February 2003 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 143440 February 11, 2003 - SERENA T. BACELONIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143440. February 11, 2003.]
SERENA T. BACELONIA, GRACIANO BACELONIA, SR. and GRACIANO T. BACELONIA, JR., Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. VICTORINO S. BOLOS, JR. and OLIVIA P. BOLOS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 6, 2000 in CA. G.R. SP No. 57455 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners and its resolution 2 promulgated on May 19, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The facts show that, on January 12, 1998, private respondents Victorino and Olivia Bolos filed a complaint 3 for damages against herein petitioners including Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33149. The case stemmed from a vehicular accident, involving a tamaraw-type school shuttle service vehicle and a 6 x 6 Isuzu cargo truck, that occurred along Aurora Blvd. in Quezon City on February 3, 1993 resulting in the untimely demise of private respondents’ daughter, Jemelee Bolos. Jemelee was on board the school shuttle service vehicle that used to transport her from Marikina City to St. Bridget School in Quezon City.
Petitioners-spouses Graciano, Sr. and Serena Bacelonia were named defendants in the said complaint for damages as owners/operators of the school shuttle service that figured in the accident. Graciano Bacelonia, Jr. was the driver thereof. The other defendants therein, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño were the owner and the driver of the cargo truck, respectively.
On February 9, 1998, the petitioners filed their answer 4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaim while their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, filed their answer with affirmative defenses and cross-claim.
Meanwhile, it appears that, prior to the filing of the complaint for damages by the private respondents, herein petitioners filed on March 1, 1995 a complaint 5 for damages arising from the said accident against their co-defendants with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23169. On April 27, 1995, herein petitioners and their co-defendants entered into a compromise agreement 6 that led to the dismissal 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-95-23169 on April 28, 1995 by the trial court.
On September 24, 1999, and upon termination of the testimony of the second witness for the complainants (herein private respondents) in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149, petitioners filed a motion 8 to be dropped as defendants therefrom on the ground that a compromise agreement had already been entered into by the parties in Civil Case No. 95-23169. The petitioners opined in essence that their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, had explicitly admitted sole responsibility for the vehicular accident by entering into the compromise agreement. Thus, they (the Bacelonias) should be excluded as defendants in Civil Case No. 98-33149. However, their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, filed an opposition 9 thereto substantially contending that res judicata does not obtain insofar as the present case is concerned, and that, on the contrary, they never admitted any responsibility for the accident on February 3, 1993.
The trial court resolved to deny the motion of the petitioners to be dropped as defendants from Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 on January 10, 2000 for lack of merit and scheduled the reception of evidence of the defense on February 3, 2000.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On January 31, 2000, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 10 of the trial court’s order denying their motion to be dropped as defendants from Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 and set the date of hearing 11 thereof on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. On the same day, January 31, 2000, the petitioners also filed a separate motion to cancel 12 the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the defense earlier scheduled on February 3, 2000 so that their motion for reconsideration, scheduled for hearing on February 15, 2000, may not be rendered moot and academic. The motion to cancel hearing was itself scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2000. Private respondents opposed the twin motions of the petitioners for lack of merit and argued that the scheduled hearing on February 3, 2000 for the initial presentation of evidence of the defense may be availed of by said petitioners for oral argument in support of their motion for reconsideration.
During the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of evidence of the defense on February 3, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners for lack of merit. 13 The petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari 14 maintaining that they were not accorded their right to due process when their motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court prior to its scheduled hearing on February 15, 2000. However, the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in the questioned Resolution promulgated on March 6, 2000 for being premature and for lack of merit. The appellate court explained that the questioned order of the trial court was interlocutory and could not be assailed in a petition for certiorari and that, moreover, res judicata did not apply insofar as the claim in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 was concerned. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court on May 19, 2000. Hence, the instant petition 15 raising the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 57455.
The private respondents filed their Comment 16 on October 9, 2000 which elicited a Reply 17 from the petitioners on May 15, 2001. Both parties filed their respective memoranda 18 on December 18, 2001 in compliance with our resolution dated October 8, 2001 after which the case was deemed submitted for decision.
It should be noted at the outset that, while the instant petition is ostensibly denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking a review of the questioned resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the discussion therein exclusively dwells on the sole issue of whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, a question which may be appropriately addressed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Specifically, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition in CA G.R. S.P. No. 57455 allegedly for being premature and for lack of merit, thereby totally ignoring the basic issue on the alleged violation by the trial court of their basic right to due process. It must be emphasized that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is generally limited only to questions of law or errors of judgment. 19 On the other hand, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of to correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 20 Consequently, the instant petition for review may be denied for being an erroneous legal recourse.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
At any rate, and to finally dispose of the instant controversy, we rule that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition in CA G.R. S.P. No. 57455 for the reason that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on February 3, 2000. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 21
It should be noted that the motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution on January 10, 2000 was filed by the petitioners on January 31, 2000. The date and time of hearing thereof was set by the petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. In this connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis ours)
It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for reconsideration was beyond the period specified by the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term "must" in fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. 22
The mandatory character of Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court becomes specially significant in this case, considering the claim of the private respondents that the petitioners have been engaging in dilatory tactics, an imputation not without factual basis. As borne by the records, herein petitioners and their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, entered into a compromise Agreement on April 27, 1995 that led to the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-95-23169 on April 28, 1995.
This compromise agreement was already interposed by the petitioners as one of the special and affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149. Thus it was no longer legally possible for the petitioners to file the Motion to Exclude on September 24, 1999 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 (actually a motion to dismiss the case against them), based on a compromise agreement that did not even bind the complainants (herein private respondents) who were not parties thereto. 23 At such stage, the private respondents were already winding up the presentation of their evidence in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149.
Upon the denial of their Motion to Exclude on January 10, 2000, the petitioners filed the subject motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2000. In addition, they moved to cancel the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of their evidence already scheduled on February 3, 2000 ostensibly to give way to oral arguments in support of their motion for reconsideration which, as above discussed, was pro forma. By their actuations, it can be conclusively presumed that the petitioners had no other intention but to delay the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Besides, the petitioners cannot validly invoke violation of due process to question the trial court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration. It should be pointed out that the motion to cancel the scheduled hearing on February 3, 2000 filed on January 31, 2000 by the petitioners was itself scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2000 24 which latter date, incidentally, was previously set by the trial court for reception of defendants’ evidence. Admittedly, the petitioners were present during the hearing on said date to argue on the merits of their motion to cancel. 25 On the same occasion, the private respondents objected to the motion to cancel the hearing on February 3, 2000, arguing that no compelling reason existed to grant the said pending motion; they proposed instead that petitioners avail of the said setting to argue their motion for reconsideration. 26
Despite the denial by the trial court of their motion to cancel, and a subsequent directive for them to argue their motion for reconsideration on February 3, 2000, the petitioners chose to ignore the same. The petitioners thus had only themselves to blame for not having been heard on their motion for reconsideration. Under the Constitution, what is violative of due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the trial court inasmuch as it afforded the petitioners more than ample opportunity to explain their side. 27
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
The facts show that, on January 12, 1998, private respondents Victorino and Olivia Bolos filed a complaint 3 for damages against herein petitioners including Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-33149. The case stemmed from a vehicular accident, involving a tamaraw-type school shuttle service vehicle and a 6 x 6 Isuzu cargo truck, that occurred along Aurora Blvd. in Quezon City on February 3, 1993 resulting in the untimely demise of private respondents’ daughter, Jemelee Bolos. Jemelee was on board the school shuttle service vehicle that used to transport her from Marikina City to St. Bridget School in Quezon City.
Petitioners-spouses Graciano, Sr. and Serena Bacelonia were named defendants in the said complaint for damages as owners/operators of the school shuttle service that figured in the accident. Graciano Bacelonia, Jr. was the driver thereof. The other defendants therein, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño were the owner and the driver of the cargo truck, respectively.
On February 9, 1998, the petitioners filed their answer 4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaim while their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, filed their answer with affirmative defenses and cross-claim.
Meanwhile, it appears that, prior to the filing of the complaint for damages by the private respondents, herein petitioners filed on March 1, 1995 a complaint 5 for damages arising from the said accident against their co-defendants with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23169. On April 27, 1995, herein petitioners and their co-defendants entered into a compromise agreement 6 that led to the dismissal 7 of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-95-23169 on April 28, 1995 by the trial court.
On September 24, 1999, and upon termination of the testimony of the second witness for the complainants (herein private respondents) in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149, petitioners filed a motion 8 to be dropped as defendants therefrom on the ground that a compromise agreement had already been entered into by the parties in Civil Case No. 95-23169. The petitioners opined in essence that their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, had explicitly admitted sole responsibility for the vehicular accident by entering into the compromise agreement. Thus, they (the Bacelonias) should be excluded as defendants in Civil Case No. 98-33149. However, their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, filed an opposition 9 thereto substantially contending that res judicata does not obtain insofar as the present case is concerned, and that, on the contrary, they never admitted any responsibility for the accident on February 3, 1993.
The trial court resolved to deny the motion of the petitioners to be dropped as defendants from Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 on January 10, 2000 for lack of merit and scheduled the reception of evidence of the defense on February 3, 2000.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On January 31, 2000, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 10 of the trial court’s order denying their motion to be dropped as defendants from Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 and set the date of hearing 11 thereof on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. On the same day, January 31, 2000, the petitioners also filed a separate motion to cancel 12 the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the defense earlier scheduled on February 3, 2000 so that their motion for reconsideration, scheduled for hearing on February 15, 2000, may not be rendered moot and academic. The motion to cancel hearing was itself scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2000. Private respondents opposed the twin motions of the petitioners for lack of merit and argued that the scheduled hearing on February 3, 2000 for the initial presentation of evidence of the defense may be availed of by said petitioners for oral argument in support of their motion for reconsideration.
During the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of evidence of the defense on February 3, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners for lack of merit. 13 The petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari 14 maintaining that they were not accorded their right to due process when their motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court prior to its scheduled hearing on February 15, 2000. However, the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in the questioned Resolution promulgated on March 6, 2000 for being premature and for lack of merit. The appellate court explained that the questioned order of the trial court was interlocutory and could not be assailed in a petition for certiorari and that, moreover, res judicata did not apply insofar as the claim in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 was concerned. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court on May 19, 2000. Hence, the instant petition 15 raising the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 57455.
The private respondents filed their Comment 16 on October 9, 2000 which elicited a Reply 17 from the petitioners on May 15, 2001. Both parties filed their respective memoranda 18 on December 18, 2001 in compliance with our resolution dated October 8, 2001 after which the case was deemed submitted for decision.
It should be noted at the outset that, while the instant petition is ostensibly denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking a review of the questioned resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the discussion therein exclusively dwells on the sole issue of whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, a question which may be appropriately addressed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Specifically, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition in CA G.R. S.P. No. 57455 allegedly for being premature and for lack of merit, thereby totally ignoring the basic issue on the alleged violation by the trial court of their basic right to due process. It must be emphasized that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is generally limited only to questions of law or errors of judgment. 19 On the other hand, the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of to correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 20 Consequently, the instant petition for review may be denied for being an erroneous legal recourse.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
At any rate, and to finally dispose of the instant controversy, we rule that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition in CA G.R. S.P. No. 57455 for the reason that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on February 3, 2000. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 21
It should be noted that the motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution on January 10, 2000 was filed by the petitioners on January 31, 2000. The date and time of hearing thereof was set by the petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. In this connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court on motions provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis ours)
It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for reconsideration was beyond the period specified by the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion, or no later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term "must" in fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court. 22
The mandatory character of Rule 15, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court becomes specially significant in this case, considering the claim of the private respondents that the petitioners have been engaging in dilatory tactics, an imputation not without factual basis. As borne by the records, herein petitioners and their co-defendants, Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, entered into a compromise Agreement on April 27, 1995 that led to the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-95-23169 on April 28, 1995.
This compromise agreement was already interposed by the petitioners as one of the special and affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149. Thus it was no longer legally possible for the petitioners to file the Motion to Exclude on September 24, 1999 in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149 (actually a motion to dismiss the case against them), based on a compromise agreement that did not even bind the complainants (herein private respondents) who were not parties thereto. 23 At such stage, the private respondents were already winding up the presentation of their evidence in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149.
Upon the denial of their Motion to Exclude on January 10, 2000, the petitioners filed the subject motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2000. In addition, they moved to cancel the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of their evidence already scheduled on February 3, 2000 ostensibly to give way to oral arguments in support of their motion for reconsideration which, as above discussed, was pro forma. By their actuations, it can be conclusively presumed that the petitioners had no other intention but to delay the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-98-33149.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Besides, the petitioners cannot validly invoke violation of due process to question the trial court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration. It should be pointed out that the motion to cancel the scheduled hearing on February 3, 2000 filed on January 31, 2000 by the petitioners was itself scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2000 24 which latter date, incidentally, was previously set by the trial court for reception of defendants’ evidence. Admittedly, the petitioners were present during the hearing on said date to argue on the merits of their motion to cancel. 25 On the same occasion, the private respondents objected to the motion to cancel the hearing on February 3, 2000, arguing that no compelling reason existed to grant the said pending motion; they proposed instead that petitioners avail of the said setting to argue their motion for reconsideration. 26
Despite the denial by the trial court of their motion to cancel, and a subsequent directive for them to argue their motion for reconsideration on February 3, 2000, the petitioners chose to ignore the same. The petitioners thus had only themselves to blame for not having been heard on their motion for reconsideration. Under the Constitution, what is violative of due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the trial court inasmuch as it afforded the petitioners more than ample opportunity to explain their side. 27
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz. Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 28–31.
2. Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 34–35.
3. Petition, Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 38–43.
4. Petition, Annex "H", Rollo, pp. 70–75.
5. Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, pp. 45–52.
6. Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 66–67.
7. Petition, Annex "G", Rollo, p. 68.
8. Petition, Annex "I", Rollo, pp. 76–79.
9. Petition, Annex "J", Rollo, pp. 80–85.
10. Petition, Annex "K", Rollo, pp. 86–97.
11. Petition, Annex "K-1", Rollo, p. 97.
12. Petition, Annex "L", Rollo, pp. 98–99.
13. Petition, Annex "M", Rollo, p. 100.
14. Petition, Annex "N", Rollo, pp. 101–125.
15. Rollo, pp. 3–27.
16. Rollo, pp. 226–236.
17. Rollo, pp. 242–249.
18. Rollo, pp. 254–261; 262–272.
19. Tanedo v. CA, 252 SCRA 80, 90 (1996); Engineering and Machinery Corp. v. CA, 252 SCRA 156, 162 (1996).
20. Asian Trading Corp. v. CA, 303 SCRA 152, 161–162 (1999).
21. Asian Trading Corporation v. CA, supra, pp. 161–162; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, 257 SCRA 200, 232 (1996).
22. Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. CA, 212 SCRA 498, 504 (1998); Prado v. Veridiano II, 204 SCRA 654, 666–667 (1991); Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses Corporation, 198 SCRA 689, 698–699 (1991).
23. Cebu International Finance Corporation v. CA, 316 SCRA 488, 498–499 (1999); Westmont Bank v. Shugo Noda & Co. Ltd., 307 SCRA 381, 391 (1999).
24. Rollo, p. 114.
25. Rollo, p. 117.
26. Rollo, p. 226.
27. China City Restaurant Corp. v. NLRC, 217 SCRA 443, 449 (1993).
