July 2008 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 166510 - People of the Philippines v. Benjamin T. Romualdez, et al.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 166510 : July 23, 2008]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. BENJAMIN "KOKOY" T. ROMUALDEZ and THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court by the People of the Philippines (People), assailing the Resolutions dated 22 June 20041 and 23 November 20042 of the Sandiganbayan in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26916 entitled People of the Philippines v. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion and/or lack or excess of jurisdiction. The first assailed Resolution granted the motion to quash filed by private respondent Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez (Romualdez); the second assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the People's motion for reconsideration of the first assailed Resolution.
ANTECEDENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information3 reads:
That on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government in the following manner: accused public officer being then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-six Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US $276,911.56), US Currency or its equivalent amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty-eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) both Philippine Currencies, respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Romualdez moved to quash the information4 on two grounds, namely: (1) that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the offense with which the accused was charged; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription. He argued that the acts imputed against him do not constitute an offense because: (a) the cited provision of the law applies only to public officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions, and the act charged - receiving dual compensation - is absolutely irrelevant and unrelated to the act of granting licenses, permits, or other concessions; and (b) there can be no damage and prejudice to the Government considering that he actually rendered services for the dual positions of Provincial Governor of Leyte and Ambassador to foreign countries.
To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of RA 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cojuangco Jr. v. PCGG5 and Cruz Jr [sic].6 He likewise argued that the Revised Penal Code provision7 that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines should not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws (Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the Revised Penal Code.
The People opposed the motion to quash on the argument that Romualdez is misleading the court in asserting that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 does not apply to him when Section 2 (b) of the law states that corrupt practices may be committed by public officers who include "elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government."8 On the issue of prescription, the People argued that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel, and that prescription is a matter of technicality to which no one has a vested right. Romualdez filed a Reply to this Opposition.9
The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first Resolution assailed in this petition. The Sandiganbayan stated:
We find that the allegation of damage and prejudice to the Government in the amount of P5,806,709.50 representing the accused's compensation is without basis, absent a showing that the accused did not actually render services for his two concurrent positions as Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte and as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and United States of America. The accused alleges in the subject Motion that he actually rendered services to the government. To receive compensation for actual services rendered would not come within the ambit of improper or illegal use of funds or properties of the government; nor would it constitute unjust enrichment tantamount to the damage and prejudice of the government.
Jurisprudence has established what "evident bad faith" and "gross negligence" entail, thus:
In order to be held guilty of violating Section 3 (e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the accused that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. But bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law, the "bad faith" must be "evident".
x x x � � � � � x x x � � � � � x x x
xxx. "Gross negligence" is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons may be affected. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
The accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding of two concurrent positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him criminally liable under the Information charged against him, given the elements of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court quoted above. At most, any liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused may be administrative in nature.
x x x
However, as discussed above, the Information does not sufficiently aver how the act of receiving dual compensation resulted to undue injury to the government so as to make the accused liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.10
The Sandiganbayan found no merit in Romualdez' prescription argument.
The People moved to reconsider this Resolution, citing "reversible errors" that the Sandiganbayan committed in its ruling.11 Romualdez opposed the People's motion, but also moved for a partial reconsideration of the Resolution's ruling on prescription.12 The People opposed Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration.13
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan denied via the second assailed Resolution14 the People's motion for reconsideration under the following terms'
The Court held in its Resolution of June 22, 2004, and so maintains and sustains, that assuming the averments of the foregoing information are hypothetically admitted by the accused, it would not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 as the elements of (a) causing undue injury to any party, including the government, by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties, and (b) that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, are wanting.
As it is, a perusal of the information shows that pertinently, accused is being charged for: (a) having himself appointed as ambassador to various posts while serving as governor of the Province of Leyte and (b) for collecting dual compensation for said positions. As to the first, the Court finds that accused cannot be held criminally liable, whether or not he had himself appointed to the position of the ambassador while concurrently holding the position of provincial governor, because the act of appointment is something that can only be imputed to the appointing authority.
Even assuming that the appointee influenced the appointing authority, the appointee only makes a passive participation by entering into the appointment, unless it is alleged that he acted in conspiracy with his appointing authority, which, however, is not so claimed by the prosecution in the instant case. Thus, even if the accused's appointment was contrary to law or the constitution, it is the appointing authority that should be responsible therefor because it is the latter who is the doer of the alleged wrongful act. In fact, under the rules on payment of compensation, the appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the appointment been lawful. As it is, the appointing authority herein, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos has been laid to rest, so it would be incongruous and illogical to hold his appointee, herein accused, liable for the appointment.
Further, the allegation in the information that the accused collected compensation in the amounts of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) cannot sustain the theory of the prosecution that the accused caused damage and prejudice to the government, in the absence of any contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party and to acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Besides receiving compensation is an incident of actual services rendered, hence it cannot be construed as injury or damage to the government.
It likewise found no merit in Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES' SUBMISSIONS
The People filed the present petition on the argument that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information based on the reasons it stated in the assailed Resolutions, considering that:
A. Romualdez cannot be legally appointed as an ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines during his incumbency as Governor of the Province of Leyte; thus, to draw salaries for the two positions is to cause undue injury to the government under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019;
b. Romualdez cannot receive compensation for his illegal appointment as Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines and for his services in this capacity; thus, to so pay him is to make illegal payment of public funds and cause undue injury to the government under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019; andcralawlibrary
c. The Sandiganbayan went beyond the ultimate facts required in charging a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and delved into matters yet to be proven during trial.
Required to comment on the petition, Romualdez filed a Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam.15 He argued that the filing of the present Rule 65 petition is improper, as a petition filed under Rule 45, instead of Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy, considering that the assailed Resolutions are appealable. He cited in support of this contention the ruling that an order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order; it is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable.16 He further argued that the present petition was belatedly filed, as the People filed it beyond the 15-day reglementary filing period for a Rule 45 petition. On the substantive issues raised in the petition, he argued that the factual averments in the Information do not constitute the offense charged and that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription.
The People, on the other hand, asserted in reply17 that while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, or that certiorari is not a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal, the rule may be relaxed when the issue raised is purely legal, when public interest is involved, and in case of urgency. It also argued that certiorari may also be availed of where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; and that it is within this Court's power to suspend or exempt a particular case from the operation of the rules when its strict application will frustrate rather than promote justice. Thus, the People asked for a review of the case based on substantial justice and the claimed merits of the instant petition.
Romualdez countered in his Rejoinder18 that the assailed Resolutions, being final, can no longer be questioned, re-opened, or reviewed; that public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Citing the express provision of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 (which provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court), he argued that certiorari cannot be availed of because of the availability of appeal.
These submissions bring to the fore the threshold issue of whether the present petition may be given due course given the Rule 65 mode of review that the People used. As will be seen below, our examination of this threshold issue leads to the consideration of the grave abuse of discretion issue.
OUR RULING
The Threshold Issue
The Sandiganbayan ruling granting Romuldez' motion to quash the Information shall, upon finality, close and terminate the proceedings against Romuldez; hence, it is a final ruling that disposes of the case and is properly reviewable by appeal.19 The appeal, as Romualdez correctly maintains, is through Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8249), which provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are appealable to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45.
Significantly, the People does not deny at all that the mode of review to question a Sandiganbayan final ruling is by way of Rule 45, as the above cited provision requires. It only posits that this requirement does not foreclose the use of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion when the issue is purely legal, when public interest is involved, or in case of urgency. In short, the People asks us to relax the application of the rules on the modes of review.
The purpose and occasion for the use of Rules 45 and 65 as modes of review are clearly established under the Rules of Court20 and related jurisprudence.21 Rule 45 provides for the broad process of appeal to the Supreme Court on pure errors of law committed by the lower court. Rule 65, on the other hand, provides a completely different basis for review through the extraordinary writ of certiorari . The writ is extraordinary because it solely addresses lower court actions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. By express provision, Rule 65 is the proper remedy when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive;certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the availability of that remedy; a petition for certiorari cannot likewise be a substitute for a lost appeal.22
Cases on the choice between the Rule 45 and Rule 65 modes of review are not novel. Because of the spirit of liberality that pervades the Rules of Court23 and the interest of substantial justice that we have always believed should be upheld,24 we have had occasions to relax the strict rules regulating these modes of review. However, these occasions are few and far between and have always been attended by exceptional circumstances; otherwise, the exceptions would displace the general rule, rendering useless the distinctions painstakingly established through the years to foster procedural orderliness.
In Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan25 we allowed a Rule 65 petition, notwithstanding that the proper remedy is a Rule 45 appeal, to review a Sandiganbayan Decision in view of the importance of the issues raised in the case. We similarly allowed a review under Rule 65 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)26 and Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Special First Division)27 - cases on ill-gotten wealth - on the reasoning that the nature of the cases was endowed with public interest and involved public policy concerns. In the latter Republic v. Sandiganbayan case, we added that substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should be relentlessly and firmly pursued. In the past, we have likewise allowed a similar treatment on the showing that an appeal was an inadequate remedy.28 That we can single out for special treatment cases involving grave abuse of discretion is supported by no less than the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversy involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Under this provision, action on grave abuse of discretion is not only a power we can exercise; more than this, it is a duty we must discharge.
In the spirit embodied in this constitutional provision and in the interest of substantial justice, we will not hesitate to deviate from the strict application of our procedural rules when grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is properly and substantially alleged in a petition filed after the lapse of the period for appeal under Rule 45 but prior to the lapse of the period for filing a Rule 65 petition. Conceptually, no major deviation from the rules in fact transpires in doing this. Under established jurisprudence, decisions and rulings rendered without or with lack or excess of jurisdiction are null and void,29 subject only to the procedural limits on the right to question them provided under Rule 65.30 It is for this reason that a decision that lapses to finality fifteen (15) days after its receipt can still be questioned, within sixty (60) days therefrom, on jurisdictional grounds, although the decision has technically lapsed to finality. The only deviation in terms of strict application of the Rules is from what we have discussed above regarding the basic nature of a Petition for Certiorari as expressly laid down by Rule 65; it is available only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and thus is not allowed as a substitute when a party fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the availability of that remedy.31
Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally erred while acting within the confines of its jurisdiction, then its ruling, even if erroneous, is properly the subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, and any Rule 65 petition subsequently filed will be for naught. The Rule 65 petition brought under these circumstances is then being used as a substitute for a lost appeal. If, on the other hand, the Sandiganbayan ruling is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then this ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional ground and we should allow it to be questioned within the period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, notwithstanding the lapse of the period of appeal under Rule 45. To reiterate, the ruling's jurisdictional defect and the demands of substantial justice that we believe should receive primacy over the strict application of rules of procedure, require that we so act.
The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
Romualdez' motion to quash that gave rise to the present case was
anchored on Section 3 (a) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Section 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
x x x
The determinative test in appreciating a motion to quash under this rule is the sufficiency of the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law without considering matters aliunde.32 As Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires, the information only needs to state the ultimate facts;33 the evidentiary and other details can be provided during the trial.34
The legal provision under which Romuldez stands charged - Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 - on the other hand provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practice of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices of government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision requires that:35
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his functions; andcralawlibrary
3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave a private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted correctly, or committed errors of law while in the exercise of its jurisdiction, or gravely abused its discretion in quashing the information, are to be determined based on the application of the standards in evaluating a motion to quash, in light of the elements and terms of the offense with which the accused stands charged. The Sandiganbayan acts correctly or commits errors of law depending on its conclusions if - based solely on the "four corners" of the information as jurisprudence mandates,36 independently of any evidence whether prima facie or conclusive, and hypothetically assuming the truth of all the allegations in the Information - it rules on whether all the elements of the offense as defined by law are present. On the other hand, it acts with grave abuse of discretion if its ruling is a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or if it rules in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; or if it acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to action outside the contemplation of law.37
Our reading of the Information, based on the elements of the offense, shows us that the first element of the offense is reflected in the allegation that the "accused BENJAMIN 'KOKOY' ROMUALDEZ, a public officer being then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his Office'. " In plain terms, the accused was then a public officer discharging official functions.
The second element appears in the averment that the "accused' willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith '" and the more particular averment that "accused public officer being then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte." In short, while being the elected Governor and in "evident bad faith," he had himself appointed to the incompatible position of ambassador.
Finally, the last element corresponds to the allegation that the "accused' cause[d] undue injury to the Government," supported further by the particular allegation "thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy-six thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US $276,911.56), US Currency or its equivalent amount of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty-eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) both Philippine Currencies, respectively, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50." Thus, attended by and as a result of the second element, the accused caused undue injury to the government by collecting dual compensation from the two incompatible positions he occupied.
In its first Resolution, the Sandiganbayan concluded that (1) "the allegation of damage and prejudice to the Government . . . is without basis, absent a showing that the accused did not actually render services for his two concurrent positions. . . and that (2) [T]he accused alleges in the subject Motion that he actually rendered service to the government. To receive compensation for actual services rendered would not come within the ambit of improper or illegal use of funds or properties."38 After citing jurisprudence defining evident bad faith and gross negligence, it went on to state that (3) the accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding of two concurrent positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him criminally liable under the Information charged against him, given the elements of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court '. At most, any liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused may be administrative in nature."39 [underscoring supplied]
In the second Resolution, on the other hand, the Sandiganbayan concluded: (1) on the allegation that Romualdez had himself appointed as Ambassador while concurrently serving as Provincial Governor, that it "finds that accused cannot be held criminally liable, whether or not he had himself appointed to the position - because the act of appointment is something that can only be imputed to the appointing authority - Even assuming that the appointee influenced the appointing authority, the appointee only makes a passive participation by entering into the appointment, unless it is alleged that he acted in conspiracy with his appointing authority '";40 and (2) on the matter of dual compensation, that the allegation - cannot sustain the theory of the prosecution that the accused caused damage and prejudice to the government, in the absence of any contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party and to acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross excusable negligence; besides, receiving compensation is an incident of actual services rendered, hence it cannot be construed as injury or damage to the government."41
To put our discussions in perspective, we are not here primarily engaged in evaluating the motion to quash that Romualdez filed with the Sandiganbayan. Rather, we are evaluating - on the basis of the standards we have defined above - the propriety of the action of the Sandiganbayan in quashing the Information against Romualdez.
Based on these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan's actions grossly violated the defined standards. Its conclusions are based on considerations that either not appropriate in evaluating a motion to quash; are evidentiary details not required to be stated in an Information; are matters of defense that have no place in an Information; or are statements amounting to rulings on the merits that a court cannot issue before trial.
To illustrate, in the first Resolution, the Sandiganbayan saw no basis for the allegation of damage and prejudice for the failure of the Information to state that Romualdez did not render service in the two positions which he occupied. The element of the offense material to the "damage and prejudice" that the Sandiganbayan refers to is the "undue injury" caused to the government by Romualdez' receipt of compensation for the incompatible positions that he could not simultaneously occupy. The allegation of "undue injury" in the Information, consisting of the extent of the injury and how it was caused, is complete. Beyond this allegation are matters that are already in excess of what a proper Information requires. To restate the rule, an Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged amounted to undue injury or damage - matters that are appropriate for the trial. Specifically, how the two positions of Romualdez were incompatible with each other and whether or not he can legally receive compensation for his two incompatible positions are matters of detail that the prosecution should adduce at the trial to flesh out the ultimate facts alleged in the Information. Whether or not compensation has been earned through proper and commensurate service is a matter in excess of the ultimate facts the Information requires and is one that Romualdez, not the Information, should invoke or introduce into the case as a matter of defense.
From another perspective, the Sandiganbayan's view that the Information should have alleged that services were not rendered assumes that Romualdez can occupy two government positions and can secure compensation from both positions if services were rendered. At the very least, these are legally erroneous assumptions that are contrary to what the then prevailing laws provided. Article XII (B), Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution provides that:
Unless otherwise provided by law, no elective official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position during his tenure except as Member of the Cabinet.
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 807 Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission states in its Section 44 that -
Limitation on Appointment. - No elective official shall be eligible for appointment to any office or position during his term of office.
On the matter of double compensation, the 1973 Constitution likewise has a specific provision - Article XV, Section 5 - which states:
SEC. 5. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept, without the consent of the Batasang Pambansa, any present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign state.
Neither the Sandiganbayan nor Romuladez has pointed to any law, and we are not aware of any such law, that would exempt Romualdez from the prohibition of the above-cited provisions.ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ
In the context of ruling on a motion to quash, the allegation that services were not rendered that the Sandiganbayan wished to require, not being a fact material to the elements of the offense, is an extraneous matter that is inappropriate for the Sandiganbayan to consider for inclusion in the Information. That the Sandiganbayan has a fixation on this approach is patent from a reading of the second assailed Resolution when the Sandiganbayan, following the same line of thought, once more insisted that "receiving compensation is an incident of actual services rendered, hence it cannot be construed as injury or damage to the government." Thus again, the Sandiganbayan grossly erred in the same manner it did in the first Resolution.
For the Sandiganbayan to assume, too, and to conclude, that there was no damage and prejudice since there was no illegality in being compensated for actual services rendered, is to pass upon the merits of the case - a task premature for the Sandiganbayan to undertake at the motion-to-quash stage of the case. In so doing, the Sandiganbayan prematurely ruled on at least two matters. First, the Sandiganbayan either assumed as correct, or admitted for purposes of the motion to quash, the defense allegation that Romualdez rendered services, when this is a disputed evidentiary matter that can only be established at the trial. Second, and as already mentioned above, the legal status of the receipt of compensation for each of two incompatible offices is, at best, legally debatable. The Sandiganbayan repeated this premature ruling on the merits of the case in its subsequent statement in the first Resolution that "the accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding of two concurrent positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him criminally liable under the Information charged against him, given the elements of the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court - At most, any liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused may be administrative in nature."42
Worse than the premature ruling it made in the above-quoted conclusion was the patent speculation that the Sandiganbayan undertook in considering "inefficiency" and arriving at its conclusion. Still much worse was its misreading of what a violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019 involves. Correctly understood, it is not the holding of two concurrent positions or the attendant efficiency in the handling of these positions, but the causing of undue injury to the government that is at the core of a Section 3(e) violation. The same misreading was evident when the Sandiganbayan stated in its second Resolution that "the accused cannot be held criminally liable, whether or not he had himself appointed to the position of the ambassador, while concurrently holding the position of provincial governor, because the act of appointment is something that can only be imputed to the appointing authority."
The Sandiganbayan fared no better and similarly gravely abused its discretion in the second Resolution when it concluded that that there could be no damage and prejudice to the government "in the absence of any contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party and to acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross excusable negligence." That no allegation of "giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party" appears in the Information is due obviously to the fact that this allegation is not necessary. "Giving a private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference" is not an element that must necessarily be alleged to complete the recital of how Section 3 (e) is violated because it is only one of two alternative modes of violating this provision, the other being causing "undue injury to any party, including the government." In short, the Information is complete solely on the basis of the "undue injury" allegation.
Even a cursory examination of the Information would show that an allegation of "evident bad faith" was expressly made, complete with a statement of how the bad faith was manifested, that is, "being then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning such position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, [Romualdez] had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries...". Whether this allegation can be successfully proven by evidence or established through an analysis of the nature of the power of appointment remains to be seen after trial, not at the motion-to-quash stage of the case. At this earlier stage, all that is required is for this allegation to be an ultimate fact directly providing for an element of the offense.
In light of all these, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan grossly and egregiously erred in the considerations it made and in the conclusions it arrived at when it quashed the Information against Romualdez, to the point of acting outside its jurisdiction through the grave abuse of discretion that attended its actions. Its errors are so patent and gross as to amount to action outside the contemplation of law. Thus, the declaration of the nullity of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated 22 June 2004 and 23 November 2004 in CRIM. CASE NO. 26916 entitled People of the Philippines v. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED TO PROCEED with the trial on the merits of the case on the basis of the Information filed. Costs against the private respondent Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by then Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, now Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with Associate Justices Roland B. Jurado and Efren N. dela Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 45-53;
2 Penned by Justice Peralta, with then Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro (now a member of this Court) and Justice dela Cruz, concurring; id., pp. 54-60.
3 Id., pp. 86-88.
4 Id., pp. 89-109.
5 G.R. No. 92319, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226, 257.
6 Referring apparently to Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.94595, February 26, 1991, 194 SCRA 474.
7 Article 91.
8 Rollo, pp. 110-113.
9 Id., pp. 114-119.
10 Supra note 1.
11 Rollo, pp. 61-85.
12 Id., pp. 120-128.
13 Id., pp. 129-145.
14 Supra note 2.
15 Rollo, pp. 174-223.
16 The respondent cited Milo v. Salonga, L-37007, July 20, 1987, 152 SCRA 113, as authority.
17 Rollo, pp. 232-253.
18 Id., pp. 254-261.
19 People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156394, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 205, 216, citing People v. Sandiganbayan, 408 SCRA 672, 674 (2003) and Africa v. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 408, 417 (1998).
20 See the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on the mechanics of filing these petitions; for Appeals by Certiorari, Rule 45 and for Petition for Certiorari, Rule 65.
21 See People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185.
22 Supra note 19.
23 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 1, Section 6.
24 See the Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837, citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368.
25 G.R. No. 79543, October 16, 1996, 263 SCRA 222.
26 G.R. No. 113420, March 7, 1997, 269 SCRA 316.
27 G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, 407 SCRA 10.
28 Supra note 19; See also Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100733, June 18, 1992, 210 SCRA 136, 148-149.
29 Albay I Cooperative, Inc. v. Martinez, G.R. No. 95559, November 9, 1993, 227 SCRA 606.
30 Longino v. General, G.R. No. 147956, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 423; see also Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647.
31 Supra note 19.
32 Poblete v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 150610, March 25, 2004, 426 SCRA 346, 351.
33 Rule 117, Section 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint.
34 See Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109376, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 655.
35 See Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162314-17, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 377, 386.
36 Supra note 31.
37 See Lalican v. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 518, and Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 246.
38 See the first assailed Resolution, quoted at pp. 4-5 of this Decision.
39 Id.
40 See the Second assailed Resolution, quoted at pp. 4-5 of this Decision.
41 Id.
42 See the first assailed Resolution, quoted at pp. 2-3 of this Decision.
