February 1918 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-11908 February 4, 1918 - ANTONIO M.A BARRETTO v. JOSE SANTA MARINA, ET AL.
037 Phil 568:
037 Phil 568:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-11908. February 4, 1918. ]
ANTONIO M.A BARRETTO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSE SANTA MARINA and "LA INSULAR", Defendants-Appellees.
Alfredo Chicote and Jose Arnaiz for Appellant.
William A. Kincaid and Kincaid & Perkins for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. INTEREST; RECOVERY. — The right to interest arises either by virtue of a contract, or by way of damages for delay or failure (demora) to pay the principal on which interest is demanded, at the time when the debtor is obliged to make such payment; and interest will not be allowed in the absence of proof of such contract or of delay or failure (demora) in the payment of the principal at the time when the debtor is obligated to make such payment.
D E C I S I O N
CARSON, J. :
The material facts upon which our disposition of this appeal necessarily turns are set out at length in our opinion in the case of Barretto v. Santa Marina, decided December 2, 1913 (26 Phil. Rep., 200). This court having ruled against the plaintiff’s contention in the former case, the now sets upon a claim for interest at the legal rate upon the amount of the purchase price of his share (participacion) in the business from the 1st of July, 1909, to the 22d day of November, 1910, the day upon which it was turned over to him.
The finding of facts, and the reasoning upon which we based our rulings in the former case, are manifestly conclusive in the present case as to the plaintiff’s claim of a right to interest from the first of July, 1909, to the third of May, 1910.
In the former case we held that the sale of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the tobacco factory was consummated on the latter date; that the valuation set upon his share (participacion) in the business was determined as of that day by the committee charged with the duty of ascertaining the cash value of this share (participacion), in order to determine the exact amount which the parties had agreed upon as the purchase price to be paid therefore; and that the committee had included the plaintiff’s share of the profits of the business down to the third of May, 1910, in their estimate of the value of his share (participacion) in the business on that date.
These rulings were made after a review of the same record which is now relied upon by plaintiff in support of his claim of interest upon the amount fixed by the committee as the true value of his share (participacion) in the business. We find nothing in the record of the contention of counsel in this regard which would justify or necessitate a modification or reversal of the conclusions reached by us in our former opinion.
Plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business having been sold on the 3rd day of May, 1910, for a stipulated price, that is to say, for its value on that day as fixed by the valuation committee, it is very clear that he is not entitled to interest on the amount fixed by the committee, prior to the date on which the sale was consummated (3rd of May, 1910).
So also plaintiff’s contention that he should be allowed interest on the amount of the purchase price from the date of the sale, May 3, 1910, down to the day upon which the money was actually turned over to him, November 22, 1910, cannot be sustained. Under the express terms of the agreement for the sale on May 3, 1910, the plaintiff agreed to accept, and the defendant to pay, the amount which the committee should find to be the true value of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business as of that amount pending the report of the committee. The only contractual obligation assumed by him was that he would pay the amount fixed by the committee in cash immediately upon the making of the award by the committee, and in accordance with its terms.
The committee’s report is dated November 14, 1910, and it appears that promptly upon the submission of this report, the amount awarded the plaintiff (P280,025.16) was paid over by the defendant to the plaintiff in cash; and the letter of counsel for plaintiff dated November 17, 1910, tendering a formal deed of sale of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business and making demand for the purchase price as fixed by the committee, read together with the formal deed of sale executed November 22, 1910, with its acknowledgment of the receipt of the purchase price, leaves no room for doubt that at that time the parties understood and accepted the purchase price therein set forth as full payment of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business in exact conformity with the conditions imposed in the agreement consummated to May 3, 1910.
The right to interest arises either by virtue of contract or by way of damages for delay or failure (demora) to pay the principal on which interest is demanded, at the time when the debtor is obligated to make such payment. In the case at bar there was no contract, express or implied, for the payment of interest pending the award of the committee appointed to value the property sold on May 3, 1910, and there was no delay in the punctual compliance with defendant’s obligation to make immediate payment, in cash, of the amount of the award, upon the filing of the report of the committee.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below dismissing the complaint in this case sine die should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Malcolm, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Araullo J., did not take part.
The finding of facts, and the reasoning upon which we based our rulings in the former case, are manifestly conclusive in the present case as to the plaintiff’s claim of a right to interest from the first of July, 1909, to the third of May, 1910.
In the former case we held that the sale of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the tobacco factory was consummated on the latter date; that the valuation set upon his share (participacion) in the business was determined as of that day by the committee charged with the duty of ascertaining the cash value of this share (participacion), in order to determine the exact amount which the parties had agreed upon as the purchase price to be paid therefore; and that the committee had included the plaintiff’s share of the profits of the business down to the third of May, 1910, in their estimate of the value of his share (participacion) in the business on that date.
These rulings were made after a review of the same record which is now relied upon by plaintiff in support of his claim of interest upon the amount fixed by the committee as the true value of his share (participacion) in the business. We find nothing in the record of the contention of counsel in this regard which would justify or necessitate a modification or reversal of the conclusions reached by us in our former opinion.
Plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business having been sold on the 3rd day of May, 1910, for a stipulated price, that is to say, for its value on that day as fixed by the valuation committee, it is very clear that he is not entitled to interest on the amount fixed by the committee, prior to the date on which the sale was consummated (3rd of May, 1910).
So also plaintiff’s contention that he should be allowed interest on the amount of the purchase price from the date of the sale, May 3, 1910, down to the day upon which the money was actually turned over to him, November 22, 1910, cannot be sustained. Under the express terms of the agreement for the sale on May 3, 1910, the plaintiff agreed to accept, and the defendant to pay, the amount which the committee should find to be the true value of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business as of that amount pending the report of the committee. The only contractual obligation assumed by him was that he would pay the amount fixed by the committee in cash immediately upon the making of the award by the committee, and in accordance with its terms.
The committee’s report is dated November 14, 1910, and it appears that promptly upon the submission of this report, the amount awarded the plaintiff (P280,025.16) was paid over by the defendant to the plaintiff in cash; and the letter of counsel for plaintiff dated November 17, 1910, tendering a formal deed of sale of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business and making demand for the purchase price as fixed by the committee, read together with the formal deed of sale executed November 22, 1910, with its acknowledgment of the receipt of the purchase price, leaves no room for doubt that at that time the parties understood and accepted the purchase price therein set forth as full payment of plaintiff’s share (participacion) in the business in exact conformity with the conditions imposed in the agreement consummated to May 3, 1910.
The right to interest arises either by virtue of contract or by way of damages for delay or failure (demora) to pay the principal on which interest is demanded, at the time when the debtor is obligated to make such payment. In the case at bar there was no contract, express or implied, for the payment of interest pending the award of the committee appointed to value the property sold on May 3, 1910, and there was no delay in the punctual compliance with defendant’s obligation to make immediate payment, in cash, of the amount of the award, upon the filing of the report of the committee.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below dismissing the complaint in this case sine die should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Malcolm, and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Araullo J., did not take part.
