonexempt year (the first taxable year subsequent to the taxable year of the notice) for the foreign organization. The January 1972 gift is allowable as a deduction under section 2522 because the taxable year ending May 31, 1972, is an exempt year for the organization.

[T.D. 7218, 37 FR 23918, Nov. 10, 1972; 37 FR 24748, Nov. 21, 1972; 38 FR 4324, Feb. 13, 1973]

Source:  T.D. 7644, 44 FR 52198, Sept. 7, 1979, unless otherwise noted.

§ 53.4951-1   Black lung trusts—taxes on self-dealing.

(a) In general. Section 4951 contains provisions that correspond to provisions of section 4941 (relating to taxes on foundation self-dealing) and section 4946 (relating to definitions and special rules). Regulations and rulings under these corresponding provisions apply to section 4951 where appropriate.

(b) Transfer of property to trust. A transfer of personal property without consideration to a trust for which a deduction is allowable under section 192 does not constitute a sale or exchange for purposes of section 4951 unless the property is subject to a mortgage or similar lien within section 4951(d)(2)(A). The transfer to a trust of a note or other evidence of indebtedness constitutes an extension of credit to the obligor for purposes of section 4951(d)(1)(B).

(c) Deposits. A time or demand deposit made with a bank or credit union that is a trustee or other disqualified person with respect to a trust constitutes a lending of money for purposes of section 4951(d)(1)(B) even though the deposit is of a kind generally authorized for investments by the trust.

(d) Trustee. The term “trustee” as used in section 4951(e)(5)(B) includes any person having powers or responsibilities with respect to a trust similar to those of trustees.

(e) Misallocation of insurance premium. Under section 501(c)(21)(A)(ii) and §1.501(c)(21)-1(d), a trust may pay a portion of a premium for insurance which covers both black lung liabilities and other liabilities, so long as the requirements of section 501(c)(21)(A)(i) concerning allocation of the total premium are met. However, if an insurance company misallocates the total premium in a manner which benefits a disqualified person, the amount of misallocation constitutes a use of trust assets for the benefit of the disqualified person within section 4951(d)(1)(D). For these purposes, it is irrelevant whether the combination of insurance is sold under one policy or more than one policy.

(f) Effective date. Section 4951 applies with respect to acts that occur after December 31, 1977, in and for trust taxable years beginning after December 31, 1977.

(a) In general. Section 4952 contains provisions that generally correspond to provisions of section 4945 (relating to taxes on taxable expenditures by private foundations) and section 4946 (relating to definitions and special rules). Regulations and rulings under these corresponding provisions apply to section 4952 where appropriate. See section 4952(e)(1) for the definition of correction.

(b) Unauthorized investments. The term “taxable expenditure” in section 4952(d) includes an investment that is not authorized under section 501(c)(21)(B)(ii).

(c) Effective date. Section 4952 applies with respect to expenditures made after December 31, 1977, in and for trust taxable years beginning after December 31, 1977.

Source:  T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16303, May 2, 1986, unless otherwise noted.

§ 53.4955-1   Tax on political expenditures.

(a) Relationship between section 4955 excise taxes and substantive standards for exemption under section 501(c)(3). The excise taxes imposed by section 4955 do not affect the substantive standards for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3), under which an organization is described in section 501(c)(3) only if it does not participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.

(b) Imposition of initial taxes on organization managers—(1) In general. The excise tax under section 4955(a)(2) on the agreement of any organization manager to the making of a political expenditure by a section 501(c)(3) organization is imposed only in cases where—

(i) A tax is imposed by section 4955(a)(1);

(ii) The organization manager knows that the expenditure to which the manager agrees is a political expenditure; and

(iii) The agreement is willful and is not due to reasonable cause.

(2) Type of organization managers covered—(i) In general. The tax under section 4955(a)(2) is imposed only on those organization managers who are authorized to approve, or to exercise discretion in recommending approval of, the making of the expenditure by the organization and on those organization managers who are members of a group (such as the organization's board of directors or trustees) which is so authorized.

(ii) Officer. For purposes of section 4955(f)(2)(A), a person is an officer of an organization if—

(A) That person is specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, bylaws, or other constitutive documents of the foundation; or

(B) That person regularly exercises general authority to make administrative or policy decisions on behalf of the organization. Independent contractors, acting in a capacity as attorneys, accountants, and investment managers and advisors, are not officers. With respect to any expenditure, any person described in this paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(B) who has authority merely to recommend particular administrative or policy decisions, but not to implement them without approval of a superior, is not an officer.

(iii) Employee. For purposes of section 4955(f)(2)(B), an individual rendering services to an organization is an employee of the organization only if that individual is an employee within the meaning of section 3121(d)(2). With respect to any expenditure, an employee (other than an officer, director, or trustee of the organization) is described in section 4955(f)(2)(B) only if he or she has final authority or responsibility (either officially or effectively) with respect to such expenditure.

(3) Type of agreement required. An organization manager agrees to the making of a political expenditure if the manager manifests approval of the expenditure which is sufficient to constitute an exercise of the organization manager's authority to approve, or to exercise discretion in recommending approval of, the making of the expenditure by the organization. The manifestation of approval need not be the final or decisive approval on behalf of the organization.

(4) Knowing—(i) General rule. For purposes of section 4955, an organization manager is considered to have agreed to an expenditure knowing that it is a political expenditure only if—

(A) The manager has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon these facts, the expenditure would be a political expenditure;

(B) The manager is aware that such an expenditure under these circumstances may violate the provisions of federal tax law governing political expenditures; and

(C) The manager negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the expenditure is a political expenditure, or the manager is aware that it is a political expenditure.

(ii) Amplification of general rule. For purposes of section 4955, knowing does not mean having reason to know. However, evidence tending to show that an organization manager has reason to know of a particular fact or particular rule is relevant in determining whether the manager had actual knowledge of the fact or rule. Thus, for example, evidence tending to show that an organization manager has reason to know of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon those facts, an expenditure would be a political expenditure is relevant in determining whether the manager has actual knowledge of the facts.

(5) Willful. An organization manager's agreement to a political expenditure is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional. No motive to avoid the restrictions of the law or the incurrence of any tax is necessary to make an agreement willful. However, an organization manager's agreement to a political expenditure is not willful if the manager does not know that it is a political expenditure.

(6) Due to reasonable cause. An organization manager's actions are due to reasonable cause if the manager has exercised his or her responsibility on behalf of the organization with ordinary business care and prudence.

(7) Advice of counsel. An organization manager's agreement to an expenditure is ordinarily not considered knowing or willful and is ordinarily considered due to reasonable cause if the manager, after full disclosure of the factual situation to legal counsel (including house counsel), relies on the advice of counsel expressed in a reasoned written legal opinion that an expenditure is not a political expenditure under section 4955 (or that expenditures conforming to certain guidelines are not political expenditures). For this purpose, a written legal opinion is considered reasoned even if it reaches a conclusion which is subsequently determined to be incorrect, so long as the opinion addresses itself to the facts and applicable law. A written legal opinion is not considered reasoned if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. However, the absence of advice of counsel with respect to an expenditure does not, by itself, give rise to any inference that an organization manager agreed to the making of the expenditure knowingly, willfully, or without reasonable cause.

(8) Cross reference. For provisions relating to the burden of proof in cases involving the issue of whether an organization manager has knowingly agreed to the making of a political expenditure, see section 7454(b).

(c) Amplification of political expenditure definition—(1) General rule. Any expenditure that would cause an organization that makes the expenditure to be classified as an action organization by reason of §1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) of this chapter is a political expenditure within the meaning of section 4955(d)(1).

(2) Other political expenditures—(i) For purposes of section 4955(d)(2), an organization is effectively controlled by a candidate or prospective candidate only if the individual has a continuing, substantial involvement in the day-to-day operations or management of the organization. An organization is not effectively controlled by a candidate or a prospective candidate merely because it is affiliated with the candidate, or merely because the candidate knows the directors, officers, or employees of the organization. The effectively controlled test is not met merely because the organization carries on its research, study, or other educational activities with respect to subject matter or issues in which the individual is interested or with which the individual is associated.

(ii) For purposes of section 4955(d)(2), a determination of whether the primary purpose of an organization is promoting the candidacy or prospective candidacy of an individual for public office is made on the basis of all the facts and circumstances. The factors to be considered include whether the surveys, studies, materials, etc. prepared by the organization are made available only to the candidate or are made available to the general public; and whether the organization pays for speeches and travel expenses for only one individual, or for speeches or travel expenses of several persons. The fact that a candidate or prospective candidate utilizes studies, papers, materials, etc., prepared by the organization (such as in a speech by the candidate) is not to be considered as a factor indicating that the organization has a purpose of promoting the candidacy or prospective candidacy of that individual where such studies, papers, materials, etc. are not made available only to that individual.

(iii) Expenditures for voter registration, voter turnout, or voter education constitute other expenses, treated as political expenditures by reason of section 4955(d)(2)(E), only if the expenditures violate the prohibition on political activity provided in section 501(c)(3).

(d) Abatement, refund, or no assessment of initial tax. No initial (first-tier) tax will be imposed under section 4955(a), or the initial tax will be abated or refunded, if the organization or an organization manager establishes to the satisfaction of the IRS that—

(1) The political expenditure was not willful and flagrant; and

(2) The political expenditure was corrected.

(e) Correction—(1) Recovery of Expenditure. For purposes of section 4955(f)(3) and this section, correction of a political expenditure is accomplished by recovering part or all of the expenditure to the extent recovery is possible, and, where full recovery cannot be accomplished, by any additional corrective action which the Commissioner may prescribe. The organization making the political expenditure is not under any obligation to attempt to recover the expenditure by legal action if the action would in all probability not result in the satisfaction of execution on a judgment.

(2) Establishing safeguards. Correction of a political expenditure must also involve the establishment of sufficient safeguards to prevent future political expenditures by the organization. The determination of whether safeguards are sufficient to prevent future political expenditures by the organization is made by the District Director.

(f) Effective date. This section is effective December 5, 1995.

[T.D. 8628, 60 FR 62210, Dec. 5, 1995]

This section lists the major captions contained in §§53.4958–1 through 53.4958–8.

§53.4958–1  Taxes on excess benefit transactions

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002]

(a) In general. Section 4958 imposes excise taxes on each excess benefit transaction (as defined in section 4958(c) and §53.4958–4) between an applicable tax-exempt organization (as defined in section 4958(e) and §53.4958–2) and a disqualified person (as defined in section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3). A disqualified person who receives an excess benefit from an excess benefit transaction is liable for payment of a section 4958(a)(1) excise tax equal to 25 percent of the excess benefit. If an initial tax is imposed by section 4958(a)(1) on an excess benefit transaction and the transaction is not corrected (as defined in section 4958(f)(6) and §53.4958–7) within the taxable period (as defined in section 4958(f)(5) and paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section), then any disqualified person who received an excess benefit from the excess benefit transaction on which the initial tax was imposed is liable for an additional tax of 200 percent of the excess benefit. An organization manager (as defined in section 4958(f)(2) and paragraph (d) of this section) who participates in an excess benefit transaction, knowing that it was such a transaction, is liable for payment of a section 4958(a)(2) excise tax equal to 10 percent of the excess benefit, unless the participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause. If an organization manager also receives an excess benefit from an excess benefit transaction, the manager may be liable for both taxes imposed by section 4958(a).

(b) Excess benefit defined. An excess benefit is the amount by which the value of the economic benefit provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing such benefit.

(c) Taxes paid by disqualified person—(1) Initial tax. Section 4958(a)(1) imposes a tax equal to 25 percent of the excess benefit on each excess benefit transaction. The section 4958(a)(1) tax shall be paid by any disqualified person who received an excess benefit from that excess benefit transaction. With respect to any excess benefit transaction, if more than one disqualified person is liable for the tax imposed by section 4958(a)(1), all such persons are jointly and severally liable for that tax.

(2) Additional tax on disqualified person—(i) In general. Section 4958(b) imposes a tax equal to 200 percent of the excess benefit in any case in which section 4958(a)(1) imposes a 25-percent tax on an excess benefit transaction and the transaction is not corrected (as defined in section 4958(f)(6) and §53.4958–7) within the taxable period (as defined in section 4958(f)(5) and paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section). If a disqualified person makes a payment of less than the full correction amount under the rules of §53.4958–7, the 200-percent tax is imposed only on the unpaid portion of the correction amount (as described in §53.4958–7(c)). The tax imposed by section 4958(b) is payable by any disqualified person who received an excess benefit from the excess benefit transaction on which the initial tax was imposed by section 4958(a)(1). With respect to any excess benefit transaction, if more than one disqualified person is liable for the tax imposed by section 4958(b), all such persons are jointly and severally liable for that tax.

(ii) Taxable period. Taxable period means, with respect to any excess benefit transaction, the period beginning with the date on which the transaction occurs and ending on the earlier of—

(A) The date of mailing a notice of deficiency under section 6212 with respect to the section 4958(a)(1) tax; or

(B) The date on which the tax imposed by section 4958(a)(1) is assessed.

(iii) Abatement if correction during the correction period. For rules relating to abatement of taxes on excess benefit transactions that are corrected within the correction period, as defined in section 4963(e), see sections 4961(a), 4962(a), and the regulations thereunder. The abatement rules of section 4961 specifically provide for a 90-day correction period after the date of mailing a notice of deficiency under section 6212 with respect to the section 4958(b) 200-percent tax. If the excess benefit is corrected during that correction period, the 200-percent tax imposed shall not be assessed, and if assessed the assessment shall be abated, and if collected shall be credited or refunded as an overpayment. For special rules relating to abatement of the 25-percent tax, see section 4962.

(d) Tax paid by organization managers—(1) In general. In any case in which section 4958(a)(1) imposes a tax, section 4958(a)(2) imposes a tax equal to 10 percent of the excess benefit on the participation of any organization manager who knowingly participated in the excess benefit transaction, unless such participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause. Any organization manager who so participated in the excess benefit transaction must pay the tax.

(2) Organization manager defined—(i) In general. An organization manager is, with respect to any applicable tax-exempt organization, any officer, director, or trustee of such organization, or any individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers, directors, or trustees of the organization, regardless of title. A person is an officer of an organization if that person—

(A) Is specifically so designated under the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or other constitutive documents of the organization; or

(B) Regularly exercises general authority to make administrative or policy decisions on behalf of the organization. A contractor who acts solely in a capacity as an attorney, accountant, or investment manager or advisor, is not an officer. For purposes of this paragraph (d)(2)(i)(B), any person who has authority merely to recommend particular administrative or policy decisions, but not to implement them without approval of a superior, is not an officer.

(ii) Special rule for certain committee members. An individual who is not an officer, director, or trustee, yet serves on a committee of the governing body of an applicable tax-exempt organization (or as a designee of the governing body described in §53.4958–6(c)(1)) that is attempting to invoke the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness described in §53.4958–6 based on the committee's (or designee's) actions, is an organization manager for purposes of the tax imposed by section 4958(a)(2).

(3) Participation. For purposes of section 4958(a)(2) and this paragraph (d), participation includes silence or inaction on the part of an organization manager where the manager is under a duty to speak or act, as well as any affirmative action by such manager. An organization manager is not considered to have participated in an excess benefit transaction, however, where the manager has opposed the transaction in a manner consistent with the fulfillment of the manager's responsibilities to the applicable tax-exempt organization.

(4) Knowing—(i) In general. For purposes of section 4958(a)(2) and this paragraph (d), a manager participates in a transaction knowingly only if the person—

(A) Has actual knowledge of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon those facts, such transaction would be an excess benefit transaction;

(B) Is aware that such a transaction under these circumstances may violate the provisions of Federal tax law governing excess benefit transactions; and

(C) Negligently fails to make reasonable attempts to ascertain whether the transaction is an excess benefit transaction, or the manager is in fact aware that it is such a transaction.

(ii) Amplification of general rule. Knowing does not mean having reason to know. However, evidence tending to show that a manager has reason to know of a particular fact or particular rule is relevant in determining whether the manager had actual knowledge of such a fact or rule. Thus, for example, evidence tending to show that a manager has reason to know of sufficient facts so that, based solely upon such facts, a transaction would be an excess benefit transaction is relevant in determining whether the manager has actual knowledge of such facts.

(iii) Reliance on professional advice. An organization manager's participation in a transaction is ordinarily not considered knowing within the meaning of section 4958(a)(2), even though the transaction is subsequently held to be an excess benefit transaction, to the extent that, after full disclosure of the factual situation to an appropriate professional, the organization manager relies on a reasoned written opinion of that professional with respect to elements of the transaction within the professional's expertise. For purposes of section 4958(a)(2) and this paragraph (d), a written opinion is reasoned even though it reaches a conclusion that is subsequently determined to be incorrect so long as the opinion addresses itself to the facts and the applicable standards. However, a written opinion is not reasoned if it does nothing more than recite the facts and express a conclusion. The absence of a written opinion of an appropriate professional with respect to a transaction shall not, by itself, however, give rise to any inference that an organization manager participated in the transaction knowingly. For purposes of this paragraph, appropriate professionals on whose written opinion an organization manager may rely, are limited to—

(A) Legal counsel, including in-house counsel;

(B) Certified public accountants or accounting firms with expertise regarding the relevant tax law matters; and

(C) Independent valuation experts who—

(1) Hold themselves out to the public as appraisers or compensation consultants;

(2) Perform the relevant valuations on a regular basis;

(3) Are qualified to make valuations of the type of property or services involved; and

(4) Include in the written opinion a certification that the requirements of paragraphs (d)(4)(iii)(C)(1) through (3) of this section are met.

(iv) Satisfaction of rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. An organization manager's participation in a transaction is ordinarily not considered knowing within the meaning of section 4958(a)(2), even though the transaction is subsequently held to be an excess benefit transaction, if the appropriate authorized body has met the requirements of §53.4958–6(a) with respect to the transaction.

(5) Willful. For purposes of section 4958(a)(2) and this paragraph (d), participation by an organization manager is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional. No motive to avoid the restrictions of the law or the incurrence of any tax is necessary to make the participation willful. However, participation by an organization manager is not willful if the manager does not know that the transaction in which the manager is participating is an excess benefit transaction.

(6) Due to reasonable cause. An organization manager's participation is due to reasonable cause if the manager has exercised responsibility on behalf of the organization with ordinary business care and prudence.

(7) Limits on liability for management. The maximum aggregate amount of tax collectible under section 4958(a)(2) and this paragraph (d) from organization managers with respect to any one excess benefit transaction is $10,000.

(8) Joint and several liability. In any case where more than one person is liable for a tax imposed by section 4958(a)(2), all such persons shall be jointly and severally liable for the taxes imposed under section 4958(a)(2) with respect to that excess benefit transaction.

(9) Burden of proof. For provisions relating to the burden of proof in cases involving the issue of whether an organization manager has knowingly participated in an excess benefit transaction, see section 7454(b) and §301.7454–2 of this chapter. In these cases, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof.

(e) Date of occurrence—(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided, an excess benefit transaction occurs on the date on which the disqualified person receives the economic benefit for Federal income tax purposes. When a single contractual arrangement provides for a series of compensation or other payments to (or for the use of) a disqualified person over the course of the disqualified person's taxable year (or part of a taxable year), any excess benefit transaction with respect to these aggregate payments is deemed to occur on the last day of the taxable year (or if the payments continue for part of the year, the date of the last payment in the series).

(2) Special rules. In the case of benefits provided pursuant to a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan, the transaction occurs on the date the benefit is vested. In the case of a transfer of property that is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture or in the case of rights to future compensation or property (including benefits under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan), the transaction occurs on the date the property, or the rights to future compensation or property, is not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. However, where the disqualified person elects to include an amount in gross income in the taxable year of transfer pursuant to section 83(b), the general rule of paragraph (e)(1) of this section applies to the property with respect to which the section 83(b) election is made. Any excess benefit transaction with respect to benefits under a deferred compensation plan which vest during any taxable year of the disqualified person is deemed to occur on the last day of such taxable year. For the rules governing the timing of the reasonableness determination for deferred, contingent, and certain other noncash compensation, see §53.4958–4(b)(2).

(3) Statute of limitations rules. See sections 6501(e)(3) and (l) and the regulations thereunder for statute of limitations rules as they apply to section 4958 excise taxes.

(f) Effective date for imposition of taxes—(1) In general. The section 4958 taxes imposed on excess benefit transactions or on participation in excess benefit transactions apply to transactions occurring on or after September 14, 1995.

(2) Existing binding contracts. The section 4958 taxes do not apply to any transaction occurring pursuant to a written contract that was binding on September 13, 1995, and at all times thereafter before the transaction occurs. A written binding contract that is terminable or subject to cancellation by the applicable tax-exempt organization without the disqualified person's consent (including as the result of a breach of contract by the disqualified person) and without substantial penalty to the organization, is no longer treated as a binding contract as of the earliest date that any such termination or cancellation, if made, would be effective. If a binding written contract is materially changed, it is treated as a new contract entered into as of the date the material change is effective. A material change includes an extension or renewal of the contract (other than an extension or renewal that results from the person contracting with the applicable tax-exempt organization unilaterally exercising an option expressly granted by the contract), or a more than incidental change to any payment under the contract.

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002]

(a) Organizations described in section 501(c)(3) or (4) and exempt from tax under section 501(a)—(1) In general. An applicable tax-exempt organization is any organization that, without regard to any excess benefit, would be described in section 501(c)(3) or (4) and exempt from tax under section 501(a). An applicable tax-exempt organization also includes any organization that was described in section 501(c)(3) or (4) and was exempt from tax under section 501(a) at any time during a five-year period ending on the date of an excess benefit transaction (the lookback period).

(2) Exceptions from definition of applicable tax-exempt organization—(i) Private foundation. A private foundation as defined in section 509(a) is not an applicable tax-exempt organization for section 4958 purposes.

(ii) Governmental unit or affiliate. A governmental unit or an affiliate of a governmental unit is not an applicable tax-exempt organization for section 4958 purposes if it is—

(A) Exempt from (or not subject to) taxation without regard to section 501(a); or

(B) Relieved from filing an annual return pursuant to the authority of §1.6033–2(g)(6).

(3) Organizations described in section 501(c)(3). An organization is described in section 501(c)(3) for purposes of section 4958 only if the organization—

(i) Provides the notice described in section 508; or

(ii) Is described in section 501(c)(3) and specifically is excluded from the requirements of section 508 by that section.

(4) Organizations described in section 501(c)(4). An organization is described in section 501(c)(4) for purposes of section 4958 only if the organization—

(i) Has applied for and received recognition from the Internal Revenue Service as an organization described in section 501(c)(4); or

(ii) Has filed an application for recognition under section 501(c)(4) with the Internal Revenue Service, has filed an annual information return as a section 501(c)(4) organization under the Internal Revenue Code or regulations promulgated thereunder, or has otherwise held itself out as being described in section 501(c)(4) and exempt from tax under section 501(a).

(5) Effect of non-recognition or revocation of exempt status. An organization is not described in paragraph (a)(3) or (4) of this section during any period covered by a final determination or adjudication that the organization is not exempt from tax under section 501(a) as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) or (4), so long as that determination or adjudication is not based upon participation in inurement or one or more excess benefit transactions. However, the organization may be an applicable tax-exempt organization for that period as a result of the five-year lookback period described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

(b) Special rules—(1) Transition rule for lookback period. In the case of any excess benefit transaction occurring before September 14, 2000, the lookback period described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section begins on September 14, 1995, and ends on the date of the transaction.

(2) Certain foreign organizations. A foreign organization, recognized by the Internal Revenue Service or by treaty, that receives substantially all of its support (other than gross investment income) from sources outside of the United States is not an organization described in section 501(c)(3) or (4) for purposes of section 4958.

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002]

(a) In general—(1) Scope of definition. Section 4958(f)(1) defines disqualified person, with respect to any transaction, as any person who was in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an applicable tax-exempt organization at any time during the five-year period ending on the date of the transaction (the lookback period). Paragraph (b) of this section describes persons who are defined to be disqualified persons under the statute, including certain family members of an individual in a position to exercise substantial influence, and certain 35-percent controlled entities. Paragraph (c) of this section describes persons in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an applicable tax-exempt organization by virtue of their powers and responsibilities or certain interests they hold. Paragraph (d) of this section describes persons deemed not to be in a position to exercise substantial influence. Whether any person who is not described in paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of this section is a disqualified person with respect to a transaction for purposes of section 4958 is based on all relevant facts and circumstances, as described in paragraph (e) of this section. Paragraph (f) of this section describes special rules for affiliated organizations. Examples in paragraph (g) of this section illustrate these categories of persons.

(2) Transition rule for lookback period. In the case of any excess benefit transaction occurring before September 14, 2000, the lookback period described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section begins on September 14, 1995, and ends on the date of the transaction.

(b) Statutory categories of disqualified persons—(1) Family members. A person is a disqualified person with respect to any transaction with an applicable tax-exempt organization if the person is a member of the family of a person who is a disqualified person described in paragraph (a) of this section (other than as a result of this paragraph) with respect to any transaction with the same organization. For purposes of the following sentence, a legally adopted child of an individual is treated as a child of such individual by blood. A person's family is limited to—

(i) Spouse;

(ii) Brothers or sisters (by whole or half blood);

(iii) Spouses of brothers or sisters (by whole or half blood);

(iv) Ancestors;

(v) Children;

(vi) Grandchildren;

(vii) Great grandchildren; and

(viii) Spouses of children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren.

(2) Thirty-five percent controlled entities—(i) In general. A person is a disqualified person with respect to any transaction with an applicable tax-exempt organization if the person is a 35-percent controlled entity. A 35-percent controlled entity is—

(A) A corporation in which persons described in this section (except in paragraphs (b)(2) and (d) of this section) own more than 35 percent of the combined voting power;

(B) A partnership in which persons described in this section (except in paragraphs (b)(2) and (d) of this section) own more than 35 percent of the profits interest; or

(C) A trust or estate in which persons described in this section (except in paragraphs (b)(2) and (d) of this section) own more than 35 percent of the beneficial interest.

(ii) Combined voting power. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(2), combined voting power includes voting power represented by holdings of voting stock, direct or indirect, but does not include voting rights held only as a director, trustee, or other fiduciary.

(iii) Constructive ownership rules—(A) Stockholdings. For purposes of section 4958(f)(3) and this paragraph (b)(2), indirect stockholdings are taken into account as under section 267(c), except that in applying section 267(c)(4), the family of an individual shall include the members of the family specified in section 4958(f)(4) and paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

(B) Profits or beneficial interest. For purposes of section 4958(f)(3) and this paragraph (b)(2), the ownership of profits or beneficial interests shall be determined in accordance with the rules for constructive ownership of stock provided in section 267(c) (other than section 267(c)(3)), except that in applying section 267(c)(4), the family of an individual shall include the members of the family specified in section 4958(f)(4) and paragraph (b)(1) of this section.

(c) Persons having substantial influence. A person who holds any of the following powers, responsibilities, or interests is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an applicable tax-exempt organization:

(1) Voting members of the governing body. This category includes any individual serving on the governing body of the organization who is entitled to vote on any matter over which the governing body has authority.

(2) Presidents, chief executive officers, or chief operating officers. This category includes any person who, regardless of title, has ultimate responsibility for implementing the decisions of the governing body or for supervising the management, administration, or operation of the organization. A person who serves as president, chief executive officer, or chief operating officer has this ultimate responsibility unless the person demonstrates otherwise. If this ultimate responsibility resides with two or more individuals (e.g., co-presidents), who may exercise such responsibility in concert or individually, then each individual is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.

(3) Treasurers and chief financial officers. This category includes any person who, regardless of title, has ultimate responsibility for managing the finances of the organization. A person who serves as treasurer or chief financial officer has this ultimate responsibility unless the person demonstrates otherwise. If this ultimate responsibility resides with two or more individuals who may exercise the responsibility in concert or individually, then each individual is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.

(4) Persons with a material financial interest in a provider-sponsored organization. For purposes of section 4958, if a hospital that participates in a provider-sponsored organization (as defined in section 1855(e) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395w–25) is an applicable tax-exempt organization, then any person with a material financial interest (within the meaning of section 501(o)) in the provider-sponsored organization has substantial influence with respect to the hospital.

(d) Persons deemed not to have substantial influence. A person is deemed not to be in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of an applicable tax-exempt organization if that person is described in one of the following categories:

(1) Tax-exempt organizations described in section 501(c)(3). This category includes any organization described in section 501(c)(3) and exempt from tax under section 501(a).

(2) Certain section 501(c)(4) organizations. Only with respect to an applicable tax-exempt organization described in section 501(c)(4) and §53.4958–2(a)(4), this category includes any other organization so described.

(3) Employees receiving economic benefits of less than a specified amount in a taxable year. This category includes, for the taxable year in which benefits are provided, any full- or part-time employee of the applicable tax-exempt organization who—

(i) Receives economic benefits, directly or indirectly from the organization, of less than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee in section 414(q)(1)(B)(i);

(ii) Is not described in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section with respect to the organization; and

(iii) Is not a substantial contributor to the organization within the meaning of section 507(d)(2)(A), taking into account only contributions received by the organization during its current taxable year and the four preceding taxable years.

(e) Facts and circumstances govern in all other cases—(1) In general. Whether a person who is not described in paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of this section is a disqualified person depends upon all relevant facts and circumstances.

(2) Facts and circumstances tending to show substantial influence. Facts and circumstances tending to show that a person has substantial influence over the affairs of an organization include, but are not limited to, the following—

(i) The person founded the organization;

(ii) The person is a substantial contributor to the organization (within the meaning of section 507(d)(2)(A)), taking into account only contributions received by the organization during its current taxable year and the four preceding taxable years;

(iii) The person's compensation is primarily based on revenues derived from activities of the organization, or of a particular department or function of the organization, that the person controls;

(iv) The person has or shares authority to control or determine a substantial portion of the organization's capital expenditures, operating budget, or compensation for employees;

(v) The person manages a discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the organization, as compared to the organization as a whole;

(vi) The person owns a controlling interest (measured by either vote or value) in a corporation, partnership, or trust that is a disqualified person; or

(vii) The person is a non-stock organization controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more disqualified persons.

(3) Facts and circumstances tending to show no substantial influence. Facts and circumstances tending to show that a person does not have substantial influence over the affairs of an organization include, but are not limited to, the following—

(i) The person has taken a bona fide vow of poverty as an employee, agent, or on behalf, of a religious organization;

(ii) The person is a contractor (such as an attorney, accountant, or investment manager or advisor) whose sole relationship to the organization is providing professional advice (without having decision-making authority) with respect to transactions from which the contractor will not economically benefit either directly or indirectly (aside from customary fees received for the professional advice rendered);

(iii) The direct supervisor of the individual is not a disqualified person;

(iv) The person does not participate in any management decisions affecting the organization as a whole or a discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents a substantial portion of the activities, assets, income, or expenses of the organization, as compared to the organization as a whole; or

(v) Any preferential treatment a person receives based on the size of that person's contribution is also offered to all other donors making a comparable contribution as part of a solicitation intended to attract a substantial number of contributions.

(f) Affiliated organizations. In the case of multiple organizations affiliated by common control or governing documents, the determination of whether a person does or does not have substantial influence shall be made separately for each applicable tax-exempt organization. A person may be a disqualified person with respect to transactions with more than one applicable tax-exempt organization.

(g) Examples. The following examples illustrate the principles of this section. A finding that a person is a disqualified person in the following examples does not indicate that an excess benefit transaction has occurred. If a person is a disqualified person, the rules of section 4958(c) and §53.4958–4 apply to determine whether an excess benefit transaction has occurred. The examples are as follows:

Example 1.  N, an artist by profession, works part-time at R, a local museum. In the first taxable year in which R employs N, R pays N a salary and provides no additional benefits to N except for free admission to the museum, a benefit R provides to all of its employees and volunteers. The total economic benefits N receives from R during the taxable year are less than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee in section 414(q)(1)(B)(i). The part-time job constitutes N's only relationship with R. N is not related to any other disqualified person with respect to R. N is deemed not to be in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of R. Therefore, N is not a disqualified person with respect to R in that year.

Example 2.  The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that in addition to the salary that R pays N for N's services during the taxable year, R also purchases one of N's paintings for $x. The total of N's salary plus $x exceeds the amount referenced for highly compensated employees in section 414(q)(1)(B)(i). Consequently, whether N is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of R for that taxable year depends upon all of the relevant facts and circumstances.

Example 3.  Q is a member of K, a section 501(c)(3) organization with a broad-based public membership. Members of K are entitled to vote only with respect to the annual election of directors and the approval of major organizational transactions such as a merger or dissolution. Q is not related to any other disqualified person of K. Q has no other relationship to K besides being a member of K and occasionally making modest donations to K. Whether Q is a disqualified person is determined by all relevant facts and circumstances. Q's voting rights, which are the same as granted to all members of K, do not place Q in a position to exercise substantial influence over K. Under these facts and circumstances, Q is not a disqualified person with respect to K.

Example 4.  E is the headmaster of Z, a school that is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. E reports to Z's board of trustees and has ultimate responsibility for supervising Z's day-to-day operations. For example, E can hire faculty members and staff, make changes to the school's curriculum and discipline students without specific board approval. Because E has ultimate responsibility for supervising the operation of Z, E is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of Z. Therefore, E is a disqualified person with respect to Z.

Example 5.  Y is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958 that decides to use bingo games as a method of generating revenue. Y enters into a contract with B, a company that operates bingo games. Under the contract, B manages the promotion and operation of the bingo activity, provides all necessary staff, equipment, and services, and pays Y q percent of the revenue from this activity. B retains the balance of the proceeds. Y provides no goods or services in connection with the bingo operation other than the use of its hall for the bingo games. The annual gross revenue earned from the bingo games represents more than half of Y's total annual revenue. B's compensation is primarily based on revenues from an activity B controls. B also manages a discrete activity of Y that represents a substantial portion of Y's income compared to the organization as a whole. Under these facts and circumstances, B is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of Y. Therefore, B is a disqualified person with respect to Y.

Example 6.  The facts are the same as in Example 5, with the additional fact that P owns a majority of the stock of B and is actively involved in managing B. Because P owns a controlling interest (measured by either vote or value) in and actively manages B, P is also in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of Y. Therefore, under these facts and circumstances, P is a disqualified person with respect to Y.

Example 7.  A, an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958, owns and operates one acute care hospital. B, a for-profit corporation, owns and operates a number of hospitals. A and B form C, a limited liability company. In exchange for proportional ownership interests, A contributes its hospital, and B contributes other assets, to C. All of A's assets then consist of its membership interest in C. A continues to be operated for exempt purposes based almost exclusively on the activities it conducts through C. C enters into a management agreement with a management company, M, to provide day to day management services to C. Subject to supervision by C's board, M is given broad discretion to manage C's day to day operation and has ultimate responsibility for supervising the management of the hospital. Because M has ultimate responsibility for supervising the management of the hospital operated by C, A's ownership interest in C is its primary asset, and C's activities form the basis for A's continued exemption as an organization described in section 501(c)(3), M is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of A. Therefore, M is a disqualified person with respect to A.

Example 8.  T is a large university and an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. L is the dean of the College of Law of T, a substantial source of revenue for T, including contributions from alumni and foundations. L is not related to any other disqualified person of T. L does not serve on T's governing body or have ultimate responsibility for managing the university as whole. However, as dean of the College of Law, L plays a key role in faculty hiring and determines a substantial portion of the capital expenditures and operating budget of the College of Law. L's compensation is greater than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee in section 414(q)(1)(B)(i) in the year benefits are provided. L's management of a discrete segment of T that represents a substantial portion of the income of T (as compared to T as a whole) places L in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of T. Under these facts and circumstances L is a disqualified person with respect to T.

Example 9.  S chairs a small academic department in the College of Arts and Sciences of the same university T described in Example 8. S is not related to any other disqualified person of T. S does not serve on T's governing body or as an officer of T. As department chair, S supervises faculty in the department, approves the course curriculum, and oversees the operating budget for the department. S's compensation is greater than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee in section 414(q)(1)(B)(i) in the year benefits are provided. Even though S manages the department, that department does not represent a substantial portion of T's activities, assets, income, expenses, or operating budget. Therefore, S does not participate in any management decisions affecting either T as a whole, or a discrete segment or activity of T that represents a substantial portion of its activities, assets, income, or expenses. Under these facts and circumstances, S does not have substantial influence over the affairs of T, and therefore S is not a disqualified person with respect to T.

Example 10.  U is a large acute-care hospital that is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. U employs X as a radiologist. X gives instructions to staff with respect to the radiology work X conducts, but X does not supervise other U employees or manage any substantial part of U's operations. X's compensation is primarily in the form of a fixed salary. In addition, X is eligible to receive an incentive award based on revenues of the radiology department. X's compensation is greater than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee in section 414(q)(1)(B)(i) in the year benefits are provided. X is not related to any other disqualified person of U. X does not serve on U's governing body or as an officer of U. Although U participates in a provider-sponsored organization (as defined in section 1855(e) of the Social Security Act), X does not have a material financial interest in that organization. X does not receive compensation primarily based on revenues derived from activities of U that X controls. X does not participate in any management decisions affecting either U as a whole or a discrete segment of U that represents a substantial portion of its activities, assets, income, or expenses. Under these facts and circumstances, X does not have substantial influence over the affairs of U, and therefore X is not a disqualified person with respect to U.

Example 11.  W is a cardiologist and head of the cardiology department of the same hospital U described in Example 10. The cardiology department is a major source of patients admitted to U and consequently represents a substantial portion of U's income, as compared to U as a whole. W does not serve on U's governing board or as an officer of U. W does not have a material financial interest in the provider-sponsored organization (as defined in section 1855(e) of the Social Security Act) in which U participates. W receives a salary and retirement and welfare benefits fixed by a three-year renewable employment contract with U. W's compensation is greater than the amount referenced for a highly compensated employee in section 414(q)(1)(B)(i) in the year benefits are provided. As department head, W manages the cardiology department and has authority to allocate the budget for that department, which includes authority to distribute incentive bonuses among cardiologists according to criteria that W has authority to set. W's management of a discrete segment of U that represents a substantial portion of its income and activities (as compared to U as a whole) places W in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of U. Under these facts and circumstances, W is a disqualified person with respect to U.

Example 12.  M is a museum that is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. D provides accounting services and tax advice to M as a contractor in return for a fee. D has no other relationship with M and is not related to any disqualified person of M. D does not provide professional advice with respect to any transaction from which D might economically benefit either directly or indirectly (aside from fees received for the professional advice rendered). Because D's sole relationship to M is providing professional advice (without having decision-making authority) with respect to transactions from which D will not economically benefit either directly or indirectly (aside from customary fees received for the professional advice rendered), under these facts and circumstances, D is not a disqualified person with respect to M.

Example 13.  F is a repertory theater company that is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. F holds a fund-raising campaign to pay for the construction of a new theater. J is a regular subscriber to F's productions who has made modest gifts to F in the past. J has no relationship to F other than as a subscriber and contributor. F solicits contributions as part of a broad public campaign intended to attract a large number of donors, including a substantial number of donors making large gifts. In its solicitations for contributions, F promises to invite all contributors giving $z or more to a special opening production and party held at the new theater. These contributors are also given a special number to call in F's office to reserve tickets for performances, make ticket exchanges, and make other special arrangements for their convenience. J makes a contribution of $z to F, which makes J a substantial contributor within the meaning of section 507(d)(2)(A), taking into account only contributions received by F during its current and the four preceding taxable years. J receives the benefits described in F's solicitation. Because F offers the same benefit to all donors of $z or more, the preferential treatment that J receives does not indicate that J is in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization. Therefore, under these facts and circumstances, J is not a disqualified person with respect to F.

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002]

(a) Definition of excess benefit transaction—(1) In general. An excess benefit transaction means any transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person, and the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing the benefit. Subject to the limitations of paragraph (c) of this section (relating to the treatment of economic benefits as compensation for the performance of services), to determine whether an excess benefit transaction has occurred, all consideration and benefits (except disregarded benefits described in paragraph (a)(4) of this section) exchanged between a disqualified person and the applicable tax-exempt organization and all entities the organization controls (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section) are taken into account. For example, in determining the reasonableness of compensation that is paid (or vests, or is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture) in one year, services performed in prior years may be taken into account. The rules of this section apply to all transactions with disqualified persons, regardless of whether the amount of the benefit provided is determined, in whole or in part, by the revenues of one or more activities of the organization. For rules regarding valuation standards, see paragraph (b) of this section. For the requirement that an applicable tax-exempt organization clearly indicate its intent to treat a benefit as compensation for services when paid, see paragraph (c) of this section.

(2) Economic benefit provided indirectly—(i) In general. A transaction that would be an excess benefit transaction if the applicable tax-exempt organization engaged in it directly with a disqualified person is likewise an excess benefit transaction when it is accomplished indirectly. An applicable tax-exempt organization may provide an excess benefit indirectly to a disqualified person through a controlled entity or through an intermediary, as described in paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section, respectively.

(ii) Through a controlled entity—(A) In general. An applicable tax-exempt organization may provide an excess benefit indirectly through the use of one or more entities it controls. For purposes of section 4958, economic benefits provided by a controlled entity will be treated as provided by the applicable tax-exempt organization.

(B) Definition of control—(1) In general. For purposes of this paragraph, control by an applicable tax-exempt organization means—

(i) In the case of a stock corporation, ownership (by vote or value) of more than 50 percent of the stock in such corporation;

(ii) In the case of a partnership, ownership of more than 50 percent of the profits interests or capital interests in the partnership;

(iii) In the case of a nonstock organization (i.e., an entity in which no person holds a proprietary interest), that at least 50 percent of the directors or trustees of the organization are either representatives (including trustees, directors, agents, or employees) of, or directly or indirectly controlled by, an applicable tax-exempt organization; or

(iv) In the case of any other entity, ownership of more than 50 percent of the beneficial interest in the entity.

(2) Constructive ownership. Section 318 (relating to constructive ownership of stock) shall apply for purposes of determining ownership of stock in a corporation. Similar principles shall apply for purposes of determining ownership of interests in any other entity.

(iii) Through an intermediary. An applicable tax-exempt organization may provide an excess benefit indirectly through an intermediary. An intermediary is any person (including an individual or a taxable or tax-exempt entity) who participates in a transaction with one or more disqualified persons of an applicable tax-exempt organization. For purposes of section 4958, economic benefits provided by an intermediary will be treated as provided by the applicable tax-exempt organization when—

(A) An applicable tax-exempt organization provides an economic benefit to an intermediary; and

(B) In connection with the receipt of the benefit by the intermediary—

(1) There is evidence of an oral or written agreement or understanding that the intermediary will provide economic benefits to or for the use of a disqualified person; or

(2) The intermediary provides economic benefits to or for the use of a disqualified person without a significant business purpose or exempt purpose of its own.

(iv) Examples. The following examples illustrate when economic benefits are provided indirectly under the rules of this paragraph (a)(2):

Example 1.  K is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. L is a wholly-owned taxable subsidiary of K. J is employed by K, and is a disqualified person with respect to K. K pays J an annual salary of $12m, and reports that amount as compensation during calendar year 2001. Although J only performed services for K for nine months of 2001, J performed equivalent services for L during the remaining three months of 2001. Taking into account all of the economic benefits K provided to J, and all of the services J performed for K and L, $12m does not exceed the fair market value of the services J performed for K and L during 2001. Therefore, under these facts, K does not provide an excess benefit to J directly or indirectly.

Example 2.  F is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. D is an entity controlled by F within the meaning of paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section. T is the chief executive officer (CEO) of F. As CEO, T is responsible for overseeing the activities of F. T's duties as CEO make him a disqualified person with respect to F. T's compensation package with F represents the maximum reasonable compensation for T's services as CEO. Thus, any additional economic benefits that F provides to T without T providing additional consideration constitute an excess benefit. D contracts with T to provide enumerated consulting services to D. However, the contract does not require T to perform any additional services for D that T is not already obligated to perform as F's chief executive officer. Therefore, any payment to T pursuant to the consulting contract with D represents an indirect excess benefit that F provides through a controlled entity, even if F, D, or T treats the additional payment to T as compensation.

Example 3.  P is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. S is a taxable entity controlled by P within the meaning of paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section. V is the chief executive officer of S, for which S pays V $w in salary and benefits. V also serves as a voting member of P's governing body. Consequently, V is a disqualified person with respect to P. P provides V with $x representing compensation for the services V provides P as a member of its governing body. Although $x represents reasonable compensation for the services V provides directly to P as a member of its governing body, the total compensation of $w + $x exceeds reasonable compensation for the services V provides to P and S collectively. Therefore, the portion of total compensation that exceeds reasonable compensation is an excess benefit provided to V.

Example 4.  G is an applicable tax-exempt organization for section 4958 purposes. F is a disqualified person who was last employed by G in a position of substantial influence three years ago. H is an entity engaged in scientific research and is unrelated to either F or G. G makes a grant to H to fund a research position. H subsequently advertises for qualified candidates for the research position. F is among several highly qualified candidates who apply for the research position. H hires F. There was no evidence of an oral or written agreement or understanding with G that H will use G's grant to provide economic benefits to or for the use of F. Although G provided economic benefits to H, and in connection with the receipt of such benefits, H will provide economic benefits to or for the use of F, H acted with a significant business purpose or exempt purpose of its own. Under these facts, G did not provide an economic benefit to F indirectly through the use of an intermediary.

(3) Exception for fixed payments made pursuant to an initial contract—(i) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(3)(iv) of this section, section 4958 does not apply to any fixed payment made to a person pursuant to an initial contract.

(ii) Fixed payment—(A) In general. For purposes of paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section, fixed payment means an amount of cash or other property specified in the contract, or determined by a fixed formula specified in the contract, which is to be paid or transferred in exchange for the provision of specified services or property. A fixed formula may incorporate an amount that depends upon future specified events or contingencies, provided that no person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of a payment or deciding whether to make a payment (such as a bonus). A specified event or contingency may include the amount of revenues generated by (or other objective measure of) one or more activities of the applicable tax-exempt organization. A fixed payment does not include any amount paid to a person under a reimbursement (or similar) arrangement where discretion is exercised by any person with respect to the amount of expenses incurred or reimbursed.

(B) Special rules. Amounts payable pursuant to a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan under section 401(a), or pursuant to an employee benefit program that is subject to and satisfies coverage and nondiscrimination rules under the Internal Revenue Code (e.g., sections 127 and 137), other than nondiscrimination rules under section 9802, are treated as fixed payments for purposes of this section, regardless of the applicable tax-exempt organization's discretion with respect to the plan or program. The fact that a person contracting with an applicable tax-exempt organization is expressly granted the choice whether to accept or reject any economic benefit is disregarded in determining whether the benefit constitutes a fixed payment for purposes of this paragraph.

(iii) Initial contract. For purposes of paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section, initial contract means a binding written contract between an applicable tax-exempt organization and a person who was not a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3 immediately prior to entering into the contract.

(iv) Substantial performance required. Paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section does not apply to any fixed payment made pursuant to the initial contract during any taxable year of the person contracting with the applicable tax-exempt organization if the person fails to perform substantially the person's obligations under the initial contract during that year.

(v) Treatment as a new contract. A written binding contract that provides that the contract is terminable or subject to cancellation by the applicable tax-exempt organization (other than as a result of a lack of substantial performance by the disqualified person, as described in paragraph (a)(3)(iv) of this section) without the other party's consent and without substantial penalty to the organization is treated as a new contract as of the earliest date that any such termination or cancellation, if made, would be effective. Additionally, if the parties make a material change to a contract, it is treated as a new contract as of the date the material change is effective. A material change includes an extension or renewal of the contract (other than an extension or renewal that results from the person contracting with the applicable tax-exempt organization unilaterally exercising an option expressly granted by the contract), or a more than incidental change to any amount payable under the contract. The new contract is tested under paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section to determine whether it is an initial contract for purposes of this section.

(vi) Evaluation of non-fixed payments. Any payment that is not a fixed payment (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section) is evaluated to determine whether it constitutes an excess benefit transaction under section 4958. In making this determination, all payments and consideration exchanged between the parties are taken into account, including any fixed payments made pursuant to an initial contract with respect to which section 4958 does not apply.

(vii) Examples. The following examples illustrate the rules governing fixed payments made pursuant to an initial contract. Unless otherwise stated, assume that the person contracting with the applicable tax-exempt organization has performed substantially the person's obligations under the contract with respect to the payment. The examples are as follows:

Example 1.  T is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. On January 1, 2002, T hires S as its chief financial officer by entering into a five-year written employment contract with S. S was not a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3 immediately prior to entering into the January 1, 2002, contract (initial contract). S's duties and responsibilities under the contract make S a disqualified person with respect to T (see §53.4958–3(c)(3)). Under the initial contract, T agrees to pay S an annual salary of $200,000, payable in monthly installments. The contract provides that, beginning in 2003, S's annual salary will be adjusted by the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the prior year. Section 4958 does not apply because S's compensation under the contract is a fixed payment pursuant to an initial contract within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3) of this section. Thus, for section 4958 purposes, it is unnecessary to evaluate whether any portion of the compensation paid to S pursuant to the initial contract is an excess benefit transaction.

Example 2.  The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the initial contract provides that, in addition to a base salary of $200,000, T may pay S an annual performance-based bonus. The contract provides that T's governing body will determine the amount of the annual bonus as of the end of each year during the term of the contract, based on the board's evaluation of S's performance, but the bonus cannot exceed $100,000 per year. Unlike the base salary portion of S's compensation, the bonus portion of S's compensation is not a fixed payment pursuant to an initial contract, because the governing body has discretion over the amount, if any, of the bonus payment. Section 4958 does not apply to payment of the $200,000 base salary (as adjusted for inflation), because it is a fixed payment pursuant to an initial contract within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3) of this section. By contrast, the annual bonuses that may be paid to S under the initial contract are not protected by the initial contract exception. Therefore, each bonus payment will be evaluated under section 4958, taking into account all payments and consideration exchanged between the parties.

Example 3.  The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that in 2003, T changes its payroll system, such that T makes biweekly, rather than monthly, salary payments to its employees. Beginning in 2003, T also grants its employees an additional two days of paid vacation each year. Neither change is a material change to S's initial contract within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(v) of this section. Therefore, section 4958 does not apply to the base salary payments to S due to the initial contract exception.

Example 4.  The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that on January 1, 2003, S becomes the chief executive officer of T and a new chief financial officer is hired. At the same time, T's board of directors approves an increase in S's annual base salary from $200,000 to $240,000, effective on that day. These changes in S's employment relationship constitute material changes of the initial contract within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(v) of this section. As a result, S is treated as entering into a new contract with T on January 1, 2003, at which time S is a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3. T's payments to S made pursuant to the new contract will be evaluated under section 4958, taking into account all payments and consideration exchanged between the parties.

Example 5.  J is a performing arts organization and an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. J hires W to become the chief executive officer of J. W was not a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3 immediately prior to entering into the employment contract with J. As a result of this employment contract, W's duties and responsibilities make W a disqualified person with respect to J (see §53.4958–3(c)(2)). Under the contract, J will pay W $x (a specified amount) plus a bonus equal to 2 percent of the total season subscription sales that exceed $100z. The $x base salary is a fixed payment pursuant to an initial contract within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3) of this section. The bonus payment is also a fixed payment pursuant to an initial contract within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3) of this section, because no person exercises discretion when calculating the amount of the bonus payment or deciding whether the bonus will be paid. Therefore, section 4958 does not apply to any of J's payments to W pursuant to the employment contract due to the initial contract exception.

Example 6.  Hospital B is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. Hospital B hires E as its chief operating officer. E was not a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3 immediately prior to entering into the employment contract with Hospital B. As a result of this employment contract, E's duties and responsibilities make E a disqualified person with respect to Hospital B (see §53.4958–3(c)(2)). E's initial employment contract provides that E will have authority to enter into hospital management arrangements on behalf of Hospital B. In E's personal capacity, E owns more than 35 percent of the combined voting power of Company X. Consequently, at the time E becomes a disqualified person with respect to B, Company X also becomes a disqualified person with respect to B (see §53.4958–3(b)(2)(i)(A)). E, acting on behalf of Hospital B as chief operating officer, enters into a contract with Company X under which Company X will provide billing and collection services to Hospital B. The initial contract exception of paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section does not apply to the billing and collection services contract, because at the time that this contractual arrangement was entered into, Company X was a disqualified person with respect to Hospital B. Although E's employment contract (which is an initial contract) authorizes E to enter into hospital management arrangements on behalf of Hospital B, the payments made to Company X are not made pursuant to E's employment contract, but rather are made by Hospital B pursuant to a separate contractual arrangement with Company X. Therefore, even if payments made to Company X under the billing and collection services contract are fixed payments (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section), section 4958 nonetheless applies to payments made by Hospital B to Company X because the billing and collection services contract itself does not constitute an initial contract under paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section. Accordingly, all payments made to Company X under the billing and collection services contract will be evaluated under section 4958.

Example 7.  Hospital C, an applicable tax-exempt organization, enters into a contract with Company Y, under which Company Y will provide a wide range of hospital management services to Hospital C. Upon entering into this contractual arrangement, Company Y becomes a disqualified person with respect to Hospital C. The contract provides that Hospital C will pay Company Y a management fee of x percent of adjusted gross revenue (i.e., gross revenue increased by the cost of charity care provided to indigents) annually for a five-year period. The management services contract specifies the cost accounting system and the standards for indigents to be used in calculating the cost of charity care. The cost accounting system objectively defines the direct and indirect costs of all health care goods and services provided as charity care. Because Company Y was not a disqualified person with respect to Hospital C immediately before entering into the management services contract, that contract is an initial contract within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(iii) of this section. The annual management fee paid to Company Y is determined by a fixed formula specified in the contract, and is therefore a fixed payment within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section. Accordingly, section 4958 does not apply to the annual management fee due to the initial contract exception.

Example 8.  The facts are the same as in Example 7, except that the management services contract also provides that Hospital C will reimburse Company Y on a monthly basis for certain expenses incurred by Company Y that are attributable to management services provided to Hospital C (e.g., legal fees and travel expenses). Although the management fee itself is a fixed payment not subject to section 4958, the reimbursement payments that Hospital C makes to Company Y for the various expenses covered by the contract are not fixed payments within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section, because Company Y exercises discretion with respect to the amount of expenses incurred. Therefore, any reimbursement payments that Hospital C pays pursuant to the contract will be evaluated under section 4958.

Example 9.  X, an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958, hires C to conduct scientific research. On January 1, 2003, C enters into a three-year written employment contract with X (initial contract). Under the terms of the contract, C is required to work full-time at X's laboratory for a fixed annual salary of $90,000. Immediately prior to entering into the employment contract, C was not a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3, nor did C become a disqualified person pursuant to the initial contract. However, two years after joining X, C marries D, who is the child of X's president. As D's spouse, C is a disqualified person within the meaning of section 4958(f)(1) and §53.4958–3 with respect to X. Nonetheless, section 4958 does not apply to X's salary payments to C due to the initial contract exception.

Example 10.  The facts are the same as in Example 9, except that the initial contract included a below-market loan provision under which C has the unilateral right to borrow up to a specified dollar amount from X at a specified interest rate for a specified term. After C's marriage to D, C borrows money from X to purchase a home under the terms of the initial contract. Section 4958 does not apply to X's loan to C due to the initial contract exception.

Example 11.  The facts are the same as in Example 9, except that after C's marriage to D, C works only sporadically at the laboratory, and performs no other services for X. Notwithstanding that C fails to perform substantially C's obligations under the initial contract, X does not exercise its right to terminate the initial contract for nonperformance and continues to pay full salary to C. Pursuant to paragraph (a)(3)(iv) of this section, the initial contract exception does not apply to any payments made pursuant to the initial contract during any taxable year of C in which C fails to perform substantially C's obligations under the initial contract.

(4) Certain economic benefits disregarded for purposes of section 4958. The following economic benefits are disregarded for purposes of section 4958—

(i) Nontaxable fringe benefits. An economic benefit that is excluded from income under section 132, except any liability insurance premium, payment, or reimbursement that must be taken into account under paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B)(2) of this section;

(ii) Expense reimbursement payments pursuant to accountable plans. Amounts paid under reimbursement arrangements that meet the requirements of §1.62–2(c) of this chapter;

(iii) Certain economic benefits provided to a volunteer for the organization. An economic benefit provided to a volunteer for the organization if the benefit is provided to the general public in exchange for a membership fee or contribution of $75 or less per year;

(iv) Certain economic benefits provided to a member of, or donor to, the organization. An economic benefit provided to a member of an organization solely on account of the payment of a membership fee, or to a donor solely on account of a contribution for which a deduction is allowable under section 170 (charitable contribution), regardless of whether the donor is eligible to claim the deduction, if—

(A) Any non-disqualified person paying a membership fee or making a charitable contribution above a specified amount to the organization is given the option of receiving substantially the same economic benefit; and

(B) The disqualified person and a significant number of non-disqualified persons make a payment or charitable contribution of at least the specified amount;

(v) Economic benefits provided to a charitable beneficiary. An economic benefit provided to a person solely because the person is a member of a charitable class that the applicable tax-exempt organization intends to benefit as part of the accomplishment of the organization's exempt purpose; and

(vi) Certain economic benefits provided to a governmental unit. Any transfer of an economic benefit to or for the use of a governmental unit defined in section 170(c)(1), if the transfer is for exclusively public purposes.

(5) Exception for certain payments made pursuant to an exemption granted by the Department of Labor under ERISA. Section 4958 does not apply to any payment made pursuant to, and in accordance with, a final individual prohibited transaction exemption issued by the Department of Labor under section 408(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 854) (ERISA) with respect to a transaction involving a plan (as defined in section 3(3) of ERISA) that is an applicable tax exempt organization.

(b) Valuation standards—(1) In general. This section provides rules for determining the value of economic benefits for purposes of section 4958.

(i) Fair market value of property. The value of property, including the right to use property, for purposes of section 4958 is the fair market value (i.e., the price at which property or the right to use property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy, sell or transfer property or the right to use property, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts).

(ii) Reasonable compensation—(A) In general. The value of services is the amount that would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises (whether taxable or tax-exempt) under like circumstances (i.e., reasonable compensation). Section 162 standards apply in determining reasonableness of compensation, taking into account the aggregate benefits (other than any benefits specifically disregarded under paragraph (a)(4) of this section) provided to a person and the rate at which any deferred compensation accrues. The fact that a compensation arrangement is subject to a cap is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of compensation. The fact that a State or local legislative or agency body or court has authorized or approved a particular compensation package paid to a disqualified person is not determinative of the reasonableness of compensation for purposes of section 4958.

(B) Items included in determining the value of compensation for purposes of determining reasonableness under section 4958. Except for economic benefits that are disregarded for purposes of section 4958 under paragraph (a)(4) of this section, compensation for purposes of determining reasonableness under section 4958 includes all economic benefits provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization in exchange for the performance of services. These benefits include, but are not limited to—

(1) All forms of cash and noncash compensation, including salary, fees, bonuses, severance payments, and deferred and noncash compensation described in §53.4958–1(e)(2);

(2) Unless excludable from income as a de minimis fringe benefit pursuant to section 132(a)(4), the payment of liability insurance premiums for, or the payment or reimbursement by the organization of—

(i) Any penalty, tax, or expense of correction owed under section 4958;

(ii) Any expense not reasonably incurred by the person in connection with a civil judicial or civil administrative proceeding arising out of the person's performance of services on behalf of the applicable tax-exempt organization; or

(iii) Any expense resulting from an act or failure to act with respect to which the person has acted willfully and without reasonable cause; and

(3) All other compensatory benefits, whether or not included in gross income for income tax purposes, including payments to welfare benefit plans, such as plans providing medical, dental, life insurance, severance pay, and disability benefits, and both taxable and nontaxable fringe benefits (other than fringe benefits described in section 132), including expense allowances or reimbursements (other than expense reimbursements pursuant to an accountable plan that meets the requirements of §1.62–2(c)), and the economic benefit of a below-market loan (within the meaning of section 7872(e)(1)). (For this purpose, the economic benefit of a below-market loan is the amount deemed transferred to the disqualified person under section 7872(a) or (b), regardless of whether section 7872 otherwise applies to the loan).

(C) Inclusion in compensation for reasonableness determination does not govern income tax treatment. The determination of whether any item listed in paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B) of this section is included in the disqualified person's gross income for income tax purposes is made on the basis of the provisions of chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, without regard to whether the item is taken into account for purposes of determining reasonableness of compensation under section 4958.

(2) Timing of reasonableness determination—(i) In general. The facts and circumstances to be taken into consideration in determining reasonableness of a fixed payment (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section) are those existing on the date the parties enter into the contract pursuant to which the payment is made. However, in the event of substantial non-performance, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and circumstances, up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment. In the case of any payment that is not a fixed payment under a contract, reasonableness is determined based on all facts and circumstances, up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment. In no event shall circumstances existing at the date when the payment is questioned be considered in making a determination of the reasonableness of the payment. These general timing rules also apply to property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Therefore, if the property subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture satisfies the definition of fixed payment (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section), reasonableness is determined at the time the parties enter into the contract providing for the transfer of the property. If the property is not a fixed payment, then reasonableness is determined based on all facts and circumstances up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment.

(ii) Treatment as a new contract. For purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, a written binding contract that provides that the contract is terminable or subject to cancellation by the applicable tax-exempt organization without the other party's consent and without substantial penalty to the organization is treated as a new contract as of the earliest date that any such termination or cancellation, if made, would be effective. Additionally, if the parties make a material change to a contract (within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(v) of this section), it is treated as a new contract as of the date the material change is effective.

(iii) Examples. The following examples illustrate the timing of the reasonableness determination under the rules of this paragraph (b)(2):

Example 1.  G is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. H is an employee of G and a disqualified person with respect to G. H's new multi-year employment contract provides for payment of a salary and provision of specific benefits pursuant to a qualified pension plan under section 401(a) and an accident and health plan that meets the requirements of section 105(h)(2). The contract provides that H's salary will be adjusted by the increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the prior year. The contributions G makes to the qualified pension plan are equal to the maximum amount G is permitted to contribute under the rules applicable to qualified plans. Under these facts, all items comprising H's total compensation are treated as fixed payments within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section. Therefore, the reasonableness of H's compensation is determined based on the circumstances existing at the time G and H enter into the employment contract.

Example 2.  The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the multi-year employment contract provides, in addition, that G will transfer title to a car to H under the condition that if H fails to complete x years of service with G, title to the car will be forfeited back to G. All relevant information about the type of car to be provided (including the make, model, and year) is included in the contract. Although ultimate vesting of title to the car is contingent on H continuing to work for G for x years, the amount of property to be vested (i.e., the type of car) is specified in the contract, and no person exercises discretion regarding the type of property or whether H will retain title to the property at the time of vesting. Under these facts, the car is a fixed payment within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section. Therefore, the reasonableness of H's compensation, including the value of the car, is determined based on the circumstances existing at the time G and H enter into the employment contract.

Example 3.  N is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. On January 2, N's governing body enters into a new one-year employment contract with K, its executive director, who is a disqualified person with respect to N. The contract provides that K will receive a specified amount of salary, contributions to a qualified pension plan under section 401(a), and other benefits pursuant to a section 125 cafeteria plan. In addition, the contract provides that N's governing body may, in its discretion, declare a bonus to be paid to K at any time during the year covered by the contract. K's salary and other specified benefits constitute fixed payments within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section. Therefore, the reasonableness of those economic benefits is determined on the date when the contract was made. However, because the bonus payment is not a fixed payment within the meaning of paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section, the determination of whether any bonus awarded to N is reasonable must be made based on all facts and circumstances (including all payments and consideration exchanged between the parties), up to and including circumstances as of the date of payment of the bonus.

(c) Establishing intent to treat economic benefit as consideration for the performance of services—(1) In general. An economic benefit is not treated as consideration for the performance of services unless the organization providing the benefit clearly indicates its intent to treat the benefit as compensation when the benefit is paid. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, an applicable tax-exempt organization (or entity controlled by an applicable tax-exempt organization, within the meaning of paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B) of this section) is treated as clearly indicating its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation for services only if the organization provides written substantiation that is contemporaneous with the transfer of the economic benefit at issue. If an organization fails to provide this contemporaneous substantiation, any services provided by the disqualified person will not be treated as provided in consideration for the economic benefit for purposes of determining the reasonableness of the transaction. In no event shall an economic benefit that a disqualified person obtains by theft or fraud be treated as consideration for the performance of services.

(2) Nontaxable benefits. For purposes of section 4958(c)(1)(A) and this section, an applicable tax-exempt organization is not required to indicate its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation for services if the economic benefit is excluded from the disqualified person's gross income for income tax purposes on the basis of the provisions of chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. Examples of these benefits include, but are not limited to, employer-provided health benefits and contributions to a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan under section 401(a), and benefits described in sections 127 and 137. However, except for economic benefits that are disregarded for purposes of section 4958 under paragraph (a)(4) of this section, all compensatory benefits (regardless of the Federal income tax treatment) provided by an organization in exchange for the performance of services are taken into account in determining the reasonableness of a person's compensation for purposes of section 4958.

(3) Contemporaneous substantiation—(i) Reporting of benefit—(A) In general. An applicable tax-exempt organization provides contemporaneous written substantiation of its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation if—

(1) The organization reports the economic benefit as compensation on an original Federal tax information return with respect to the payment (e.g., Form W-2, “Wage and Tax Statement”, or Form 1099, “Miscellaneous Income”) or with respect to the organization (e.g., Form 990, “Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax”), or on an amended Federal tax information return filed prior to the commencement of an Internal Revenue Service examination of the applicable tax-exempt organization or the disqualified person for the taxable year in which the transaction occurred (as determined under §53.4958–1(e)); or

(2) The recipient disqualified person reports the benefit as income on the person's original Federal tax return (e.g., Form 1040, “U.S. Individual Income Tax Return”), or on the person's amended Federal tax return filed prior to the earlier of the following dates—

(i) Commencement of an Internal Revenue Service examination described in paragraph (c)(3)(i)(A)(1) of this section; or

(ii) The first documentation in writing by the Internal Revenue Service of a potential excess benefit transaction involving either the applicable tax-exempt organization or the disqualified person.

(B) Failure to report due to reasonable cause. If an applicable tax-exempt organization's failure to report an economic benefit as required under the Internal Revenue Code is due to reasonable cause (within the meaning of §301.6724–1 of this chapter), then the organization will be treated as having clearly indicated its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation for services. To show that its failure to report an economic benefit that should have been reported on an information return was due to reasonable cause, an applicable tax-exempt organization must establish that there were significant mitigating factors with respect to its failure to report (as described in §301.6724–1(b) of this chapter), or the failure arose from events beyond the organization's control (as described in §301.6724–1(c) of this chapter), and that the organization acted in a responsible manner both before and after the failure occurred (as described in §301.6724–1(d) of this chapter).

(ii) Other written contemporaneous evidence. In addition, other written contemporaneous evidence may be used to demonstrate that the appropriate decision-making body or an officer authorized to approve compensation approved a transfer as compensation for services in accordance with established procedures, including but not limited to—

(A) An approved written employment contract executed on or before the date of the transfer;

(B) Documentation satisfying the requirements of §53.4958–6(a)(3) indicating that an authorized body approved the transfer as compensation for services on or before the date of the transfer; or

(C) Written evidence that was in existence on or before the due date of the applicable Federal tax return described in paragraph (c)(3)(i)(A)(1) or (2) of this section (including extensions but not amendments), of a reasonable belief by the applicable tax-exempt organization that a benefit was a nontaxable benefit as defined in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.

(4) Examples. The following examples illustrate the requirement that an organization contemporaneously substantiate its intent to provide an economic benefit as compensation for services, as defined in paragraph (c) of this section:

Example 1.  G is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. G hires an individual contractor, P, who is also the child of a disqualified person of G, to design a computer program for it. G executes a contract with P for that purpose in accordance with G's established procedures, and pays P $1,000 during the year pursuant to the contract. Before January 31 of the next year, G reports the full amount paid to P under the contract on a Form 1099 filed with the Internal Revenue Service. G will be treated as providing contemporaneous written substantiation of its intent to provide the $1,000 paid to P as compensation for the services P performed under the contract by virtue of either the Form 1099 filed with the Internal Revenue Service reporting the amount, or by virtue of the written contract executed between G and P.

Example 2.  G is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. D is the chief operating officer of G, and a disqualified person with respect to G. D receives a bonus at the end of the year. G's accounting department determines that the bonus is to be reported on D's Form W-2. Due to events beyond G's control, the bonus is not reflected on D's Form W-2. As a result, D fails to report the bonus on D's individual income tax return. G acts to amend Forms W-2 affected as soon as G is made aware of the error during an Internal Revenue Service examination. G's failure to report the bonus on an information return issued to D arose from events beyond G's control, and G acted in a responsible manner both before and after the failure occurred. Thus, because G had reasonable cause (within the meaning §301.6724–1 of this chapter) for failing to report D's bonus, G will be treated as providing contemporaneous written substantiation of its intent to provide the bonus as compensation for services when paid.

Example 3.  H is an applicable tax-exempt organization and J is a disqualified person with respect to H. J's written employment agreement provides for a fixed salary of $y. J's duties include soliciting funds for various programs of H. H raises a large portion of its funds in a major metropolitan area. Accordingly, H maintains an apartment there in order to provide a place to entertain potential donors. H makes the apartment available exclusively to J to assist in the fundraising. J's written employment contract does not mention the use of the apartment. H obtains the written opinion of a benefits compensation expert that the rental value of the apartment is not includable in J's income by reason of section 119, based on the expectation that the apartment will be used for fundraising activities. Consequently, H does not report the rental value of the apartment on J's Form W-2, which otherwise correctly reports J's taxable compensation. J does not report the rental value of the apartment on J's individual Form 1040. Later, the Internal Revenue Service correctly determines that the requirements of section 119 were not satisfied. Because of the written expert opinion, H has written evidence of its reasonable belief that use of the apartment was a nontaxable benefit as defined in paragraph (c)(2) of this section. That evidence was in existence on or before the due date of the applicable Federal tax return. Therefore, H has demonstrated its intent to treat the use of the apartment as compensation for services performed by J.

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002; 67 FR 12472, Mar. 19, 2002]

(a) In general. Payments under a compensation arrangement are presumed to be reasonable, and a transfer of property, or the right to use property, is presumed to be at fair market value, if the following conditions are satisfied—

(1) The compensation arrangement or the terms of the property transfer are approved in advance by an authorized body of the applicable tax-exempt organization (or an entity controlled by the organization within the meaning of §53.4958–4(a)(2)(ii)(B)) composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of interest (within the meaning of paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of this section) with respect to the compensation arrangement or property transfer, as described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section;

(2) The authorized body obtained and relied upon appropriate data as to comparability prior to making its determination, as described in paragraph (c)(2) of this section; and

(3) The authorized body adequately documented the basis for its determination concurrently with making that determination, as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section.

(b) Rebutting the presumption. If the three requirements of paragraph (a) of this section are satisfied, then the Internal Revenue Service may rebut the presumption that arises under paragraph (a) of this section only if it develops sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the probative value of the comparability data relied upon by the authorized body. With respect to any fixed payment (within the meaning of §53.4958–4(a)(3)(ii)), rebuttal evidence is limited to evidence relating to facts and circumstances existing on the date the parties enter into the contract pursuant to which the payment is made (except in the event of substantial nonperformance). With respect to all other payments (including non-fixed payments subject to a cap, as described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section), rebuttal evidence may include facts and circumstances up to and including the date of payment. See §53.4958–4(b)(2)(i).

(c) Requirements for invoking rebuttable presumption—(1) Approval by an authorized body—(i) In general. An authorized body means—

(A) The governing body (i.e., the board of directors, board of trustees, or equivalent controlling body) of the organization;

(B) A committee of the governing body, which may be composed of any individuals permitted under State law to serve on such a committee, to the extent that the committee is permitted by State law to act on behalf of the governing body; or

(C) To the extent permitted under State law, other parties authorized by the governing body of the organization to act on its behalf by following procedures specified by the governing body in approving compensation arrangements or property transfers.

(ii) Individuals not included on authorized body. For purposes of determining whether the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section have been met with respect to a specific compensation arrangement or property transfer, an individual is not included on the authorized body when it is reviewing a transaction if that individual meets with other members only to answer questions, and otherwise recuses himself or herself from the meeting and is not present during debate and voting on the compensation arrangement or property transfer.

(iii) Absence of conflict of interest. A member of the authorized body does not have a conflict of interest with respect to a compensation arrangement or property transfer only if the member—

(A) Is not a disqualified person participating in or economically benefitting from the compensation arrangement or property transfer, and is not a member of the family of any such disqualified person, as described in section 4958(f)(4) or §53.4958–3(b)(1);

(B) Is not in an employment relationship subject to the direction or control of any disqualified person participating in or economically benefitting from the compensation arrangement or property transfer;

(C) Does not receive compensation or other payments subject to approval by any disqualified person participating in or economically benefitting from the compensation arrangement or property transfer;

(D) Has no material financial interest affected by the compensation arrangement or property transfer; and

(E) Does not approve a transaction providing economic benefits to any disqualified person participating in the compensation arrangement or property transfer, who in turn has approved or will approve a transaction providing economic benefits to the member.

(2) Appropriate data as to comparability—(i) In general. An authorized body has appropriate data as to comparability if, given the knowledge and expertise of its members, it has information sufficient to determine whether, under the standards set forth in §53.4958–4(b), the compensation arrangement in its entirety is reasonable or the property transfer is at fair market value. In the case of compensation, relevant information includes, but is not limited to, compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations, both taxable and tax-exempt, for functionally comparable positions; the availability of similar services in the geographic area of the applicable tax-exempt organization; current compensation surveys compiled by independent firms; and actual written offers from similar institutions competing for the services of the disqualified person. In the case of property, relevant information includes, but is not limited to, current independent appraisals of the value of all property to be transferred; and offers received as part of an open and competitive bidding process.

(ii) Special rule for compensation paid by small organizations. For organizations with annual gross receipts (including contributions) of less than $1 million reviewing compensation arrangements, the authorized body will be considered to have appropriate data as to comparability if it has data on compensation paid by three comparable organizations in the same or similar communities for similar services. No inference is intended with respect to whether circumstances falling outside this safe harbor will meet the requirement with respect to the collection of appropriate data.

(iii) Application of special rule for small organizations. For purposes of determining whether the special rule for small organizations described in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section applies, an organization may calculate its annual gross receipts based on an average of its gross receipts during the three prior taxable years. If any applicable tax-exempt organization is controlled by or controls another entity (as defined in §53.4958–4(a)(2)(ii)(B)), the annual gross receipts of such organizations must be aggregated to determine applicability of the special rule stated in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section.

(iv) Examples. The following examples illustrate the rules for appropriate data as to comparability for purposes of invoking the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness described in this section. In all examples, compensation refers to the aggregate value of all benefits provided in exchange for services. The examples are as follows:

Example 1.  Z is a university that is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. Z is negotiating a new contract with Q, its president, because the old contract will expire at the end of the year. In setting Q's compensation for its president at $600x per annum, the executive committee of the Board of Trustees relies solely on a national survey of compensation for university presidents that indicates university presidents receive annual compensation in the range of $100x to $700x; this survey does not divide its data by any criteria, such as the number of students served by the institution, annual revenues, academic ranking, or geographic location. Although many members of the executive committee have significant business experience, none of the members has any particular expertise in higher education compensation matters. Given the failure of the survey to provide information specific to universities comparable to Z, and because no other information was presented, the executive committee's decision with respect to Q's compensation was not based upon appropriate data as to comparability.

Example 2.  The facts are the same as Example 1, except that the national compensation survey divides the data regarding compensation for university presidents into categories based on various university-specific factors, including the size of the institution (in terms of the number of students it serves and the amount of its revenues) and geographic area. The survey data shows that university presidents at institutions comparable to and in the same geographic area as Z receive annual compensation in the range of $200x to $300x. The executive committee of the Board of Trustees of Z relies on the survey data and its evaluation of Q's many years of service as a tenured professor and high-ranking university official at Z in setting Q's compensation at $275x annually. The data relied upon by the executive committee constitutes appropriate data as to comparability.

Example 3.  X is a tax-exempt hospital that is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. Before renewing the contracts of X's chief executive officer and chief financial officer, X's governing board commissioned a customized compensation survey from an independent firm that specializes in consulting on issues related to executive placement and compensation. The survey covered executives with comparable responsibilities at a significant number of taxable and tax-exempt hospitals. The survey data are sorted by a number of different variables, including the size of the hospitals and the nature of the services they provide, the level of experience and specific responsibilities of the executives, and the composition of the annual compensation packages. The board members were provided with the survey results, a detailed written analysis comparing the hospital's executives to those covered by the survey, and an opportunity to ask questions of a member of the firm that prepared the survey. The survey, as prepared and presented to X's board, constitutes appropriate data as to comparability.

Example 4.  The facts are the same as Example 3, except that one year later, X is negotiating a new contract with its chief executive officer. The governing board of X obtains information indicating that the relevant market conditions have not changed materially, and possesses no other information indicating that the results of the prior year's survey are no longer valid. Therefore, X may continue to rely on the independent compensation survey prepared for the prior year in setting annual compensation under the new contract.

Example 5.  W is a local repertory theater and an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. W has had annual gross receipts ranging from $400,000 to $800,000 over its past three taxable years. In determining the next year's compensation for W's artistic director, the board of directors of W relies on data compiled from a telephone survey of three other unrelated performing arts organizations of similar size in similar communities. A member of the board drafts a brief written summary of the annual compensation information obtained from this informal survey. The annual compensation information obtained in the telephone survey is appropriate data as to comparability.

(3) Documentation—(i) For a decision to be documented adequately, the written or electronic records of the authorized body must note—

(A) The terms of the transaction that was approved and the date it was approved;

(B) The members of the authorized body who were present during debate on the transaction that was approved and those who voted on it;

(C) The comparability data obtained and relied upon by the authorized body and how the data was obtained; and

(D) Any actions taken with respect to consideration of the transaction by anyone who is otherwise a member of the authorized body but who had a conflict of interest with respect to the transaction.

(ii) If the authorized body determines that reasonable compensation for a specific arrangement or fair market value in a specific property transfer is higher or lower than the range of comparability data obtained, the authorized body must record the basis for its determination. For a decision to be documented concurrently, records must be prepared before the later of the next meeting of the authorized body or 60 days after the final action or actions of the authorized body are taken. Records must be reviewed and approved by the authorized body as reasonable, accurate and complete within a reasonable time period thereafter.

(d) No presumption with respect to non-fixed payments until amounts are determined—(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, in the case of a payment that is not a fixed payment (within the meaning of §53.4958–4(a)(3)(ii)), the rebuttable presumption of this section arises only after the exact amount of the payment is determined, or a fixed formula for calculating the payment is specified, and the three requirements for the presumption under paragraph (a) of this section subsequently are satisfied. See §53.4958–4(b)(2)(i).

(2) Special rule for certain non-fixed payments subject to a cap. If the authorized body approves an employment contract with a disqualified person that includes a non-fixed payment (such as a discretionary bonus) subject to a specified cap, the authorized body may establish a rebuttable presumption with respect to the non-fixed payment at the time the employment contract is entered into if—

(i) Prior to approving the contract, the authorized body obtains appropriate comparability data indicating that a fixed payment of up to a certain amount to the particular disqualified person would represent reasonable compensation;

(ii) The maximum amount payable under the contract (taking into account both fixed and non-fixed payments) does not exceed the amount referred to in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section; and

(iii) The other requirements for the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness under paragraph (a) of this section are satisfied.

(e) No inference from absence of presumption. The fact that a transaction between an applicable tax-exempt organization and a disqualified person is not subject to the presumption described in this section neither creates any inference that the transaction is an excess benefit transaction, nor exempts or relieves any person from compliance with any Federal or state law imposing any obligation, duty, responsibility, or other standard of conduct with respect to the operation or administration of any applicable tax-exempt organization.

(f) Period of reliance on rebuttable presumption. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section with respect to non-fixed payments, the rebuttable presumption applies to all payments made or transactions completed in accordance with a contract, provided that the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section were met at the time the parties entered into the contract.

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002]

(a) In general. An excess benefit transaction is corrected by undoing the excess benefit to the extent possible, and taking any additional measures necessary to place the applicable tax-exempt organization involved in the excess benefit transaction in a financial position not worse than that in which it would be if the disqualified person were dealing under the highest fiduciary standards. Paragraph (b) of this section describes the acceptable forms of correction. Paragraph (c) of this section defines the correction amount. Paragraph (d) of this section describes correction where a contract has been partially performed. Paragraph (e) of this section describes correction where the applicable tax-exempt organization involved in the transaction has ceased to exist or is no longer tax-exempt. Paragraph (f) of this section provides examples illustrating correction.

(b) Form of correction—(1) Cash or cash equivalents. Except as provided in paragraphs (b)(3) and (4) of this section, a disqualified person corrects an excess benefit only by making a payment in cash or cash equivalents, excluding payment by a promissory note, to the applicable tax-exempt organization equal to the correction amount, as defined in paragraph (c) of this section.

(2) Anti-abuse rule. A disqualified person will not satisfy the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this section if the Commissioner determines that the disqualified person engaged in one or more transactions with the applicable tax-exempt organization to circumvent the requirements of this correction section, and as a result, the disqualified person effectively transferred property other than cash or cash equivalents.

(3) Special rule relating to nonqualified deferred compensation. If an excess benefit transaction results, in whole or in part, from the vesting (as described in §53.4958–1(e)(2)) of benefits provided under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan, then, to the extent that such benefits have not yet been distributed to the disqualified person, the disqualified person may correct the portion of the excess benefit resulting from the undistributed deferred compensation by relinquishing any right to receive the excess portion of the undistributed deferred compensation (including any earnings thereon).

(4) Return of specific property—(i) In general. A disqualified person may, with the agreement of the applicable tax-exempt organization, make a payment by returning specific property previously transferred in the excess benefit transaction. In this case, the disqualified person is treated as making a payment equal to the lesser of—

(A) The fair market value of the property determined on the date the property is returned to the organization; or

(B) The fair market value of the property on the date the excess benefit transaction occurred.

(ii) Payment not equal to correction amount. If the payment described in paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section is less than the correction amount (as described in paragraph (c) of this section), the disqualified person must make an additional cash payment to the organization equal to the difference. Conversely, if the payment described in paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section exceeds the correction amount (as described in paragraph (c) of this section), the organization may make a cash payment to the disqualified person equal to the difference.

(iii) Disqualified person may not participate in decision. Any disqualified person who received an excess benefit from the excess benefit transaction may not participate in the applicable tax-exempt organization's decision whether to accept the return of specific property under paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this section.

(c) Correction amount. The correction amount with respect to an excess benefit transaction equals the sum of the excess benefit (as defined in §53.4958–1(b)) and interest on the excess benefit. The amount of the interest charge for purposes of this section is determined by multiplying the excess benefit by an interest rate, compounded annually, for the period from the date the excess benefit transaction occurred (as defined in §53.4958–1(e)) to the date of correction. The interest rate used for this purpose must be a rate that equals or exceeds the applicable Federal rate (AFR), compounded annually, for the month in which the transaction occurred. The period from the date the excess benefit transaction occurred to the date of correction is used to determine whether the appropriate AFR is the Federal short-term rate, the Federal mid-term rate, or the Federal long-term rate. See section 1274(d)(1)(A).

(d) Correction where contract has been partially performed. If the excess benefit transaction arises under a contract that has been partially performed, termination of the contractual relationship between the organization and the disqualified person is not required in order to correct. However, the parties may need to modify the terms of any ongoing contract to avoid future excess benefit transactions.

(e) Correction in the case of an applicable tax-exempt organization that has ceased to exist, or is no longer tax-exempt—(1) In general. A disqualified person must correct an excess benefit transaction in accordance with this paragraph where the applicable tax-exempt organization that engaged in the transaction no longer exists or is no longer described in section 501(c)(3) or (4) and exempt from tax under section 501(a).

(2) Section 501(c)(3) organizations. In the case of an excess benefit transaction with a section 501(c)(3) applicable tax-exempt organization, the disqualified person must pay the correction amount, as defined in paragraph (c) of this section, to another organization described in section 501(c)(3) and exempt from tax under section 501(a) in accordance with the dissolution clause contained in the constitutive documents of the applicable tax-exempt organization involved in the excess benefit transaction, provided that—

(i) The organization receiving the correction amount is described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) and (viii)) and has been in existence and so described for a continuous period of at least 60 calendar months ending on the correction date;

(ii) The disqualified person is not also a disqualified person (as defined in §53.4958–3) with respect to the organization receiving the correction amount; and

(iii) The organization receiving the correction amount does not allow the disqualified person (or persons described in §53.4958–3(b) with respect to that person) to make or recommend any grants or distributions by the organization.

(3) Section 501(c)(4) organizations. In the case of an excess benefit transaction with a section 501(c)(4) applicable tax-exempt organization, the disqualified person must pay the correction amount, as defined in paragraph (c) of this section, to a successor section 501(c)(4) organization or, if no tax-exempt successor, to any organization described in section 501(c)(3) or (4) and exempt from tax under section 501(a), provided that the requirements of paragraphs (e)(2)(i) through (iii) of this section are satisfied (except that the requirement that the organization receiving the correction amount is described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than in section 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) and (viii)) shall not apply if the organization is described in section 501(c)(4)).

(f) Examples. The following examples illustrate the principles of this section describing the requirements of correction:

Example 1.  W is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. D is a disqualified person with respect to W. W employed D in 1999 and made payments totaling $12t to D as compensation throughout the taxable year. The fair market value of D's services in 1999 was $7t. Thus, D received excess compensation in the amount of $5t, the excess benefit for purposes of section 4958. In accordance with §53.4958–1(e)(1), the excess benefit transaction with respect to the series of compensatory payments during 1999 is deemed to occur on December 31, 1999, the last day of D's taxable year. In order to correct the excess benefit transaction on June 30, 2002, D must pay W, in cash or cash equivalents, excluding payment with a promissory note, $5t (the excess benefit) plus interest on $5t for the period from the date the excess benefit transaction occurred to the date of correction (i.e., December 31, 1999, to June 30, 2002). Because this period is not more than three years, the interest rate D must use to determine the interest on the excess benefit must equal or exceed the short-term AFR, compounded annually, for December, 1999 (5.74%, compounded annually).

Example 2.  X is an applicable tax-exempt organization for purposes of section 4958. B is a disqualified person with respect to X. On January 1, 2000, B paid X $6v for Property F. Property F had a fair market value of $10v on January 1, 2000. Thus, the sales transaction on that date provided an excess benefit to B in the amount of $4v. In order to correct the excess benefit on July 5, 2005, B pays X, in cash or cash equivalents, excluding payment with a promissory note, $4v (the excess benefit) plus interest on $4v for the period from the date the excess benefit transaction occurred to the date of correction (i.e., January 1, 2000, to July 5, 2005). Because this period is over three but not over nine years, the interest rate B must use to determine the interest on the excess benefit must equal or exceed the mid-term AFR, compounded annually, for January, 2000 (6.21%, compounded annually).

Example 3.  The facts are the same as in Example 2, except that B offers to return Property F. X agrees to accept the return of Property F, a decision in which B does not participate. Property F has declined in value since the date of the excess benefit transaction. On July 5, 2005, the property has a fair market value of $9v. For purposes of correction, B's return of Property F to X is treated as a payment of $9v, the fair market value of the property determined on the date the property is returned to the organization. If $9v is greater than the correction amount ($4v plus interest on $4v at a rate that equals or exceeds 6.21%, compounded annually, for the period from January 1, 2000, to July 5, 2005), then X may make a cash payment to B equal to the difference.

Example 4.  The facts are the same as in Example 3, except that Property F has increased in value since January 1, 2000, the date the excess benefit transaction occurred, and on July 5, 2005, has a fair market value of $13v. For purposes of correction, B's return of Property F to X is treated as a payment of $10v, the fair market value of the property on the date the excess benefit transaction occurred. If $10v is greater than the correction amount ($4v plus interest on $4v at a rate that equals or exceeds 6.21%, compounded annually, for the period from January 1, 2000, to July 5, 2005), then X may make a cash payment to B equal to the difference.

Example 5.  The facts are the same as in Example 2. Assume that the correction amount B paid X in cash on July 5, 2005, was $5.58v. On July 4, 2005, X loaned $5.58v to B, in exchange for a promissory note signed by B in the amount of $5.58v, payable with interest at a future date. These facts indicate that B engaged in the loan transaction to circumvent the requirement of this section that (except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) or (4) of this section), the correction amount must be paid only in cash or cash equivalents. As a result, the Commissioner may determine that B effectively transferred property other than cash or cash equivalents, and therefore did not satisfy the correction requirements of this section.

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002]

(a) Substantive requirements for exemption still apply. Section 4958 does not affect the substantive standards for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) or (4), including the requirements that the organization be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes, and that no part of its net earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. Thus, regardless of whether a particular transaction is subject to excise taxes under section 4958, existing principles and rules may be implicated, such as the limitation on private benefit. For example, transactions that are not subject to section 4958 because of the initial contract exception described in §53.4958–4(a)(3) may, under certain circumstances, jeopardize the organization's tax-exempt status.

(b) Interaction between section 4958 and section 7611 rules for church tax inquiries and examinations. The procedures of section 7611 will be used in initiating and conducting any inquiry or examination into whether an excess benefit transaction has occurred between a church and a disqualified person. For purposes of this rule, the reasonable belief required to initiate a church tax inquiry is satisfied if there is a reasonable belief that a section 4958 tax is due from a disqualified person with respect to a transaction involving a church. See §301.7611–1 Q&A 19 of this chapter.

(c) Other substantiation requirements. These regulations, in §53.4958–4(c)(3), set forth specific substantiation rules. Compliance with the specific substantiation rules of that section does not relieve applicable tax-exempt organizations of other rules and requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, Revenue Rulings, and other guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service (including the substantiation rules of sections 162 and 274, or §1.6001–1(a) and (c) of this chapter).

[T.D. 8978, 67 FR 3083, Jan. 23, 2002]

If any taxable event is corrected during the correction period for the event, then any second tier tax imposed with respect to the event shall not be assessed. If the tax has been assessed, it shall be abated. If the tax has been collected, it shall be credited or refunded as an overpayment. For purposes of this section, the tax imposed includes interest, additions to the tax and additional amounts. For definitions of the terms second tier tax, taxable event, correct, and correction period, see §53.4963–1.

(a) Introduction. Under section 4961 (b) and (c), the period of limitations on collection may be suspended and assessment or collection of first or second tier tax may be prohibited during the pendency of administrative and judicial proceedings conducted to determine a taxpayer's liability for second tier tax. This section provides rules relating to the suspension of the limitations period and the prohibitions on assessment and collection. In addition, this section describes the administrative and judicial proceedings to which these rules apply.

(b) Initial proceeding—(1) Defined. For purposes of subpart K, an initial proceeding means a proceeding described in subparagraph (2) or (3).

(2) Tax Court proceeding before assessment. A proceeding is described in this subparagraph (2) if it is a proceeding with respect to the taxpayer's liability for second tier tax and is commenced in accordance with section 6213 (a).

(3) Refund proceeding commenced before correction period ends. A proceeding is described in this subparagraph (3) if it is a proceeding commenced under section 7422, in accordance with the provisions of §53.4963–1(e) (4) and (5) (relating to prerequisites to extension of the correction period during certain refund proceedings), and with respect to the taxpayer's liability for second tier tax.

(c) Supplemental proceeding—(1) Jurisdiction. If a determination in an initial proceeding that a taxpayer is liable for a second tier tax has become final, the court in which the initial proceeding was commenced shall have jurisdiction to conduct any necessary supplemental proceeding to determine whether the taxable event was corrected during the correction period.

(2) Time for beginning proceeding. The time for beginning a supplemental proceeding begins on the day after a determination in an initial proceeding becomes final and ends on the 90th day after the last day of the correction period.

(d) Restriction on assessment during Tax Court proceeding. If a supplemental proceeding described in section 4961 (b) and §53.4961–2(c) is commenced in the Tax Court, the provisions of the second and third sentences of section 6213(a) and the first and third sentences of §301.6213–1(a)(2) apply with respect to a deficiency in second tier tax until the decision of the Tax Court in the supplemental proceeding is final.

(e) Suspension of period of collection for second tier tax—(1) Scope. Except as provided in subparagraph (6), this paragraph (e) applies to the second tier tax assessed with respect to a taxable event if a claim described in subparagraph (2) is filed.

(2) Claim for refund. A claim for refund is described in this subparagraph (2) if, no later than 90 days after the day on which the second tier tax is assessed with respect to a taxable event, the taxpayer—

(i) Pays the full amount of first tier tax for the taxable period, and

(ii) Files a claim for refund of the amount paid.

(3) Collection prohibited. No levy or proceeding in court for the collection of the second tier tax shall be made, begun, or prosecuted until the end of the collection prohibition period described in subparagraph (5). Notwithstanding section 7421(a), the collection by levy or proceeding may be enjoined during the collection prohibition period by a proceeding in the proper court.

(4) Suspension of running of period of limitations on collection. With respect to a second tier tax to which this paragraph (e) applies, the running of the period of limitations provided in section 6502 (relating to collection of tax by levy or by a proceeding in court) shall be suspended for the collection prohibition period described in subparagraph (5).

(5) Collection prohibition period. The collection prohibition period begins on the day the second tier tax is assessed and ends on the latest of:

(i) The day a decision in a refund proceeding commenced before the 91st day after denial of the claim described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph (including any supplemental proceeding under §53.4961–2(c)) becomes final;

(ii) The 90th day after the claim referred to in subparagraph (2) is denied; or

(iii) The 90th day after the second tier tax is assessed.

(6) Jeopardy collection. If the Secretary makes a finding that the collection of the second tier tax is in jeopardy, nothing in this paragraph (e) shall prevent the immediate collection of such tax.

(f) Finality—(1) Tax Court proceeding. For purposes of this subpart K, section 7481 applies in determining when a decision in a Tax Court proceeding becomes final.

(2) Refund proceeding. For purposes of this subpart K, §301.7422–1 applies in determining when a decision in a refund proceeding becomes final.

(a) First tier tax. For purposes of this subpart K, the term first tier tax means any tax imposed by subsection (a) of section 4941, 4942, 4943, 4944, 4945, 4951, 4952, 4955, 4958, 4971, or 4975. A first tier tax may also be referred to as an “initial tax” in parts 53 and 54.

(b) Second tier tax. For purposes of this subpart K, the term second tier tax means any tax imposed by subsection (b) of section 4941, 4942, 4943, 4944, 4945, 4951, 4952, 4955, 4958, 4971, or 4975. A second tier tax may also be referred to as an “additional tax” in parts 53 and 54.

(c) Taxable event. For purposes of this subpart K, the term taxable event means any act, or failure to act, giving rise to liability for tax under section 4941, 4942, 4943, 4944, 4945, 4951, 4952, 4955, 4958, 4971, or 4975.

(d) Correct—(1) In general. Except as provided in subparagraph (2), the term correct has the same meaning for purposes of this subpart K as in the section which imposes the second tier tax or the regulations thereunder.

(2) Special rules. The term correct means—

(i) For a second tier tax imposed by section 4942(b), reducing the amount of the undistributed income to zero,

(ii) For a second tier tax imposed by section 4943(b), reducing the amount of the excess business holdings to zero, and

(iii) For a second tier tax imposed by section 4944(b), removing the investment from jeopardy.

(e) Correction period—(1) In general. The correction period with respect to any taxable event shall begin with the date on which the taxable event occurs and shall end 90 days after the date of mailing of a notice of deficiency under section 6212 with respect to the second tier tax imposed with respect to the taxable event.

(2) Extensions of correction period. The correction period referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall be extended by any period in which a deficiency cannot be assessed under section 6213(a). In addition, the correction period referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph (e) shall be extended in accordance with subparagraph (3), (4), and (5) of this paragraph except that subparagraph (4), or (5) shall not operate to extend a correction period with respect to which a taxpayer has filed a petition with the United States Tax Court for redetermination of a deficiency within the time prescribed by section 6213(a).

(3) Extensions by Commissioner. The correction period referred to in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph may be extended by any period which the Commissioner determines is reasonable and necessary to bring about correction (including, for taxes imposed by section 4975, equitable relief sought by the Secretary of Labor) of the taxable event. The Commissioner ordinarily will not extend the correction period unless the following factors are present.

(i) The taxpayer on whom the second tier tax is imposed, the Secretary of Labor (for taxes imposed by section 4975), or an appropriate State officer (as defined in section 6104(c)(2)) is actively seeking in good faith to correct the taxable event;

(ii) Adequate corrective action cannot reasonably be expected to result during the unextended correction period;

(iii) For taxes imposed by section 4975, the Secretary of Labor requests the extension because subdivision (ii) applies; and

(iv) For taxes imposed by chapter 42 (other than taxes imposed by section 4940), the taxable event appears to have been an isolated occurrence so that it appears unlikely that similar taxable events will occur in the future.

(4) Extension for payment of first tier tax. If, within the unexpected correction period, the taxpayer pays the full amount of the first tier tax imposed with respect to the taxable event the Commissioner shall extend the correction period to the later of—

(i) Ninety days after the payment of the first tier tax, or

(ii) The last day of the correction period determined without regard to this paragraph.

(5) Extensions for filing claim for refund or refund suit. If prior to the expiration of the correction period (including extensions) a claim for refund is filed with respect to payment of the full amount of the first tier tax imposed with respect to the taxable event, the Commissioner shall extend the correction period during the pendency of the claim plus an additional 90 days. If within that time a suit or proceeding referred to in section 7422(g) with respect to the claim is filed, the Commissioner shall extend the correction period until the determination in the suit for refund (determined without regard to a supplemental proceeding under section 4861(b)) is final, determined under §301.7422–2(a).

(6) End of correction period if waiver accepted. If the notice of deficiency referred to in paragraph (1) is not mailed because there is a waiver of the restrictions on assessment and collection of the deficiency or because the deficiency is paid, the correction period will end with the end of the collection prohibition period described in §53.4961–2(e)(5).

(7) Date on which taxable event occurs. For purposes of subparagraph (1), the taxable event shall be treated as occurring—

(i) Under section 4942, on the first day of the taxable year for which there is undistributed income,

(ii) Under section 4943, on the first day on which there are excess business holdings,

(iii) Under section 4971, on the last day of the plan year in which there is an accumulated funding deficiency, and

(iv) In all other cases, the date on which the event occurred.

(f) Effective date. The provisions of this subpart K are effective with respect to second tier taxes assessed after December 24, 1980. The preceding sentence shall not be construed to permit the assessment of a tax in a case to which, on December 24, 1980, the doctrine of res judicata applied.

[T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16303, May 2, 1986; 51 FR 17732, May 15, 1986, as amended by T.D. 8628, 60 FR 62212, Dec. 5, 1995; T.D. 8920, 66 FR 2171, Jan. 10, 2001]

Source:  T.D. 7368, 40 FR 29843, July 16, 1975, unless otherwise noted. Redesignated by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16303, May 2, 1986.

§ 53.6001-1   Notice or regulations requiring records, statements, and special returns.

(a) In general. Any person subject to tax under Chapter 42, Subtitle D, of the Code shall keep such complete and detailed records as are sufficient to enable the district director to determine accurately the amount of liability under Chapter 42.

(b) Notice by district director requiring returns, statements, or the keeping of records. The district director may require any person, by notice served upon him, to make such returns, render such statements, or keep such specific records as will enable the district director to determine whether or not such person is liable for tax under Chapter 42.

(c) Retention of records. The records required by this section shall be kept at all times available for inspection by authorized internal revenue officers or employees, and shall be retained so long as the contents thereof may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law.

(a) Every private foundation liable for tax under section 4940 or 4948(a) shall file an annual return with respect to such tax on the form prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service for such purpose and shall include therein the information required by such form and the instructions issued with respect thereto.

(b) Every person liable for tax imposed by sections 4941(a), 4942(a), 4943(a), 4944(a), 4945(a), 4955(a), or 4958(a), and every private foundation and every trust described in section 4947(a)(2) which has engaged in an act of self-dealing (as defined in section 4941(d)) (other than an act giving rise to no tax under section 4941(a)) shall file an annual return on Form 4720 and shall include therein the information required by such form and the instructions issued with respect thereto. In the case of any tax imposed by sections 4941(a), 4942(a), 4943(a), and 4944(a), the annual return shall be filed with respect to each act (or failure to act) for each year (or part thereof) in the taxable period (as defined in sections 4941 (e)(1), 4942(j)(1), 4943(d)(2), and 4944(e)(1)). In the case of a tax imposed by section 4945(a), 4955(a), or 4958(a), the annual return shall be filed with respect to each act for the year in which such act giving rise to liability occurred.

(c) If a Form 4720 is filed by a private foundation or trust described in section 4947(a)(2) with respect to a transaction to which other persons are required to file under paragraph (b) of this section, such persons may by their signature designate such organization's Form 4720 (to the extent applicable) as their return for purposes of compliance with such paragraph. However, this paragraph shall not apply to a person whose taxable year is other than the taxable year of the foundation or trust.

(d) For taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1975, every trust described in section 4947(a)(2) which is subject to any of the provisions of Chapter 42 as if it were a private foundation shall file an annual return on Form 5227. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1980, every trust described in section 4947(a)(1) which is a private foundation shall file an annual return on Form 990–PF.

(e) For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1977, every person liable for tax under section 4951, 4952, or 4953 (relating to taxes on self-dealing, taxable expenditures, and excess contributions involving black lung benefit trusts) shall file an annual return with respect to the tax on the form prescribed by the Internal Revenue Service for that purpose. The person liable for the tax shall include the information required by the form and its related instructions.

[T.D. 7368, 40 FR 29843, July 16, 1975, as amended by T.D. 7838, 47 FR 44249, Oct. 7, 1982; T.D. 8026, 50 FR 20757, May 20, 1985; T.D. 8628, 60 FR 62212, Dec. 5, 1995; T.D. 8705, 62 FR 26, Jan. 2, 1997]

(a) In general. If a transaction is identified as a listed transaction as defined in §1.6011–4 of this chapter by the Commissioner in published guidance (see §601.601(d)(2) of this chapter), and the listed transaction involves an excise tax under chapter 42 of subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to private foundations and certain other tax-exempt organizations), the transaction must be disclosed in the manner stated in such published guidance.

(b) Effective date. This section applies to transactions entered into on or after January 1, 2003.

[T.D. 9046, 68 FR 10169, Mar. 4, 2003]

Any return, statement, or other document required to be made with respect to a tax imposed by Chapter 42 or the regulations thereunder shall be signed by the person required to file such return, statement or document, or by such other persons required or duly authorized to sign in accordance with the regulations, forms or instructions prescribed with respect to such return, statement or other document. The person required or duly authorized to make the return may incur liability for penalties provided for erroneous, false or fraudulent returns. For criminal penalties see sections 7201, 7203, 7206, and 7207.

(a) Penalties of perjury. If a return, statement, or other document made under the provisions of Chapter 42 or Subtitle F of the Code or the regulations thereunder with respect to any tax imposed by Chapter 42 of the Code, or the form and instructions issued with respect to such return, statement, or other document, requires that it shall contain or be verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, it must be so verified by the person or persons required to sign such return, statement, or other document. In addition, any other statement or document submitted under any provision of Chapter 42 or Subtitle F of the Code or regulations thereunder with respect to any tax imposed by Chapter 42 of the Code may be required to contain or be verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.

(b) Oath. Any return, statement, or other document required to be submitted under Chapter 42 or Subtitle F of the Code or regulations prescribed thereunder with respect to any tax imposed by Chapter 42 of the Code may be required to be verified by an oath.

(a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a return required by §53.6011–1 shall be filed at the time the private foundation or trust described in section 4947(a)(2) is required to file its annual information or tax return under section 6033 or 6012 (as may be applicable).

(b) Exception. The Form 4720 of a person whose taxable year ends on a date other than that on which the taxable year of the foundation or trust ends shall be filed on or before the 15th day of the fifth month following the close of such person's taxable year.

(c) Form 5227. A Form 5227 required to be filed by paragraph (d) of §53.6011–1 for a trust described in section 4947(a) shall be filed on or before the 15th day of the fourth month following the close of the trust's taxable year.

(d) Taxes related to black lung benefit trusts. Forms 990–BL and 6069 shall be filed on or before the 15th day of the fifth month following the close of the filer's taxable year.

(e) Taxes related to political expenditures of organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A Form 4720 required to be filed by §53.6011–1(b) for an organization liable for tax imposed by section 4955(a) must be filed by the unextended due date for filing its annual information return under section 6033 or, if the organization is exempt from filing, the date the organization would be required to file an annual information return if it was not exempt from filing. The Form 4720 of a person whose taxable year ends on a date other than that on which the taxable year of the organization described in section 501(c)(3) ends must be filed on or before the 15th day of the fifth month following the close of the person's taxable year.

(f) Taxes imposed on excess benefit transactions engaged in by organizations described in sections 501(c)(3) (except private foundations) and 501(c)(4)—(1) General rule. A Form 4720 required by §53.6011–1(b) for a disqualified person or organization manager liable for tax imposed by section 4958(a) shall be filed by that person on or before the 15th day of the fifth month following the close of such person's taxable year.

(2) Special rule for taxable years ending after September 13, 1995, and on or before July 30, 1996. A Form 4720 required by §53.6011–1(b) for a disqualified person or organization manager liable for tax imposed by section 4958(a) on an excess benefit transaction occurring in such person's taxable year ending after September 13, 1995, and on or before July 30, 1996, is due on or before December 15, 1996.

[T.D. 7368, 40 FR 29843, July 16, 1975, as amended by T.D. 7407, 41 FR 9322, Mar. 4, 1976; T.D. 7838, 47 FR 44249, Oct. 7, 1982; T.D. 8628, 60 FR 62212, Dec. 5, 1995; T.D. 8736, 62 FR 52257, Oct. 7, 1997]

(a) In general. A disqualified person for purposes of section 4951(e)(4) who engaged in self-dealing with a Nuclear Decommissioning Fund, and must report tax due under section 4951 on Form 1120–ND, “Return for Nuclear Decommissioning Funds and Certain Related Persons,” will be allowed an automatic 6-month extension of time to file the return after the date prescribed for filing the return if the disqualified person files an application under this section in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section. For guidance on requesting an extension of time to file Form 1120–ND for purposes of reporting contributions received, income earned, administrative expenses of operating the fund, and the tax on modified gross income, see §1.6081–3 of this chapter.

(b) Requirements. To satisfy this paragraph (b), a disqualified person must—

(1) Submit a complete application on Form 7004, “Application for Automatic 6-Month Extension of Time to File Certain Business Income Tax, Information, and Other Returns,” or in any other manner prescribed by the Commissioner;

(2) File the application on or before the date prescribed for filing the return with the Internal Revenue Service office designated in the application's instructions; and

(3) Remit the amount of the properly estimated unpaid tax liability on or before the date prescribed for payment.

(c) No extension of time for the payment of tax. An automatic extension of time for filing a return granted under paragraph (a) of this section will not extend the time for payment of any tax due on such return.

(d) Termination of automatic extension. The Commissioner may terminate an automatic extension at any time by mailing to the disqualified person a notice of termination at least 10 days prior to the termination date designated in such notice. The Commissioner must mail the notice of termination to the address shown on the Form 7004 or to the disqualified person's last known address. For further guidance regarding the definition of last known address, see §301.6212–2 of this chapter.

(e) Penalties. See section 6651 for failure to file or failure to pay the amount shown as tax on the return.

(f) Effective dates. This section is applicable for applications for an automatic extension of time to file a return to report taxes due under section 4951 for self-dealing with a Nuclear Decommissioning Fund filed after December 31, 2005. The applicability of this section expires on November 4, 2008.

[T.D. 9229, 70 FR 67362, Nov. 7, 2005]

Except as provided in §53.6091–2 (relating to exceptional cases):

(a) Persons other than corporations. Chapter 42 tax returns of persons other than corporations shall be filed with any person assigned the responsibility to receive returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office that serves the legal residence or principal place of business of the person required to make the return.

(b) Corporations. Chapter 42 tax returns of corporations shall be filed with any person assigned the responsibility to receive returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office that serves the principal place of business or principal office or agency of the corporation.

(c) Returns filed with service centers. Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, unless a return is filed by hand carrying, whenever instructions applicable to Chapter 42 tax returns provide that the returns be filed with a service center, the returns must be so filed in accordance with the instructions. Returns which are filed by hand carrying shall be filed with any person assigned the responsibility to receive hand-carried returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office in accordance with paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section, whichever is applicable.

(d) Returns of persons subject to a termination assessment. Notwithstanding paragraph (c) of this section, income tax returns of persons with respect to whom a chapter 42 tax assessment was made under section 6852(a) with respect to the taxable year must be filed with any person assigned the responsibility to receive returns in the local Internal Revenue Service office as provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

[T.D. 7368, 40 FR 29843, July 16, 1975, as amended by T.D. 7495, 42 FR 33727, July 1, 1977; T.D. 8628, 60 FR 62212, Dec. 5, 1995; T.D. 9156, 69 FR 55746, Sept. 16, 2004]

Notwithstanding the provisions of §53.6091–1, the Commissioner may permit the filing of any Chapter 42 tax return in any local Internal Revenue Service office.

[T.D. 7368, 40 FR 29843, July 16, 1975. Redesignated by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16303, May 2, 1986, as amended by T.D. 9156, 69 FR 55746, Sept. 16, 2004]

The Chapter 42 tax shown on any return shall, without assessment or notice and demand, be paid to the internal revenue officer with whom the return is filed at the time and place for filing such return (determined without regard to any extension of time for filing the return). For provisions relating to the time and place for filing such return, see §§53.6071–1 and 53.6091–1. For provisions relating to the extension of time for paying the tax, see §53.6161–1.

(a) In general—(1) Tax shown or required to be shown on return. A reasonable extension of the time for payment of the amount of any tax imposed by Chapter 42 and shown or required to be shown on any return, may be granted by the district directors and directors of the service centers at the request of the taxpayer. The period of such extension shall not be in excess of 6 months from the date fixed for payment of such tax, except that if the taxpayer is abroad the period of the extension may be in excess of 6 months.

(2) Deficiency. The time for payment of any amount determined as a deficiency in respect of tax imposed by Chapter 42 may, at the request of the taxpayer, be extended by the internal revenue officer to whom the tax is required to be paid for a period not to exceed 18 months from the date fixed for payment of the deficiency, as shown on the notice and demand, and, in exceptional cases for a further period not in excess of 12 months. No extension of the time for payment of a deficiency shall be granted if the deficiency is due to negligence, to intentional disregard of rules and regulations, or to fraud with intent to evade tax.

(3) Extension of time for filing distinguished. The granting of an extension of time for filing a return does not operate to extend the time for the payment of the tax or any part thereof unless so specified in the extension.

(b) Undue hardship required for extension. An extension of the time for payment shall be granted only upon a satisfactory showing that payment on the due date of the amount with respect to which the extension is desired will result in an undue hardship. The extension will not be granted upon a general statement of hardship. The term “undue hardship” means more than an inconvenience to the taxpayer. It must appear that substantial financial loss, for example, loss due to the sale of property at a sacrifice price, will result to the taxpayer from making payment on the due date of the amount with respect to which the extension is desired. If a market exists, the sale of property at the current market price is not ordinarily considered as resulting in an undue hardship.

(c) Application for extension. An application for an extension of the time for payment of the tax shown or required to be shown on any return, or for the payment of any amount determined as a deficiency shall be made on Form 1127 and shall be accompanied by evidence showing the undue hardship that would result to the taxpayer if the extension were refused. Such application shall also be accompanied by a statement of the assets and liabilities of the taxpayer and an itemized statement showing all receipts and disbursements for each of the three months immediately preceding the due date of the amount to which the application relates. The application, with supporting documents, must be filed on or before the date prescribed for payment of the amount with respect to which the extension is desired with the internal revenue officer to whom the tax is to be paid. The application will be examined, and within 30 days, if possible, will be denied, granted, or tentatively granted subject to certain conditions of which the taxpayer will be notified. If an additional extension is desired, the request therefor must be made on or before the expiration of the period for which the prior extension is granted.

(d) Payment pursuant to extension. If an extension of time for payment is granted, the amount the time for payment of which is so extended shall be paid on or before the expiration of the period of the extension without the necessity of notice and demand. The granting of an extension of the time for payment of the tax or deficiency does not relieve the taxpayer from liability for the payment of interest thereon during the period of the extension. See section 6601 and §301.6601–1 of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Administration).

If an extension of time for payment of tax or deficiency is granted under section 6161, the district director or the director of the service center may, if he deems it necessary, require a bond for the payment of the amount in respect of which the extension is granted in accordance with the terms of the extension. However, such bond shall not exceed double the amount with respect to which the extension is granted. For provisions relating to form of bonds, see the regulations under section 7101 contained in part 301 of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Administration).

For regulations concerning interest on underpayment, nonpayment, or extensions of time for payment of tax, see §301.6601–1 of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Administration).

(a) General rules. For general rules relating to the failure to file tax return or to pay tax, see the regulations under section 6651 contained in part 301 of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Administration).

(b) Special rule where foundation files return. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, in the case of tax imposed by section 4941(a)(1) on any disqualified person, reasonable cause shall be presumed, for purposes of section 6651(a)(1), where the private foundation or trust described in section 4947(a)(2) files a return in good faith and such return indicates no tax liability with respect to such tax on the part of such disqualified person.

(2) Paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall not apply where the disqualified person knew of facts which, if known by the foundation, would have precluded the foundation from making the return, as filed, in good faith.

For provisions relating to form of bonds, see the regulations under section 7101 contained in part 301 of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Administration).

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