June 1941 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 47684 June 10, 1941 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DIONISIO A. MANEJA
072 Phil 256:
072 Phil 256:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47684. June 10, 1941.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIONISIO A. MANEJA, Defendant-Appellee.
First Assistant Solicitor-General Reyes and Solicitor Barcelona for Appellant.
Del Rosario & Del Rosario, Pelaez & Pelaez and Hilario B. Abellana for Appellee.
Godofredo Reyes and Enrique Medina as private prosecutors.
SYLLABUS
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; FALSE TESTIMONY; PRESCRIPTION. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. v. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People v. Marcos, G. R. No. 47388, October 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
D E C I S I O N
MORAN, J.:
The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the period of prescription for the offense of false testimony which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends.
We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. v. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People v. Marcos Et. Al., G. R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is given, it would be impossible to determine the length of such period in any particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period of prescription is only five years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be impossible to determine the period of prescription — whether twenty years or five years — as either of these two periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the main case.
The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the name, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure co-incidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code — and the instant case falls on one of them — uniformly presuppose a final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite to the action ability of the crime of false testimony.
Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without costs.
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, Laurel and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. v. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People v. Marcos Et. Al., G. R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is given, it would be impossible to determine the length of such period in any particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period of prescription is only five years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be impossible to determine the period of prescription — whether twenty years or five years — as either of these two periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the main case.
The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the name, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure co-incidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code — and the instant case falls on one of them — uniformly presuppose a final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite to the action ability of the crime of false testimony.
Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without costs.
Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, Laurel and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
