ROMERO, J.:

As we turn a new leaf in our countrys history, we should brace ourselves to meet the challenges that continue to threaten our sovereignty and our enjoyment of the blessings of democracy. It is in this light that the free and unfettered exercise of the right of suffrage, which is the instrument through which the people express their sovereign will, should be defended at all costs. So too, should we strive to give full effect to the true will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots.

In view of the above reasons, I beg to differ from the majority position.

For a better understanding of the points I wish to raise in this opinion, a review of the factual milieu is in order:

On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe C. Miranda, then incumbent city mayor of Santiago, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy¹ for the same mayoralty post in view of the synchronized elections of May 11, 1998. Among others, Jose Pempe C. Miranda declared the following in his certificate of candidacy, viz:

12. I AM ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.

On March 29, 1998, Antonio M. Abaya, private respondent herein, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy² docketed as SPA No. 98-019, against Jose Pempe C. Miranda, who was then the official candidate of the Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP). Private respondent alleged that Jose Pempe C. Miranda made a false material representation³ in his certificate of candidacy, pointing out that Jose Pempe C. Miranda is ineligible for re-election as city mayor of Santiago, Isabela, by virtue of the limitation stated in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution⁴ and in Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160,⁵ otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which prohibits elective local officials from seeking a fourth consecutive term for the same elective post.

In a resolution⁶ dated May 5, 1998, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division⁷ resolved to disqualify Jose Pempe C. Miranda on the ground that he has already served the maximum three (3) consecutive terms⁸ for the same position, hence rendering him ineligible to run for the same position in the May 11, 1998 elections. The dispositive portion of the May 5, 1998 resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE Pepe MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.⁹

Since neither Jose Pempe C. Miranda nor private respondent Antonio M. Abaya moved for the reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution dated May 5, 1998, said resolution became final and executory.¹⁰

On May 6, 1998, Joel G. Miranda, petitioner herein, filed his certificate of candidacy¹¹ for the mayoralty post, as a substitute candidate for his father, Jose Pempe C. Miranda, who was earlier declared disqualified by the COMELEC. Petitioners certificate of candidacy was accompanied by a certificate of nomination¹² from the same political party, the LAMMP. The substitution is in accordance with Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code¹³ which provides that a candidate disqualified for any cause may be substituted by the same political party to which the disqualified candidate is affiliated. The substitution of Joel G. Miranda was sanctioned by the COMELEC En Banc, as it in fact included petitioners name in the certified list of candidates for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela.

Meanwhile, on May 11, 1998, elections were held. In Santiago City, Isabela, where only two (2) candidates vied for the mayoralty seat, petitioner garnered 22,002 votes as against private respondent, who obtained 20,336 votes. Thus, petitioner won with a margin of 1,666 votes.

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.¹⁴ Said petition¹⁵, docketed as SPA No. 98-288, prays for the nullification of petitioners certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for being void ab initio on the ground that since the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe C. Miranda has been cancelled and/or denied due course, there was no certificate of candidacy to be substituted or replaced by the certificate of candidacy of petitioner. Private respondent argues that the substitution of candidacy presupposes the existence, at the time of substitution, of a certificate of candidacy to be replaced or substituted by the substitute certificate of candidacy. Private respondent further avers that the substitution should be nullified since the cancellation of and/or denial of due course to a certificate of candidacy is not one of the grounds for substitution under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.¹⁶

In an Amended Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order¹⁷ filed on May 14, 1998, private respondent further argues that the substitution of petitioner was not valid considering that the latters certificate of candidacy was hastily and prematurely filed. Private respondent asserts that a substitution, when allowed, should take place only after the lapse of the five-day period within which to file a motion for reconsideration.¹⁸ In this case, since the resolution declaring Jose Pempe C. Miranda disqualified was promulgated on May 5, 1998, then the substitute candidate can file his certificate of candidacy only on May 11, 1998. Private respondent further contends that, even assuming that substitution is allowed, the certificate of nomination, which should accompany petitioners certificate of candidacy, was not attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general, or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so,¹⁹ in contravention of the requirements of Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2977,²⁰ dated January 15, 1998.

In both the original and amended petitions, private respondent prayed that the proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, be enjoined. However, no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the COMELEC and consequently, the petitioner was proclaimed duly elected city mayor.²¹

On May 16, 1998, the COMELEC First Division dismissed motu proprio the Amended Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. In its resolution dated May 16, 1998,²² the COMELEC First Division ruled in this wise:

I. There was valid substitution.

The petition in SPA No. 98-019 was anchored essentially on the ineligibility of he respondent to run for the fourth (4th) time for the mayorship of Santiago City. In Substance, it was a petition to disqualify. Even the Resolution of the Commission (First Division) promulgated on May 5, 1998 and a copy of which was attached to the petition herein is clear that respondent therein was disqualified by this Commission. Said ruling on the DISQUALIFICATION of Jose Pempe Miranda was accepted by herein petitioner, a fact that is conclusive on him, by reason of his failure to appeal said Resolution. Jose Pempe Miranda, being a disqualified candidate may, therefore, be substituted.

II. No premature substitution.

While it may be true that a period of five (5) days to appeal is allowed under the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the option to consider the Resolution final and executory without waiting for the expiration of the period to appeal belongs to the aggrieved party. Thereupon, the winning party has no cause for complaint. An express waiver of the right to appeal by the losing party is not necessary to the validity of his subsequent acts.

It must also be remembered that the respondent Jose Miranda in SPA 98-019 was wearing two hats: one, in his capacity as respondent in said case and two, as District Chairman in the 4th District of Isabela for LAMMP. Personal acts or omissions of respondent cannot vitiate his official acts as District Chairman. The party nomination as well as the Certificate of candidacy of the substituted candidate, both dated May 6, 1998, cannot be made infirm by Jose Mirandas decision to accept the ruling as final within the appeal period.

III. A party nomination signed by the District Chairman of the party concerned is valid.

Petitioner contends that the party nomination issued to herein respondent by the LAMMP Chairman for the Fourth District of Isabela, to which Santiago City belongs, is flawed for two reasons:

a. The authority in writing for the LAMMP Chairman to nominate is not attached to the nomination;

b. The Certificate of Nomination is not under oath.

Section 5 of Comelec Resolution No. 2977 relied on by the petitioner does not require that the written authority to nominate granted by the LAMMP to its District Chairman must be attached to the nomination. Hence, the nomination issued by the District Chairman in this case cannot be challenged on that ground.²³ (Underscoring supplied.)

On May 21, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration²⁴ of the COMELEC resolution dated May 16, 1998, raising the following errors²⁵ for consideration, to wit:

I. The action or remedy instituted by petitioner in SPA No. 98-019 captioned Antonio M. Abaya vs. Jose Pempe Miranda was purely a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent therein pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and not a petition for disqualification.

II. The certificate of candidacy filed by herein respondent in substitution for the certificate of candidacy filed by his father and which was denied due course and/or canceled in SPA No. 98-019, is fatally defective and void ab initio. (All caps in the original)

On December 8, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc, public respondent herein, issued a resolution²⁶ resolving jointly the petitions docketed as SPA No. 98-288 and SPA No. 98-019.²⁷ The Commission En Banc resolved to grant the Motion for Reconsideration in SPA No. 98-288 thereby nullifying the substitution of petitioner as mayoralty candidate. Curiously, the COMELEC En Banc resolution altered and amended the dispositive portion of the resolution dated May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, which has already become final and executory. It deleted the phrase Jose Pe[m]pe Miranda is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, and in lieu thereof, amended and rectified the dispositive portion thereof to read as:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE 'PEMPE MIRANDAs certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.²⁸

The COMELEC En Banc resolution likewise annulled the election and proclamation of the petitioner as mayor of Santiago City, Isabela and cancelled his certificate of canvass and proclamation; and, ordered the proclamation of the private respondent as duly elected mayor of Santiago City, Isabela. The Commission En Banc disposed thus:

2. ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election and CANCEL the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued therefor;

3. DIRECT THE City of board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE, prepare a new certificate of canvass & proclamation and PROCLAIM the winning candidate those voted upon as the duly elected mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election.²⁹

The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the resolution dated May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019 did not disqualify petitioners father, Jose Pempe C. Miranda, but that his certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled. Hence, Jose Pempe C. Miranda, ceased to be a candidate and thus, cannot be substituted by anybody, petitioner included. The Commission En banc distinguished between Section 78³⁰ of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 74,³¹ whereon SPA No. 98-019 is based, and Section 68³² of the same Code. The substitution of petitioner being null and void ab initio, he did not become a candidate in the May 11, 1998 elections and therefore, the votes petitioner garnered should be considered stray or invalid and his election and consequent proclamation non-existent. It follows that private respondent was the sole candidate for the office of mayor of Santiago City, and in the absence of any candidate who may have obtained the greater number of votes, the right to be proclaimed is legally vested upon private respondent.³³

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari³⁴ under Rules 64 and 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the COMELEC En Banc resolution promulgated on December 8, 1998, in SPA No. 98-288, which reversed and set aside the earlier resolution dated May 16, 1998 of the COMELEC First Division in SPA No. 98-019, dismissing the petition to declare void the substitution of petitioner as candidate for city mayor of Santiago City, Isabela.

In view of petitioners assertion that the people of Santiago City, Isabela would suffer great and irreparable injury unless a temporary restraining order is issued, the Court had caused the issuance of a temporary restraining order on December 11, 1998, to take effect immediately and to continue until further orders, upon the filing of the required bond.³⁵

From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to and form part of the circumstances attendant to this petition, the following issues have been aptly formulated by the majority:

1. Whether the annulment of the substitution and proclamation of the petitioner was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the order of the COMELEC directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.³⁶

The prevailing principle in this jurisdiction on petitions for certiorari is, only where there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion would this Court be warranted in reversing the resolution or decision of the respondent tribunal.

After a thorough and judicious review of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, it is my considered view that the resolution dated December 8, 1998, of the COMELEC En Banc was issued capriciously, whimsically and in grave abuse of discretion. I, therefore, find for the petitioner.

At the outset, I note the patent and palpable error committed by the public respondent COMELEC En Banc when it motu proprio joined the cases in SPA No. 98-019 and SPA No. 98-288, on the tenuous basis of identity of parties and issues involved. The resolution now assailed as having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion was supposed to address only the issues as they were presented in the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent. The public respondent, instead of confining itself only with the instant case, erroneously included the issues posed in SPA No. 98-019, which issues had long been resolved and had become final and executory.

I am perplexed by the sudden resurrection of the issues in SPA No. 98-019, which have long been laid to rest in the resolution dated May 5, 1998, of the COMELEC First Division. Since no motion for reconsideration was filed by the parties, the resolution became final and executory. It is a rule of long-standing that a judgment which has become final and executory, can no longer be reviewed, amended or corrected by the Court, except for clerical errors or mistakes.³⁷ This being the case, the public respondent did not acquire jurisdiction over SPA No. 98-019, and accordingly, should not have consolidated or jointly resolved the two cases. What is even more disturbing is the fact that public respondent has caused the amendment of the dispositive portion of the resolution dated May 5, 1998, in the resolution dated December 8, 1998, of the Commission En Banc. This is a blatant and unprecedented deviation from the principle that once a decision becomes final, even the Court which rendered it cannot lawfully alter or modify the same, especially where the alteration or modification is material and substantial.³⁸

While the resolution of the instant petition can be arrived at by confining the discussion to the issues raised in SPA No. 98-288, I shall, nevertheless, explain why the issues in SPA No. 98-019 bear upon the instant petition. This should not, however, mislead one into thinking that this Court can motu proprio take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over SPA No. 98-019 despite the fact that the resolution therein had never been appealed to the Commission En Banc nor had been subject of a motion for reconsideration; or that this Court can re-open a decided case that has long become final and executory.³⁹

The pivotal issue posed in SPA No. 98-019 is: Whether Jose Pempe C. Mirandas certificate of candidacy should be denied due course and/or cancelled, by virtue of his having served the maximum legal limit of three (3) consecutive terms for the same position.

The COMELEC First Division found that, indeed, Jose Pempe C. Miranda had already served three (3) consecutive terms as mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, and hence, is ineligible to run for the same position in the May 11, 1998 elections. Note that in the decretal portion of the said resolution, the Commission used the word DISQUALIFIED. It bears stressing that neither of the parties moved for reconsideration, thereby making said resolution final and executory. As a result of the disqualification of Jose Pempe C. Miranda as official mayoralty candidate of the LAMMP, the party was constrained to field herein petitioner as substitute candidate.

Elections were held, and substitute candidate Joel G. Miranda, petitioner herein, obtained the highest number of votes. It appears that, only after the canvassing of votes showing petitioner in the lead did private respondent, too late in the day, questioned the resolution dated May 5, 1998, through a petition to declare null and void the substitution of petitioner as official mayoralty candidate of the LAMMP. It should be pointed out that from the time petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy up until the counting of ballots and canvassing of votes, private respondent did nothing to impugn the validity of petitioners substitution and his certificate of candidacy.

In seeking to nullify petitioners certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for being void ab initio, private respondent asserts that since his petition was denominated as a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, the COMELEC First Division, in resolving to grant said petition, actually denied due course to and/or cancelled the certificate of candidacy filed by Jose Pempe C. Miranda.

The COMELEC En Banc upheld private respondents contention and criticized its First Division for having unwittingly committed a serious error in semantics by using the term DISQUALIFIED, instead of the more appropriate word CANCELLED.⁴⁰ It ruled that the erroneous word, notwithstanding, the certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe C. Miranda was deemed cancelled and/or denied due course, and thus, there was no certificate of candidacy to be substituted or replaced by the certificate of candidacy of petitioner.⁴¹ The Commission En Banc deduced that since the cancellation of and/or denial of due course to a certificate of candidacy is not one of the grounds for substitution under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the substitution of petitioner is null and void ab initio.⁴² Further, the Commission En Banc inferred that since petitioner never acquired the status and personality of a registered candidate, private respondent became the sole candidate for the mayoralty post⁴³ in Santiago City, Isabela. Therefore, when there is a showing that private respondent obtained the requisite majority vote, he should be proclaimed as duly elected mayor of Santiago City, Isabela.

Turning now to the nexus or vinculum of SPA No. 98-019 to the instant case, I have here occasion to discuss the disqualification of Jose Pempe C. Miranda and the substitution of Joel G. Miranda as mayoralty aspirant.

I am in total conformity with the choice of remedy of private respondent in challenging the eligibility of Jose Pempe C. Miranda. For when a material representation required by law to be stated in a certificate of candidacy is false, the eligibility of the candidate concerned may be impugned only through a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy.⁴⁴ Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 74⁴⁵ of the same Code, operates to deny due course and/or to cancel certificates of candidacy that contain material representations that are false.

In his certificate of candidacy, Jose Pempe C. Miranda falsely represented himself to be eligible for the office of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, when in fact, he had already served the maximum legal limit of three (3) consecutive terms for the same position. The ineligibility or disqualification of Jose Pempe C. Miranda from seeking a fourth consecutive term finds justification in statutory⁴⁶ and constitutional⁴⁷ law. But because he made a material representation in his certificate of candidacy that is false, in violation of Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, the proper recourse against the candidate is via a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the same Code. This is not to say, however, that the ineligibility of Jose Pempe C. Miranda merely or solely stems from his false statement in his certificate of candidacy, such that, if he omits said representation or, if he admits his ineligibility to seek the public office, then he can run and be voted for in the May 11, 1998 elections. For even absent the false material representation referred to in Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, Jose Pempe C. Miranda is disqualified or ineligible to seek another consecutive term for the same office ipso jure.

Stated differently, even if the petition filed by private respondent was denominated as a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, the fact remains that Jose Pempe C. Miranda, in view of the term limits fixed under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code, is DISQUALIFIED to seek the mayoralty post a fourth time.

In fine, even if the petition was filed pursuant to Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC First Division correctly found Jose Pempe C. Miranda to be DISQUALIFIED, since the false material representation is essentially based on his disqualification under relevant statutory and constitutional provisions.

Indeed, the assertion of private respondent that there is a world of difference between disqualified and denied due course and/or canceled for purposes of substitution, is untenable. The hair-splitting distinction which private respondent arduously explained, and to which the majority subscribes, cannot, by any stretch of legal hermeneutics, be construed as sanctioning a conclusion that a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy, when granted, excludes a finding that the candidate concerned is disqualified by virtue of his ineligibility as prescribed under statutory and constitutional law.

The disqualification of Jose Pempe C. Miranda having been established, I now proceed to determine the validity of the substitution of Joel G. Miranda.

Private respondent, as sustained by the Commission En Banc, makes capital of the argument that the substitute certificate of candidacy filed by petitioner to replace the cancelled certificate of candidacy of his father Jose Pempe C. Miranda, is fatally defective for lack of legal basis, and as such, the same is necessarily void ab initio and petitioner who filed the same is not, in law, a candidate.⁴⁸

When, as in the instant case, an official mayoralty aspirant of a political party has been declared disqualified for any reason to seek said public office, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code operates to authorize a substitute to file a certificate of candidacy, to replace the candidate who was disqualified. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that x x x only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified x x x.

The term SUBSTITUTION ordinarily means replacement, or turning to an alternative. Applying the evident intention of the law, as literally expressed in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, that which is sought to be replaced is not the certificate of candidacy previously filed, but to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The provision on substitution outlined under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, enables the registered or accredited political party to field a substitute candidate to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. Private respondents assertion that it is the certificate of candidacy which is to be substituted or replaced by the substitute certificate of candidacy of herein petitioner,⁴⁹ is grossly inaccurate and logically flawed. What is crystal clear from a reading of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, is that it authorizes a person (petitioner) belonging to and nominated by the same political party (LAMMP) to replace the candidate who was disqualified (Jose Pempe C. Miranda). In the instant case, Petitioner, who has filed the requisite certificate of candidacy and certificate of nomination, is found to have validly substituted or replaced Jose Pempe C. Miranda as official mayoralty aspirant of the LAMMP in the May 11, 1998 elections, in Santiago City, Isabela.

Private respondent, in challenging the validity of the substitution of petitioner, alleges that petitioners certificate of candidacy was hastily and prematurely filed. Private respondent further contends that, there could not have been a valid substitution since the certificate of nomination, which should accompany petitioners certificate of candidacy, was not attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general, or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so, in contravention of the requirements of Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2977.

With respect to the contention that the substitution of petitioner was done in haste and that his certificate of candidacy was prematurely filed, I invite attention to the fact that the resolution declaring Jose Pempe C. Miranda disqualified was promulgated on May 5, 1998. If we were to follow the five-day reglementary period before a substitute candidate can file his certificate of candidacy, then petitioner can only file his certificate of candidacy on May 11, 1998. Considering that the purpose of filing a certificate of candidacy is to apprise the voting public of ones candidacy for a particular elective post, the petitioner and his party cannot certainly be faulted for filing the substitute certificate of candidacy immediately after the disqualification or before May 11, 1998. Since the resolution was promulgated only on May 5, 1998, to strictly enforce the five-day reglementary period on petitioner, as to permit him to file his certificate of candidacy only on May 11, 1998, election day, would be to effectively deprive him of the opportunity to make known publicly his candidacy for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela.

With respect to the allegation that the petitioners certificate of candidacy is fatally defective owing to the failure of the certificate of nomination to bear an attestation under oath of the party president, chairman, secretary-general, or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so, it is my well-considered view that the absence of an attestation under oath in the certificate of nomination, does not render said certificate invalid. It is a rule of long-standing that departure from the formal requirements⁵⁰ prescribed under the election laws, when not used as a means for fraudulent practice, will be considered a harmless irregularity.⁵¹ This irregularity, cannot invalidate the certificate nor the election itself for the fundamental reason that, after the people have expressed their sovereign choice, it being proven that petitioner Joel G. Miranda obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a mere technicality.⁵² It is judicially accepted that election rules, while mandatory before the election, are merely directory after such election and it is not just to nullify the will of the electorate by purely technical reasons.⁵³ In a long line of cases, this Court ruled that laws governing election cases must be liberally construed, and that technical and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.⁵⁴

Finally, I cannot agree with public respondents ruling that private respondent should be proclaimed as the winning candidate among those voted upon as the duly elected Mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 elections.

As records prove, petitioner Joel G. Miranda obtained the highest number of votes, leading by 1,666 votes over private respondent.⁵⁵ Having been chosen and elected by the majority of the voting populace of Santiago City, Isabela, petitioner is legally entitled to serve in the capacity of city mayor.

Even on the assumption that Jose Pempe C. Miranda was declared disqualified, private respondent, being the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, cannot occupy the office that was vacated as a result of the disqualification of petitioner, who obtained the highest number of votes.⁵⁶ By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an ineligible candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.⁵⁷ To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.⁵⁸ This is not to say that he is bereft of any other recourse.