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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

VITUG, J.:

The innate right of a person to an unimpaired reputation and good name is no less a constitutional imperative than that which protects his life, liberty or property. Thus, the law imposes upon him who attacks anothers reputation, by slanderous words or libelous publication, a liability to make compensation for the injury done and the damages sustained.1

Private respondent Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations in the country, and the other named respondents all claim, with understandable indignation, that they have been defamed by an item published by petitioners in Bulgar, a tabloid, circulated in the Metro Manila area. The article reads:

ALAM BA NINYO?

Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?

Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan

Private respondents, for themselves and in behalf of all Muslims, filed the complaint before the trial court against petitioners, alleging that the published article was defamatory and an insult to respondents. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered petitioners to pay damages to private respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioners are now before the Court to assail the findings of the Court of Appeals on the existence of the elements of libel, the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.

The present controversy stems from a civil action for damages and not from a criminal complaint. The Civil Code recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Article 26, paragraph (4), to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal offense, vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition, can give rise to a cause of action for damages, or consonantly with Article 33 which provides that in case of defamation, a civil complaint for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the injured party. Both civil actions are based on tort liability under common law and require the plaintiff to establish that he has suffered personal damage or injury as a direct consequence of the defendants wrongful conduct. In fine, it must be shown that the act complained of is vexatious or defamatory of, and as it pertains to, the claimant, thereby humiliating or besmirching the latters dignity and honor.

Defined in simple terms, vexation is an act of annoyance or irritation that causes distress or agitation.2 Early American cases have refused all remedy for mental injury, such as one caused by vexation, because of the difficulty of proof or of measurement of damages.3 In comparatively recent times, however, the infliction of mental distress as a basis for an independent tort action has been recognized. It is said that one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress.4 Nevertheless, it has also been often held that petty insult or indignity lacks, from its very nature, any convincing assurance that the asserted emotional or mental distress is genuine, or that if genuine it is serious.5 Accordingly, it is generally declared that there can be no recovery for insults,6 indignities or threats7 which are considered to amount to nothing more than mere annoyances or hurt feelings.8 At all events, it would be essential to prove that personal damage is directly suffered by the plaintiff on account of the wrongful act of the defendant.

A kindred concept, albeit of greater degree of perversity, defamation, broadly defined, is an attack on the reputation of another, the unprivileged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately result in injury to another.9 It is that which tends to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which a person is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.10 Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.11 The Revised Penal Code, although not the primary governing law in this instance, provides an instructive definition of libel as being a form of defamation expressed in writing, print, pictures, or signs,12 to wit: A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.13

While arguably, the article subject of the complaint could be characterized as vexatious or defamatory and as imparting an erroneous interpretation of a Muslim practice that tends to ridicule the Islamic faith, it is, however, impersonal on its face, its language not being directed at any particular person but to a large segment of society. In order that defamatory words can be actionable in court, it is essential that they are personal to the party maligned, an ascertained or ascertainable individual.14 It is only then that plaintiffs emotions and/or reputation can be said to have been injured; thus, the plaintiff, to recover, must show that he or she is the person to whom the statements are directed.15 Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action16 without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the bill of rights.17

If an article, for instance, states that judges in the Philippines are corrupt, such a general condemnation cannot reasonably be interpreted to be pointing to each judge or to a certain judge in the Philippines. Thus, no particular magistrate can claim to have been disgraced or to have sustained an impaired reputation because of that article. If, on the other hand, the article proclaims that judges in Metro Manila are corrupt, such statement of derogatory conduct now refers to a relatively narrow group that might yet warrant its looking into in an. appropriate suit. And if the article accuses the Justices of the Supreme Court of corruption, then there is a specific derogatory statement about a definite number of no more than fifteen persons.

Jurisprudence would appear to suggest that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has 25 or fewer members.18 When statements concern groups with larger composition, the individual members of that group would be hardput to show that the statements are of and concerning them.19 Although no precise limits can be set as to the size of a group or class that would be sufficiently small, increasing size, at some point, would be seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury would fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit.20 This principle is said to embrace two important public policies: 1) where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each individual member; and 2) the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases.21

Thus, no recovery was allowed where the remarks complained of had been made about correspondence schools, one school suing;22 or where there was imputation of criminality to a union, one member suing;23 or where an attack was made on Catholic clergymen, one clergyman suing.24

In Newsweek, Inc., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,25 this Court dismissed a class suit for scurrilous remarks filed by four incorporated associations of sugar planters in Negros Occidental in behalf of all sugar planters in that province, against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground, among other things, that the plaintiffs were not sufficiently ascribed to in the article published by the defendant. And so also it was in an older case,26 where the Court ratiocinated that an article directed at a class or group of persons in broad language would not be actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements were sweeping but, even then, it would be highly probable, said the Court, that no action could lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part.

In the present case, the subject article relates to the entire Muslim population and not just to the Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines or to any of the individual respondents. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or any of its members, or to any of the individual complainants. Respondents scarcely can claim having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., itself, much like any other artificial being or juridical entity, having existence only in legal contemplation, would be devoid of any such real feeling or emotion as ordinarily these terms are understood27, and it cannot have that kind of reputation that an individual has that could allow it to sue for damages based on impinged personal reputation.28

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition and to SET ASIDE the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, REINSTATING thereby the order of dismissal rendered by the Regional Trial Court.

1 See Worcester vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil 42.

2 Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. p. 1565.

3 Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., p. 55.

4 Restatement (Second) of Torts 46(1965)

5 Prosser and Keeton, supra., p. 59.

6 Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., Fla. 1958, 100 So. 2d 396; Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., Mun. App. D.C. 1946,49 A2d 81; Stavnezar v. Sage-Allen & Co., 1959, 146 Conn. 460, 152 A. 2d. 312.

7 Taft v. Taft, 1867,40 Vt. 229; Stratton v. Posse Normal School of Gymnastics, 1928 163 N. E. 905; State National Bank of Iowa Park v. Rogers, Tex. Civ. App. 1935, S. W. 2d 825.

8 Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., supra.

9 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander 2.

10 Blacks Law dictionary, 6^th Ed., p. 417.

11 Prosser and Kecton, supra., p. 771.

12 See Article 355, Revised Penal Code.

13 Article 353, Revised Penal Code.

14 Corpus v. Cuaderno, Sr., 16 SCR.A 807; Kunkle v. Cablenews American, et al., 42 Phil 757; Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 1.

15 50 Am Jur 2d (1995), p. 674.

16 Id.

17 Sec. 4, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.

18 Restatement (Second) of Torts 564A comment b (1977).

19 50 Am Jur 2d, (1995), p. 675.

20 Neil J. Rosini, The Practical Guide to Libel, supra, citing Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D. 2d 229.

21 50 Am Jur 2d, (1995), p. 675.

22 189 F. 86, as cited by Ella Cooper Thomas in The Law of Libel and Slander (New York, 1973), p. 21.

23 131 N.Y.S. 680, as cited in The Law of Libel and Slander, supra.

24 81 N.E. 459, as cited in The Law of Libel and Slander. supra.

25 142 SCRA 171

26 Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen, 32 Phil 624.

27 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 572.

28 50 Am Jur 2d (1995), p. 678.