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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18788 January 31, 1964

ROMULO LOPEZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. LUIS GONZAGA, ET AL., defendants,
LUIS GONZAGA and ASUNCION GONZAGA, Defendants-Appellants.

Lakandola G. Lopez and Romulo Lopez for plaintiffs-appellants.
Amalia K. del Rosario for defendants-appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:chanrobles virtual law library

Joint and direct appeal by both parties-plaintiffs an parties-defendants from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (in its Civil Case No. 5033 to this Supreme Court, because the properties involved a valued at more than P200,000.00. The appealed decision dismissed the petition of plaintiffs (appellants) for partition and cancellation of titles of registered lands and ordered them to pay defendants (appellees) P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, but refused to award moral damages in favor of the defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The original petition was filed with the court a quo on 6 October 1958, alleging, among other things, that on Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer died intestate on 11 April 1935 without any issue and leaving real and personal properties worth P400,000.00; that she was survived by the plaintiffs, who are her nearest of kin, being her brother sisters, nephews, and nieces; that during the lifetime the deceased, she expressed the wish that as long as her brother, Luis Gonzaga, the principal defendant, was engaged in his coconut oil experimentation he could use products and rentals of her properties in furtherance his experiments; that the said scientific venture by said defendant was discontinued when he became totally blind in October, 1955 in view of which the plaintiffs now ask a partition of the estate and the cancellation of titles of lands allegedly fraudulently transferred by, and in the name of, the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and non-inclusion of indispensable parties. The plainttiffs amended their petition to include the omitted parties. After hearing on the motion to dismiss, the court denied the said motion. Thereupon, the defendant filed their answer, pleading a denial as to intestacy of deceased, and alleging, among others, that a will of Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer instituted Luis Gonzaga as the sole heir estate, and that the will was duly allowed and probated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment, a both parties appealed, as aforesaid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The genuineness of the following documents, and the jurisdiction of the court with respect to them, are not disputed:

As a witness, the defendant's counsel, Atty. Amelia del Rosario, testified that the aforequoted records of the probate court of Iloilo were discovered by her among the records of the cadastral court in Negros Occidental.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Due to the destruction of the court and property record of Iloilo as a result of the last war, as attested by the Clerk of Court, no will or probate order was produce and neither were attested copies registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental leave little room for doubt that Doña Soledad Gonzaga died leaving a will instituting her nephew the appellee Luis Gonzaga y Jesena, as her sole testamentary heir, in default forced heirs; that said will was duly probated in 1935 or 1936 by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in its Special Proceedings No. 2163; that the net residue of the estate was adjudicated by the court of said appellee, subject to a claim of Consolacion G. de Lopez for P1,000.00 (Exh. 2); and that, thereafter, upon sworn petition of appellee, through his counsel, Francisco S. Hortillas, the Court First Instance of Iloilo (Exhibit 22) and Occidental Negros (Exhibit 3) ordered the respective Provincial Registers of Deeds to cancel the Certificates of Title standing then in the name of the deceased Soledad Gonzaga and lieu thereof to issue new certificates in the name of apellee Luis Gonzaga y Jesena, as admittedly was done. In the course of the years prior to the institution of this case in 1958, appellee held the properties and dealt with them as sole owner, leasing, encumbering, and selling some them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We can not fail to be impressed by the statement of attorney Francisco Hortillas, averring under with in clear and unmistakable terms, not only once, but twice before the Courts of First Instance of Iloilo and Negros (Exhibits 1 and 9), that the deceased Doña Soledad, in her probated will, made Luis Gonzaga y Jesena the sole heir to her properties. These manifestations are nigh conclusive, for the reason that attorney Hortillas was himself married to Monserrat Gonzaga, a sister of Soledad, who would have been one of the latter's heirs intestate had it not been for the testament in favor of the appellee. It taxes credulity beyond all reason to imply (as appellants do) that attorney Hortillas, violating family ties and affection, conspired with appellee to deprive his own wife and children (now some of the present appellants) of the lawful share by intestacy in the properties left by Doña Soledad if it were untrue that the latter had duly and properly bequeathed all her estate to appellee Luis Gonzaga. The authenticity of the sworn petitions of the late attorney Hortillas (Exhibits a and 1) are not impugned, and they were actually acted upon and granted by the two courts of first instance to which he addressed his petitions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Coupled with his undoubted possession as owner and with his own dominical acts exercised over the former properties of Doña Soledad Gonzaga for twenty-two years (1936-1958), the exhibits aforementioned constitute practically conclusive proof of the truth of appellee's defenses, as found by the court below, despite the destruction of the original will and decree of probate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Plaintiffs-appellants, however, assail the trial court is admission of the said court records on the ground that defendant-appellee failed to lay proper basis, or predicate, for their admission. Granting that the original will was destroyed with the court records in the last war, it is averred that appellee was duty-bound to produce the copy that, according to appellee's deposition, was in the custody of Encarnacion Gonzaga, as well as that left with attorney Hortillas. The argument is misleading. There is no proof that copies of the will ever existed other than the one burned while in appellee's possession (Dep. p. 23). Page 24 of the appellee's deposition is to the effect that -chanrobles virtual law library

My sister Encarnacion had the custody of the will because she was the one who was at the beside of my sister (referring to the testatrix Doña Soledad);chanrobles virtual law library

but by "the will" was obviously meant the one signed by the testatrix and the witnesses, not a copy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Similarly, the witness was asked,chanrobles virtual law library

When you filed this petition through your lawyer for the probate of the will, am I correct that you also presented a copy of the will?; chanrobles virtual law library

to which question the witness answered,

The original was the one submitted.

From this answer, it certainly can not be inferred that Attorney Hortillas kept a copy of the original submitted to the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Neither do we see that appellee was bound to call, or, account, for the witnesses to the testament. He was not trying to show that the will complied with the statutory requirements, but that the will had been admitted to probate and of course, the probate decree conclusively established the due execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Appellants contend that if it were true that the will constituted Luis Gonzaga as sole heir, he had no need to ask the court for an order of adjudication. There is no merit to this contention. The order of adjudication is the judicial recognition that in appointing Luis as her only heir the testatrix did not contravene the law, and that the heir was in no way disqualified to inherit; just as a final order admitting a will to probate concludes all and sundry from thereafter contending that statutory formal requirements have not been observed in executing the testament. Instead of contradicting the testamentary institution of heir, the order of adjudication confirms it in this case. It may well be noted, in passing, that the order of February 8, 1936 (Exhibit 1 or B) speaks of approval of a "project of partition", while the petition of January 29, 1936 referred to therein spoke of an order of adjudication to a single heir. Since the order made evident reference to the petition of January 29, we agree with the court below that the difference in terminology was an inadvertent mistake. Anyway, appellants do not claim under the will or the partition; their theory is that Doña Soledad Gonzaga died intestate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The failure of the defendant, Luis Gonzaga, to file with the Register of Deeds a certified copy of his letters of administration and the will, as provided in Section 90 of Act 496, and to record the attested copies of the will and of the allowance thereof by the court under Section 624 of Act 190, does not negate the validity of the judgment or decree of probate nor the rights of the devisee under the will. Section 90 of Act 496 refers to the dealings with registered lands by an executor or administrator; and while Luis Gonzaga was an administrator, this is beside the point, because his dealings with the lands, if any, during his tenure as an administrator are not here in question. That the defendant sought judicial orders to effect the transfers to his name of the certificates of title after the will was probated, and succeeded in having them so transferred, are not "dealings" with the property as administrator under section 90 of the Registration Act. The defendant sought and obtained the change in title in his own behalf and capacity. Although the step taken is not exactly what Section 624 of Act 190 directs, the same purpose was achieved - that of notice to all strangers of the cause and nature of the transfers; and it does not appear that anyone was prejudiced by the defect in registration complained of. At any rate, the recording of the judicial orders sufficed as notice to interested parties, and was substantial compliance with the required recording of the will itself. No one faced by the recorded documents could ignore the reference therein to the probated testament; and the rule is that knowledge of what might have been revealed by proper inquiry is imputable to the inquirer (cf. Emas vs. De Zuzuarregui, 53 Phil. 197, 204).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As to the fact that Luis Gonzaga paid the inheritance taxes, since by law, no delivery of properties can be made importance. It is usual for an Administrator to pay these taxes, since by law, no delivery of properties can be made to the heirs until and unless the inheritance taxes are paid [Internal Revenue Code, section 95 (c)].chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The contention that defendant-appellee, having been appointed Administrator, must be deemed a trustee up to the present is infantile. In the first place, no administration could continue to exist after the order of February 8, 1936 had approved the final account, adjudicate the property to the only heir, cancelled the bond of the administrator, and ordered the case "archivado el mismo por terminado". No proof exists that the proceedings were reopened. Secondly, the transfer of the certificates title to Luis Gonzaga's own name in 1936 would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of more than twenty years' open and adverse possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription in the appellee, since appellants, who knew of the death of Doña Soledad in 1935, never made any move to require Luis to reconvey the property, or any part thereof. The explanation that Doña Soledad Gonzaga had express the wish that all the income should go to Luis while conducted experimental studies on coconut products wholly unconvincing as an excuse for the laches; his right to the income could not have blocked a partition of capital assets among appellants, if they had been at entitled to them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

That some of the plaintiffs were denied their day in court is incredible, since all the plaintiffs were represented by counsel Vicente Delfin, who claimed, and is presumed, to have been authorized to appear in their behalf, and did appear for them from the inception of the case after the lower court's decision was rendered. The authority of said counsel was never questioned until the verse decision was rendered by the court below; and complainant's failure to appear by themselves, or by counsel, prior to the judgment is mute but eloquent proof that their allegation that Delfin was not their attorney but a last minute attempt to escape the adverse effect the appealed decision, a maneuver that deserves no consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Coming to the defendants' appeal: It is grounded the disallowance of attorney's fees, expense, and moral damages. The lower court granted only P1,000.00 for attorney's fees, but the defendants urge that the amount should be P41,000.00, based on an agreement of P1,000.00 Plus 10% of the value of the properties if the case is decided in their favor. The other expenses refer to transportation, board and lodging, stenographic notes, photostatic copies of exhibits, securing documents, and taking of deposition in the sum of P1,205.00. Moral damages asked is P100,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The award of attorney's fees against the adverse party is essentially discretionary with the trial court (Francisco vs. GSIS, L-18287, 30 March 1963), and, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, the same should not be disturbed. The other expenses, unless recoverable as judicial costs, cannot be allowed because the complaint, although unmeritorious, is not clearly unfounded; moral damages, likewise, are not allowable because the suit is not a malicious prosecution under No. 8 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. The issue is one primarily addressed to the discretion of the court below, which we are not inclined to disturb.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.