SECOND
DIVISION
HUBERT
WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO,HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,PETER
ESTRADA and MICHAEL GATCHALIAN,
Petitioners,
G. R. No. 127262
July 24, 1997
-versus-
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque,
Branch 274, and LAURO VIZCONDE,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners
Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Michael Gatchalian[1]
assail the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 1996 in C.A.
G. R. SP No. 39839[2]
and C.A. G. R. SP No. 39840,[3]
as well as its resolution dated November 15, 1996 insofar as it denied
the petition for the inhibition of respondent Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino
in Criminal Case No. 95-404[4]
pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque.[5]
The antecedent
facts show that on August 8, 1995,
petitioners were charged with the crime of rape with homicide for
allegedly
raping Carmela Vizconde and on the occasion thereof, killing Carmela
herself
and her mother, Estrellita, and her sister, Jennifer. The crime was
committed
in the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991 at
the
Vizconde residence in BF Homes, Paranaque.[6]
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404, was raffled to Branch
274
of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque presided by respondent judge.cralaw:red
Prior to their
arraignment, petitioner Webb and
his co-accused, Gerardo Biong, had sought the disqualification of
respondent
judge in Criminal Case No. 95-404. In his motion of August 21, 1995,
petitioner
Webb relied on the ground that respondent judge allegedly told the
media
that "failure of the accused to surrender following the issuance of the
warrant of arrest is an indication of guilt." Respondent judge denied
the
motion. Two days later, on August 23, 1995, petitioner Webb filed a
second
motion to disqualify respondent judge as the latter allegedly told the
media that the accused "should not expect the comforts of home,"
pending
the resolution of his motion to be committed to the custody of the
Philippine
National Police at Camp Ricardo Papa, Bicutan, Paranaque. Respondent
judge
again denied the motion to inhibit. On September 4, 1995, Gerardo Biong
filed another motion to disqualify respondent judge on the ground of
bias
and partiality. This was likewise denied by respondent judge.cralaw:red
The petitioners
were arraigned on September 4,
1995. They then filed separate petitions for bail.
On September 21, 1995, petitioner Webb
filed
an Urgent Motion for Hospitalization. He alleged that he was sick of
dermatitis
or asthma of the skin which aggravated due to his continuous commitment
at the Paranaque Municipal Jail. The motion was denied by respondent
judge
on October 16, 1995. On October 9, 1995, the hearing on petitioners'
petitions
for bail commenced. The prosecution presented its "star witness,"
Jessica Alfaro, who identified petitioners as the perpetrators of the
crime.
During the cross-examination, the defense counsel tried to impeach
Alfaro's
credibility by asking her questions regarding the contents of an
affidavit
she executed at the National Bureau of Investigation [NBI] on April 28,
1995. The defense tried to show that some of her statements in said
affidavit
are inconsistent with her statements in a subsequent affidavit executed
on May 21, 1995 and with her testimony in court. The prosecution
objected
and moved that all questions relating to the contents of Alfaro's April
28 affidavit be expunged from the records for being inadmissible in
evidence
under Article III Section 12[1] and [3] of the 1987 Constitution.[7]
Respondent judge sustained the objection and on October 30, 1995, she
issued
an order holding that Alfaro cannot be cross-examined on the contents
of
her April 28 affidavit because said affidavit was inadmissible in
evidence
as it was not executed in the presence of a counsel.[8]
The defense also
tried to prove Alfaro's motive
in testifying against petitioners. She was questioned about her
brother,
Patrick Alfaro, and her uncle, Roberto Alfaro. Jessica Alfaro allegedly
admitted that her brother, Patrick, was a drug addict and was arrested
once by the NBI for illegal possession of drugs and that he is
presently
in the United States. When defense counsel inquired about the
circumstances
of Patrick's departure for the United States, the prosecution objected
to the questions on the ground of irrelevancy. Respondent judge
sustained
the objection.cralaw:red
The defense also
cross-examined Alfaro on her
educational attainment to show that she lied in her direct testimony.
The
defense presented her transcript of records to prove that she only
enrolled
for a year and earned nine [9] academic units, contrary to her claim
that
she finished second year college. The prosecution again objected on the
ground that Alfaro's educational attainment was irrelevant. Respondent
judge sustained the objection. On November 9, 1995, petitioners filed a
motion to disqualify or inhibit respondent judge due to bias and
prejudice.
Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit on November 28,
1995.[9]
On November 15,
1995, petitioners filed two separate
petitions with this Court. Petitioners Webb, Lejano, Fernandez,
together
with their co-accused, Gerardo Biong, filed a petition for certiorari
seeking
to set aside [1] the order of respondent judge dated October 16, 1995
denying
petitioner Webb's motion for hospitalization and [2] the order of
respondent
judge dated October 30, 1995 disallowing the defense to cross-examine
Alfaro
on the contents of her April 28 affidavit.[10]
Petitioners Gatchalian and Estrada filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition
and mandamus assailing respondent judge's order prohibiting the
cross-examination
of Alfaro on the contents of her April 28 affidavit.[11]
On December 8,
1995, petitioners filed with this
Court a supplemental petition to set aside the November 28, 1995 order
of respondent judge denying their motion for inhibition. In a
resolution
dated January 22, 1996, we referred both petitions and the supplemental
petition to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. In
the meantime, the hearing on petitioners' petitions for bail continued.
The prosecution presented Mila Gaviola, a former maid at the Webb
residence,
who testified that she saw petitioner Webb in their house in the early
morning of June 30, 1991. On December 5, 1995, respondent judge, over
the
objection of the petitioners, ordered an ocular inspection of the
former
Webb residence in BF Homes, Paranaque to verify Gaviola's testimony
about
a secret door through which she peeped to see petitioner Webb.cralaw:red
On January 12,
1996, petitioner Webb filed a motion
for deposition of witnesses residing in the United States who shall
testify
on his presence in the United States on the date of the commission of
the
crime.[12]
On February 6, 1996, respondent judge denied the motion for the reason
that petitioner Webb failed to allege that the witnesses do not have
the
means to go to the place of the trial.[13]
Hence, on January 12, 1996, petitioner Webb filed another supplemental
petition to the Court of Appeals challenging the said order.cralaw:red
Petitioners made
their Formal Offer of Evidence
upon conclusion of the hearings on the petitions for bail. On September
25, 1995, the prosecution filed its Comment/Objection to the Formal
Offer
of Evidence. On October 1, 1996, respondent judge ruled on petitioner's
formal offer of evidence. She admitted only ten [10] out of the one
hundred
forty two [142] exhibits offered by petitioner.[14]On October 11, 1996,
respondent
judge denied petitioners' petitions for bail.[15]
On June 21, 1996,
the Court of Appeals rendered
its Decision on the various petitions and supplemental petitions. It
reversed
respondent judge's ruling refusing to admit Alfaro's April 28 affidavit
but denied all the other reliefs prayed for by petitioners.[16]
It also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated November 15, 1996.[17] On December 12, 1996,
petitioners
filed the present petition contending:
I.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals erred in
declaring that
no sufficient ground exists for the disqualification of the respondent
judge.chanrobles virtual law library
A. Respondent judge has consistently
and
repeatedly
shown bias and hostility against petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
B. The rejection of the 132 of 142
exhibits
not only paved the way for the denial of bail but also sets
irreversibly
the eventual conviction of all the accused.chanrobles virtual law library
C. The reported trip to the Vizconde
residence
by the respondent judge exposes her propensity to consort with the
complainant
on the pending issues.chanrobles virtual law library
II.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals erred in not
honoring
that the right to a fair trial requires that the case be tried by an
impartial
judge.chanrobles virtual law library
On February 5,
1997, petitioners filed a supplemental
petition. It alleged, among others, that during the trial on the
merits,
respondent judge allowed prosecution witness Atty. Pedro Rivera to
testify
on the character of the accused although the defense had not put his
character
in issue; that respondent judge disallowed the defense to impeach the
credibility
of Atty. Rivera by the presentation of an earlier statement executed by
him because such statement was immaterial; and that respondent judge
struck
off from the record the proffer of oral evidence made by defense
counsel
Atty. Vitaliano Aguirre after ruling that the proffer was improper on
cross-examination.[18]
The core issue is
whether respondent judge should
inhibit herself from hearing Criminal Case No. 95-404 on the ground of
bias and prejudice.cralaw:red
We rule in the
negative.cralaw:red
The Bill of
Rights guarantees that "[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law."[19]
A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial
and
disinterested tribunal. We have ingrained the jurisprudence that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial
judge for all the other elements of due process, like notice and
hearing,
would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial
and biased judge.[20]
Hence, the Rules of Court allows a judge to voluntarily inhibit himself
from hearing a case for "just or valid reasons" other than those
referring
to his pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous
rulings
or decisions. Section 1 Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges.
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other
than those mentioned above.
Under the
second paragraph, a party has the right
to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear
to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling
the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide
cases without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the
ground
of bias and prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and
convincing
evidence. This is a heavy burden and petitioners failed to discharge
their
burden of proof.
To prove bias and
prejudice on the part of respondent
judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of
respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they
do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent
judge.
To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have
stemmed
from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in
the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings,
although
erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and
conduct
observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the
part
of the judge.[21]
As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how
erroneous
and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for
disqualification
of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.[22]
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be
inferred
from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so
erroneous
as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic
evidence,
the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against
the
judge.[23]
The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent
as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.cralaw:red
A perusal of the
records will reveal that petitioners
failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent judge
was motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed rulings.
Petitioners
simply lean on the alleged series of adverse rulings of the respondent
judge which they characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough.
We note that respondent judge's rulings resolving the various motions
filed
by petitioners were all made after considering the arguments raised by
all the parties. It is true that the respondent judge erred in some of
her rulings such as her rejection of petitioners' one hundred thirty
two
[132] pieces of evidence. It appears, however, that respondent judge
reversed
this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence
after finding that "the defects in [their] admissibility have been
cured
through the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the
merits."[24]
This correction diminishes the strength of petitioners' charge that
respondent
judge is hopelessly biased against them. To be sure, the respondent
judge
did not score a complete cipher in her rulings against the petitioners.
Just last June 11, 1997, the Third Division of this Court dismissed an
administrative complaint against the respondent judge on the ground
that
"it is within the respondent judge's right to conduct an ocular
inspection
since it is an exercise of her judicial prerogative"[25]
There is still another reason why we should observe caution in
disqualifying
respondent judge. The trial of the petitioners is about to end and to
assign
a new judge to determine the guilt or innocence of petitioners will not
be for the best interest of justice. The records of the case at bar run
into volumes. These voluminous records cannot capture in print the
complete
credibility of witnesses when they testified in court. As the
respondent
judge observed the demeanor of witnesses while in the witness chair,
she
is in the best position to calibrate their credibility. The task of
evaluating
the credibility of witnesses includes interpreting their body language
and their meaningful nuances are not expressed in the transcripts of
their
testimonies.cralaw:red
We hasten to
stress that a party aggrieved by
erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not without
remedy. The range of remedy is provided in our Rules of Court and we
need
not make an elongated discourse on the subject. But certainly, the
remedy
for erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad
faith,
is not the outright disqualification of the judge. For there is yet to
come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always
infallible.
The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who err for we all
err.cralaw:red
We again remind
respondent judge of our counsel
in the first Webb case[26]
"that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every
trial,
and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a
silent
accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent,
the
business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that
justice shall be done and is done and that is the only way for
the
judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion."
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. No costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Romero
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.cralaw:red
________________________________
Endnotes
[1]
The original petition filed with this Court included Gerardo Biong as
one
of the petitioners, but on December 19, 1996, petitioners filed a
Manifestation
of Partial Withdrawal dropping Gerardo Biong from the petition as the
latter
is independently pursuing a separate remedy for the same cause of
action
[Rollo, pp. 259-260].
[2]
Entitled Hubert J.P. Webb, et al. v. The Honorable Amelita G.
Tolentino,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Paranaque Branch 274 and the People of the
Philippines.
[3]
Entitled Michael A. Gatchalian and Peter Estrada v. The Honorable
Amelita
G. Tolentino, Presiding Judge, RTC-Paranaque and the People of the
Philippines.
[4]
Entitled People of the Philippines v. Hubert Webb, et al.
[5]
The Decision and the Resolution were penned by Justice Ricardo P.
Galvez
with the concurrence of Justice Antonio M. Martinez and Justice
Hilarion
L. Aquino.
[6]
Information, Annex "D" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 138-140.
[7]
"Sec. 12. [1] Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence
of counsel.
"xxx
xxx
xxx
"[3] Any confession or
admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible
in evidence against him."
[8]
Annex "E" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 142-150.
[9]
Annex "F" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 151-161.
[10]
Docketed as G.R. No. 122488.
[11]
Docketed as G.R. No. 122504.
[12]
Annex "G" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 162-171.
[13]
Annex "H" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 172-176.
[14]
Annex "J" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 190-196.
[15]
Annex "K" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 197-199.
[16]
Annex "A" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 51-68.
[17]
Annex "C" to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 82-89.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 263-271.
[19]Section 14[1] Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[20]
Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306 [1976]; Castillo v. Juan, 62 SCRA 124
[1975]; Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 [1973]; Garcia v. Executive
Secretary,
6 SCRA 1 [1962].
[21]
People v. Massarella, 400 N.E. 2d 436; United States v. International
Business
Machine, 475 F. Supp. 1372 [1979]; Smith v. Danyo, 441 F. Supp. 171
[1977];
King v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 1141 [1977].
[22]
United States v. International Business Machines, 475 F. Supp. 1372
[1979];
People v. Massarella, 400 N.E. 2d 436; United States v. Gallagher, 576
F. 2d 1028 (1978); Miller v. Richardson, 623 P. 2d 1317 [1981].
[23]
Annotation: Scope of the Constitutional Independence of Judges, 240
SCRA
163 [1995].
[24]
See Order dated June 18, 1997 in Crim. Case No. 95-404, People vs.
Webb,
et al, RTC, NCR, Paranaque, Metro Manila Br. 274.
[25]
Resolution dated June 11, 1997 of the Third Division in Adm. Matter OCA
I.P.I. No. 97-293-RTC, Singson, et al. vs. Judge Tolentino, etc.
[26]
247 SCRA 692-693.
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