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DISSENTING OPINION

VITUG, J.:

In a democratic society, the immense power of the State is placed in the hands of the people. Whether this apothegm is truly genuine or merely a farce depends on how the institution values the sanctity and strength of the ballot through which that power is wielded.

The COMELEC is entrusted with the task of seeing to it that the results of any election reflect the true will of the electorate, and it has been correspondingly accorded broad powers, administrative and judicial, to carry out that mandate.

Brought up for consideration by the Court is a special civil action for certiorari at the instance of Arthur Velayo which seeks to set aside the resolution, dated 06 October 1998, of public respondent Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"), setting aside his proclamation, directing the Board of Canvassers of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, to immediately convene to exclude precincts 44A-1, 44A-2 and 50A and 50A-1, and to proclaim the winning candidate for Mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

Conjectures aside, the case and material factual settings are not in serious dispute. In the last national and local elections, held on 11 May 1998, petitioner Arthur Velayo and private respondent Ernesto Natividad were among the candidates for the elective mayoralty post in the Municipality of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. During the official canvass of the election returns of the votes cast for national, provincial and municipal officials on 12 May 1998, a representative of Natividad orally sought the exclusion from the canvass of Election Returns No. 424, 5882 and 4900753. The Municipal Board of Canvassers refused to defer the canvass of the returns. On even date, Natividad filed SPC 98-002¹ with the COMELEC, seeking to disqualify the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Canvassers for alleged illegal proceedings, i.e., for proceeding to canvass the orally objected returns, and to annul any canvass of said returns. The next day, 13 May 1998, Natividad submitted to the Board a letter asking for the disqualification of its Chairman and Vice-Chairman for alleged bias, partiality and gross violations of the law and COMELEC rules and regulations. The concerned officials ruled against their disqualification.

In a petition, dated 16 May 1998, Natividad filed another case, docketed SPC 98-050,² with the Comelec, received by the latter on 18 May 1998, which sought to declare null and void the proceedings conducted by the Board on 13 May 1998, to disqualify the Board Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and to annul any proclamation of winners for the local elections.

On 17 May 1998, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed, among other candidates, Velayo to be the duly elected Mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

On 19 May 1998, Natividad filed his petition, docketed SPC No. 98-073,³ appealing from the written rulings, dated 13, 14 and 15 May 1998, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers "on Contested Election Returns No. 4900678 of Precinct No. 9A-3/9A4."

All the aforesaid pre-proclamation and post-proclamation cases were all assigned to the Second Division of COMELEC. On 09 June 1998, respondent COMELEC [Second Division] issued an Order, which read:

"In view of the proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, of all the winning candidates for the municipal positions of said municipality on May 17, 1998, as evidenced by duly signed Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal Offices [C.E. form No. 25] with Serial No. 03490337, this Commission [Second Division] RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES TO DISMISS this instant petition for being MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

"SO ORDERED."⁴cräläwvirtualibräry

On 23 June 1998, respondent Natividad moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of the COMELEC [Second Division].

The COMELEC [Second Division], on 03 July 1998, issued an Order, directing the elevation of the entire records of the subject cases to the COMELEC En Banc for proper disposition. On 06 October 1998, COMELEC (en banc) issued its now assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which read:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the proclamation of Arthur V. Velayo is hereby ANNULLED. The Board of Canvassers of Gapan, Nueva Ecija is hereby DIRECTED to convene immediately exclude Precincts 44A, 44A2 and 50A & 50A1 and immediately proclaim the winning candidate for Mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

"Further, they are directed to immediately inform the Commission of their action thereon."⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

In thus resolving, the COMELEC (en banc) ratiocinated:

"The objection to these election returns are on the grounds that they are prepared under' duress, force and intimidation.' Petitioner submitted the affidavits of his witnesses attached as Annex 'A' to 'T.' Also submitted as evidence for the exclusion of election returns for Precincts 43A, 43A1, 43A2, 43A3, 44A, 44A1, 44A2 and 50A1/50A2 are the Annex Y, police blotter and affidavits of Danilo Simon, joint affidavits of Nestor Pascual and Gerry Mangahas; Rico Andres and Perfecto San Gabriel; Editha Pasco and Jose San Gabriel; Eladio Bartolome and Edgar Gatus; Rolando Linsangan and Samuel Lazaro; Ramon Natividad and George Lazaro; Eduardo A. Santiago and Guillermo Gatus; Francisco de los Santos and Cesar Nanalis and Roberto S. Delegiado and Eduardo Hernandez.

"A close perusal of the above-entitled cases would show that the above objections and appeals were made strictly in accordance with law, however, the Board in defiance of Section 245 and Section 20 of Republic Act 7166, particularly sub-paragraph (i) included the assailed election returns without giving opportunity to the aggrieved party to go on appeal to the Commission.

"Said Section 20 (I) of R.A. 7166 states:

"'The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.'

"In this case, it is clear that the objected election returns will adversely affect the results of the elections.

"Thus, after close perusal of the above cited objected election returns, the Commission finds that the election returns of 44A, 44A2 and 50A1A2 should be excluded from the canvass. It is worth noting that in these precincts 44A and 44A2 petitioner Natividad got zero votes which is statistically improbable. The affidavits of the following watchers respectively to wit: Rolando C. Gamboa, Eduardo Mallare and Eduardo Surio together with the police report of Miguel S. Inductivo of the threats received by Danilo Simon all watchers of petitioner, all in the dialect which attest to the incident wherein they were prevented and threatened from entering the polling place by four identified men and they were able to witness these men threatening the teachers and telling them to tamper the election return in such a way that they will not be noticed by other people and they will have no problem.

"Watchers play a vital role in protecting the votes especially during the counting of the votes in the precinct level. The fact that the watchers were prevented and in fact heard the teachers threatened to have the election returns altered makes the whole election process a mockery in these precincts as the returns are no longer reflective of the true results of the elections. It is no wonder then that in these precincts Natividad got zero votes.

"Further, since there was already an objection against the two members of the Board of Canvassers and their illegal proceedings they cannot proceed to canvass, to cite Section 244 of the Omnibus Election Code:

"'Section 244. Contested composition or proceedings of the board. - When the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers are contested, the board of canvassers shall, within twenty-four hours, make a ruling thereon with notice to the contestant who, if adversely affected, may appeal the matter to the Commission within five days after the ruling with proper notice to the board of canvassers. After due notice and hearing, the Commission shall decide the case within ten days from the filing thereof. During the pendency of the case, the board of canvassers shall suspend the canvass until the Commission orders the continuation or resumption thereof and citing their reasons or grounds therefor.'

"Thus, the action of the Board in proclaiming the winning candidate for mayor in the Municipality of Gapan is illegal for violation of Section 20(a) to (i) of R.A. 7166 and Section 244 of the Omnibus Election Code."⁶cräläwvirtualibräry

Forthwith, petitioner instituted the instant petition for certiorari to annul the 06th October 1998 resolution of the COMELEC. Respondents were ordered by the Court to comment on the petition. On 14 October 1999, petitioner filed with this Court a "Very, Very Urgent Petition for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order Against Respondents and the Gapan Municipal Board of Canvassers," which the Court simply NOTED, while awaiting the comment of public respondent and which the Court ultimately denied pending a final resolution on the case.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC, dated 06 October 1998, the MBC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, reconvened on 17 October 1998 and canvassed the votes for Mayor of Gapan excluding the votes cast in the aforementioned four precincts. On even date, Natividad was proclaimed by the Gapan Municipal Board of Canvassers as being the duly elected Mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

In his present recourse, Velayo has anchored the petition on the following grounds:

"1) The questioned resolution (Annex "A") of October 6, 1998 is ultra vires and void ab initio because it was issued ex-parte, without notice and opportunity afforded the petitioner to be heard and therefore, violative of due process.

"2) The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss respondent Natividad's motion for reconsideration on SPC Nos. 98-002, 98-050 and 98-073 for being filed out of time.

"3) The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it excluded the votes cast in Precincts 44A, 44A2, 50A and 50A1 as manufactured and contrary to statistical probabilities without the required notice and hearing consistent with due process.

"4) The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it annulled the proclamation of petitioner without the required notice and hearing consistent with due process.

"5) The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss said pre-proclamation cases for the reason that the grounds relied upon by respondent Natividad are proper grounds for election protests."⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner Velayo, in fine, has raised two principal issues, to wit: (a) whether or not Natividad's motion for reconsideration has been filed out of time and (b) whether or not the COMELEC has gravely abused its discretion in issuing its questioned 06th October 1998 resolution ex parte.jo

The Solicitor General has joined Velayo in asserting that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to Natividad's motion for reconsideration despite its having been belatedly filed.

The pertinent provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure read:

"Section 2. Period for filing motions for reconsideration - A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."

The order issued by the COMELEC [Second Division] dismissing Natividad's petition was promulgated on 09 June 1998. He moved for reconsideration of said order on 25 June 1998.⁸cräläwvirtualibräry

In his comment, Natividad explained that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on 25 June 1998 was within the reglementary period because he received a copy of the 9th June 1998 order of the COMELEC only on 22 June 1998,⁹ and thus, he had until 27 June 1998 within which to move for a reconsideration.

In Bulaong vs. COMELEC,¹⁰ where an Order of the COMELEC, dated 09 September 1992, was received by the petitioner (therein) on 16 September 1992, the Court held that he had until 21 September 1992 within which to file his motion for reconsideration. Applying this rule, the filing of the motion for reconsideration by Natividad on 25 June 1998 of the COMELEC order, dated 09 June 1998, received by him on 22 June 1998, was still within the 5-day reglementary period.

On the second issue, invoking the case of Bince vs. COMELEC,¹¹ where the Court stated that after the proclamation of a candidate and the taking of his oath, an annulment of the proclamation or suspension of its effects, either partially or totally, without notice and hearing violated the right of said proclaimed candidate to due process and rendered the order annulling it null and void, petitioner Velayo would decry the alleged failure of COMELEC to observe due process in the issuance ex parte of its 6th October 1998 resolution. He claimed that he was not furnished with a copy of the three petitions filed by Natividad before the COMELEC but this asseveration was disputed by Natividad who contended that "Velayo was given the opportunity to be heard and [to] submit his written and verified evidence but failed."

My colleagues in the majority have decreed for petitioner.

I respectfully disagree.

Prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.7166, Section 246 then read:

"SEC. 246. Summary proceeding before the Commission. - All pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the Commission after due notice and hearing, and its decisions shall be executory after the lapse of five days from receipt by the losing party of the decision of the Commission, unless restrained by the Supreme Court."

All pre-proclamation controversies involving provincial, city or municipal offices are now governed by the amendatory provisions of Sections 17, 18, 19 20, 21 and 22 of Republic Act No. 7166.¹² The pertinent provisions of Sections 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, as thus amended, specifically on the inclusion and exlusion of election returns, reads in full:

"SEC 245. Procedure in disposition of contested election returns. - (a) Any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns on any of the grounds authorized under Article XX or Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented for inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the canvass.

"(b) Upon receipt of any such objection, the board of canvassers shall automatically defer the canvass of the contested returns and shall proceed to canvass the returns which are not contested by any party.

"(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall also enter his objection in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the Commission. Within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection, the objecting party shall submit the evidence in support of the objection, which shall be attached to the form for written objections. Within the same period of twenty-four (24) hours after presentation of the objection, any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection in the form also to be prescribed by the Commission, attaching thereto supporting evidence, if any. The board shall not entertain an objection or opposition unless reduced to writing in the prescribed forms.

"The evidence attached to the objection or opposition. Submitted by the parties, shall be immediately and formally admitted into the records of the board by the chairman affixing his signature at the back of each and every page thereof.

"(d) Upon receipt of the evidence, the board shall take up the contested returns, consider the written objections thereto and opposition, if any, and summarily and immediately rule thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the prescribed form and authenticate the same by the signatures of its members.

"(e) Any party adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall Immediately inform the board if he intends to appeal said ruling. The board shall enter said information in the minutes of the canvass, set aside the returns and proceed to consider the other returns.

"(f) After all the uncontested returns have been canvassed and the contested returns ruled upon by it, the board shall suspend the canvass. Within forty-eight (48) hours therefrom, any party adversely affected by the ruling may file with the board a written and verified notice of appeal; and within an unextendible period of five (5) days thereafter, an appeal may be taken to the Commission.

"(g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an appropriate report to the Commission, elevating therewith the complete records and evidence submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the parties with copies of the report.

"(h) On the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board, the Commission shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of said records and evidence. Any appeal brought before the Commission on the ruling of the board, without the accomplished forms and the evidence appended thereto, shall be summarily dismissed.

"The decision of the Commission shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipt thereof by the losing party.

"(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. (Sec. 20 of RA 7166)."

The decision of the Board of Canvassers may be appealed to the Commission in the manner prescribed under Section 246; viz:

"SEC. 246. Summary disposition of pre-proclamation controversies. --- All pre-proclamation controversies on election returns or certificates of canvass shall, on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers, be disposed of summarily by the Commission within seven (7) days from receipt thereof. Its decision shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipt by the losing party of the decision of the Commission." (As amended by Sec. 18, R.A. 7166)

Unlike the old rule, which has clearly prescribed "due notice and hearing," the amendatory law deletes that requirement and directs the Commission on Elections to instead summarily dispose of all pre- proclamation controversies on election returns or certificates of canvass explicitly "on the basis of the records and evidence to be elevated to it by the board of canvassers."

The decision in Bince vs. COMELEC,¹³ relied upon by petitioner is rooted in the rulings of Farinas vs. COMELEC,¹⁴ Reyes vs. COMELEC,¹⁵ and Gallardo vs. COMELEC,¹⁶ all decided prior to the passage of Republic Act 7166. Most importantly, as amended by R.A. 7166, pre-proclamation controversies specifically relating to election returns or certificates of canvass are now required to be disposed of summarily by the Commission on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers. This intent is unequivocally, expressed in the explanatory note of the Senate version of R.A. 7166, Senate Bill No. 1861, viz:

"This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992 and provide for the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

"Specifically it seeks to:

xxx xxx xxx

"12. Provide a mechanism for the summary disposition of pre-proclamation controversies. A pre-proclamation controversy is a unique extraordinary remedy in the Philippine election law. It is supposed to be summary in character by the nature of proceedings. Yet, the Commission is continually faced with prolonged and broadened issues that are more properly pursued through an election protest. Two major reasons for delays are the requirement of 'due notice and hearing' and the scope for raising objections on election returns at the Commission level, even when such were not raised before the board of canvassers. The proposed amendments would authorize the Commission to dispose of pre-proclamation controversies on the basis of the records and evidence presented to the board of canvassers and mandates short time periods for their resolution and execution."¹⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

Evidently, the law seeks to do away with an otherwise protracted electoral process and to leave any election controversy between the parties to be later resolved in an appropriate election protest.

The COMELEC is responsible for enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. First and foremost, it must ensure that the true results of the elections are properly reflected. The COMELEC exercises, in this area, direct supervision and control over the proceedings of the board of canvassers and discharges its administrative, not adjudicative, authority to superintend the election process. It may be well to heed the advice of this Court in one case.¹⁸cräläwvirtualibräry

"While normally the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court ... as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citations here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done."

In its above function, the COMELEC can act ex parte and the law can cut down on, such as it has now done, the additional niceties of notice and hearing which almost invariably can result in unwarranted delays. A pre-proclamation controversy involving election returns is confined to an examination of such returns on their face. A full reception of evidence aliunde and the meticulous examination of voluminous election documents would be "clearly anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy which, by its very nature, is to be heard summarily and decided on as promptly as possible."¹⁹ A party feeling aggrieved for some other grounds is not without recourse for he can, in due time, avail himself of an election protest. The underlying reason, this Court said in Sison vs. COMELEC,²⁰ "is the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. That is why such questions which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration are left for examination in the corresponding election protest."

The foregoing disquisition has focused on the statutory aspect of notice and hearing then prescribed by the old Section 246 and later dispensed with per the amendatory R.A. 7166, a matter that is undoubtedly within the legislative authority of Congress.

The Constitutional requirement of due process, it might be explained, is not here involved. Section I, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The Court need not belabor too much the fact that the case at bar involves neither "life" nor "liberty" contemplated by the fundamental law. "Life", in the context of the due process clause is the right to be alive or the right to be secured in one's limb against physical harm.²¹ "Liberty," includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude.²² The term of course, is not dwarfed into mere freedom from physiestraint for, indeed, it can embrace the right of an individual to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed,²³ subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. The United States Supreme Court, while recognizing that the right to hold specific private employment free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the "liberty" concept of the Fifth Amendment,²⁴ holds however, that a person employed in public service does not have the same constitutional prerogative.²⁵ Nor does the right asserted by petitioner fall within the concept of "property ." The statement of the Court in Bince vs. COMELEC²⁶ that the right to public office is akin to property as also being a "protected right" should only be taken within context. The avowal is anchored on the cases of Segovia vs. Noel²⁷ and Borja vs. Agoncillo,²⁸ but not without a caveat --- "the subject of said cases more properly belong to the Law on Public Officers and the Civil Service System whose establishment is authorized by the Constitution itself."²⁹ Truly, no one has a vested right to public office. In a popular representative government, a public office is a trust where no one man has a proprietary or contractual right.³⁰ In his historical and analytical treatise on the origin, development and the state of due process law, Dr. Rodney L. Mott wrote that political privileges, such as the right to hold office, have not been thought of as being subject to the limitations of due process and may apparently be curtailed or extended at will without any limitation on due process of law. He did opine, however, that in an extreme case, which he exemplified by giving the hypothetical instance of a state legislature providing that "Republicans should forever be disfranchised," might exceptionally induce courts to apply the principle.³¹cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner complains of having been deprived of the benefits of his proclamation. There is, however, no proclamation to even speak of. By the clear language of Section 45(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, the "board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party," and that any proclamation made in violation thereof "shall be void ab initio x x x." As so mandated, a notice of appeal having been filed with it, the board of canvassers should have waited for the resolution of COMELEC thereon before any proclamation by it. The proclamation sans such authority is, by the unmistakable declaration of the law, null and void. Unfortunately, the majority holding of this Court would have the effect of ignoring this law.

Petitioner would insinuate that COMELEC annulled his proclamation not necessarily on the basis of the official records of the case. The undisputed facts, heretofore recited, would inevitably show that the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was unauthorized by the Commission in patent violation of Section 20 of Republic Act No.7166. The COMELEC could not have made this pronouncement without the records having been elevated to it. It should not, in any case, be right to assume an irregularity in the performance of official acts; quite the contrary, since the COMELEC, said the Court in one case,³² was conceived by its very "charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the other concomitant powers, it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government."

Indeed, when the COMELEC directed the exclusion of the election returns, based on the doctrine of statistical improbability, it could only mean that it did act on the basis of the records elevated to it, and would preclude the idea of any further need of evidence aliunde, as so heretofore explained, to show the palpability of fraud. Even if it were to be assumed that COMELEC erred in this appreciation or in its assessment, it would have been at most a case of an error of judgment much too far from the grave abuse of discretion that can deny it lawful jurisdiction and permit the extraordinary relief of an action for certiorari to prevail against it.

Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

¹ "In the Matter of the Challenge and Objection to the Composition and Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Gapan, Nueva Ecija and for Annulment of Certain Returns Illegally Canvassed and For Suspension of Canvass of Election Returns Pending Substitution of the Challenged Members thereof."

² "In the Matter of the Appeal from the Adverse Ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Dated 14 May 1998 Seeking the Disqualification of Ms. Linda D. Sandoval and Eduardo Pancho to Sit as Chairman and Vice Chairman thereof; to Suspend the Canvass and to Suspend/Annul Proclamation of the Winning Candidates"

³ "In the Matter of the Appeal From the Written Rulings Dated 13, 14 and 15 May 1998 of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Gapan, Nueva Ecija, on Contested Election Returns No. 4900678 of Precinct No. 9A3/9A4 Dated 13 May 1998; Etc."

⁴ Rollo, p. 267.

⁵ Records, Annex 8.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Rollo, pp. 8-9.

⁸ Petition, Rollo, p. 12.

⁹ Comment of Respondent Natividad, Rollo, p, 150.

¹⁰ 220 SCRA 745.

¹¹ 218 SCRA 782.

¹² SEC. 16, R.A. 7166.

SEC. 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies; How commenced. -- Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in. the board or directly with the Commission. However, matters raised under Section 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, and the certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first instance before the board of canvassers only.

SEC. 18. Amended Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SEC. 19. Contested composition or proceedings of the board; period to appeal; Decision by the Commission.- Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the Commission within three (3) days from a ruling thereon. The Commission shall summarily decide the case within five days from the filing thereof. (Amended SEC. 244 of the Omnibus Election Code).

SEC. 20. Now SEC. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SEC. 21. Partial Proclamation. - Notwithstanding the pendency of any pre-proclamation controversy, the Commission may summarily order the proclamation of other winning candidates whose election will not be affected by the outcome of the controversy.

SEC. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers.- All election contests involving municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six (6) months after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall be final, unappealable and executory.

¹³ The case involves the application of Sec. 242 of the Omnibus Election Code.

¹⁴ G. R. No. 81763, 03 March 1988.

¹⁵ G. R. No. 81856, 03 March 1988.

¹⁶ G. R. No. 85974, 02 May 1989.

¹⁷ Senate S. No. 1861, Introduced by the Committee on Electoral Reforms and People's Participation and Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, Senators Gonzales, Lina, Jr., Guingona, Aquino, Estrada, Saguisag, Taada, Pimentel, Jr., and Mercado.

¹⁸ Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 88 SCRA 251.

¹⁹ Matalam v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 733; see also Dipatuan vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 86.

²⁰ G.R. No. 134096, 03 March 1999; see also Loong v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 1.

²¹ Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1st Edition, (1987), page 41.

²² Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660.

²³ Id. See also Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399.

²⁴ U.S. vs. Robel, 389 US 258, 19 L Ed 2d 508, 88 S Ct 419.

²⁵ Board of Trustees vs. Owens (3d District) 206 Cal App 2d, 23 Cal Rptr 710

²⁶ 218 SCRA 782.

²⁷ 47 Phil. 543

²⁸ 46 Phil. 432

²⁹ See Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424.

³⁰ Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 432, citing Taylor vs. Beckman, 178 U.S. 548, cited in Bernas, Joaquin SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987 Ed., p. 40.

³¹ Due Process of Law, Rodney L. Mott, Ph.D., Published by the Bobbs-Meriel Company, p. 595.

³² Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, supra., p. 271.