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^{DISSENTING OPINION}

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

On the basis of the antecedent facts summarized in the majority opinion, I regret I have to express a dissenting view.

Two factors compel me to do so.

First, private respondent was dismissed from his employment by petitioner through its Supervisor Victoriano Henson. It is claimed that the dismissal was summary, meaning illegal, I suppose.

Second, Roques acquittal in the estafa case was not that he did not commit the crime charged, but because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the first, there is at all no indication that Roque filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, including, of course, damages, with the office of the Labor Arbiter. He should have because only the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction on the matter pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code.

In Primero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (156 SCRA 435, 443-446 [1987], cited in Suario vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 176 SCRA 688 [1989]), this Court said:

Going by the literal terms of the law, it would seem clear that at the time that Primero filed his complaints for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages, etc. With the Labor Arbiter, the latter possessed original and exclusive jurisdiction also over claims for moral and other forms of damages; this, in virtue of Article 265 [now Article 217] of PD 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, effective from May 1, 1974. In other words, in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Primero plainly had the right to plead and prosecute a claim not only for the reliefs specified by the Labor Code itself for unlawful termination of employment, but also for moral or other damages under the Civil Code arising from or connected with that termination of employment. And this was the state of the law when he moved for the dismissal of his claims before the Labor Arbiter, for reinstatement and recovery of back wages, so that he might later file a damage suit in a civil court which has exclusive jurisdiction over his complaint x x founded on tortious acts, breach of employment contract x x and consequent effects (thereof).

The legislative intent appears clear to allow recovery in proceedings before Labor Arbiters of moral and other forms of damages, in all cases or matters arising from employer-employee relations. This would no doubt include, particularly, instances where an employee has been unlawfully dismissed. In such a case the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided by labor laws, but also moral and other forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Moral damages would be recoverable, for example, where the dismissal of the employee was not only effected without authorized cause and/or due process for which relief is granted by the Labor Code but was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy¹ for which the obtainable relief is determined by the Civil Code² (not the Labor Code). Stated otherwise, if the evidence adduced by the employee before the Labor Arbiter should establish that the employer did indeed terminate the employees services without just cause or without according him due process, the Labor Arbiters judgment shall be for the employer to reinstate the employee and pay him back wages or, exceptionally, for the employee simply to receive separation pay. These are reliefs explicitly prescribed by the Labor Code³. But any award of moral damages by the Labor Arbiter obviously cannot be based on the Labor Code but should be grounded on the Civil Code. Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, to repeat, that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy; and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom.⁴

It is clear that the question of the legality of the act of dismissal is intimately related to the issue of the legality of the manner by which that act of dismissal was performed. But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available as regards the first the employees separation from employment it does not at all deal with the second the manner of that separation which is governed exclusively by the Civil Code. In addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in addressing the second, the Civil Code. And this appears to be the plain and patent intendment of the law. For apart from the reliefs expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from employment, no other damages may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee other than those specified by the Civil Code. Hence, the fact that the issue whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to him in the circumstances is determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, obviously was not meant to create a cause of action independent of that for illegal dismissal and thus place the matter beyond the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction.

Thus, an employee who has been illegally dismissed (i.e., discharged without just cause or being accorded due process), in such a manner as to cause him to suffer moral damages (as determined by the Civil Code), has a cause of action for reinstatement and recovery of back wages and damages. When he institutes proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, he should make a claim for all said reliefs. He cannot, to be sure, be permitted to prosecute his claims piecemeal. He cannot institute proceedings separately and contemporaneously in a court of justice upon the same cause of action or a part thereof. He cannot and should not be allowed to sue in two forums: one, before the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages, or for separation pay, upon the theory that his dismissal was illegal; an two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory that the manner of his dismissal was unduly injurious, or tortious. This is what in procedural law is known as splitting causes of action, engendering multiplicity of actions. It is against such mischiefs that the Labor Code amendments just discussed are evidently directed, and it is such duplicity which the Rules of Court regard as ground for abatement or dismissal of actions, constituting either litis pendentia (auter action pendant) or res adjudicata, as the case may be.⁵ But this was precisely what Primeros counsel did. He split Primeros cause of action; and he made one of the split parts the subject of a cause of action before a court of justice. Consequently, the judgment of the Labor Arbiter granting Primero separation pay operated as a bar to his subsequent action for the recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance under the doctrine of res judicata. The rule is that the prior judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceedings, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.⁶

Pursuant to Article 291 of Labor Code, as amended, the complaint should have been filed within three (3) years from the accrual of Roques cause of action (his dismissal in 1982), otherwise, his claim shall be forever barred.

Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that the regular courts have jurisdiction over his claims for damages because of his illegal dismissal, such claims necessarily arose upon an injury to his (as plaintiff) rights. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code an action arising from injury to plaintiffs rights prescribes in four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. It was only in 1 June 1989, or after the lapse of seven (7) years after his illegal dismissal, when Roque filed his complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court.

Moreover, since Roques acquittal was based on the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, there could then be no case for malicious prosecution, much less under the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil, there being no showing of a violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Bad faith is the only element relied upon the courts below, which is not the whole of Article 19. Neither can petitioner be held liable for damages under Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. In the former, the defendant must wilfully or negligently cause damage to another in a manner contrary to law. Article 21 involves causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. There is no finding that petitioner had so acted in the ways mentioned in both Articles.

I vote then to GRANT the petition and to REVERSE the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals.

Endnotes:

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¹ Citing Art. 1701, Civil Code, and Arts. 2219 (10) in relation to Art. 21 of the same Code.

² Citing Arts. 2195-2235, Civil Code.

³ Citing Art. 280, to be precise.

⁴ Citing Barreto v. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771; Francisco v. GSIS, L-18155, 30 March 1963; Parang v. Ty Belizar, L-19487, 31 January 1967; People v. Reyes, 103 SCRA 103.

⁵ Citing Sec. 1 (e), Rule 16, and Sec. 49(b), Rule 39, Rules of Court; See Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91, citing Urtula v. Republic, and Gamboa v. CA, 108 SCRA 1; See also cases collated in Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1979 ed., vol. 1, page 485, footnote 2, and vol. 2, page 351, footnote 1 and 2.

⁶ Citing Sec. 49 (b), Rule 39; Emphasis supplied; See Mapa v. Guanzon, 77 SCRA 398.