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^{CONCURRING OPINION}

KAPUNAN, J.:

I respectfully submit that respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584, dated February 8, 2001, denying the request to conduct a special registration of voters less than one hundred twenty (120) days before the regular elections on May 14, 2001.

The right of suffrage is enshrined in the Constitution as it is the means by which the people exercise their sovereign authority to choose their representatives in the governance of the State. The importance of this right is such that the electoral process must be at all times free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible. To this end, the Constitution has lodged with the COMELEC the duty to ensure and safeguard the expression of the peoples will through the ballots.

R.A. No. 8189 (R.A. No. 8189) ¹ entitled An Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration, Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor was enacted by Congress on June 11, 1996. ² It was adopted precisely to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. ³ The certified list of voters then existing under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) was declared therein to be ineffective and inoperative. ⁴ To replace the cancelled list, R.A. No. 8189 provided for a general registration as well as a system of continuing registration thus:

SEC. 7. General Registration of Voters. - Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives and recalls subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general registration of voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and subject to the discretion of the Commission on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.

SEC. 8. System of Continuing registration of Voters. - The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

I

In support of their petitions, petitioners argue that the COMELEC possess a standby power under Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646 ⁵ (R.A. No. 6646) and Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 ⁶ (R.A. No. 8436) to fix additional periods and dates for registration of voters other than those already provided for under existing laws. The aforementioned provisions identically state that (i)f it shall no longer be reasonably possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts, the COMELEC shall fix additional periods and dates to ensure the accomplishment of the activities so that voters shall not be deprived of their right of suffrage. However, these provisions are inapplicable to the pre-election activity of registration in view of the existence of Republic Act No. 8189, the present law governing the system of registration of voters.

The standby power of the COMELEC to fix additional dates and periods for registration under Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 must be understood in the context of the inadequacy of the registration period under the law then prevailing, i.e. the period provided in Section 126 of B.P. 881. Under this provision, ⁷ registration of voters was held only on the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election. It was in recognition of the insufficiency of the two-day registration period under Section 126 that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 granted the COMELEC a standby power to fix additional dates and times for pre-election activities, including registration. Section 126 of B.P. 881 has, however, been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 8189, which prescribes an entirely new system of registration, and which in fact allows a prolonged period of registration for potential voters. The implied repeal of Section 126 of B.P. 881 by sections 7 and 8 of R.A. No. 8189 cannot be gainsaid inasmuch as these provisions speak of two systems of registration of voters which are obviously inconsistent with each other. B.P. 881 merely provided for a two-day registration period whereas R.A. 8189 now calls for a prolonged and continuous period of registration (daily during regular office hours) except during the prohibited period. To uphold the view that both systems of registration are presently co-existing would give rise to the absurd situation where potential voters who failed to register daily during regular office hours before the 120-day period would nonetheless be allowed to register on the seventh and sixth Saturdays within the 120-day prohibited period. Obviously, when Congress prescribed the new system of registration under R.A. No. 8189, it intended to discard that the system set forth in B.P. 881.

There is clearly no reason for the use of the standby power under Section 29 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436 to conduct a registration considering that Section 8 of R.A. No. 8189 specifically lays down a system of continuing registration, i.e., voter registration conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer, except one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. It would seem that any exercise by the COMELEC of the so-called standby power in the conduct of registration would render the system of continuing registration meaningless and pointless.

Moreover, Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 cannot prevail over R.A. 8189 with respect to the pre-election activity of registration since the latter deals specifically with registration of voters. The rule is that a law which treats a subject in general terms and which does not contradict the provisions of a special statute is not to be considered as intending to affect the provisions of the latter, unless it is absolutely necessary to construe it in order to give its provisions any meaning at all. ⁸ Where a conflict between a general law and a special statute exists, the latter should prevail because it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general law. The special law is to be construed as an exception to the general law in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion. ⁹ Applying the foregoing rule to the cases at bar, since Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 R.A. 8436 do not deal with registration of voters alone, as in fact the aforementioned provisions speak of pre-election activities in general ¹⁰ and R.A. 8189 deals particularly with the pre-election activity of registration, the provisions of the latter regarding registration are controlling.

To my mind, the provision that no registration shall be conducted within 120 days prior to regular elections is clear and unequivocal. The reasons therefor are readily apparent. The 120-day prohibition was designed to allow the COMELEC to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections, including, among others: (1) completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including the determination of the precincts to which they shall be assigned; (3) inspection, verification and sealing of the Book of Voters containing the approved Voter Registration Records; (4) finalizing the Computerized Voters List; and (5) preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of additional list of Voters Information sheet. ¹¹ The said prohibition should be likewise viewed in conjunction with Section 35 of the same law on the prohibition against the filing of petitions for exclusion within one hundred (100) days prior to regular elections. As pointed out by the COMELEC, petitions for exclusion are necessary mechanisms to ensure that the voters lists are free from flying voters, ghost voters, unqualified registrants and the like. If a special registration is conducted within the prohibited period, without providing for an extension of time for the filing of exclusion petitions, then the integrity of the Voters List and the entire election process might be seriously compromised. Indeed, to allow the conduct of registration at this very late hour, less than 50 days from the election, is patently against the letter and spirit of R.A. No. 8189.

Considering the express prohibition under Section 8 of R.A. 8189 against registration of voters within 120 days prior to a regular election and in the absence of power on the part of the COMELEC to conduct a special registration within this prohibited period, there is no legal basis for the Court to compel respondent Commission to conduct such activity. Only a law amending the periods for registration set forth in R.A. No. 8189 and allowing such special registration can empower the COMELEC to conduct said process. This has been tacitly admitted by Congress itself when it called for a special session for the passage of a law allowing a special registration of voters before the May 14, 2001 elections. But since Congress has deemed it unwise to enact a law providing for a special registration, COMELEC simply cannot hold said activity.

To order the COMELEC to conduct a special registration would, moreover, compel it to disregard certain provisions prohibiting specific pre-election acts. Section 34 of R.A. No. 8189 proscribes the filing of a petition for inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters one hundred five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior to a special election:

SEC. 34. Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List. - Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except one hundred five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy five (75) days prior to a special election. xxx.

Section 35 of the same Act prohibits the filing of a petition for exclusion of voters from the permanent list, thus:

SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List. - Any registered voter, representative of any political party of the Election Officer, may file with the court a sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address and the precinct of the challenged voter at anytime except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election or sixty-five (65) days before a special election. xxx

The Commission is also prevented from executing any order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters within ninety (90) days before an election under Section 39, R.A. No. 8189:

SEC. 39. Annulment of Book of Voters. - The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter of election officer of duly registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act or was prepared through fraud; bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar irregularity, or which contains data that are statistically improbable. No order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within (90) days before an election.

Violation of any these provisions is deemed an election offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) to six (6) years without probation, disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.

SEC. 45. Election Offense. The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act.

a) x x x

x x x

j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 46. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of any Election offense under this Act shall be punished an imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported after the present term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).

These penal provisions underscore the prohibitive feature of the foregoing provisions as well as that prescribing the 120-day period against registration.

Indubitably, mandamus would not lie since petitioners have not shown a duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration. On the contrary, the issuance of the writ would force COMELEC to perform an act prohibited and punished by law.

The Solicitor General makes much ado over the issuance by the COMELEC of Resolution No. 3258, dated September 28, 2000, prescribing December 27, 2000 as the last day of filing applications for registration. He points out that the 120-day prohibited period, counted from May 14, 2001, began on January 14, 2001. Hence, prospective applicants had until January 13, 2001 and not December 27, 2000 to apply for registration. Effectively, the solicitor General argues, unregistered but otherwise qualified voters were deprived by respondent COMELEC of eleven (11) working days within which to register. Petitioners and the Solicitor General also fault the COMELEC for failing to engage in sufficiently disseminating information to the public regarding the December 27, 2000 deadline.

It is an overstatement to say, as petitioners and the Solicitor General do, that the reason for the disenfranchisement of four million new Filipino voters a figure not duly established - was the alleged absence of a massive and active information campaign by the COMELEC for new voters to register. R.A. No. 8189 providing for continuing registration has been in existence since June 11, 1996 or for more than four (4) years. Everybody is presumed to know the law. The right of suffrage is so important that every citizen knows or ought to know that it is his right, duty and privilege to register and vote, if qualified. The failure to register lies, perhaps, on neglect, apathy or nonchalance, rather than the COMELECs alleged lack of information campaign.

On the argument that the COMELEC advanced the deadline forregistration, it should be noted that the COMELEC resolution setting the time limit was adopted on December 28, 2000; hence, those who turned 18 between December 27, 2000 and January 13, 2001 should have been forewarned to register on or before the deadline or asked for extension of up to January 13, 2001. There is no showing that anybody had done so. The advancing of the deadline for a few days is not as serious an infraction as petitioners would portray.

II

Granting arguendo that COMELEC has the standby power to order a special registration during the prohibited period, the Court cannot compel to compel the COMELEC to conduct the same given its admission that it is already operationally impossible to undertake said activity at this point in time. In its Comment, the COMELEC outlined its calendar of activities for the election on May 14, 2001, and showed, in the process, why the conduct of a special registration is no longer practicable. The Court should seriously take these objective facts into consideration. After all, it is the COMELEC which is solely tasked by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, an recall ¹² and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. ¹³cräläwvirtualibräry

The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive (enforcement) and administrative (administration) in nature. ¹⁴ It is elementary in administrative law that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge an training of such agencies. ¹⁵ The reason behind this salutary policy has been explained in this manner:

The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs the Court stressed executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, an to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to contemporaneous construction because of the respect due the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they are frequently the drafters of the law they interpret.¹⁶ (Citations omitted)

The determination of the feasibility of conducting a special registration less than fifty (50) days prior to the regular election must be dealt with realistically and not from the standpoint of pure theory. ¹⁷ The COMELEC, not this Court, is concededly in a better position to resolve this matter considering its actual experience as well as its knowledge of its own operational and logistical capabilities. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the greater objective for which it was created - free, orderly and honest elections. ¹⁸ Since it is the COMELECs honest-to-goodness assessment that it cannot undertake the conduct of special registration without compromising the integrity of the entire election process, then the Court would do well to respect this administrative finding of fact.

The marked trend in our laws and jurisprudence has been to grant the COMELEC ample latitude in order that it can more effectively perform its duty in safeguarding the sanctity of our elections. In Cauton vs. COMELEC, ¹⁹ the Court enunciated that the primordial objective of the COMELEC is to promote free, orderly, and honest elections:

The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of the elections and to suppress all evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of he voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of popular government. x x x In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was granted - to promote free, orderly, and honest elections.x x x²⁰cräläwvirtualibräry

This pronouncement was reiterated in Loong vs. COMELEC. ²¹ Due regard for the independent character of the COMELEC, as ordained by the Constitution, requires that the Court must not by any excessive zeal ²² compel that body to perform an act that would imperil the holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election on May 14, 2001. This Courts function is merely to check and not to supplant the COMELEC, or to ascertain merely whether it has gone beyond the limits prescribed by law, not to exercise the power vested in it or to determine the wisdom of its act. ²³ Clearly, certiorari would not lie.

A final word. Petitioners must remember that while the right of suffrage is constitutionally guaranteed, this is no reason for them to be complacent in the performance of their corresponding duties as potential voters and excuse them from complying with the requirements laid down by law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , I vote to DISMISS the instant petitions.

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Endnotes:

¹ An Act providing for a General Registration of Voters, adopting A System of Continuing Registration, prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of funds Therefor.

² The Law took effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

³ Section 2, R.A. No. 8189.

⁴ Section 7, id.

⁵ An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for Other Purposes.

⁶ An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National or Local Electoral Exercises, providing funds Therefor and for other Purposes.

⁷ The provision reads:

Sec. 126. Registration of voters.- On the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election or on the second Saturday following the day of the proclamation calling for a new special election, plebiscite or referendum, any person desiring to be registered as a voter shall accomplish in triplicate before the board of election inspectors a voters affidavit in which shall be stated the following data:

(a) Name, surname, middle name, maternal surname;

(b) Date and place of birth;

(c) Citizenship;

(d) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

(e) Exact address with the name of the street and house number or in case there is none, a brief description of the locality and the place;

(f) a statement that the applicant has not been previously registered, otherwise, he shall be required to attach a sworn application for cancellation of his previous registration; and

(g) Such other information or data which may be required by the Commission.

The voters affidavit shall also contain three specimens of the applicants signature and clear and legible prints of his left and right hand thumbmarks and shall be sworn to and filed together with four copies of the latest identification photograph to be supplied by the applicant.

The oath of the appellant shall include a statement that he has does not have any of the disqualifications of a voter and that he has not been previously registered in the precinct or in any other precinct.

Before the applicant accomplishes his voters affidavit, the board of election inspectors shall appraise the applicant of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter. It shall also see to it that the accomplished voters affidavit contain all the data therein required and that the applicants specimen signatures, the prints of his left and right hand thumbmarks and his photograph are properly affixed in each of the voters affidavit. (Emphasis supplied.)

⁸ See Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 56-57 (1995); Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294 (1988); Garcia v. Pascual, 113 Phil. 632, 635 (1932).

⁹ Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 57 (1995).

¹⁰ These would include: (1) preparation and posting of the Certified List of Voters [Sec. 30, R.A. 8189], and (2) sealing of precinct Book of voters [Sec. 31, R.A. 8189].

¹¹ Comment of Respondent Commission on Elections, pp. 10-11.

¹² Section 2(1), Article IX.

¹³ Section 2(3), Article IX.

¹⁴ Ututalam v. COMELEC, 15 SCRA 465, 469 (1965).

¹⁵ Melendres v. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262, 275 (1999) citing First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA, 253 SCRA 552 (1996).

¹⁶ Nestle Phil., Inc. v. CA, 203 SCRA 504, 510-511 (1991).

¹⁷ In Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (19941), the court made the following pronouncement:

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, its should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so this court may also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the greater objective for which it was created - free, orderly and honest elections. We may not fully agree with its choice of means but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derive from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. (Underscoring ours)

¹⁸ Id.

¹⁹ 19 SCRA 911 (1967).

²⁰ Id., at 921-922.

²¹ 305 SCRA 832 (1999).

²² See Note 17.

²³ See Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).