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^{SEPARATE OPINION}

KAPUNAN, J.:

For resolution of the Court are: (1) petitioners motion to set aside the resolution dated January 18, 1999 (First Division) as allegedly contrary to Resolution En Banc No. 98-12-05-SC; (2) petitioners motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration with the second motion for reconsideration attached thereto, and motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to consolidate G.R. No. 135244 with G.R. No. 135192; and (3) petitioners motion to refer its motion to set aside resolution of Jan. 18, 1999 to the Court En Banc.

Petitioner claims in its first motion that the January 18,1999 resolution was not in accord with the resolution of Court En Banc No. 98-12-05-SC dated December 21, 1998 which is quoted as follows:

xxx

As a consequence of this reorganization, the cases raffled to each Member of the Court shall henceforth pertain to the Division to which such Member has been assigned: Provided, however, that motions for reconsideration of decisions or signed resolutions penned by such Member while yet a Member of a previous Division shall be resolved by a Special Division composed of the Chairman and Members of the previous division with the Chairman of the former Division as a Chairman of the Special Division.

Motions for reconsideration of minute resolutions of a Members previous Division shall be resolved by his or her new Division.

This resolution shall take effect on 15 January 1999.

It is petitioners contention that the unsigned resolution of January 18, 1999 promulgated by the First Division of this Court was not a minute resolution but actually a decision because (I)t is two pages long, single-spaced, containing nine paragraphs consisting of about 850 words xxx and contains a statement of the procedural antecedents of this case. It further avers that the said resolution being in fact a decision, the motion for reconsideration thereof should have been resolved by a Special Division composed of the Chairman and Members of the previous division (the Second Division) pursuant to Resolution En Banc No. 98-12-05-SC.

For purposes of determining which Justices or Divisions shall resolve motions for reconsideration of decisions or resolutions penned by the Justices while yet members of the previous divisions, following the reorganization of the Courts three divisions created by the retirement of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado and the promotion of Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., as Chief Justice, the incidents are classified into three categories in the order of their importance, namely: (1) decisions, (2) signed resolutions, and (3) minute resolutions.

Under the first category are decisions which must necessarily express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based to comply with the Constitutional requirement.

However, the Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its judgment shall be framed. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions provided a legal basis is given, depending upon its evaluation of a case (In Re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 [1987]); Policarpio v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 106 Phil. 125 [1959]). The grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion (Novino v. CA, 8 SCRA 279 [1963]). This also means that the Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals (Toyota v. Yuseco, 105 Phil. 484 [1959]).

When the Court decides to dismiss a petition, it may do so in the form of a decision or a resolution. A decision, although one of dismissal, may be opted because of the jurisprudential importance of the case or perhaps, while the judgment sought to be reviewed may be substantially correct, the facts and the law involved in the case call for further discussion, elaboration or emphasis for guidance of the bench and bar.

The disposition of the petition may be in the form of a resolution, which may be signed or unsigned. Obviously, not in the level of a decision, a signed resolution dismissing or denying an unmeritorious petition is usually an extended one with statement of facts and the law. On the other hand, a minute resolution, as the terminology connotes, is issued for the prompt and quick dispatch of the action of the Court and is generally unsigned. It is promulgated through the Clerk of Court and does not require certification of the Chief Justice.

The number of words a resolution contains, standing alone, is not determinative of whether it is an extended or minute resolution. A resolution that embodies a statement of facts and law, does not necessarily exclude it from the category of a minute resolution. For that matter, an issuance consisting only of a single page or of a relatively limited number of words may be in the form of a signed resolution. Clearly then, we have no reason to depart from the well-entrenched rule that the Court has discretion to determine how its judgment shall be framed.

The October 21, 1998 resolution being an unsigned resolution, the motion for reconsideration thereof was correctly assigned to the First Division, to which the ponente was transferred, for deliberation and disposition in accordance with the Resolution En Banc No. 98-12-05-SC.

Consequently, there is legal basis for petitioners motion to set aside the resolution of January 18, 1999 on the ground that it is contrary to Resolution En Banc No. 98-12-05-SC.

Petitioner's motion for lead to file a second motion for reconsideration is premised principally on the belief that the Court failed to adequately pass upon, if not overlooked, the specific grounds raised by petitioner in its first motion for reconsideration.

The grounds invoked in the second motion for reconsideration are, I believe, extensively and forcefully discussed therein. In the best interest of justice, the motion deserves a second hard look.

Another point to consider is the fact that there is another case docketed as G.R. No. 135192, which has a lower number, involving the same parties, facts, issues and subject matter, hence, the two cases should be consolidated for expediency and to prevent possible conflicting opinions. We believe that these grounds are sufficiently persuasive to admit a second motion for reconsideration.

The grant of a second or further motion for reconsideration by this Court in meritorious cases is not without precedents. The Court reversed its judgment on second motion for reconsideration in San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC (174 SCRA 510 [1989]), Galman vs. Sandiganbayan (144 SCRA 43 [1986]), Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. National Telecommunications Commission (131 SCRA 200 [1984]), and Republic vs. De los Angeles, (41 SCRA 422 [1971]); and on a third motion for reconsideration in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services vs. NLRC (125 SCRA 577 [1983]); the Court modified or amended on second motion for reconsideration its ruling in Cathay Pacific vs. Romillo (143 SCRA 396 [1986]) and Cosio vs. De Rama (17 SCRA 207 [1996]).

WHEREFORE, the I vote to:

a) DENY the motion to refer to set aside resolution of January 18, 1999 to the Court En Banc;

b) GRANT the motion to file a second motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court (Second Division) dated October 21,1998 dismissing the petition;

c) ADMIT the second motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court dated October 21, 1998;

d) GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion for consolidation; and

e) CONSOLIDATE G.R. No. 135224 with G.R. No. 135192.