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DISSENTING OPINION

MELO, J., Dissenting

I find myself unable to join the majority. The opinion written by my esteemed colleague, Madame Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, will have far-searching ramification on settled dotrines concerning the finality and conclusiveness of the factual findings of the trial court in view of its unique advantage of being able to observe at first-hand the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, and especially when such findings of facts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which is the final arbiter of questions of fact (People vs. Edao, 64 SCRA 675 [1975]; People vs. Tala, 141 SCRA 240; People vs. Canada and Dondoy, 144 SCRA 121 [1986]; People vs. Clore, 184 SCRA 638 [1990]; Binalay vs. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 [1991]; People vs. Miscala, 202 SCRA 26 [1991]; People vs. Lagrosa, 230 SCRA 298 [1994]). All these conditions are present in the case at bar, and I have grave reservations about the propriety of setting aside time-tested principles in favor of a finding that hinges principally on the credibility of a single witness, whom we are asked to disbelieve on the basis merely of her recorded testimony without the benefit of the advantage that the trial court had, disregarding in the process another long-established rule that mere relationship of a witness to a party does not discredit his testimony in court (U.S. vs. Mante, 27 Phil 124; People vs. Pagaduan, 37 Phil 90; People vs. Reyes, 69 SCRA 474 [1976]; People vs. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 [1976]; Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 329 [1976]; People vs. Estocada, 75 SCRA 295 [1977]; People vs. Ciria, 106 SCRA 381 [1981]; People vs. Ramo, 132 SCRA 174 [1984]; People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242 [1987]; People vs. Gutierrez, Jr., 158 SCRA 614 [1988]; People vs. Bandoquillo, 167 SCRA 549 [1988]; People vs. Suitos, 220 SCRA 419 [1993]).

The primordial issue is whether or not the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion dated September 27, 1960 conveying the subject property to Maxima Hemedes is valid. If the transfer is not valid, no title passed to her successor-in-interest, R & B Insurance Corporation.

The Court of Appeals, confirming and summarizing the findings of fact and law made by the trial court, declared:

We sustain the findings of the trial court.

To begin with, the deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion was nullified by the trial court on two (2) grounds:

First, MAXIMA failed to comply with the requirements laid down by Article 1332 of the Civil Code. Said provision reads:

Art. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

In her testimony, MAXIMA admitted the entire document was written in English, a language not known to Justa Kausapin (TSN, 17 November 1981, pp. 7-8; Deposition of Justa Kausapin). Yet, MAXIMA failed to introduce sufficient evidence that would purportedly show that the deed of conveyance was explained to Justa Kausapin before the latter allegedly affixed her thumbmark. On the contrary, she admitted having failed to translate the deed of conveyance to Justa Kausapin because according to her, the latter has no voice anyway insofar as the property is concerned. Her testimony reads:

Q- In connection with this deed of conveyance which has been marked as Exh. 2-Maxima, we note that this is written in English, do you know, Mrs. Hernandez (MAXIMA), whether this document was ever translated to Justa Kausapin?

A- Justa Kausapin has no voice because thats the order of my father so anyway

Court Answer the question, you were only asked whether that was translated.

A No. (TSN 26 November, 1984, pp.36-37, Maxima Hemedes).

Second, MAXIMA failed to repudiate the allegation of Justa Kausapin disclaiming knowledge of her having executed such a deed. As a matter of fact, Justa Kausapin claimed that it was only during the hearing conducted on 07 December 1981 that she first caught glimpse of the deed of conveyance (TSN, 07 December 1981, pp. 22-23, ibid.) She therefore could not have possibly affixed her thumbmark therein. In the light of such a denial, the burden of proving that the deed of conveyance was indeed genuine laid on MAXIMA. After all, any party who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting evidence required to obtian a favorable judgment (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 290).

Instead, what was clearly established from the deposition of Justa Kausapin is the fact that she never executed any document donating the property to anybody else except ENRIQUE. This can be readily gleaned from her testimony, reading:

Q From the time, Aling Justa, that your husband Jose Hemedes donated the property to you up to the time you in turn donated the same to Enrique Hemedes in 1971, do you recall having executed any document donating this particular property to anybody else?

A None, Sir. (TSN, 17 November 1981, p. 21)

(pp. 63-64, Rollo.)

There is no dispute that Justa Kausapin twice repudiated the conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes. As found by the trial court:

In an Affidavit dated April 10, 1981 executed by Justa Kausapin before three witnesses (Exh. D-Dominium), said affiant disowned the alleged Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion invoked by defendant Maxima Hemedes, and expressly stated that she never granted any right over the property to Maxima Hemedes, whether as owner or mortgagor, that she never allowed her to use the land as security or collateral for loan. In the same affidavit, Justa Kausapin affirmed the authenticity of the Kasunduan whereby she transferred ownership of the disputed land to Enrique Hemedes, her stepson and reliable source of assistance throughout the years that she was in need of help. The testimony of Justa Kausapin was also taken by deposition on November 17, December 7 and 14, 1981 and on January 14, 1982, wherein all the contending parties were represented and had the opportunity to cross-examine her. In her testimony (the entire transcript of which has been submitted as Exh. K-Enrique), Justa Kausapin reiterated her repudiation of the Deed of Conveyance in favor of Maxima Hemedes and re-affirmed the validity of the Kasunduan in favor of Enrique Hemedes, as well as the sunsequent sale of the land by Enrique Hemedes to Dominium.

(pp. 83-84, Rollo.)

The majority would hold that the twin repudiation cannot be given credence because the witness is biased in favor of Enrique Hemedes, who, by providing support and financial assistance to the witness before, during and after the execution of the Kasunduan, is said to have influenced her into signing the same. This issue refers to the credibility of witnesses which, as stated earlier, is best left for determination by the trial court (People vs. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 [1998], citing People vs. Pontillar, Jr., 275 SCRA 338 [1997]; People vs. Rubio, 257 SCRA 528 [1996]; People vs. Del Prado, 253 SCRA 731 [1996]). I am not prepared to substitute my judgment for that of the trial court on the credibility of Justa Kausapin on the basis alone of the relationship between her and Enrique Hemedes. To reiterate, the rule is mere relationship of a witness to a party does not discredit his testimony in court. (U.S. vs. Mante, supra; Aznar vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 329 [1976]; People vs. Letigio, 268 SCRA 227, 243 [1997]).

I cannot infer from the mere circumstance that Justa Kausapin was receiving support and sustenance from Enrique Hemedes that she had any improper motives to testify in favor of Enrique and against Maxima. It must be remembered that Justa Kausapin had a legal right to such financial assistance, not only from respondent Enrique Hemedes, but also from Maxima Hemedes, who are both her stepchildren. If one must impute improper motives in favor of Enrique, one could just as easily ascribe these to Maxima. Furthermore, it must be noted that Justa kausapins entitlement to support flowed from her usufructuary rights contained in the Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory Conditions executed by her late husband, Jose Hemedes, the common father of petitioner Maxima and respondent Enrique Hemedes. In supporting his stepmother, Enrique was, therefore, merely performing a legal or contractual duty in favor of Justa Kausapin. There was nothing improper in Justa Kausapins repudiation of the conveyance in favor of Maxima, especially so if one considers the fact that the latter did not adduce any other evidence to defeat the presumption that Justa Kausapin was stating the truth when she said that she never conveyed the property to Justa Maxima. As the trial court found:

. . . The actuation of Enrique Hemedes towards Justa Kausapin is legally and morally justified. It must be remembered that Justa Kausapin is the stepmother of Enrique Hemedes; she was also the usufructuary of property in dispute. It is only natural and in keeping with law and custom, or Filipino tradition, for a son to support his mother (even if she happens to be a stepmother); and form a legal standpoint, the naked owner Enrique Hemedes was bound to support Justa Kausapin by way of giving her what she was entitled to as usufructuary.

(p. 104, Rollo.)

The trial courts ruling on the invalidity of the title of Maxima is not based solely on Justa Kausapins repudiation of the deed of conveyance, but likewise on the very acts of Maxima and her transferee R & B Surety and Insurance. The factual findings of the trial court are to the effect that despite the alleged transfer of ownership from Justa Kausapin to Maxima Hemedes on September 27, 1960 and the subsequent transfer to R & B Insurance on May 3, 1968 by way of foreclosure and public auction sale, neither do these petitioners exercised their rights of ownership over the disputed property, never even asserting their supposed ownership rights until it was too late. The following findings of the trial court stand unassailed:

There are other indication which led this Court to believe that neither defendant Maxima Hemedes not defendant R & B INSURANCE consider themselves the owner of the property in question. Both of these claimants never declared themselves as owners of the property for tax purposes; much less did they pay a single centavo in real estate taxes. The argument that since Justa Kausapin was in possession of the property as usufructuary she should pay the taxes contravenes the clear provision of the Civil Code that the taxes which may be imposed directly on the capital during the usufruct, in this case the realty taxes, shall be at the expense of the owner (Article 597, Civil Code). If Maxima Hemedes and R & B INSURANCE were convinced that they were the owners of the property, why did they not pay taxes for the same? This attitude is not consistent with that of an owner in good faith. The Court has noted that the very owner of R & B INSURANCE has admitted in her testimony that they declared the property as one of the assets of R & B INSURANCE only in 1976, which is eight years after they supposedly bought it at public auction in 1968 (TSN, July 6, 1987, pp. 22-23) Decision, pp. 32-33).

(pp. 101-102, Rollo.)

Faced with the categorical and straightforward repudiations of the conveyance supposedly made in her favor, Maxima Hemedes could only gratuitously assert otherwise, as no other testimonial or documentary evidence was adduced in support thereof. Maximas self-serving assertions, however, are legally infirm in view of her admission that the deed of conveyance in her favor was written in a language unknown to the person who supposedly executed the same and the terms thereof were not fully explained to the person who executed the same. These are the facts as found by the trial court:

Questioned about the execution of the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion which is the basis of her claim, defendant Maxima Hemedes admitted that the document which is in English was not translated or explained to Justa Kausapin before the latter supposedly affixed her thumbmark to the document (TSN, November 26, 1984, p. 34; TSN, December 10, 1984, p. 9). The Court has noted from the records that the Notary Public before whom the said document was notarized was not presented as a wittiness by defendant Maxima Hemedes, if only to attest to the execution of said document by Justa Kausapin, considering that the latter is an illiterate when it comes to documents written in English. Maxima explained the non-translation of the Deed of Conveyance into a language understood by Justa Kausapin with the statement that the latter (Justa Kausapin) has no voice anyway in so far as the property is concerned (TSN, November 26, 1984, p. 36) the Notary Public before whom the said document was supposed to have been axknowledged was also not presented as a witness, and there was no explanation as to why he was not also presented. In the face of such an admission and failure on the part of defendant Maxima Hemedes, coupled with the Straightforward repudiation by Justa Kausapin herself of the document relied upon by said defendant the Court finds and so concludes that the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion is not a credible and convincing evidence and is of no evidentiary value under the law upon which claimant Maxima Hemedes may anchor a valid claim of ownership over the property subject of this action.

(pp. 91-93, Rollo.)

It is argued that private respondents failed to have the thumbmarks of Justa Kausapin appearing on the deeds executed in favor of Maxima and Enrique compared and this failure may be taken as wilful suppression of evidence that is presumed to be adverse if produced (Rules of Court, rule 131, Sec. 3(e). The applicability of this rule presupposes that the suppressed evidence is not available to the other party for production in court (People vs. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 [1976]; People vs. Silvestre, 279 SCRA 474, 495 [1997]). This is not the case here for the same documents were available to petitioners. In fact, the records show that counsel for Maxima Hemedes pledged to submit the document which will be compared with the specimen thumbmark to be obtained from Justa Kausapin (TSN, December 7, 1981, p. 28). The records, however, do not show that said counsel persisted in his request for comparison of Kausapins thumbmarks. If petitioners were convinced that the specimen thumbprint of Justa Kausapin was of crucial importance to their cause, they should have insisted on presenting her as a witness and, thereupon, obtaining her thumbprint. Their own failure to pursue the production of the specimen thumprint of Justa Kausapin negated any belated claim that the said specimen was suppressed (People vs. Tulop, citing People vs. Pagal, 272 SCRA 443 [1998]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Tokyo Shipping Company, Ltd., 244 SCRA 332 [1995]; citing Nicolas vs. Nicolas, 52 Phil 265 [1928] and Ang Seng Quiem vs. Te Chico, 7 Phil 541 [1907]).

The two courts below were, to my mind, most perceptive when they held that proof of authenticity of the thumbprint of Justa Kausapin would not render valid an otherwise void document in light of the admission of Maxima Hemedes that she did not explain the English contents thereof to Justa Kausapin in a language understood by her.

On the other hand, the validity of the conveyance to Enrique Hemedes is amply proven by the evidence on record. Thus, largely uncontested are the following findings of the fact of the trial court:

Enough has already been said hereinabove concerning the claim of ownership of plaintiff Enrique. From an overall evaluation of the facts found by the Court to be substantiated by the evidence on record, the Court is convinced and so holds that the three conflicting claimants, it is party plaintiffs, Enrique Hemedes and now DOMINIUM, who have both law and equity on their side. Plaintiff Enrique Hemedes title to the property in question by virtue of the Kasunduan dated May 27, 1971 was confirmed twice by his grantor, Justa Kausapin; he complied with his obligations as naked owner by giving Justa Kausapin her usufructaury rights in the form of financial and other assistance; he declared his ownership of the property openly and adversely to other claimants by recording the same in the appropriate government agencies, namely, the Municipal and Provincial Assessors Office, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and the Bureau of Lands; he was openly known in the community where the property is located as the owner thereof; he paid the taxes on the property conscientiously from the time he acquired the same to the time he sold the same to co-plaintiff DOMINIUM; he was in continuous possession of the property during the said period; he paid the tenant, Nemesio Marquez, the disturbance fee required under the Land Reform Law.

(pp. 102-103, Rollo.)

The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in holding that since the deed of conveyance to Maxima was found to be spurious, it necessarily follows that OCT No. (0-941) 0-198 issued in her name is null and void. This is because the registration will not invalidate a forged or invalid document.

I, therefore, vote to dismiss the petition and to affirm the decision appealed from.





























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