A. M. No. RTJ-03-1775 - April 30, 2003
Dr. ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Complainant, vs. JUDGE PHILBERT I. ITURRALDE, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, Branch 72, Respondent.
Not every erroneous act will subject a judge to disciplinary sanctions. Only judicial errors tainted with bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.
In a verified Complaint1 filed before the Office of Court Administrator (OCA), Dr. Isagani C. Cruz charges Judge Philbert I. Iturralde of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City (Branch 72) with gross misconduct, dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, bias and partiality.
On April 18, 2001, Dr. Isagani C. Cruz filed against his Swiss wife, Yolande L. Cruz, a Complaint for Injunction under Article 72 of the Family Code. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-6139, was assigned to Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, the designated Family Court in that area. As Branch 72 had no presiding judge at the time, the hearings were conducted by Executive Judge Mauricio M. Rivera. After several negotiations, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings with Prayer for a Hold-Departure Order on Mrs. Cruz. Judge Rivera granted the Motion for the suspension of the proceedings, but denied the request for the issuance of a hold-departure order.
On September 21, 2001, Mrs. Cruz filed a Motion asking the court to allow her and her two children to take a vacation to Switzerland and to compel complainant to return her travel documents. Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2001, respondent assumed office as the new presiding judge of Branch 72.
At a hearing on November 26, 2001, complainant filed his Opposition to the Motion filed by his wife. He also asked the court to issue a hold-departure order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent her from leaving the country. During the same hearing, respondent expressed his predisposition to grant her Motion. His declaration supposedly constituted partiality, which showed that he had already prejudged the incidents of the case.
Consequently, complainant filed a Motion to inhibit respondent from further hearing the case. The latter denied this Motion in an Order dated February 28, 2002.2
Earlier, on January 9, 2002, complainant's counsel received, simultaneously by mail, respondent's Orders dated November 26, December 7 and December 18, 2001.
The December 18, 2001 Order denied the application of complainant for the issuance of a hold-departure order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction and compelled him to surrender all the travel documents of his wife and children.
He claims that the simultaneous mailing of the three Orders "had a very insidious effect." He argues that he could have moved for the amendment or correction of the two earlier ones, had these been served on him ahead of the December 18, 2001 Order. He insinuates that the last Order was either antedated or properly dated but mailed very late.
According to him, either of these acts renders respondent liable for gross negligence of duty. Furthermore, in ordering him to return the travel documents of his wife and denying his application for a hold-departure order/injunction respondent allegedly committed either gross ignorance or deliberate misapplication of the law.
Complainant also submitted a verified Supplemental Complaint3 dated February 26, 2002, accusing respondent of plagiarism. In his February 28, 2002 Order, the latter purportedly copied several paragraphs from an article written by Atty. Raul J. Palabrica in the January 27, 2002 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. The word-for-word reproduction of portions of the article supposedly constituted an act of dishonesty that should be dealt with administratively.
In an Indorsement4 dated March 4, 2002, the OCA required Judge Iturralde to comment on the foregoing Complaints. In his Comment,5 he stated that, contrary to what had been alleged in the verified Complaint, he could not find any specific act of dishonesty, gross misconduct, or gross ignorance of the law and procedure on his part. If at all, he might have been perceived as biased because of his Orders that were unfavorable to complainant. Allegedly, in denying the Motion to issue hold-departure order/writ of preliminary injunction and ordering complainant to surrender his wife's passport and other travel documents, respondent might have irked the former. In his defense, the latter maintains that he merely upheld Executive Judge Rivera's earlier Order.
On the Motion to Inhibit, respondent avers that he first met the parties and their respective counsels only during the November 26, 2001 hearing, and that none of them had been known to him personally or otherwise prior to that date. Moreover, he believed he could decide the case on the merits without bias, prejudice, fear or favor. Thus, he found no justifiable reason to inhibit himself from hearing it. He claims that he even advised the parties to appeal his Orders by way of a petition for certiorari, if they believe his rulings were erroneous.
As to the allegation of plagiarism, he argues that there is nothing wrong in adopting or citing a newspaper article containing the legal views of Atty. Palabrica, who is a seasoned and respected member of the bar. He adds that, even granting without admitting that his acts amounted to plagiarism, complainant is not the proper party to assert such cause of action.
Respondent maintains that while there is a constitutional guarantee for the litigants' right to air their legitimate grievance through legal action, they should be enjoined to do so only after thorough circumspection and exhaustion of all other available remedies. He claims that the instant administrative case was resorted to, only to intimidate, harass and pressure him to inhibit himself from hearing the civil case.
Report and Recommendation of the OCA
After a thorough study of the verified Complaint and respondent's Comment, the OCA submitted to this Court its evaluation and recommendation as follows:
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the OCA.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Settled is the rule in administrative cases that complainants bear the onus of establishing their averments by substantial evidence.7 After a careful scrutiny of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, we find no sufficient basis to hold respondent administratively liable. The accusations of dishonesty, neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law are bereft of factual bases. Furthermore, they pertain to alleged errors he committed in the exercise of his adjudicative functions. Such errors cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through appropriate judicial remedies.
As complainant admitted in a Letter8 dated October 22, 2002, the questioned rulings of respondent judge are the subject of a certiorari case still pending before the Court of Appeals.9 To say the least, a decision on the propriety of the latter's rulings in this administrative proceeding would be premature. Indeed, where sufficient judicial remedies exist, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper recourse to correct a judge's allegedly erroneous act.
Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies. Thus, any inquiry into their administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies have been settled.10 Parties-litigants abuse court processes by prematurely resorting to administrative disciplinary action, even before the judicial issues involved have been finally resolved.11
As to the allegation of bias and partiality, complainant apparently got that impression when respondent declared during the November 26, 2001 hearing that the latter was inclined to grant the Motion of Mrs. Cruz to allow her and her children to travel to Switzerland. The suspicion of respondent's supposed preferential leanings might have been fortified by the subsequent denial of complainant's Motion for the issuance of a hold-departure order.
It is important to note that Supreme Court Circular No. 39-9712 explicitly provides that hold-departure orders may be issued only in criminal cases:
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