SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

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^{SEPARATE OPINION}

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur with the majority that, as a rule, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors.

Due to their peculiar factual circumstances, however, Petitioner Binays cases, I believe, should be deemed exceptions and referred to the proper courts, that is, the regional trial courts. These factual circumstances are simple: (1) the Information charging Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, prior the enactment of RA 7975; and (2) when RA 7975 took effect on May 16, 1995, trial in the anti-graft court had not yet commenced. In fact, Binay had not been arraigned yet. These undisputed facts are plainly governed by the unambiguous provision of Section 7, RA 7975, which reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

The majority, however, complicates the above syllogistic application of the law by ruling that before Section 7 could be used, a prior determination as to which court has jurisdiction over the cases should first be undertaken. Since the aforesaid general rule states that the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over municipal mayors, then Binays cases should be referred by the anti-graft court to itself, not to the regional trial courts.

With due respect, I believe this rather circumlocutory interpretation renders Section 7 useless. In fact, I daresay that said interpretation or explanation is much more difficult to understand than the provision itself. Indeed, why should the words proper courts be deemed to include the Sandiganbayan? The majoritys ruling leads to the absurdity of the Sandiganbayans being required to refer to itself a criminal case already pending before it, one in which trial has not yet begun. I would rather rest on the most fundamental rule in statutory construction: Interpretation is needed only when the law is vague, not when it is clear and unambiguous,¹ as in the case of Section 7, RA 7975.

Consequently, I vote (1) to GRANT the Petition in GR Nos. 120681-83, because Binays cases fall under the exception stated in Section 7, RA 7975; and (2) to DISMISS the Petition in GR No. 128136, because Petitioner Magsaysays cases were filed after RA 7975 had taken effect; they are thus covered by the general rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over municipal mayors.

Endnotes:

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¹ Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 94.1