November 1959 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1959 > November 1959 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-13230 November 23, 1959 - DEMETRIO BUNAYOG v. SIXTO CHIONG
106 Phil 510:
106 Phil 510:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-13230. November 23, 1959.]
DEMETRIO BUNAYOG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SIXTO CHIONG, Defendant-Appellee.
Emiliano A. Bunayog for Appellant.
Francisco D. Boter for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. SALES; PACTO DE RETRO; FAILURE TO REDEEM CANNOT GIVE RISE TO DAMAGES. — The failure of the vendor a retro to redeem the property he sold within the period stipulated in the contract of sale does not give rise to an award of damages even if it is stipulated in said contract that the vendor shall pay damages, court and attorney’s fees if he should violate any of the conditions stipulated therein. Such failure is not an infringement of the contract but a right reserved to the vendor a retro which he may waive if he so desire.
D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On September 6, 1956, plaintiff brought this action against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental praying that his ownership over the property in question be consolidated by virtue of the latter’s failure to redeem it as agreed upon, and that he be awarded damages and attorney’s fees.
Defendant in his answer admitted that the property in question was sold by him to plaintiff with an option to repurchase within a stipulated period and that he failed to exercise that right within the period agreed upon, but denied that he violated any condition of the contract which would entitled plaintiff to damages whereupon he moved that judgment be rendered on the pleadings insofar as his prayer for consolidation of ownership is concerned although with regard to damages the court may set the case for hearing if it believes said claim to be tenable.
Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion contending that while the issue as regards the consolidation of ownership is not disputed the issue as to the claim for damages is controverted and hence there is need that a hearing be had insofar as said damages is concerned.
On January 12, 1957, the court considering that the answer of defendant is practically a confession of judgment with regard to the consolidation of ownership, while the claim for damages is untenable, rendered judgment declaring the ownership of the property consolidated in favor of plaintiff but without making any pronouncement as to damages and costs.
Hence plaintiff interposed the present appeal contending that the trial court erred in not declaring that defendant violated the contract of pacto de retro sale by his failure to redeem the property as agreed upon, and in not awarding damages to plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint.
There is no merit in the appeal. A cursory examination of the terms of the contract in relation to the averments of the complaint would show that appellee bound himself to pay damages, court and attorney’s fees only if he should violate any of the conditions stipulated therein. Here appellee did not violate any of the conditions stipulated, or at least none has been alleged to warrant any award for damages. The failure of appellee to redeem the property cannot be considered as an infringement of the contract. That is a right reserved to him which he may waive if he so desires. Such failure cannot give rise to an award for damages.
Appellant makes mention in his brief of certain facts which show bad faith on the part of appellee in selling the property in that he sold to him something which he knew did not belong to him, but said facts do not appear in the complaint and so cannot now be taken into account in this appeal.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Defendant in his answer admitted that the property in question was sold by him to plaintiff with an option to repurchase within a stipulated period and that he failed to exercise that right within the period agreed upon, but denied that he violated any condition of the contract which would entitled plaintiff to damages whereupon he moved that judgment be rendered on the pleadings insofar as his prayer for consolidation of ownership is concerned although with regard to damages the court may set the case for hearing if it believes said claim to be tenable.
Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion contending that while the issue as regards the consolidation of ownership is not disputed the issue as to the claim for damages is controverted and hence there is need that a hearing be had insofar as said damages is concerned.
On January 12, 1957, the court considering that the answer of defendant is practically a confession of judgment with regard to the consolidation of ownership, while the claim for damages is untenable, rendered judgment declaring the ownership of the property consolidated in favor of plaintiff but without making any pronouncement as to damages and costs.
Hence plaintiff interposed the present appeal contending that the trial court erred in not declaring that defendant violated the contract of pacto de retro sale by his failure to redeem the property as agreed upon, and in not awarding damages to plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint.
There is no merit in the appeal. A cursory examination of the terms of the contract in relation to the averments of the complaint would show that appellee bound himself to pay damages, court and attorney’s fees only if he should violate any of the conditions stipulated therein. Here appellee did not violate any of the conditions stipulated, or at least none has been alleged to warrant any award for damages. The failure of appellee to redeem the property cannot be considered as an infringement of the contract. That is a right reserved to him which he may waive if he so desires. Such failure cannot give rise to an award for damages.
Appellant makes mention in his brief of certain facts which show bad faith on the part of appellee in selling the property in that he sold to him something which he knew did not belong to him, but said facts do not appear in the complaint and so cannot now be taken into account in this appeal.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
