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CONCURRING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

I join Justice Bellosillo in his well-crafted and logically compelling ponencia. It is a consecrated legal axiom that the reason of the law is the life of the law. Ratio legis est anima, which means the reason of the law is its soul.¹ The reason of a law may cease in a given situation. This may happen when the purpose of the law sought to be achieved is accomplished, or the mischief sought to be repressed is prevented, by an act or event independent of the statute itself. The law, in such a case, though remaining in force and effect, finds no application in the given situation.² This truism hold true in the case at bar.

Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Civil Service Commission which directed petitioner to reinstate private respondent. Petitioner maintains that the dismissal of private respondent was justified as it insists on the strict application of the civil service rules on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL):

Sec. 15. Applications for vacation leave of absence for one full day or more shall be submitted on the prescribed form for action by the proper chief agency in advance, whenever possible, of the effective date of such leave.

Sec. 20. Leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an officer or employee or of any member of his family must be contingent upon the need of the service. Hence, the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of department/agency.

Sec. 21. Any violation of the leave laws, rules or regulations, or any misrepresentation or deception in connection with an application for leave, shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

Sec. 35. Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and shall be dropped from the service after due notice. However, when the exigencies of the service require the immediate presence and he fails/refuses to return to the service, the head of office may drop him for the service even prior to the expiration of the 30-day period abovestated.[3cräläwvirtualibräry

Invoking Sections 20 and 35 quoted above, petitioner argues that any absence without leave, for whatever cause or reason, is a ground for dropping of the officer or employee from the service.

Petitioners contention is untenable. The requirement for leave application contemplated in Sections 20 and 35 cannot apply to extraordinary or abnormal situations such as the one private respondent was confronted with. Private respondents failure to apply for leave was not because of her whim, defiance or impertinence, as petitioner put it, but due to circumstances beyond her control. Her absence from work was clearly involuntary. It is undisputed that she was incarcerated and was not allowed to post bail. The criminal charge against her, kidnapping with serious physical injuries, was grave and carried with it the capital penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Her life and liberty were then at stake. During that time, private respondent could not obviously be expected to think of the formality of filing an application for leave, which would have been absurd if she did in the first place! In the situation she was in, she was not in the position to apply for leave of absence, nor for her superiors to grant it.

These were the circumstances that were taken into account by the CSC when it held that private respondent cannot be considered on AWOL as she was considered on automatic leave of absence. The CSC recognized that the policy on absence without leave is not a hard and fast rule and admits of some exceptions such as the case of private respondent. Accordingly, the CSC found in favor of private respondent as it cited its previous ruling in a case involving substantially similar facts:

In a similar case (Cenon A. Vargas, CSC Resolution Nos. 94-2795; 95-5559), the Commission said:

When Mr. Vargas was in jail, his services were considered automatically suspended. He could not be expected to file his corresponding application for leave of absence, because whether he likes it or not he could not possibly report to work. He is considered on automatic leave of absence for the period of his detention on jail.

Finally, Vargas had been acquitted of the criminal charges leveled against him. Since no separate administrative case was filed against him, there is no basis to separate him from the service.

Based on the abovementioned decision, Galzote is excused from filing her leave of absence because she could not report to work. She is therefore, on automatic leave of absence for the period of her detention there being no evidence to show that Galzote deliberately absented herself from work. Besides, her act of requesting the Municipal Personnel Officer for reinstatement after she was released from jail show the she had no intention to go on AWOL.[4cräläwvirtualibräry

This interpretation of the CSC of the pertinent civil service rules is entitled to great weight and respect.⁵cräläwvirtualibräry

Likewise, I agree with the CA that petitioners act of suspending private respondent is incongruous to its position that private respondent went on AWOL. As the CA rhetorically asked, For how can one who is suspended go on leave?⁶cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioner, tried to downplay this inconsistency by stating that private respondents suspension was lifted on December 8, 1991 as indicated in her employment record. It does not appear from the records, however, that private respondent was even informed of the purported lifting of her suspension. Private respondents ignorance thereof is evident from her letter-request for reinstatement, dated October 19, 1994, which is quoted below in part:

In view thereof, may I respectfully request that the suspension issued on 9 September 1991 be lifted and that the undersigned be allowed to resume position as Clerk III, in the Department of Engineering and Public Works in this municipality.[7cräläwvirtualibräry

However, petitioner now advances the view that the suspension was erroneous and void as there was then no administrative charge against private respondent. In other words, the suspension was without basis. Hence, according to petitioner, private respondent should have filed an application for leave as she was not excused therefrom under the law. To my mind, this ratiocination is quite unfair. How would private respondent, not being well versed in the fine points of the law, to know that her suspension was invalid? Since she was already under suspension, why would she still file an application for leave for the duration thereof? Her letter to Hon. Jejomar Binay is revealing:

On the second ground cited by Atty. NERY,[8 the undersigned, in view of the suspension order, assumed that there is no need on her part to file an application for leave of absence.

It is very illogical on the part of an individual who is suspended from work to file a leave of absence during the duration of the suspension.[9cräläwvirtualibräry

On the other hand, the manner by which she was dropped from the roll violated due process. The fundamental rule of due process requires that a person be accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard.¹⁰ These requisites were not observed in private respondents case. Private respondent was neither notified of the charge against her nor given the opportunity to present her side.

Even the service of termination, dated January 21, 1993, was defective. The same was served at the home address of private respondent, when petitioner fully knew that at that time private respondent was still in prison. The CA aptly applied our ruling in Gonzales vs. Civil Service Commission¹¹ on this point:

It is the ruling of the respondent Civil Service Commission that the sending of the said notice to the residence of the petitioner constitutes substantial compliance with the demands of due process. The ruling would have some allure if the address of petitioner in the United States was not known to the officials of ATI and if his Philippine address was his last known address. But as stressed above, they knew of petitioners exact address in the United States and there appears no impediment for them to send the notice in this correct address. Petitioner, be it noted, was not moving from one residence to another, to avoid service of legal notices. They were aware that petitioner was not momentarily staying in his address in Quezon City where he could receive said notice. Under the circumstances, it is grave abuse of discretion for the respondent Commission to hold that there was substantial compliance with the notice requirement of the due process. The disputed ruling cuts too deeply on petitioners right to continue his employment in the government and unduly dilutes the protection of due process.[12cräläwvirtualibräry

Finally, petitioners allegation that private respondent abandoned her position cannot hold water. The rule on abandonment by a public employee is explained in this manner:

Abandonment of the duties of a position is generally regarded as a form of resignation, having all the consequences of a voluntary resignation. The rule is: A position is held upon the implied condition that the employee will diligently and faithfully perform the duties assigned to him. Where it appears that the employee refuses or neglects to perform the duties of his position for so long a period of time and under such circumstances as to reasonably warrant the presumption that he does not desire or intend to perform the duties of his position he will be held to have abandoned it, not only where his refusal to perform was willful but also where, though not intending to vacate the position, he in good faith but mistakenly supposed he had no right to it. While an abandonment of a position by an employee must be total and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate its absolute relinquishment, whether or not a position has been abandoned is dependent on his acts and conduct rather than his declared intention. The law will infer an abandonment where the acts and conduct of the employee indicate that he has completely relinquished the duties of his position.[13cräläwvirtualibräry

In other words, in order to constitute abandonment, it is necessary to show that the incumbent has manifested a clear intention to abandon the office and its duties, although such intention may be inferred from conduct.¹⁴ Further, an office cannot be abandoned without the intention by the officer to relinquish the same.¹⁵ Private respondents absence from work, albeit prolonged, was certainly not due to any intention to relinquish her duties. Rather, as earlier explained, she was wrongfully implicated and imprisoned for a crime that she did not commit. Upon her acquittal, private respondents act of immediately requesting that she be reinstated to her position negates any claim that she abandoned the same.

Private respondent had been unjustifiably dismissed from the service due to petitioners rigid and unreasonable application of the civil service rules. Faced with a choice between a decision that will serve justice and another that will deny it because of a too-strict interpretation of the law, the Court, as in this case, will resolve in favor of the former, for the ultimate end of the law is justice.¹⁶ Indeed, [a]s judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.¹⁷cräläwvirtualibräry

For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the majority opinion and vote to DENY the petition.

¹ Concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto in Ocampo Vda. De Gomez vs. Government Insurance Board, 78 Phil. 217 (1947) citing Bocobo, Cult of Legalism.

² Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2^nd Ed. (1990).

³ Rule XVI, omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.

⁴ CSC Resolution No. 960153, January 6, 1996, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 58-59.

⁵ Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas, 244 SCRA 595 (1995).

⁶ CA Decision, October 27, 1997, p. 5.; Rollo, p. 66.

⁷ Records, p. 13.

⁸ One of the legal officers in petitioners Office of the Municipal Attorney and Chief of Legal Division.

⁹ See Note 3, p. 15.

¹⁰ Rubenecia v. Civil Service Commission, 244 SCRA 640 (1995).

¹¹ 226 SCRA 66 (1993).

¹² Ibid., p. 71.

¹³ State of Nebraska v. City of Scottsbluff, 100 N.W. 2d 202 (1960) citing Mechem on Public Officers, 435, p. 278.

¹⁴ State v. Green, 175 S.W.2d 575 (1943).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Pangan v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 375 (1988).

¹⁷ Alonzo vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 259 (1987).