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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy), Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision¹ of the Court of Appeals² affirming the decision and supplemental decision of the trial court,³ as follows:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the appeals interposed by both accused and Reyes Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and Supplemental Decision dated June 6, 1992 and October 26, 1992 respectively.

"SO ORDERED."⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

The facts are as follows:

On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property, reading as follows:

"That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being the driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the same while along the National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and ordinances and without taking the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due to irreversible shock, internal and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries, open wounds, abrasions, and further causing damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and damages to his Nissan Pick-Up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of P2,000,000.00.

"CONTRARY TO LAW.

"Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.

"(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC
"Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor"

Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged.⁵ On November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action.⁶ However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver.⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted aint trial of the same.

The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be undisputed, are as follows:

"The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short) from the latters San Fernando, Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside from the Corporations memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to physically inspect their vehicles before each trip (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMCs Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to a professional drivers license, it also conducts a rigid examination of all driver applicants before they are hired.

"In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00 oclock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the trucks right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped. (see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-14, pp. 9-11, record), and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh. A-19) from external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp. 15 and 16, record).

"For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the time of his death he was 45 years old. He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic Wood Products and Development Corporation (DWPC), a wood processing establishment, from which he was receiving an income of P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy appear to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each with par value of P100.00 per share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60,000 shares valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1 & 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns (Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University graduate in Business Administration, past president of the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976, respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees International in 1979. He was also the recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader (Exh. C). His children were all studying in prestigious schools and spent about P180,000.00 for their education in 1988 alone (Exh. H-4).

"As stated earlier, the plaintiffs procurement of a writ of attachment of the properties of the Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of Appeals. It was shown that on December 26, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units of Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its garage at San Fernando, Pampanga. These vehicles were kept under PC guard by the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the Corporation to operate them. However, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dissolved the writ (p. 30, record) and on December 29, 1989, said Sheriff reported to this Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the defendants representative, Melita Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record). The defendants general Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per day for the non-operation of the six units during their attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, proceedings on December 10, 1990)."⁸cräläwvirtualibräry

On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered aint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered:

"1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months and twenty days as maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00 as compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;

"2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and

"3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.

"No pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED.

"Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.

"(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA
"Regional Trial Judge"⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from theint decision.¹⁰cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of theint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused.¹¹cräläwvirtualibräry

On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion by inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows:

"2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the damages of P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant in the next preceding paragraph; and x x x"¹²cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental decision.¹³cräläwvirtualibräry

During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.¹⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision affirming that of the trial court, as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.¹⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended decision.¹⁶cräläwvirtualibräry

On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.¹⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, this petition for review.¹⁸cräläwvirtualibräry

On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.¹⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment.²⁰ On April 13, 1998, the Court granted leave to petitioner to file a reply and noted the reply it filed on March 11, 1998.²¹cräläwvirtualibräry

We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case.

Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition, which, however, boil down to two (2) basic issues, namely:

1.....May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the truck driver?

2.....May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property?²²cräläwvirtualibräry

We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the trial court for determination of the civil liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delicto re-opened for the purpose.

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused.²³ This is the rule against double recovery.

In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability."²⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law.

The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily consideredint tortfeasors, is solidary.²⁵ The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.²⁶cräläwvirtualibräry

As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.²⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.²⁸cräläwvirtualibräry

The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck driver became clearer when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.

It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action. However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation or filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides:

"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others."

The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. The restrictive phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for its basis the same act or omission of the offender.²⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court grievously erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and could not be granted affirmative relief.³⁰cräläwvirtualibräry

The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding"³¹ or exempted "a particular case from the operation of the rules."³²cräläwvirtualibräry

Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence.³³cräläwvirtualibräry

With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,[34] "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.

In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action.

With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the amended information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal case because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused.³⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer.³⁶ The injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.³⁷chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum." This is erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.³⁸cräläwvirtualibräry

Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if erroneous, as it is, because it has become final and executory.

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as homicide through reckless imprudence, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; or simple imprudence causing damages to property."³⁹cräläwvirtualibräry

There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997, and theint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.

IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined and penalized under Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, with violation of the automobile law (R. A. No. 4136, as amended), and sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum,⁴⁰ without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and

(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of the defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendants counterclaim.

No costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J. see dissenting opinion.

Puno, J., concur but pro hac vice.

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Mendoza, J., see dissenting opinion.

Panganiban, J., in the result.

Quisumbing. J., concur in separate opinion of J. Vitug.

Purisima, J., in Justice Mendozas dissenting opinion.

¹ In CA-G. R. CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997.

² Ibay-Somera, J., ponente, Lipana-Reyes+, and Vasquez, JJ., concurring.

³ Dated June 6, 1992, and October 26, 1992, respectively, in Consolidated Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, Regional Trial Court, Cauayan, Isabela, Judge Artemio R. Alivia, presiding.

⁴ Rollo, pp. 35-43.

⁵ See Manifestation, Rollo, p. 55.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 55-56.

⁷ Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.

⁸ Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 64-80, at pp. 67-69.

⁹ Petition, Annex "F", Rollo, pp. 64-80.

¹⁰ Rollo, pp. 81-82.

¹¹ It is not indicated when the motion for amendment of the trial courts decision was filed, but this fact is mentioned in the trial courts supplemental decision of October 26, 1992.

¹² Rollo, pp. 83-84.

¹³ Rollo, pp. 85-86.

¹⁴ CA Record, pp. 92-94.

¹⁵ Rollo, pp. 35-43.

¹⁶ Petition, Annex "J", Rollo, pp. 87-91.

¹⁷ Rollo, p. 45.

¹⁸ Filed on June 13, 1997, Rollo, pp. 11-33.

¹⁹ Rollo, p. 96.

²⁰ Rollo, pp. 114-120.

²¹ Rollo, p. 133.

²² Petition, par. V, Rollo, pp. 11-33, at p. 19.

²³ Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 5, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; Article 2177, Civil Code; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472 (1978)

²⁴ Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 429, 436 (1989)

²⁵ Article 2194, Civil Code of the Philippines.

²⁶ Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331, 338 (1989)

²⁷ Maniago vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 674, 681(1996)

²⁸ Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

²⁹ Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1998 edition, pp. 128-129.

³⁰ Policarpio vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 344, 357 (1997)

³¹ Nerves vs. Civil Service Commission, 276 SCRA 610, 617 (1997)

³² Blanco v. Bernabe, 63 Phil. 124 (1936)

³³ Guaring, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 274, 283 (1997)

³⁴ 72 SCRA 562, 566 (1976)

³⁵ Maniago v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 686.

³⁶ Maniago v. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 687.

³⁷ Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 (1942), reiterated in Maniago v. Court of Appeals, supra.

³⁸ Quizon v. The Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, 97 Phil. 342, 346 (1955)

³⁹ Quizon v. The Justice of the Peace of Pampanga, supra, at p. 345.

⁴⁰ This was the penalty imposed by the trial court, which has become final and executory.