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^{SEPARATE OPINION}

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur "in the result": the petitioner failed to fulfill the one-year residence requirement in order to qualify as a candidate for congressman of the lone district of Sarangani. With all due respect, I disagree however with the majority view that residence as a qualification for candidacy for an elective public office imports the same meaning as domicile.

That a member of the House of Representatives must be a resident of the district which he or she seeks to represent "for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election"¹ is a constitutional requirement that should be interpreted in the sense in which ordinary lay persons understand it. The common people who ratified the Constitution and were thereafter expected to abide by it would not normally refer to the journals of the Constitutional Commission in order to understand the words and phrases contained therein. Rather, they would usually refer to the common source being used when they look up for the meaning of words -- the dictionary.² In this sense, Webster's definition of residence³ should be controlling.

When the Constitution speaks of residence, the word should be understood, consistent with Webster, to mean actual, physical and personal presence in the district that a candidate seeks to represent. In other words, the candidate's presence should be substantial enough to show by overt acts his intention to fulfill the duties of the position he seeks.

If the framers of our basic law intended our people to understand residence as legal domicile, they should have said so. Then our people would have looked up the meaning of domicile and would have understood the constitutional provision in that context. However, the framers of our Constitution did not. I therefore submit that residence must be understood in its common dictionary meaning as understood by ordinary lay persons.

At any rate, the original concept of domicile, which arose from American jurisprudence, was not intended to govern political rights. Rather, it was designed to resolve the conflict of laws between or among states where a decedent may have lived for various reasons, for the purpose of determining which law was applicable as regards his estate. Allow me to quote this short disquisition:⁴

"xxx This question first came before the courts at an early day, long before our present easy and extensive means of transportation, and at a time before the present ready movement from one country to another. At that time, men left for Europe for the Western Continent or elsewhere largely for purposes of adventure or in search of an opportunity for the promotion of commerce. It was at a time before the invention of the steamboat and before the era of the oceanic cable. Men left their native land knowing that they would be gone for long periods of time, and that means of communication with their home land were infrequent, difficult, and slow. The traditions of their native country were strong with these men. In the event of death, while absent, they desired that their property should descend in accordance with the laws of the land of their birth. Many such men were adventurers who had the purpose and intent to eventually return to the land of their nativity. There was a large degree of sentiment connected with the first announcement of the rules of law in the matter of the estates of such men. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

These reasons, which were, to an extent at least, historical and patriotic, found early expression in the decisions of the courts on the question of domicile. xxx"

Subsequently, domicile was used in other "conflicts" cases involving taxation, divorce and other civil matters. To use it to determine qualifications for political office is to enlarge its meaning beyond what was intended, resulting in strained and contortive interpretations of the Constitution.

Specifically, I submit that applying the concept of domicile in determining residence as a qualification for an elective office would negate the objective behind the residence requirement of one year (or six months, in the case of local positions). This required period of residence preceding the day of the election, I believe, is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves -- their needs, difficulties, potentials for growth and development and all matters vital to their common welfare. Such requisite period would precisely give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate their fitness for the offices they seek.

If all that is required of elective officials is legal domicile, then they would qualify even if, for several years prior to the election, they have never set foot in their districts (or in the country, for that matter), since it is possible to maintain legal domicile even without actual presence, provided one retains the animus revertendi or the intention to return.

The Constitution is the most basic law of the land. It enshrines the most cherished aspirations and ideals of the population at large. It is not a document reserved only for scholarly disquisition by the most eminent legal minds of the land. In ascertaining its import, lawyers are not meant to quibble over it, to define its legal niceties, or to articulate its nuances. Its contents and words should be interpreted in the sense understood by the ordinary men and women who place their lives on the line in its defense and who pin their hopes for a better life on its fulfillment.

The call for simplicity in understanding and interpreting our Constitution has been made a number of times. About three decades ago, this Court declared:⁵

"It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum."

Having said this, I still believe that Petitioner Juan Domino failed to adduce sufficient convincing evidence to prove his actual, physical and personal presence in the district of Sarangani for at least one year prior to the 1998 elections.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition at bar.

Endnotes:

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¹ 6, Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

² See Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Comelec, 255 SCRA xi, October 25, 1995.

³ Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co., 1979 ed.: "xxx the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some time xxx; the act or fact of living or regularly staying at or in some place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a benefit xxx; the place where one actually lives as distinguished from his domicile or a place of temporary sojourn xxx."

⁴ In Re Jones' Estate, 182 NW 227, 229-230 (1921); 16 ALR 1286.

⁵ JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423, February 18, 1970; per Fernando, J. (later CJ)