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PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURT
DECISIONS
ROSENDO
PIÑERO,
DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL COLLEGE
G.R.
No.
149610
-versus- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FOURTH DIVISION, CEBU CITY AND DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL COLLEGE, INC., Respondents. D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the May 25, 2001 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52084 which affirmed the Resolution[2] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-0002-95 sustaining the Labor Arbiter’s Decision[3] in RAB-VII-011-0315-91-D. The assailed decision declared as illegal the strike staged by Dumaguete Cathedral College Faculty and Staff Association-National Federation of Teachers and Employees Union (DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU), and ordered the dismissal of the officers thereof. Private respondent Dumaguete Cathedral College, Inc.,[4] an educational institution, is the employer of the faculty and staff members comprising the labor union DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU. On December 19, 1986, DUCACOFSA (then affiliated with the National Alliance of Teachers and Allied Workers – NATAW) and private respondent entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective for 3 years.[5] Upon the expiration of their CBA in 1989, the parties failed to conclude another CBA which led DUCACOFSA (now affiliated with NAFTEU) to file a notice of strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the ground of refusal to bargain.[6] On November 4, 1991, DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU conducted a strike in the premises of private respondent without submitting to the DOLE the required results of the strike vote obtained from the members of the union.cralaw:red Consequently, on November 21, 1991, private respondent filed with the DOLE a complaint to declare the strike illegal and to dismiss the following officers of DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library
On October 28, 1994, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Unfazed, the union officers appealed[9] to the NLRC. Meanwhile, on November 29, 1991, the said officers returned to work by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement entered into by DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU and private respondent allowing them to resume service without prejudice to the outcome of the instant case then pending appeal with the NLRC.[10] On December 19, 1995, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[11] In addition to the failure to comply with strike vote requirements, the NLRC ratiocinated that the strike was illegal because DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU, not being a legitimate labor organization, has no personality to hold a strike. The union officers filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied.[12] Petitioner Rosendo U. Piñero filed with this Court a petition for certiorari[13] which was referred to the Court of Appeals[14] pursuant to the ruling in St. Martin’s Funeral Home v. NLRC.[15] On March 25, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the NLRC, thus:chanrobles virtual law library
On August 29, 2001, Piñero’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.[17] Hence, the instant petition. The issues to be resolved are: (1) Was the strike staged by DUCACOFSA- NAFTEU illegal? (2) If yes, should Piñero be dismissed? The NLRC declared the strike illegal on the grounds that DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU is legally non-existent and therefore has no personality to hold a strike; and that the strike was conducted without the requisite strike vote.cralaw:red Anent the first ground, we find that DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU’s status as a legitimate labor organization has been settled in a final and executory decision of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-0432-93,[18] which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-02-0025-93-D,[19] finding private respondent guilty of unfair labor practice and recognizing DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU as an existing legitimate labor organization. Pertinent portions of the Labor Arbiter’s findings which were adopted by the NLRC are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
By reason of the foregoing certification Annexes “1”, “2” and “3” respondent [Dumaguete Cathedral College, Inc.] alleges that complainant [union] does not legally exist hence, respondent cannot be held liable for Unfair Labor Practice. We disagree.cralaw:red x x x x x x x x x The averment that complainant is not existing by reason of the certifications marked as Annexes “1”, “2” and “3” cannot be upheld for the reason that per resolution marked as Exh. “C” and the letter signed by Evelyn B. Quijano, Deputy Secretary-General marked as Exh. “D” which was duly received by the DOLE Docket Section on March 25, 1992 shows otherwise. We cannot also sustain the averment that the union was dissolved by reason of the resignation of some members for mere resignation of some members does not ipso facto dissolve a union.[20]chanrobles virtual law library Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment which is also known as “preclusion of issues” or “collateral estoppel,” issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.[21] Accordingly, private respondent is now barred from challenging the status of DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU.cralaw:red Anent the second ground, however, there is no doubt that the strike staged by DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU is illegal for non-compliance with the strike-vote requirements. The relevant provisions of Article 263 of the Labor Code read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under the aforequoted provisions, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.[22] Pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code, any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.cralaw:red In the case at bar, DUCACOFSA-NAFTEU failed to prove that it obtained the required strike-vote among its members and that the results thereof were submitted to the DOLE. The strike was therefore correctly declared illegal, for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of Article 263 of the Labor Code, and Piñero properly dismissed from service.chanrobles virtual law library The Court notes that petitioner Piñero turned 60 years old and retired on March 1, 1996[23] after 29 years[24] of service, rendering his dismissal from service moot and academic. However, in view of the propriety of his termination as a consequence of the illegal strike, he is no longer entitled to payment of retirement benefits because he lost his employment status effective as of the date of the decision of the Labor Arbiter – October 28, 1994.[25] An employee who is dismissed for cause is generally not entitled to any financial assistance. Equity considerations, however, provide an exception. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room for application where there is law.[26] Although meriting termination of employment, Piñero’s infraction is not so reprehensible nor unscrupulous as to warrant complete disregard of his long years of service.[27] Moreover, he has no previous derogatory records. Weighed on the scales of justice, conscience and reason tip in favor of granting financial assistance to support him in the twilight of his life after long years of service.chanrobles virtual law library Under the circumstances,
social and compassionate justice dictate that petitioner Piñero
be awarded financial assistance equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s
pay
for every year of service[28]
computed from his date of employment up to October 28, 1994 when he was
declared to have lost his employment status. Indeed, equities of
this case should be accorded due weight because labor law
determinations
are not only secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem.[29]
No pronouncement as to costs.cralaw:red SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices
Hilarion
L. Aquino and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Rollo, p. 137).
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