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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120751. March 17, 1999]

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES and PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 7, 1995 Order¹ of the then Acting Secretary Jose Brillantes of the Department of Labor and Employment, in NCMB-NCR-NS-03-122-95, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The antecedent facts are, as follows:

On March 9, 1995, the private respondent, Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA), duly certified collective bargaining representative of the daily paid workers of the petitioner, Phimco Industries Inc. (PHIMCO), filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, NCR, against PHIMCO, a corporation engaged in the production of matches, after a deadlock in the collective bargaining and negotiation. On April 21, 1995, when the several conciliation conferences called by the contending parties failed to resolve their differences PILA, composed of 352² members, staged a strike.

On June 7, 1995, PILA presented a petition for the intervention of the Secretary of Labor in the resolution of the labor dispute, to which petition PHIMCO opposed. Pending resolution of the said petition or on June 26, 1995, to be precise, PHIMCO sent notice of termination to some 47³ workers including several union officers.

On July 7, 1995, the then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued his Order; ruling, thus:

WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, this office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the dispute at Phimco Industries, Inc.

Accordingly, all the striking workers, except those who have been handed down termination papers on June 26, 1995, are hereby directed to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.

The parties are further ordered to cease and desist from committing any act that will aggravate the situation.

To expedite the resolution of this dispute, the parties are directed to submit their position papers and evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.⁴

On July 12, 1995, petitioner brought the present petition; theorizing, that:

I

THE HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY JOSE BRILLANTES ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER.

II

THE HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY JOSE BRILLANTES ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE WENT BEYOND THE BASIS FOR ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION UNDER ART. 263 OF THE LABOR CODE."⁵

On July 31, 1995, two weeks after the filing of the Petition, the public respondent issued another Order⁶ temporarily holding in abeyance the implementation of the questioned Order dated July 7, 1995 for a period of thirty (30) day; directing, as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the implementation of our Order dated 7 July 1995 is hereby temporarily held in abeyance for a period of thirty (30) days effective from receipt thereof pending the private negotiations of the parties for the settlement of their labor dispute. Thereafter, both the Union and the Company are directed to submit to this Office the result of their negotiations for our evaluation and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED."⁷

The pivotal issue here is: whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over subject labor dispute.

The petition is impressed with merit

Article 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, provides:

(g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration x x x.

The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the national interest. Accordingly, upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said industry.⁸ This power, however, is not without any limitation. In upholding the constitutionality of B.P. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 (g)⁹ of the Labor Code, it stressed in the case of Free telephone Workers Union vs. Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, et al.,¹⁰ the limitation set by the legislature on the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute, thus:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.¹¹

In this case at bar, however, the very admission by the public respondent draws the labor dispute in question out of the ambit of the Secretarys prerogative, to wit:

While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict categorization of cases imbued with national interest, this office believes that the obtaining circumstances warrant the exercise of the powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.¹²

The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the indispensability of the match factory to the national interest. It must have been aware that a match factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an industry indispensable to the national interest as it cannot be in the same category as generation and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries.¹³ Yet, the public respondent assumed jurisdiction thereover, ratiocinating as follows:

For one, the prolonged work disruption has adversely affected not only the protagonists, i.e., the workers and the Company, but also those directly and indirectly dependent upon the unhampered and continued operations of the Company for their means of livelihood and existence. In addition, the entire community where the plant is situated has also been placed in jeopardy. If the dispute at the Company remains unabated, possible loss of employment, not to mention consequent social problems, might result thereby compounding the unemployment problem of the country.

Thus we cannot be unmindful of the possible dire consequences that might ensue if the present dispute is allowed to remain unresolved, particularly when an alternative dispute resolution mechanism obtains to dispose of the differences between the parties herein.¹⁴

It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction grounded on the alleged obtaining circumstances and not on a determination that the industry involved in the labor dispute is one indispensable to the national interest, the standard set by the legislature, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises would be stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the community, or work disruptions in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would then come within the Secretarys power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in any Labor dispute at his pleasure. This is precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law. For when an overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law itself is disregarded¹⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent gravely abused his discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute sued upon in the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED; and the assailed Order, dated July 7, 1995, of the Acting Secretary of Labor SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Romero (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., see concurring opinion.

Endnotes:

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¹ Annex A; Rollo, pp. 17-21.

² Petition, Rollo, p. 52.

³ Order, Rollo, p. 110.

⁴ Rollo, pp. 20-21.

⁵ Petition; Rollo, pp. 4-5.

⁶ Annex A; Rollo, pp. 107-112.

⁷ Order; Rollo, p. 112.

⁸ Philtread Workers Union (PTWU), et al. vs. Confesor, et. al., 269 SCRA 393, p. 394 [ March 12, 1997].

⁹ Now Article 263 (g).

¹⁰ 108 SCRA 757 [OCTOBER 30, 1991].

¹¹ Id., pp. 769 - 770.

¹² Order; Rollo, p.19.

¹³ GTE Directors Corporation vs. Honorable Augosto Sanchez, et al., 197 SCRA 452, P. 471.

¹⁴ Order; Rollo, pp. 19-20.

¹⁵ Colgate Palmolive Philippines Inc. v. Ople, et. al., 163 SCRA 323, P. 330 [JUNE 30, 1988].