x x x chanrobles virtual law library

Meanwhile, on August 14, 1992, Samuel C. Cleofe, Register of Deeds of Quezon City, in his reply to a letter from herein complainant Zuzuarregui, stated that per verification from their Control Log Book, TCT No. 308462 is not shown as among those filed in their office (Exh. A). chanrobles virtual law library

On September 18, 1992, Zuzuarreguis Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing his criminal complaint against the accused was granted in a resolution issued by Asst. City Prosecutor Dimaranan Vidal (Exh. 15). Accordingly, herein accused was formally charged with three counts of falsification of public documents in three separate criminal informations filed with the RTC of Quezon City and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92, the first being for falsification of technical description of land and the other two being for falsification of Declarations of Real Property (Exhs. 13; 13-B and 13-C). chanrobles virtual law library

In the meantime, upon request of certain Miguel V. Sison, Jr., Officer in Charge, Director IV, Office of the Executive Secretary, Presidential Action Center, Malacaang, the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an examination of both the specimen and questioned signatures of Vicente Coloyan, former Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the questioned signatures being those appearing on TCT No. 308462. On March 9, 1993, Director Epimaco Velasco of the NBI wrote Miguel V. Sison, Jr. (Exh. 3) transmitting copy of their findings contained in a Questioned Document Report No. 151-393, dated March 9, 1993 (Exh. 4) signed by Rogelio G. Azores, Document Examiner IV of the NBI (Exh. 4-B), as approved by Arcadio A. Ramos, Chief of the Questioned Document Division (Exh. 4-C) and noted by Manuel C. Roura, Deputy Director, Technical Services (Exh. 4-D). The conclusion arrived at as per the Report is that the questioned and standard signatures of Vicenter [sic] Coloyan were written by one and the same person. chanrobles virtual law library

On October 13, 1993, in response to a request of Rogelio Azores who rendered the above Questioned Document Report, Quezon City Assosor [sic] Constantino P. Rosas issued a Certification (Exh. K) to the effect that Tax Declarations Nos. 22731 for Lot 822-C-1 Piedad Estate and 22732 for Lot 822-C-2 Piedad Estate, both in the name of Domingo R. Locsin, do not appear in their Office Tax Map, Property Index System as well as in the Assessment Roll. chanrobles virtual law library

On April 15, 1994, Assistant Quezon City Assessor Benjamin Kasala issued still another Certification to the effect that per assessment records of their office, there is no property whether land or improvement registered for taxation purposes in the name of accused Garcia (Exh. M). chanrobles virtual law library

Meanwhile, Criminal Cases Nos. 36490-92 for falsification of public documents filed by the herein complainant against the herein accused were raffled to Branch 85 of this Court then presided by the Honorable Benjamin P. Abesamis and subsequently by the Honorable Judge Mariano M. Umali. In a decision penned by the latter, dated May 17, 1994, the herein accused was acquitted of all the above charges on reasonable doubt (Exh. 16-C). chanrobles virtual law library

On June 9, 1994, in the course of the trial of the present case, counsel for the accused, Atty. Ciriaco O. Atienza, wrote the Land Registration Authority (Exh. 9) requesting, among others, clarification on the finality of an order of reconstitution, apparently referring to the order of August 20, 1991 by Reconstituting Officer Bustos (Exh. 6, supra.) which was later set aside in a Supplemental Order of the same officer dated October 8, 1991. x x x chanrobles virtual law library

On August 5, 1994, herein complainant wrote another letter-request this time addressed to Mr. Ernesto Erive, Land Management Services Chief of Surveys Division, Bureau of Lands (Exh. V), for the latter to certify as to the authenticity of the technical description of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954, in the name of Domingo Locsin attached to the letter-request which was one of the documents submitted by the accused in support of her application for administrative reconstitution. In reply thereto, Erive wrote Zuzuarregui on August 18, 1994 (Exh. U) informing the latter that their office (Department of Environment and Natural resources, National Capital Region) has no record of Lot 822-C-2, Psd-19954 and, hence, said technical description was not prepared by their office. chanrobles virtual law library

On September 30, 1994, the LRA Administrator Reynaldo Maulit came out with a Resolution (Exh. 20) on the appeal interposed by the accused affirming the finality of LRA Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-283(91) dated August 20, 1991 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to reconstitute, among others, the original of TCT No. 308462 in the name of petitioner-appellant Azucena L. Garcia, accused herein and, therefore, the Supplemental Order dated October 8, 1991 could not have validly amended the aforestated order of August 20, 1991. It added, however, that the reconstitution does not confirm nor adjudicate ownership over the property subject thereof citing the case of Serra, Serra vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482 (Exh. S).[2] chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 with falsifying the entries in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 308462, forging the signature therein of Vicente N. Coloyan, and introducing or using said TCT in support of her application for reconstitution of title. Similarly, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-94-53590 and Q-94-53591, petitioner was charged with falsifying the entries in Declaration of Real Property Nos. 22731 and 22732, respectively, forging the signatures therein of Jose C. Gonzales, and introducing or using the same in support of her application before the Land Registration Administration (LRA). chanrobles virtual law library

In its Decision dated April 20, 1995, the trial court found petitioner guilty of three (3) counts of falsification of public documents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, and subsequently this Court, affirmed petitioners conviction. Entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999. chanrobles virtual law library

In the instant petition, petitioner only questions the validity of the judgment rendered in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589. She contends that where proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of the accused, the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus. Hence, in her case, the fundamental unfairness of the judgment, when viewed in light of the record, renders the same subject to attack for being violative of her right to due process of law. Petitioner explains that this fundamental unfairness stems from the omission and failure of the trial court, the prosecution and the defense counsel to formally project into the evidentiary stream the evidence decisive on the merits of the case, consisting of official determinations and findings[3] on the genuineness and authenticity of Vicente Coloyans signature on the owners copy of TCT No. 308462, which underlay the different official acts of office holders participating in the proceeding on administrative reconstitution of the original of said [TCT] No. 308462 of the Q.C. Register of Deeds.[4] chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner explains that the disquisition of the trial judge was totally silent on the official findings and determinations that Coloyans signature on the owners copy of the TCT No. 308462 was genuine. Instead, the trial judge merely relied on the testimony of Coloyan that the signature appearing on the photocopy of TCT No. 308462 is not his. Petitioner points out that the unfairness of such reliance becomes apparent when official determinations and findings as to the genuineness of Coloyans signature on TCT No. 308462 are considered. chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner then alleges that the prosecution failed to call the attention of the trial court to these official determinations and findings which constituted exculpatory evidence in her favor. Petitioner further faults the prosecution in willfully presenting Coloyan as a witness to disclaim his signature notwithstanding indications in the record that he was hired and was possibly a corrupt witness. She maintains that the prosecution should have exerted their best efforts to safeguard the trial process against this type of witness, who from all reasonable indicators is a paid and perjured witness.[5] chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner likewise claims that she was denied due process of law by reason of her being represented by ineffective counsel. Petitioner illustrates that her counsel failed to formally offer in evidence exhibits, consisting of the official acts of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and officials of the LRA,[6] for the specific purpose of proving the genuineness of Coloyans signature. Petitioners counsel also took no steps to bar Coloyan from being presented as a witness for the prosecution and was not especially alert to the danger or risk of a perjured witness. In this regard, petitioner maintains that her counsel could have asked for a deferment of the trial to give him time to make a full investigation of the circumstances attending the presentation of Coloyan as a witness. chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner concludes that the foregoing arguments and precedents warrant the grant of preliminary injunctive relief in the form of a status quo order, and, after consideration of the merits of the case, a writ of habeas corpus annulling the judgment of conviction rendered against her. chanrobles virtual law library

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained of his liberty. Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ. chanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, the ground invoked by petitioner pertains to the appreciation of evidence, a matter which falls within the exclusive discretion and prerogative of the trial court. The OSG stresses that a writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error. As such, the writ will not lie to correct alleged mistakes of fact or of law committed by a court in the exercise of its functions. The OSG also points out that the ground invoked by petitioner is one which has been considered, passed upon and found to be without merit not only by the Court of Appeals but by this Court as well. The OSG is of the view that the instant petition is merely intended to delay the administration of justice. chanrobles virtual law library

We deny the petition. chanrobles virtual law library

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.[7] Its object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the detainee.[8] However, it is equally well-settled that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail,[9] or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order.[10] In the case at bar, therefore, petitioner can no longer seek relief via a petition for habeas corpus having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document and use thereof. Said judgment is already final and executory. Petitioner even discloses that entry of judgment was made on April 8, 1999, or eight (8) months prior to the filing of this petition. The OSG has also pointed out that petitioner is still out on bail. To this petitioner merely replied that: chanrobles virtual law library

For purposes of habeas corpus, RESTRAINT is not confined to imprisonment or actual physical custody. Recent federal jurisprudence has extended this to accused under final conviction, who are out on bail, and to convicts on parole. Such jurisprudence is part of Anglo-American jueisprudence (sic), which is highly persuasive in this jurisdiction because our law on Habeas Corpus is of Anglo-American origin.[11] chanrobles virtual law library

Even if we disregard the fact that petitioner is out on bail, the writ prayed for should not be granted. Indeed, we have held that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of his detention.[12] Petitioner, however, has failed to persuade this Court that the proceedings before the trial court were attended by violations of her right to due process, or for that matter, other constitutional rights. chanrobles virtual law library

It is apparent from the arguments advanced by petitioner that the purpose of this petition is to cause this Court to once again re-examine and pass judgment upon the trial courts appreciation of the evidence presented, especially the credibility of Coloyan as a witness. The Decision dated April 20, 1995 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, and the Resolution dated October 27, 1998 of the Third Division of this Court, finding that no reversible error was committed by the trial court, should have impressed upon petitioner that issues relating to the trial courts appreciation of the evidence have already been settled and thus, can no longer be reviewed anew by this Court. As early as the 1913 case of Trono Felipe v. Director of Prisons,[13] we have laid down the rule that an application for habeas corpus cannot function as a writ of error. We explained therein that: chanrobles virtual law library

But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy for the correction of such errors.[14] Court cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings, review the record in a criminal case after judgment of conviction has been rendered, and the defendants have entered on the execution of the sentence imposed, to ascertain whether the facts found by the trial court were in accordance with the evidence disclosed by the record, or to pass upon the correctness of conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts thus found. Under the statute, a commitment in due form based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a criminal case is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it appears that the court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the penalty. Mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law.[15] chanrobles virtual law library

As to the charge that the prosecution committed manifest prosecutorial misconduct, we find the same bereft of merit. First, the existence of exculpatory evidence is a matter of defense. As such, it is principally the duty of the accused, not the prosecution, to bring its existence to the attention of the court. Second, whether the Orders of Reconstitution issued by the reconstitution officer and the LRA administrator on August 20, 1991 and September 30, 1994, respectively, as well as the reconstituted TCT No. 308462 constitute sufficient evidence to exonerate petitioner from criminal liability, involves appreciation and weighing of evidence, and for reasons already stated, this Court is proscribed from again considering. Even petitioners accusation that Coloyan was a paid and perjured witness was not supported by evidence. chanrobles virtual law library

Similarly, apart from her bare allegations, petitioner offered no convincing evidence to substantiate her claim that the ineffectiveness of her counsel deprived her of her right to counsel. We specifically note that petitioners own documentary evidence in support of the instant petition actually belies her allegation that her counsel failed to adduce exculpatory evidence. Petitioners Formal Offer of Exhibits before the trial court shows that among the evidence offered by her counsel were the following:

Exhibit(s) Description(s) Purpose(s)

x x x x x x xxx

3, 4 and 4-A 4-B, (a) NBI Directors (1) To prove that the NBI examined

4-C and 4-D Letter dated March 9, TCT No. 308462 and the

1993, (Exh. 3) signature of Vicente N. Coloyan

transmitting to Hon. (2) To prove that the NBI

Miguel V. Sison, Jr findings is that the signature

the NBI Questioned of Vicente N. Coloyan appearing

Documents Report on (sic) TCT No. 308462 is written

No. 151-393 by one and the same Vicente N.

Coloyan, Acting Register of

(b) Questioned NBI Deeds, whose standard signatures

Documents Report No. appear on various titles on

151-391 dated March file with the Registry of

9, 1993 Deeds, Quezon City

(3) to prove that this Questioned

Documents Report No. 151-393

submitted by Document Examiner

Rogelio G. Azores was approved

by NBI

(4) To prove that TCT No.

308462 is genuine, not falsified

xxx xxx xxx

6                                     Adm. Reconstitution (1) To prove that the LRA

Order No. Q-283 (91) approved the Administrative

issued on August 20, 1991 Reconstitution of the

by Land Registration Accuseds TCT No. 308462

Authority (LRA) through for Lot 822-C-1 and Lot

the Reconstitution Officer, Atty. 822-C-2, Piedad Estate

Benjamin Busto

(2) To prove that this Adm.

Reconstitution Order had

already acquired finality

when the reconstitution

of TCT No.308462

was recalled by Atty. Busto

(3) To prove that TCT

No. 308462 is genuine,

not falsified16 (Underscoring ours) chanrobles virtual law library

It appears, however, that these documents were among the official acts repeatedly cited by petitioner as presupposing official determination and findings that Coloyans signature on TCT No. 308462 was genuine and, therefore, allegedly constituted evidence exempting petitioner from criminal liability. Petitioner faulted her counsel in Criminal Case No. Q-94-53589 for being ineffective in that her counsel allegedly failed to formally offer in evidence the said documents but the record shows that her counsel did not fail to do so. chanrobles virtual law library

Significantly, it is not disputed that petitioner appealed the adverse Decision or judgment of conviction dated April 20, 1995 of the RTC of Quezon City to the Court of Appeals; that the Court of Appeals and later this Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner; and that Entry of Judgment was made on August 8, 1999. The petitioner, therefore, may not validly resort to this present petition for habeas corpus in lieu of her lost or dismissed appeal in the said criminal case. The petition of herein petitioner who is out on bail, appears to be patently intended for delay. chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, petitioner Azucena L. Garcia, having failed to establish sufficient cause to warrant issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtual law library

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur .