March 1932 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1932 > March 1932 Decisions >G.R. No. 34192 February 6, 1932 - GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. v. DALMACIO ABALOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 34192 February 6, 1932 - GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. v. DALMACIO ABALOS, ET AL.
056 Phil 504:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 34192. February 6, 1932.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant, v. DALMACIO ABALOS, ET AL., claimants. HEIRS OF BASILIO REGUYAL, appellants, and PLACIDO CABILES ET AL., Appellees.
[G.R. No. 34193. February 6, 1932.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant, v. PEDRO ABAD ET AL., claimants. HEIRS OF BASILIO REGUYAL, appellants, and GREGORIO ALVARADO ET AL., Appellees.
R. Monserrat, for Appellants.
Bernabe de Guzman, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. PRESCRIPTION; ADVERSE POSSESSION OF LAND; EXCEPTION IN FAVOR OF MINOR; RIGHT ACCRUING DURING LIFE OF MINOR. — Before the statutory saving in favor of a minor can be effective, it must appear that the right of action originated in the life of such minor. Adverse possession beginning during the life of the ancestor will be effective against his infant heirs.
2. EQUITY; INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE; WHEN TITLE EFFECTIVE AGAINST OWNERS NOT HOLDING DOCUMENTARY TITLE. — Where various co�wners of land permit one of their number to take title in himself alone, any innocent purchaser for value from him, having no notice of the rights of his co�wners, will obtain a valid title free from the equity of the other co�wners. The same rule applies to a possessory right which ripens into title by adverse possession.
2. EQUITY; INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE; WHEN TITLE EFFECTIVE AGAINST OWNERS NOT HOLDING DOCUMENTARY TITLE. — Where various co�wners of land permit one of their number to take title in himself alone, any innocent purchaser for value from him, having no notice of the rights of his co�wners, will obtain a valid title free from the equity of the other co�wners. The same rule applies to a possessory right which ripens into title by adverse possession.
D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
The combined appeals in these two cases are concerned with two rival claims to lots 959, 960, 961, 973, 997, 1001, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1034, and 4304 in cadastral expedientes Nos. 23 and 24, G. L. R. O. record Nos. 657 and 660. The individuals representing the two conflicting interests are numerous; and the land in contention is located in the municipality of Umiñgan, in the Province of Pangasinan. For cadastral purposes it has been divided into the lots enumerated above, forming what was formerly part of a larger mass. The appellees are the successors in interest of Adriano Reguyal, son of Basilio Reguyal. The appellants are also descendants of Basilio Reguyal. The question raised by the appellants is, briefly whether the land now in question formerly belonged exclusively to Adriano Reguyal or to him and his other brothers and sisters in common.
The chain of title of the appellees begins in Adriano Reguyal, who, in 1894, procured and caused to be properly registered a possessory information covering all of the land now in controversy. This information was extended in the name of Adriano Reguyal as possessor, and it is in due form of law, having been duly registered in 1894 in the office of the register of property of the province. In 1909 Adriano Reguyal sold said property for a valuable consideration to one Domingo Belisario (Exhibit D), who entered into possession promptly after the purchase of the property was effected by him. Later Belisario at various times sold the land, in small parcels, to the present possessors, over seventy in number, who are the appellees in this case.
It is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Adriano Reguyal held peaceful possession of this property from about the year 1890 until he sold it to Belisario, and that the produce of the land, while it was in his possession, was enjoyed by himself, to the exclusion of all other persons. It is further proved that from the time Belisario acquired the property in 1909 the produce has been enjoyed by himself and his successors in interest without disturbance from any one, though in 1920 an action of reivindicacion was instituted by Paulina Casimina, one of the present appellants, and others, to recover the property from the occupants (the appellees).
The appellant’s case supposes that the land in question, having an area of nearly 300 hectares, formerly belonged to Basilio Reguyal, who died about 1889, leaving six children, who inherited said land as property in common. It is furthermore claimed that this property has never been divided, with the result that at least a five-sixths undivided interest therein belongs to the plaintiffs. In this connection it is asserted that the possessory information was extended in the name of Adriano Reguyal because he was the oldest son of Basilio Reguyal, and because it was not convenient for the other persons in interest to attend at the office of the official before whom the information was drawn up and promulgated. It is claimed furthermore that there was an agreement among the heirs to the effect that the taking of the possessory information in the name of Adriano should not prejudice the right of the other heirs.
We are of the opinion that the trial court was right in awarding the property to the appellees, who derive title from Adriano Reguyal, through Domingo Belisario. The latter was clearly a bona fide purchaser for value from the apparent owner, Adriano Reguyal, without notice of the alleged rights of the appellants. Furthermore the appellees, the actual occupants of the property, are purchasers for value under Domingo Belisario, and the duration of their successive possession extends over at least forty years. Any right on the part of the appellants has therefore been extinguished by adverse possession even supposing that the property originally pertained to Basilio Reguyal and not exclusively to his son Adriano.
An attempt is made to avoid the effects of the long continued adverse possession of the appellees and their predecessors in interest by means of the minority of one of the appellants, Paulina Casimina, who is said to have been born in 1900, and who accordingly must have attained majority in 1921. It should be borne in mind, however, that the possession of Adriano Reguyal began before the birth of this claimant, and it is a rule that before the birth of this claimant, and it is a rule that before the statutory saving in favor of a minor can be effective, it must appear that the right of action originated in the life of such minor. In other words, if the statute of limitations once begins to run against a parent, before a child is born, there is no saving in favor of the child. Otherwise stated, the rule is that, adverse possession beginning during the life of the ancestor will be effective against his infant heirs. The protection afforded by the statue is for those against whom adverse possession is first asserted and who may at that time be under disability. (Armstrong v. Wilcox, 57 Fla., 30; 131 A. S. R., 1080; Jackson v. Moore, 13 Johns. [N. Y. ], 513; 7 Am. Dec., 398; Scallon v. Manhattan R. Co., 185 N. Y., 359; 7 Ann. Cas., 168; Garner v. Wingrove [1905], 2 Ch., 233; 3 Ann. Cas., 837; 3 British R. Cas., 737). It results that, in the case before us, the title of the appellees is perfect, and was such when the appellants filed their claim to the land in this case.
There is another aspect of the case which is equally decisive against the claim of the appellants, and it is this: When the appellants or their ancestors consented for the possessory information to be taken exclusively in the name of Adriano Reguyal, the latter became a trustee in effect for the others, supposing these to be owners of the property in common with Adriano, as they claim; and Adriano necessarily acquired a power of disposition adequate to convey the possessory right to any bona fide purchaser from him. The right of the appellants was thereby reduced to a mere equity, which is ineffective against Domingo Belisario and purchasers under him.
What has been said goes on the assumption that the land with which we are here concerned belonged in life to Basilio Reguyal and that the title descended at his death to all of his children in common. This fact mainly rests, however, on the testimony of one of the appellants, and the correctness of the assumption is open to grave question.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.
The chain of title of the appellees begins in Adriano Reguyal, who, in 1894, procured and caused to be properly registered a possessory information covering all of the land now in controversy. This information was extended in the name of Adriano Reguyal as possessor, and it is in due form of law, having been duly registered in 1894 in the office of the register of property of the province. In 1909 Adriano Reguyal sold said property for a valuable consideration to one Domingo Belisario (Exhibit D), who entered into possession promptly after the purchase of the property was effected by him. Later Belisario at various times sold the land, in small parcels, to the present possessors, over seventy in number, who are the appellees in this case.
It is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Adriano Reguyal held peaceful possession of this property from about the year 1890 until he sold it to Belisario, and that the produce of the land, while it was in his possession, was enjoyed by himself, to the exclusion of all other persons. It is further proved that from the time Belisario acquired the property in 1909 the produce has been enjoyed by himself and his successors in interest without disturbance from any one, though in 1920 an action of reivindicacion was instituted by Paulina Casimina, one of the present appellants, and others, to recover the property from the occupants (the appellees).
The appellant’s case supposes that the land in question, having an area of nearly 300 hectares, formerly belonged to Basilio Reguyal, who died about 1889, leaving six children, who inherited said land as property in common. It is furthermore claimed that this property has never been divided, with the result that at least a five-sixths undivided interest therein belongs to the plaintiffs. In this connection it is asserted that the possessory information was extended in the name of Adriano Reguyal because he was the oldest son of Basilio Reguyal, and because it was not convenient for the other persons in interest to attend at the office of the official before whom the information was drawn up and promulgated. It is claimed furthermore that there was an agreement among the heirs to the effect that the taking of the possessory information in the name of Adriano should not prejudice the right of the other heirs.
We are of the opinion that the trial court was right in awarding the property to the appellees, who derive title from Adriano Reguyal, through Domingo Belisario. The latter was clearly a bona fide purchaser for value from the apparent owner, Adriano Reguyal, without notice of the alleged rights of the appellants. Furthermore the appellees, the actual occupants of the property, are purchasers for value under Domingo Belisario, and the duration of their successive possession extends over at least forty years. Any right on the part of the appellants has therefore been extinguished by adverse possession even supposing that the property originally pertained to Basilio Reguyal and not exclusively to his son Adriano.
An attempt is made to avoid the effects of the long continued adverse possession of the appellees and their predecessors in interest by means of the minority of one of the appellants, Paulina Casimina, who is said to have been born in 1900, and who accordingly must have attained majority in 1921. It should be borne in mind, however, that the possession of Adriano Reguyal began before the birth of this claimant, and it is a rule that before the birth of this claimant, and it is a rule that before the statutory saving in favor of a minor can be effective, it must appear that the right of action originated in the life of such minor. In other words, if the statute of limitations once begins to run against a parent, before a child is born, there is no saving in favor of the child. Otherwise stated, the rule is that, adverse possession beginning during the life of the ancestor will be effective against his infant heirs. The protection afforded by the statue is for those against whom adverse possession is first asserted and who may at that time be under disability. (Armstrong v. Wilcox, 57 Fla., 30; 131 A. S. R., 1080; Jackson v. Moore, 13 Johns. [N. Y. ], 513; 7 Am. Dec., 398; Scallon v. Manhattan R. Co., 185 N. Y., 359; 7 Ann. Cas., 168; Garner v. Wingrove [1905], 2 Ch., 233; 3 Ann. Cas., 837; 3 British R. Cas., 737). It results that, in the case before us, the title of the appellees is perfect, and was such when the appellants filed their claim to the land in this case.
There is another aspect of the case which is equally decisive against the claim of the appellants, and it is this: When the appellants or their ancestors consented for the possessory information to be taken exclusively in the name of Adriano Reguyal, the latter became a trustee in effect for the others, supposing these to be owners of the property in common with Adriano, as they claim; and Adriano necessarily acquired a power of disposition adequate to convey the possessory right to any bona fide purchaser from him. The right of the appellants was thereby reduced to a mere equity, which is ineffective against Domingo Belisario and purchasers under him.
What has been said goes on the assumption that the land with which we are here concerned belonged in life to Basilio Reguyal and that the title descended at his death to all of his children in common. This fact mainly rests, however, on the testimony of one of the appellants, and the correctness of the assumption is open to grave question.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.
