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DISSENTING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I appreciate the scholarly disquisition of the majority led by my distinguished brother, Justice Jose A. R. Melo, explaining the difference between the disqualification of a candidate and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The majority holds that, under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three instances in which a candidate may be substituted, and these are death, withdrawal or disqualification of such candidate. Inasmuch as the certificate of candidacy of petitioners father, Jose Pempe Miranda, was merely cancelled, he could not be legally substituted by reason of the rule on statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.¹

I agree that there is some legal logic in this conclusion. However, as the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. has aptly said, The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. With due respect, may I point out that the problem with the majoritys position is that it totally scuttles the result of the election for the position of mayor and, instead, unceremoniously installs the elected vice mayor to the said position.

There is no doubt that the petitioner was the peoples choice for mayor. He garnered the highest number of votes in the election for mayor of the City of Santiago. Why should this Court, in the name of hair-splitting logic, obliterate the popular will and impose upon the electorate a person whom nobody voted for the position of mayor? Experience and common sense rebel against this proposition.

To start with, by virtue of the Comelec Resolution of May 5, 1998, petitioners father was DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela.² However, Mr. Justice Melo contends that he was not really disqualified; rather, the Comelec GRANTED the petition of private respondent who had prayed for the cancellation of Jose Pempe Mirandas certificate of candidacy.

I can concede that the Comelec Resolution is less than perfect; in fact, it may even be termed as confusing or contradictory. I submit, however, that such confusion should not be used to thwart the will of the electorate. I believe that in every action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the people, for it is but sound public policy to cause electoral offices to be filled by the choice of the electorate. We must liberally construe election laws and jurisprudence to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people and to give life and meaning to their mandate.³ In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, in every way possible, be given effect.⁴

In the recent case Loong v. Comelec,⁵ the Court strongly exhorted once more that the will of the people should not be kick[ed] away xxx by giving a literal interpretation to [the law].⁶ When the sovereignty of the people is at stake, it is not enough for this Court to make a statement but it should do everything to have that sovereignty obeyed by all.⁷

To buttress my Dissent, I hereby quote our en banc Decision in Frivaldo v. Comelec:⁸

At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to elections: Literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. [Emphasis supplied.]

Indeed, to inflict upon the electorate of Santiago City a person (the vice mayor) whom they never voted for the position of mayor constitutes, in my humble opinion, an unwarranted imposition on the people and unacceptable assault to the judicial conscience.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the Petition.

Endnotes:

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¹ The express mention of the things included excludes those not included. German G. Lee Jr., Handbook of Legal Maxims, 2nd revised ed. (1998), p. 183.

² The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE Pe[m]pe MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

³ See Mentang v. Comelec, 229 SCRA 666, February 4, 1994; Pabilan v. Tabalba, 230 SCRA 205, February 21, 1994; Aruelo Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 311, October 20, 1993; Tatlonghari v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 849, July 31, 1991; Unda v. Comelec, 190 SCRA 827, October 18, 1990.

⁴ Benito v. Comelec, 235 SCRA 436, August 17, 1994.

⁵ GR No. 133676, April 14, 1999, per Puno, J.

⁶ At p. 32. While I agree in principle with this doctrine, I believe that the Court misapplied it in Loong because, as I explained in my Dissenting Opinion therein, the election results of the manual count were not reflective of the automated count, which the law mandated.

⁷ At p. 36.

⁸ 257 SCRA 727, 769, June 28, 1996, per Panganiban, J.